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Thesis:
This thesis is in three parts. The first and second parts analyse the development of the
law and policy on freedom of information in the European Economic Community
and European Union between 1984 and 2004. These two parts focus on how the
Council, the Commission, and the Parliament enacted and implemented the rules on
FOI protection, and on the role of the Community court in this field. The third part
examines the roles of the European Parliament and the European Ombudsman, which
have supplemented the role of the Court in securing this right. As to the objectives of
this project: on the one hand, it seeks to understand the degree of legal protection
offered to freedom of information in the Union over the last two decades; on the
other, it seeks to identify how the current EU FOI regime could be improved. To
accomplish these objectives, attention is drawn to the following interrelated issues.
First of all, we consider the major controversies surrounding FOI law and policy
between 1984 and 2004. In particular, this thesis focuses on the extent to which the
2001 FOI Regulation addresses the pre-existing obstacles to FOI protection.
Secondly, the exceptions in Article 4(1) and Article 4(2) of the 2001 Regulation can
be categorised as mandatory and discretionary respectively, but the distinction
between the two provisions is vague. This indistinct dividing line should be removed
to end the misunderstanding that the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament
are entitled to refuse requests systematically when invoking the so-called mandatory
exceptions. Thirdly, we take into account the principles established by the 2001
Regulation, the EC Treaty, or by the Court to guide the interpretation of the
exceptions laid down in the Regulation. Fourthly, we argued that the EU legislator
should expressly incorporate the principle of proportionality into the 2001
Regulation. Finally, we analyse recent initiatives to adopt a constitution for Europe.
In the light of the "no" votes to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in
the referendums in France and the Netherlands in mid 2005, further steps are now
required to guarantee freedom of information in the future.
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Freedom of Information in the European Union
1 Introduction
1.1 Problematic trends
The European Union (EU) is widely considered to be insufficiently democratic, a
concern neatly highlighted by the phrase "democratic deficit".1 The EU's lack of
democracy can be analysed from various perspectives, but previous research on this
phenomenon has very much focused on the policy and rule making of the EC
institutions.2 The issue of freedom of information does, however, deserve particular
attention as failure to secure this right has a negative impact on the democratic nature
of the Union. This is especially so, given the proposition that citizens should have a
1 T. Hartley, Constitutional Problems ofthe European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999),
18; P. Birkinshaw, Freedom of Information, The Law, the Practice and the Ideal (3rd edn., London,
Butterworths, 2001), 1. Democratic deficit refers broadly to the belief that the Union lacks sufficient
democratic control. L. Dobson and A. Weale, 'Government and Legitimacy,' in E. Bomberg and A.
Stubb (eds.), The European Union: How Does it Work? (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), 157.
2 For instance, many community experts have long been interested in the operation of the European
Parliament and European Commission. Several writers have pointed out that the Community has no
government or opposition which can be held directly accountable for the EU's action. Hartley, n. 1
above, at 19, and Dobson and Weale, ibid. Some commentators consider the Commission the
government of the community, but it is not a party government. No political party is responsible for
the policies proposed by the Commission as no party holds power. Secondly, some political analysts
originally thought that the problem of the democratic deficit would be solved as soon as the European
Parliament was directly elected by the European citizens. Nevertheless, the Parliament gave the
Community little more than a facade of democracy, because the directly-elected Parliament had
initially limited control over the legislative process, though its position has been enhanced by
procedural changes introduced by the Maastricht and Amsterdam revisions to the Treaty of Rome: the
co-decision procedure introduced under Article 251 (ex Article 189b) EC. Thirdly, the excessive
secretiveness in the Council is also a major cause of the democratic deficit. This institution's lack of
openness has a negative impact on the EU citizens' freedom of information, which will be examined
in detail in later chapters.
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right to information held by their governments has at present been recognised within
liberal democracies, such as Sweden, the U.S.A., and the U.K., which have adopted
statutes to realise freedom of information.
At least two factors, other than the respective roles and operation of the EU
institutions, have led to the democratic deficit displayed by the Union in its practices.
First, the origin of the Union as an international organisation has ensured that secrecy
and sensitivity attended its diplomatic relations. The European enterprise began on
18 April 1951 when three large Member States and three small ones met in Paris to
sign the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, which was the
result of the "Schuman Plan".3 French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman,
emboldened by Jean Monnet's suggestion and by the swing in official French
opinion towards an economic accord with Germany, floated the proposal with
secrecy and speed. Before the plan was revealed to the public, Mr. Monnet and Mr.
Schuman clandestinely obtained approval from three key parties: the French, German,
and U.S. governments.4 As regards policy-making within the ECSC, the ECSC
Treaty did not state that the highest decision-making body, namely the High
Authority, was entitled to operate in absolute secrecy. However, the High Authority
consisting of nine members, most of whom were appointed by the Member States,
was allowed to make various arrangements for the operation of its departments,
according to Articles 9(1), 10(1), and 16(1) of the ECSC Treaty.5 Such information
3 The three large Member States are Germany, France, and Italy, and the three small ones are Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. This Treaty entered into force on 25 July 1952.
4 D. Dinan, Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Integration (2nd edn., Basingstoke,
Macmillan, 1999), 21-22, and sources there cited.
5 Article 9(1) of the ECSC Treaty provides that "[t]he High Authority shall consist of nine members
appointed for six years and chosen on the grounds of their general competence", while Article 10(1)
states that "[t]he Governments of the Member States shall appoint eight members of the High
Authority by common accord. These eight members shall appoint the ninth member, who shall be duly
elected if he receives at least five votes". Under Article 16(1) of this Treaty, that "[t]he High Authority
shall make all appropriate administrative arrangements for the operation of its departments"
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as was to be made available to the public was merely a sketchy description of the
activities and the administrative expenditure of the ECSC, under Article 17 of the
ECSC Treaty.6 Whatever Community jurists may say of its present nature, the EU's
origin ensured that maximum secrecy would attend the political relationships
between the Member States.
Second, the lack of a European identity among the population also poses a
dilemma for European democracy. Democracy, which means popular sovereignty
and implies the existence of a people, a demos, depends on a sufficient number of
individuals feeling that they belong to the same political community. Democracy
presupposes that most members of the electorate think of other voters in some sense
as "one of us". The feeling of belonging to the same community is often expressed
by terms such as "one nation". However, originally only the Member States rather
than individuals played a role in the Community, though it is possible to see greater
status afforded to the individual within the EU system through the introduction of
direct elections and the concept of EU citizenship. Despite this, EU citizens, drawn
from a number of separate nations, have only a limited sense of being European.7
Easier access to information from public authorities would help European
citizens become familiar with the operation of the Union and assist them in
participating in decision-making. In other words, the right to information is
undoubtedly an essential part of the democratisation of the EU administration.
The foundation of freedom of information concerns the democratic principle
(emphasis added).
6 Article 17 of the ECSC Treaty states that "[t]he High Authority shall publish annually, not later than
one month before the opening of the session of the Assembly, a general report on the activities and the
administrative expenditure of the Community". The Assembly refers to the Common Assembly, the
precedent of the European Parliament.
7
Hartley, n. 1 above, at 20; I. Harden, 'Citizenship and Information' (2001) 7 European Public Law
184.
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which has both "affirmative" and "critical" aspects. The affirmative aspect of
democracy is that popular sovereignty is the source of authority to create and enforce
obligations on citizens. The critical aspect, on the other hand, questions, limits and
constrains public power.8 Freedom of information is based on the latter but also has
a link to the former. Professor Ian Harden says that "[t]he right [to call public
authorities to account] cannot be exercised effectively without access to information
about what the public authorities are doing and why. Public access enables citizens to
scrutinise the activities of those exercising public authority and to make an
independent evaluation of them".9 Elaborating on the functions of this freedom,
Professor Patrick Birkinshaw notes that "[f]reedom of information does not mean
access to brute information alone such as documents or records in whatever form, as
we shall see. It leads into open government in so far as it necessitates access to
governmental decision-making in a more participatory form. The claims are couched
in terms of a right to know, a democratic right".10 The issues concerning access to
the documents produced for decision-making of the EU authorities fall within the
scope of this study. It does not, however, seek to consider generally all the issues
regarding decision-making processes in the Union.11
The issues relating to FOI protection were almost completely neglected by
Community jurists and the Community administration, prior to the initial defeat of
8
Harden, n. 7 above, at 184-185.
9
Harden, n. 7 above, at 185.
10
Birkinshaw, n. 1 above, at 28.
11 Some academic writers have considered generally the major issues concerning decision-making in
the Union, which closely relate to a broad and ever-expanding concept of "accountability". A. Arnull
and D. Wincott (eds.), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2002); C. Harlow, Accountability in the European Union (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2002); D. Curtin, 'Delegation to EU Non-Majoritarian Agencies and Emerging
Practices of Public Accountability,' in D. Geradin, R. Munoz, and N. Petit (eds.), Regulation through
Agencies: a New Paradigm of European Governance (Cheltenham Glos, Edward Elgar Publishing,
2005), 1-32.
4
the Treaty of Maastricht in June 1992 in Denmark, and its narrow approval in France
three months later.12 During the early days of the history of European integration,
the discordance between the expectation of freedom of information and the
secretiveness of the Union did not lead to a "crisis of legitimacy". The difficulties
encountered in adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, nevertheless, revealed the huge gap
that existed between European citizens and the high-ranking officials which
governed them. In the early 1990s, as Professor Desmond Dinan has said, "[t]he
Council seemed secretive and self-serving, the Commission remote and technocratic,
and the EP expensive and irrelevant".13 The challenge encountered in obtaining the
citizens' approval was attributable to the lack of information which citizens had
about the Treaty and the proposed change to the EC at that time. The citizens of the
Member States apparently felt that they were alienated from a complex system of
governance, which was based on unelected institutions, perceived as remote and
inaccessible owing to lack ofparticipation.
Granting freedom of information to citizens in the Member States has played a
crucial role in improving the EU's imperfect democratic order especially following
the accession of two Nordic countries, Sweden and Finland, in 1995. As Professor
Inger Osterdahl records, upon Sweden's entry into the Union, many Swedish people
feared that their domestic legislation on openness would not survive EU membership,
because Community law at that time allowed for far less openness in certain areas
than Swedish law.14 Throughout this thesis, references are made to relevant FOI
initiatives in other countries, particularly those in the EU, where there is a great
12 Denmark rejected ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by referendum on 2 June 1992. A
referendum in France ratified this Treaty on 20 September 1992 by only 50.4 percent to 49.4 percent.
13
Dinan, n. 4 above, at 152.
14 I. Osterdahl, 'Openness v. Secrecy: Public Access to Documents in Sweden and the European
Union' (1998) 23 European Law Review 336.
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diversity of cultures of openness. The focus of this thesis is, however, on the
development of FOI law in the EU and how this can be improved, and, given the
present word constraints, it has not been possible to do more than touch on these
issues.
1.2 Scope of freedom of information
For many who employ the phrase freedom of information, it means having access to
government documents or information in any other form in order better to understand
the policies of the government. In some jurisdictions, it means not only allowing
access to files in whatever form they exist, but also opening up the meetings of
governments, their advisory bodies and client groups to public scrutiny. Alternatively,
it may involve access by individuals to files containing information about them - and
an assurance that such information is not being used for improper or unauthorised
purposes.15
The term "transparency" has been frequently employed in the language of the
institutions to refer to openness in the working of the Community institutions. "It is
linked to a variety of demands for broader public access to information and EU
documents and more easily readable instruments (simplification of the Treaties,
consolidation and better drafting of legislation)".16 Complaints regarding lack of
transparency, "tend to reflect a general feeling that the European institutions are
remote and secretive and that decision-making procedures are difficult for the
15 Birkinshaw, n. 1 above, at 1.
16 This definition is available at the section entitled "Glossary" of Europa, the EU's portal website,
http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000t.htm#t4
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ordinary European citizen to understand". 17 This definition indicates that
transparency, a central theme in the EU administration, has a wider reach than
freedom of information.18
Freedom of information may, in turn, be seen as wider ranging than another
commonly used phrase, "open government", in so far as the former covers
potentially all information in the public and private domain. The two terms are not
absolutely the same though very closely related. This study concentrates on the latter,
which refers to openness of processes, as well as documentation, in the field of
governmental decision making, and may concern private institutions in so far as they
are used as a surrogate for such decision-making.19
1.3 Structure
This project has three main parts. My objectives in this study will be to:
(1) Set out and explain the key Community regulatory provisions in this
field noting, in particular, the range of information covered and scope
17 Ibid.
18 Professor Deidre Curtin has also said that "[tjransparency refers not only to access to
government-held information by individuals and legislative assemblies (both the European Parliament
and the national parliaments), but also, more widely, to open government as such (the question of
opening up meetings, rule-making proceedings and governmental deliberations to the public)". D.
Curtin, "Civil Society' and the European Union: Opening Spaces for Deliberative Democracy?,' in
Academy of European law (ed.), Collected Courses of the Academy ofEuropean Law vol. VII, Book 1
(The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999), 250. See also C. Harlow, "Freedom of Information and
Transparency as Administrative and Constitutional Rights," in A. Dashwood and A. Ward (eds.),
Cambridge Yearbook ofEuropean Legal Studies vol. II (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000), 285-286. It
bears noting that the scope of transparency has not yet been fully crystallised. However, some
academic writers have made attempts to identify its elements. For instance, Dr. Linda Senden
discusses Articles 253-255 EC and the principle of certainty when she considers the principle of
transparency. L. Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004),
96-104.
19 Birkinshaw, n. 1 above, at 27-28
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of any exceptions to openness.
(2) Assess the effectiveness of the procedures for obtaining information, in
particular, the availability of information concerning what is available,
for example, through a register of documents, and enforcement
mechanisms. In addition, issues concerning the availability of appeal
procedures and the EC institutions' duty to provide reasons for refusals
to grant information will also be analysed.
(3) Examine the role of the Community courts in interpretation and
enforcement of the above mentioned provisions.
(4) Focus on the roles of the European Parliament and the European
Ombudsman in EU FOI protection, which offer alternative mechanisms
for enforcing transparency and openness of the EU institutions,
agencies, and bodies. The Parliament and Ombudsman have long
employed a number of measures, such as inquiries and petition
procedures, in order to safeguard freedom of information in the Union.
Chapters 2 to 5 examine the evolution of freedom of information legislation and
policy in the Union. The Union, which at present commits itself to giving "the fullest
possible effect to the right of public access to documents and to lay down the general
principles on such access",20 does not have a long history of active steps to protect
the right to information.21 The evolution of policies and legislation in this field can
be divided into three stages. The first stage, from 1984 to 1992, dealt with in Chapter
20
Regulation EC 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents [2001] OJ L145/43.
21 Professor Curtin also said in 1999 that "[t]he topic of transparency, in the sense of the openness of
the EU legislative process, was until a couple of years ago a virtual non-subject". Curtin, n. 18 above,
at 250.
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2, was a phase of tentative steps towards openness. The European Parliament adopted
22
an initial resolution on access to Community information in 1984." Four years later,
it adopted another resolution, as neither the Commission nor the Council took
action to make information in the Community more accessible to the public. The
most significant initiative of the Commission on the subject during this period,
namely its proposal for a draft directive on the freedom of access to information on
the environment,24 will be examined. In addition, the 1990 Zwartveld judgment
concerning conflicts between secrecy within the Commission and freedom of
information will also be analysed.25 Policy governing freedom of information in the
Union was born out of a deep crisis of legitimacy which threatened the integration of
Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Our analysis indicates that both the public
and the EC institutions can, therefore, be considered victims of the absence of FOI
legislation at this first stage of the FOI evolution.
Attention then focuses on the policies and legislation made between 1993 and
2000, principally the 1993 Code of Conduct and corresponding Council Decision
2693/731 and Commission Decision 94/90, in response to the legitimacy crisis. This
constitutes the second phase of Community involvement in this field. The Code of
Conduct, the two decisions, and court rulings relating to these three measures, are
22 Resolution on the compulsory publication of information by the European Community [1984] OJ
C172/176.
23 Resolution on the compulsory publication of information by the European Community [1988] OJ
C49/174.
24
Proposal for a Council Directive on the freedom of access to information on the environment [1988]
OJ C355/5. The Council of Ministers adopted the Directive (90/313/EEC [1990] OJ LI 58/56), which
entered into force on 1 January 1993. A decade later, the Parliament and the Council adopted a new
Directive on access to environmental information. Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing
Council Directive 90/313/EEC [2003] OJ L41/26.
25 Case C-2/88 Imm, Zwartveld and others [1990] ECR 1-3365.
26 The Code ofConduct concerning public access to Council and Commission documents (93/730/EC)
[1993] OJ L340/41. Council Decision of 20 December 1993 on public access to Council documents
(93/731/EC) [1993] OJ L340/43, and Commission Decision of 8 February 1994 on public access to
Commission documents (94/90/ECSC, EC, Euratom) [1994] OJ L46/58.
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examined in detail in Chapter 3. First of all, we concentrate on the legal rules or
principles employed by applicants and the Court to interpret narrowly the exceptions
set out in the Code of Conduct and the corresponding Council and Commission
decisions. In particular we can see that:
(1) The CFI stressed the importance of the principle of "widest possible
access" set out in the first section of the Code of Conduct.
(2) Section 4, subsection 2 of the Code of Conduct was held by the Court
to require a balancing test. The CFI elaborated on the balancing test
and repeatedly emphasised its importance.
(3) The CFI stressed that the Commission, in refusing access to the
documents sought, should have provided sufficient reasons as required
by Article 190 (now Article 253 EC).27 Nonetheless, the CFI has not
adopted a consistent approach when interpreting the term "sufficient
reasons" and "adequate reasoning".
(4) The CFI introduced the principle of proportionality into the EU FOI
field.
Secondly, the Council and Commission between 1993 and 2000 tended to refuse
applications systematically, which indicated that the two institutions held to the view
that secrecy ought to be the rule and openness the exception. Thirdly, there seemed to
be a clear distinction between the two categories of exceptions set out in the Code of
Conduct. The first category of exceptions appeared to be mandatory and the other
27 Former Article 190 EC provides that "[r]egulations, directives and decisions adopted jointly by the
European Parliament and the Council, and such acts adopted by the Council or the Commission, shall
state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any proposals or opinions which were
required to be obtained pursuant to this Treaty".
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discretionary. However, the judgments delivered by the Courts between 1995 and
2001 indicate that the distinction between these two provisions is not at all distinct.
Towards the end of the second stage, the Amsterdam Treaty, signed in June
1997, explicitly acknowledged a right of access to documents held by the EU
institutions. It directed that an implementing regulation should be adopted within two
years of the entry into force of the Treaty. The European Parliament and the Council
adopted a new regulation in May 2001, which came into effect the following
December, marking the start of the third stage. Chapter 5 analyses the 2001
Regulation, its implementation, and relevant court decisions. In particular, it
considers whether the Union has now done enough to meet the demands for more
openness or, alternatively, whether it has achieved only partial success. Professor Ian
Harden said in 2001 that "[w]hen the (2001) public access Regulation is
? 30
implemented, it should significantly enhance the openness of the European Union".
Meanwhile, Professor Patrick Birkinshaw observed that the general feeling was that
the European Parliament had done well to see through its major proposals on the
subject, though certain parties were still disappointed by some of the concessions on
"sensitive" documents.31
The steps taken by the EU do seem significant. Nonetheless, this thesis analyses
the 2001 Regulation in more detail to ascertain which of the provisions could, or
indeed are, proving problematic for freedom of information. We consider not only
28 As to the first category of exceptions, section 4, subsection 1 of the Code of Conduct stated that,
the Council and the Commission "will refuse access to any document whose disclosure could
undermine" the protection of certain public interests, as well as privacy, and commercial secrecy, etc.
According to section 4, subsection 2 of the Code of Conduct, the two institutions "may also refuse




j0 Harden, n. 7 above, at 193.
jl Birkinshaw, n. 1 above, at 484.
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the provisions of the 2001 Regulation and the relevant judgments, but also the
influence of established administrative attitudes and norms about the confidentiality
of interstate communications, which could have a significant impact on how the rules
operate in practice and which could even trump demands for freedom of information.
By the end of December 2004, the most important policy documents were:
(1) Council Annual Reports on Access to Documents for 2002 and 2003;32
(2) Reports from the Commission on the Application in 2002 and 2003 of
the 2001 Regulation;33
(3) Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the principles in
the 2001 Regulation.34
In addition, the Court of Justice has continued to make a contribution to the law and
has made a number of important rulings following the entry into force of the 2001
Regulation. These judgments are considered in detail in Chapter 5. Although many of
these concern the earlier Code of Conduct and linked decisions, they are of interest
because they may suggest how the Court will rule on, in some circumstances closely
analogous, provisions in the 2001 Regulation. What do these judgments mainly
indicate?
32 The Council, Council Annual Report on Access to Documents - 2002 (Brussels, the Council, April
2003), http://register.consilium.eu.int/utfregister/frames/introfsEN.htm; The Council, Council
Annual Report on Access to Documents - 2003 (Brussels, the Council, April 2004),
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/RapAnCons.en03.pdf
33
The European Commission, Report from the Commission on the Application in 2002 ofRegulation (EC) No
1019/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding Public Access to European Parliament,
Council and Commission documents, COM(2003) 216 final, (Brussels, European Commission, 29 April 2003),
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&Ig=EN&numdoc=520
03DC0216&modcl~guichctt; The European Commission, Report from the Commission on the Application in
2003 of Regidation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding Public Access to European Parliament, Council and
Commission documents, COM(2004) 347 final, (Brussels, European Commission, 30 April 2004),
http://europa.eu.int/eur-Iex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/coni2004_0347en01.pdf
34
European Commission, Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the principles in EC
Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission
Documents, COM(2004)45 final, (Brussels, European Commission, 30 Jan. 2004),
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/rpt/2004/com2004_0045en01.pdf
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(1) The CFI stressed that the Council and Commission were obliged to
consider the principle of proportionality when they refused access to
documents on the basis of protecting international relations. However,
it remains uncertain whether an institution bears the same duty when
invoking any of the other exceptions as the basis for a refusal.
(2) The issues relating to the authorship rule became extremely
contentious after the 2001 Regulation came into effect. The case law
indicates that this rule ran counter to the principle of widest possible
access set out in the Code of Conduct. In particular, the CFI
regarded the reference to the authorship rule to provide a sufficiently
clear basis for a refusal of access and to be in conformity with the duty
to give reasons in Article 253 EC.
(3) Article 4(5) of the 2001 Regulation or the so-called "non-disclosure
rule", which can be regarded as a "Member State" exception, differs
significantly from the authorship rule set out in the Code of Conduct.36
Under Article 4(5), the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament
are not bound by the requests from the Member States, but the CFI has
not paid sufficient attention to this important feature. The invocation of
this highly controversial provision is expected to trigger ongoing
debate.
(4) As regards the public interest exceptions relating to investigations,
inspections, and court proceedings set out in the Code of Conduct, as
jS The authorship rule provides that "[wjhere the document held by an institution was written by a
natural or legal person, a Member State, another Community institution or body or any other national
or international body, the application must be sent direct to the author".
Article 4(5) states that "[a] Member State may request the institution not to disclose a document
originating from that Member State without its prior agreement".
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well as the two corresponding decisions, the case law indicates that the
purpose behind these exceptions was unclear.
Part I and Part II of this thesis examine both the relevant implementing measures
adopted by the EU institutions and the disputes concerning freedom of information
which have come before the ECJ and CFI to date. A key question which underlies
this analysis is whether the judicial institutions of the Community were able to
develop appropriate guidelines in this area and make significant inroads into secrecy.
Generally, the Court has made a considerable contribution to FOI protection in the
Union. It has not, however, adopted a consistent approach when applying legal rules
or principles, such as the balancing test and the principle of proportionality, to
counter systematic refusals of access to information.
The EU experience of reform gave cause for optimism because it led to the
adoption of new treaty provisions and the Code of Conduct, two corresponding
Council and Commission decisions, as well as the 2001 Regulation, which appeared
to have improved the EU imperfect democratic order. But does the EU truly
recognise freedom of information as a fundamental right? Or does it take advantage
of this right instrumentally for political objectives, in particular, to strengthen public
confidence in the Union? The significant body of case law, which highlights
problems with the operation of the right of access, indicates that the Council and
Commission have been systematically refusing access to information by invoking
certain exceptions. To reduce such refusals, we suggest that the EU legislator include
an explicit reference to the principle of proportionality in the 2001 Regulation. This
proposed provision requires that (A) the proportionality test be applied when any of
the exceptions set out in the Regulation are invoked, and (B) the way this test is
14
applied in any given cases should be expressly indicated in the refusal.
The third part (Chapters 6 and 7) of this study concentrates on the roles of the
European Parliament and Ombudsman in this field. The Ombudsman's functions and
findings deserve specific attention, as the institution has long been active in
influencing other institutions and bodies and has made a considerable contribution in
this field. As Professor Patrick Birkinshaw has said, "[t]he Ombudsman has in fact
attacked secrecy in the EU with missionary zeal. All institutions not covered by the
Code [of Conduct], including the court, eventually accepted that they should adopt
their own practices in relation to access which were based on the Code. Without such
37
a practice, they would run the risk of being found guilty ofmaladministration".
The eighth and final chapter pulls together the conclusions reached in the
previous chapters and makes a number of proposals for reform of the existing law.
First of all, it re-evaluates the remarkable changes in position of the Council and the
Commission towards FOI protection. It also looks at the case law and annual reports
which demonstrate the institutions' overbroad interpretation of the public interest
exceptions relating to inspections, investigations, court proceedings, and of the
authorship rule. Second, this chapter considers how such controversies might be
reduced and focuses, in particular, on how the role played by the principle of
proportionality could be enhanced. In the final section of this chapter, we consider
what we can learn from recent initiatives to adopt a constitution for Europe. In the
light of the "no" votes to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in the
referendums in France and the Netherlands in mid 2005, what further steps are
37 Birkinshaw, n. 1 above, at 368-369, and reference there cited. The Ombudsman also boasted that
his inquiries on public access to EU documents "led almost all the Community institutions and bodies
to adopt and publish rules on access". European Ombudsman, What can the European Ombudsman
Do for You (Strasbourg, European Ombudsman, 2002), 15.
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required to guarantee freedom of information? We argue that collaborative efforts to
secure freedom of information by the Commission, the Council, the Parliament, the





Tentative Steps towards Freedom of Information
Protection - Evolution I (1984~1992)
2.1 Resolutions adopted by the Parliament
Some writers argue that policy governing access to information in the EU institutions
was born out of a crisis of legitimacy that confronted the project of European
integration in the late 1980s and early 1990s.1 Nonetheless, the European Parliament
started to work out its policy on freedom of information as early as the first half of
the 1980s. It became the first Community institution to show an interest in this area
when it adopted a Resolution on 24 May 1984, some eight years before the Treaty on
the European Union was signed in Maastricht. This Resolution is the first measure
1 A. Roberts, 'Multilateral Institutions and the Right to Information: Experience in the European
Union' (2002) 8 European Public Law 258. Professor Emmanuel Paraschos has also said the EU did
not start to focus on its information policies until the Maastricht Treaty began to face serious questions
both before and after its signing in December 1991 and February 1992. E. Paraschos, Media Law and
Regulation in the European Union, National, Transnational and U.S. Perspectives (Armco, Iowa State
University Press, 1998), 116.
2 Resolution on the compulsory publication of information by the European Community [1984] OJ
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in the Community calling for introduction of legislation on freedom of information,
though few have discussed the plan revealed in this Resolution to ameliorate the
Community democratic order.3 The first directly elected Parliament adopted this
Resolution,4 one month before the second elections and three months after it passed
the "Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union", a proposal of decision-making
reform designed to improve efficiency and to close the democratic deficit.5
The Parliament, according to this Resolution, considered that "the European
Community should have its own legislation on openness of government of
Community affairs", and instructed its President to call on the newly elected
Parliament at that time to press for the drafting of legislation on this matter. The
Parliament also considered that activities of the various Community institutions
"should be expanded so as to satisfy the information requirements of European
citizens to an even greater extent". This Resolution indicated that the Parliament,
whose members had been elected by direct universal suffrage since 1979, realised in
the early 1980s that there was an urgent need for more openness.
Although the Parliament pointed out that the Community should have its own
C172/176.
3
Many writers ignore this Resolution in their discussion of Community FOI evolution. A few others
realise that the Parliament showed an interest in the subject for the first time when adopting this
Resolution. Professors Deirdre Curtin and Herman Meijers said in 1995 that the Parliament showed a
pioneering interest in freedom of information more than a decade ago and adopted the Resolution in
1984, calling for the introduction of the legislation. D. Curtin and H. Meijers, 'Access to European
Union Information: an Element of Citizenship and a Neglected Constitutional Right' in N. Neuwahl
and A. Rosas (eds.), The European Union and Human Rights (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 81.
In addition, Professor Michael O'Neill also says that the Parliament, on its cmsade to redress the
democratic deficit, had sought to place the general issue of access to information on the Community
agenda, with the adoption of its Resolution on the compulsory publishing of information in 1984. M.
O'Neill, 'The Right of Access to Community - Held Documentation as a General Principle of EC
Law' (1998) 4 European Public Law 407-408. Unfortunately, these two articles do not touch on the
proposal set out in this first measure in the Community FOI field.
4 The first directly elected Parliament, which lacked influence, wished to revive the process of
European integration. Between April 1980 and February 1982, the Parliament passed no less than
eight Resolutions advocating institutional and policy reform in the Community. D. Dinan, Ever Closer
Union, An Intivduction to European Integration (2nd edn., Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1999), 98.
5 Ibid.
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FOI legislation, neither the Council nor the Commission took action in response. In
another attempt to create a more open Community, the Parliament adopted a further
Resolution on access to Community information on 22 January 1988,6 seven months
after a United Kingdom (and Irish) citizen raised the issue of the compatibility of the
SEA provisions on political cooperation with the policy of neutrality long pursued by
Ireland. The difficulty in ratification of the Single European Act signed in 1986
gave intimation of the potential troubles ifpublic opinion was ignored.
The Parliament, according to the 1988 Resolution, regretted that the Council
and the Commission had failed to act in response to the 1984 Resolution. The
Parliament said that "the right to information is one of the fundamental freedoms of
the people of Europe and that it should be recognised as such by the European
Community". This was the first time that a Community institution expressly stated
that this right should be regarded as a fundamental right, though this right was at
most an aspiration in the Community at that time.
The Parliament urged the Commission to draw up a proposal for Community
legislation on access to information on Community administrative measures. It also
worked out a framework for the future legislation. According to the Resolution:
The European Parliament hopes that this legislation will contain a precise
definition of the nature and scope of the right to information, the exemptions on
the grounds of confidentiality, the description of documents intended for
internal use, the procedure for publication of the documents and administrative
measures covered by this legislation, the settlement of any disputes and the
6 Resolution on the compulsory publication of information by the European Community [1988] OJ
C49/174.
7 The Supreme Court of Ireland ruled (Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] IR 713) that, in accordance with
the Constitution, Irish ratification could proceed only following a positive result in a national
referendum. In May 1987 a healthy majority (69.9 percent against 30.1 percent) supported the
necessary amendment.
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penalties for failure to comply with the legislation.
The Parliament drew up a framework for the legislation and realised what could be
the most controversial issues in the future. To make the decision-making procedure
of the Council accessible to the public, the Parliament, according to the Resolution,
"requests that the minutes of Council meetings which concern the discussion of and
decision-making on a regulation or directive should be published, including the
statements which alter the purpose of the directive or give another interpretation to
the published document".
The Parliament also "wishes to see open access to information concerning the
activities of the management and the advisory committees, with a view to obtaining
precise information on the scope of the decisions taken". The Parliament believed
that the operation of not only the Council but also the advisory committees should be
available to the public, or citizens in the Community would only be able to access
incomplete information about the decision-making. The advisory committees are
known as "comitology committees". Most decisions at EC level are purely
administrative and concern the implementation of various policies. The Commission
has primary responsibility for such decisions, but a complicated committee procedure
exists under the name of comitology, which allows national officials to monitor the
execution of the policies.8 The Commission has expressed little enthusiasm for
improving transparency by allowing access to records of comitology committees.
Commentators have jokingly said what is clear is that "the only person who truly
understands [comitology] is the doorman at 35 Avenue Brochart in Brussels (the
venue for most meetings) who can survey the hundreds of national and EU
8
A. Stubb, H. Wallace, and J. Peterson, 'The Policy-Making Process' in E. Bomberg and A. Stubb
(eds.), The European Union: How Does it Work? (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), 142.
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bureaucrats and experts walking in and out of comitology meetings on a daily
basis".9
The adoption of the two Resolutions indicated that the Parliament had laboured
during the 1980s to supply the citizens in the Community with more freedom of
information, but the content of the Resolutions was merely aspirational owing to
their unclear legal effects. Article 249 EC (former Article 189 EC) lists five
categories of acts that may be adopted by the Parliament and the Council acting
jointly, by the Council, or by the Commission, three of which - regulations,
directives and decisions - are usually binding.10 Resolutions such as the two adopted
by the Parliament are, however, a different kind of measure and are not specially
mentioned in Article 249 EC, though they perform a similar function to non-binding
recommendations and opinions. They can be adopted by the Parliament, the
Commission, or by the Council, but they are not readily capable of inclusion in the
forms set out in Article 249 EC. Such measures, which are listed as one form of
action for forming and shaping the legal order in the Community, are within the
category of .S7// gpnpris acts 11 Resolutions only set out the views and intentions of an
9 Ibid.
10 Article 249 EC lists five lands of acts and contains a description of the characteristics they have. It
states that:
In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, the
European Parliament acting jointly with the Council, the Council and the Commission shall
make regulations and issue directives, take decisions, make recommendations or deliver
opinions.
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly
applicable in all Member States.
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which
it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.
11 Resolutions fall within the category of sui generis acts, but they only have vague characteristics. J.
Shaw, Law of the European Union (3rd edn., Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2000), 247. In Case 22/70,
Commission v. Council [1971] ECR 263, the Court stated that "[u]nder Article 173, the Court has a
duty to review the legality of acts of the Council ... other than recommendations or opinions".
Professor Trevor Hartley says that Article 249 EC appears to form a neat and tidy system in which
formal designations correspond to differences in function. The differences suggest a hierarchy.
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institution regarding the overall process of integration and specific tasks within and
outside the Community.12 Thus, the two Resolutions adopted in 1984 and 1988 by
the Parliament, whose legal effects were not as intense as regulations, directives, or
decisions, were tentative steps towards FOI protection, in contrast to the more
concrete measures taken by the EC institutions following the Maastricht Treaty.
The Parliament in the two Resolutions called on the Commission to draw up a
proposal for Community legislation on access to information on Community
administrative measures, but the Commission only worked out a plan concerning
access to environmental information rather than regarding all administrative acts.
2.2 The Commission initiative
The Commission in October 1988 submitted to the Council a proposal for a Council
1 o
Directive on the freedom of information on the environment. Article 1 of the
proposal stated that "[fjreedom of access to information on the environment held by
the public authorities and its dissemination shall be ensured throughout the
Community in accordance with the provisions of this Directive". Such information,
however, could never be "ensured throughout the Community" because the term
Nevertheless, one of the major complications is that resolutions do not fall into any of the categories
enumerated in Article 249 EC. T. Hartley, The Foundations ofEuropean Community Law (5th edn.,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), 104. Dr Klaus-Dieter Borchardt has said that "the primary
significance of resolutions is that they help to give the Council's future work a political direction. ...
Any assessment of [resolutions'] legal significance must also take account of these functions, i.e. they
should remain a flexible tool and not be tied down by too many legal requirements and obligations".
K.-D. Borchardt, TheABC ofCommunity Law (5th edn., Brussels, European Commission, 2000), 71.
12 Borchardt, n. 11 above, at 71.
13
Proposal for a Council Directive on the freedom of access to information on the environment [1988]
OJ C355/5.
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"public authorities", according to paragraph 1 of Article 2(c), "means State
administrations and any public body or State-supervised body with powers at
national, regional or local level". These rules were not intended to apply to the
Community institutions. In addition, "[b]odies exercising judicial powers or
legislative bodies", according to paragraph 2 of Article 2(c), were not required to
make the information in their possession available to the public.
This plan revealed that the Commission was generous in making Member State
information available to the public but declined to show the same generosity of spirit
when addressing its own or any other institution's information. The Commission
later decided to consult the European Economic and Social Committee, the
non-political organisation which had long been the only consultative body in the
Community that provided not only the Commission but also the Parliament and the
Council with views of the people in Member States.14 This Committee adopted an
opinion on the proposal, disagreeing with the Commission's reluctance to work out
draft legislation on environmental information it held.15 The Committee said that:
The draft Directive's scope is confined to Member States' public authorities,
corporations, etc. If the need for a Directive of this kind is recognised, there is
an equally strong need for Community bodies and authorities to provide access
to information. The Committee sees no reason for putting off this legislation
until a later date.16
14 This Committee boasts that it gives the EC institutions the views of the people "on the ground" -
those most directly affected by EC legislation. This non-political organisation consists of
representatives of employers' organisations, trade unions, farmers, consumer groups, and professional
associations in Europe. Answers to frequently asked questions concerning this Committee:
http://www.esc.eu.int/pages/en/faq/faq.htm. For more information about this Committee, see The
European Economic and Social Committee, The EESC in Ten Points (Brussels, European Economic
and Social Committee, 2005). This booklet is also available on the web site of this Committee,
http://www.esc.eu.int/publications/pdf/leaflets/EESC-2002-016-EN.pdf
15
Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive on the freedom of access to information on the
environment [1989] OJ C139/47.
16 Ibid.
23
The Committee stressed that "the obligation to disclose information should also
cover the European Community authorities" when commenting on Article 2(c)
paragraph 2 of the proposal, which defined the term "public authorities" as "[sjtate
administrations and any public body or State-supervised body with powers at
national, regional or local level". The Committee also criticised the attempt shown
in Article 2(c) paragraph 2 to exclude legislative bodies from such obligation. It said
that "[i]t also does not seem logical to the Committee to exclude legislative bodies
from this obligation. The private citizen and other interested parties could have a
legitimate interest in the opinions, etc., of these bodies".
The Council in June 1990 adopted the Directive without extending the scope of
IT.
the draft to the Community authorities. This legislation came into force on 1
January 1993. According to Article 1 of this Directive, "[t]he object of this Directive
is to ensure freedom of access to, and dissemination of, information on the
environment held by public authorities and to set out the basic terms and conditions
on which such information should be made available". The Council avoided claiming
that dissemination of the environmental information held by the public authorities
would be ensured throughout the Community. Article 2(b) states that '"public
authorities' shall mean any public administration at national, regional or local level
with responsibilities, and possessing information, relating to the environment with
the exception of bodies acting in a judicial or legislative capacity". This provision
indicated that this Directive was still intended to apply to the Member States rather
than the Communities authorities.
In January 2003, the Parliament and the Council adopted a new Directive on
17 Council Directive of 7 June 1990 on the freedom of access to information on the environment
(90/313/EEC) [1990] OJ L158/56. This Directive is no longer in force.
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access to environmental information. This Directive sets out measures in addition
to those in the 1990 Directive in order to expand the access to environmental
information in the EU. Nevertheless, the scope of the 2003 Directive is still confined
to the public authorities at national, regional or local level rather than those at
Community level.19
2.3 The Zwartveld case20
The Directive on environmental information noted above revealed that the
Commission was generous in making Member State information available to the
public but declined to extend similar rules to its information. What was the attitude
of the Commission? Was it opposed to openness or just cautious in moving forward
at this time as it was preparing to offer more freedom of information to people in the
Community? The Zwartveld judgment is very important because it was the first time
that the Commission revealed its attitude as to whether its documents should be
accessible to the public.
2.3.1 Facts
The Recliter-commissaris (investigating magistrate) at the Arrondissementsrechtbank
18 Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public
access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC [2003] OJ L41/26.
19 Articles 1(a) and 2(2) of this Directive, n. 18 above.
20 Case C-2/88 Imm, Zwartveld and others [1990] ECR 1-3365.
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(District Court) Groningen, the Netherlands, submitted to the European Court of
Justice a "request for judicial cooperation", saying the members of the management
of a Dutch fish market were under investigation for having allegedly committed a
crime of fraud when introducing a black market, in addition to the official market.
This was in breach of the Dutch law adopted to implement the Community rules on
21
fishing quotas. The Rechter-commissaris told the ECJ that European Economic
Community (EEC) inspectors conducted inspections in the Netherlands between
22 • •1983 and 1986. He requested the Commission to offer the inspection reports, and
if necessary, to allow him to take evidence from the inspectors.23 This request was
refused as "the documents formed part of a file on legal matters pending in the
Commission".24 He referred to Articles 1 and 12 of the Protocol on the Privileges
25and Immunities of the European Communities, requesting the ECJ to order the
Commission to offer the documents that he had failed to obtain. He also asked the
ECJ to order or at least allow the inspectors and senior officials in the
Directorate-General for Fisheries to be examined as witnesses by him or in his
presence by a Community examining magistrate.26
The Commission contended before the ECJ that the Rechter-commissaris's
77 ...
request was inadmissible. The Commission said that "[t]he right of national courts
to refer a case to the Court was regulated exhaustively in Article 177 of the EEC
21
para. 1 (i) and para. 1 (ii), n. 20 above.
22
para, l(iii), n. 20 above.
23
para. l(iv), n. 20 above.
24
para. l(v), n. 20 above.
25 This protocol was annexed to the Treaty establishing a Single Council and Single Commission of
the European Communities of 8 April 1965. Article 1 of the Protocol provides that "[t]he premises and
buildings of the Communities shall be inviolable. They shall be exempt from search, requisition,
confiscation or expropriation. The property and assets of the Communities shall not be the subject of
any administrative or legal measure of constraint without the authorisation of the Court of Justice".
Article 12 of the Protocol details types of the privileges and immunities granted to officials of the
European Communities.
26
para. 2, n. 20 above.
27
para. 3, n. 20 above.
26
Treaty".28 Under former Article 177(a) EEC (now Article 234 EC), the Court has
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of this Treaty.
The Commission said the request at issue "did not concern the interpretation of a
7Q
provision of the EEC Treaty or secondary legislation". It also stated the legal basis
on which it opposed disclosure, saying there was no obligation to do so under
Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol.30 It added that "[AJrticle 12 did not concern the
hearing of officials and other servants of the Community as witnesses or the lifting in
that connection of the immunities enjoyed by those persons". The Commission
eventually revealed its views on the report sought in the following statement:
[T]he report drawn up by [the] inspectors were documents which of their nature
could not be used except for internal information. They were purely internal
documents and could not commit the Commission or reflect its position. Their
production might in addition jeopardise the Commission's relations with the
32Member States in the delicate area of supervision.
The Commission said it was not prepared to divulge the identity of the inspectors or
to authorise them to give evidence. "Any obligation on inspectors to be examined as
witnesses would appreciably affect their work and therefore the effectiveness of
28 Former Article 177 EEC provides that:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where those
statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or
tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give
judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State,
against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall
bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
29
para. 4, n. 20 above.
J" Article 2 of the Protocol states that "[t]he archives of the Communities shall be inviolable".
31
para. 5, n. 20 above.
32





The ECJ stated that relations between the Member States and the Community
institutions were governed, according to former Article 5 EEC (now Article 10 EC),34
by a principle of sincere cooperation. It said the Protocol, designed to avoid
interference with the functioning of the Communities, did not permit the institutions
to neglect the duty of sincere cooperation with the national authorities, adding that
such duty is referred to in Article 19 of the Protocol itself.35 The ECJ stated that "[i]t
is incumbent upon every Community institution to give its active assistance to such
national legal proceedings, by producing documents to the national court and
authorising its officials to give evidence in the national proceedings".37
Addressing the Commission's challenge to its jurisdiction, the Court stated that
"[t]he Court, which is responsible under Article 164 of the EEC Treaty for
ensuring that in the interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is observed,
must have the power to review ... whether the duty of sincere cooperation,
j3
para. 10, n. 20 above.
Former Article 5 EEC provides that:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure
fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the
institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks.
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of
this Treaty.
35
para. 17, n. 20 above.
36
paras. 19 and 21, n. 20 above. Article 19 of the Protocol states that "[tjhe institutions of the
Communities shall, for the purpose of applying this Protocol, cooperate with the responsible
authorities of the Member States concerned".
37
para. 22, n. 20 above.
38 Former Article 164 EEC provides that "[tjhe Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation
and application of this Treaty the law is observed".
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incumbent on the Commission in this case, has been complied with".39 Consequently,
the Court held that the Commission had to produce to the Rechter-commissaris the
requested documents and to authorise its officials to be witnesses before the district
court, unless the Commission could present imperative reasons concerning the need
to safeguard the functioning of the communities and could justify its refusal.40
2.3.3 Comment
The disputes in the present case appeared to relate to the scope of sincere cooperation
and privileges of the Community institutions, but the nature of the controversy
concerned conflicts between secrecy and freedom of information, rather than the
definition of cooperation and privileges. Where the Commission agreed to assist the
Rechter-commissaris in the investigation by offering the documents to him, it was
unnecessary for him to take evidence from the inspectors concerned. The disputes
were, in fact, triggered by the Commission refusal. There was a strong need for more
freedom of information because the Member States and the institutions would not be
able to cooperate sincerely with each other without sharing information. It was,
therefore, the FOI legislation rather than definition of the terms "sincere
cooperation" and "privileges" that could help end this controversy.
The Commission adopted three major strategies to avoid disclosing the
information sought or allow the EEC inspectors to be witnesses. First, it took
advantage of the privileges granted by the Protocol, which was intended to avoid
para. 23, n. 20 above.
40
paras. 25 and 26, n. 20 above.
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interference with the functioning and independence of the Communities. As there
were no definitions of the terms "archives" and "inviolable" in Article 2 or the other
provisions of the Protocol, the Commission defined them in the broadest sense.
Offering of investigation reports to the Rechter-commissaris was regarded by the
Commission to be a violation of archives, even though the information related to
potential infringements of Community law. Describing the reports sought as "purely
internal documents", the Commission said production of them "might in addition
jeopardise the Commission's relations with the Member States in the delicate area of
supervision". However, the Rechter-commissaris was seeking to ensure that
Community law was respected and it is thus arguable that he should be allowed to
make use of the reports, even though these relations could be slightly damaged.
The second strategy adopted by the Commission was to read the term "work" in
a narrow fashion, arguing that the work of the EEC inspectors would be appreciably
affected if they served as witnesses. However, cooperation with judicial authorities of
a Member State to guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law
was also part of the officials' work. This cooperation should not to be regarded as
having a negative impact on the effectiveness of Community supervision. Third, the
Commission made a literal interpretation of Article 2 of the Protocol when stressing
that this provision did not empower the ECJ to lift the inviolability of the law. It
made a further attempt to exclude the Court from addressing this dispute in its
interpretation of Article 177 EEC, before it stated that both Articles 1 and 2 of the
Protocol did not relate to this case, suggesting that the Rechter-commissaris had
misinterpreted these two provisions.
It was almost impossible for the ECJ to admit that it had no jurisdiction in this
case, because if it did so, the institution would be able to avoid cooperation with the
30
Member States by extending the scope of "purely internal information". The ECJ
stressed it "must have the power" to review this case under Article 164 EEC.
Elowever, it did not respond to the basis of the challenge by the Commission, which
stated that the district court was not entitled to refer this case to the ECJ under Article
177 EEC.
The ECJ provided the Rechter-commissaris with the right to the requested
information by interpreting the term "sincere cooperation" very broadly, but this
measure helped solve only part of the real problem. The citizens in the Community
would presumably be supportive of the ECJ's efforts to extend the scope of the right
to information.41 It is, however, contentious whether the Court should have made
such a broad interpretation of sincere cooperation, an uncertain legal concept in EC
law. We also doubt whether the ECJ would apply the principle again if a court in a
Member State were to request access to documents held by the Parliament or Court.
This dispute indicated that the Community was in need of FOI legislation. In the
present case, the Commission tried stopping the Rechter-commissaris from obtaining
the information by extending the scope of its legal privileges. This case also
indicated that the jurisdiction of the ECJ concerning the right to information should
be explicitly defined in legislation, or its jurisdiction could be challenged by a party
trying to avoid judicial scrutiny. In addition, the citizens in the Community were in
need of not only the documents possessed by the Commission but also those held by
the other institutions.
The first stage of the development of EU policy in the field of freedom of
41 This innovative judgment was widely hailed at the time as the first step towards creating greater
openness in the administration of the Community in general. Curtin and Meijers, n. 3 above, at 82 and
83. It should, however, be noted that although the Court extended the scope of FOI protection to the
Member States, it did not extend it to citizens in the Community in this judgment.
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information highlights the attitude of the decision-makers in the 1980s and lays the
ground-work for analysis of the second stage of the evolution. It can be concluded
that the Parliament made an effort to create a framework for FOI legislation from the
beginning of this stage, but the Council and Commission took little action in
response and even tried to obstruct Member States from accessing its documentation.
2.4 Ratification crisis
The Netherlands was the first Member State to show serious interest in freedom of
information in the Community. It was the only nation to indicate awareness in
January 1991 at the Maastricht Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that there could
be a future transparency problem. The Dutch delegation proposed to amend Article
213 EEC (now Article 284 EC).42 The idea was to establish explicit competence for
the Council to adopt a regulation on access to information held by the Community
institutions and organs.43 These efforts indicate that the Dutch delegation was of the
opinion that the issue of freedom of information was not so much a matter of the
internal working procedures of the institutions, but rather that of the public's right to
information.44 There was, however, only a consolation prize for the Netherlands:
42 Former Article 213 EEC states that "[t]he Commission may, within the limits and under the
conditions laid down by the Council in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, collect any
information and carry out any checks required for the performance of the tasks entrusted to it".
4j
According to the plan by the Dutch delegation, some of the institutions and organs, including the
Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, the European Investment Bank and the European Central Bank,
were excluded for imperative reasons tied to their independence from political interference. D. Curtin
and H. Meijers, n. 3 above, at 83, and references there cited.
44 Ibid.
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Declaration 17 to the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union). The Maastricht
IGC stated in a non-legally binding Declaration that:
The Conference considers that transparency of the decision-making process
strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions and the public's
confidence in the administration. The Conference accordingly recommends
that the Commission submit to the Council no later than 1993 a report on
measures designed to improve public access to the information available to the
institutions.
Those attending the IGC, with the exception of the Dutch delegates, did not grasp the
chance to enhance public accountability directly themselves by amending the Treaty
ofRome. They recommended the Commission, an institution which, as we have seen,
had not contributed much to FOI protection, to design the measures to increase
access to the information held by itself and the other the Community institutions.
On 2 June 1992, of the 82.9 percent Danish voters who voted, 49.3 voted to
approve the Maastricht Treaty but 50.7 percent were against it in a referendum.45
The Commission, the Danish government, and other Member States that spent a year
negotiating the Maastricht Treaty, never considered that a majority of Danes, or of
any other nationality, would vote against this Treaty.46 They were extraordinarily
complacent owing to Denmark's positive results of the 1972 accession referendum47
and the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) referendum. The "yes" votes suggested
45 Like the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty had to be ratified by each Member State before it could come
into force. Ratification procedures differed from country to country in the Community. In Denmark, it
was up to the electorate to decide in a referendum. Dinan, n. 4 above, at 149.
46
Dinan, n. 4 above, at 149.
47 The referendum in Denmark resulted in an impressive endorsement of membership in early
October, 1972, one week after a narrow majority voted against accession in a non-binding vote. 63
percent voted in favour of accession. It was necessary for Denmark to enter the enlarged Community
at that time, with the bulk of the country's exports going to the United Kingdom and Germany.
48 A majority of Danes in 1986 endorsed the SEA following the Danish parliament's rejection of it.
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that a majority of Danes would presumably support major treaty reform again. The
Danish electorate's narrow rejection of the Treaty thwarted implementation of it and
jeopardised the future of European integration. The impact of this vote was all the
more striking as ratification was proceeding smoothly in every other Member State.
The Irish referendum followed on 18 June 1992, two weeks after the Danish
"no" vote. Of the 57 percent who voted, 69 percent favoured the ratification and 31
percent against. The French electorate went to the polls on 20 September 1992,
which assumed much more significance for the Treaty as France had historically
been a pivotal member of the Community. A positive result would help dispel the
gloom caused by the Danish "no" vote, but a negative one would shake the
Community to its core. The result revealed that, in a 70 percent turnout, only a
narrow majority of 51.05 percent voted in favour of the ratification and 48.95 percent
voted against it.
After the negative result in Denmark, exhaustive analyses indicated a host of
reasons for the no votes, including, inter alia, concerns about European Monetary
Union, about losing national identity, and about the role of small states in the
Community.49 In addition, Professor Desmond Dinan says that "[a]t issue in
Denmark and elsewhere was the so-called democratic deficit: the EU's perceived
remoteness and lack of accountability".50 A writer also said the Maastricht Treaty's
49
Dinan, n. 4 above, at 149. The Danish government embodied the Danes' concerns in a White Paper
published in October 1992. The Danish government said in this document that it wanted the other
Member States to accept clauses that would, inter alia, permit Denmark to opt out of currency union,
any future common defence policy, any institutionalisation of European citizenship. D. Urwin,
Community ofEurope: A Histoiy of European Integration Since 1945 (2nd edn., London, Longman,
1995), 258. These conditions were accepted in full by participants in the European Council in
Edinburgh in December 1992. See 'Decision of the Heads of State and Government, Meeting within
the European Council, concerning Certain Problems Raised by Denmark on the Treaty on European
Union,' European Council, Edinburgh Summit, 11-12 December 1992, available at
http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/edinburgh/bl_en.pdf
50 Professor Dinan says the issue concerning the democratic deficit remains a major challenge for the
Union into the twenty-first century. D. Dinan, 'How Did We Get Here?' in Bomberg and Stubb (eds.),
34
defeat in Denmark and the narrow approval in France had pointed out the large gap
that existed between European citizens and those who governed them, especially the
Eurocrats in Brussels.51 In addition, Mr. Peter Dyrberg says that the Danish and
French referenda, as well as opinion polls in other countries that demonstrated scant
popular support for the Union, "made it urgent to act upon this Declaration, and
transparency found its way onto the agenda of European Council meetings".52 To be
brief, a lack of transparency in the Community was one of the major reasons for the
"no" votes in Denmark. The ratification crisis also revealed that Declaration 17, a
compromise solution and the "sop" to the Dutch demands for a more open
administration, was insufficient to satisfy the information requirements of European
citizens, if no action was taken accordingly in response of demands for more FOI
protection.
2.5 Response of the Heads of State or Government at the
European Council summits in Birmingham and Edinburgh
Leaders of the Community and high-ranking officials of the Member States grasped
the seriousness of the Danish referendum result. Among these leaders was Mr.
Jacques Delors, European Commission President from 1985 to 1995, who resolved to
emphasise subsidiarity to ensure the Union's compatibility with the political
n. 8 above, at 35.
51
Paraschos, n. 1 above, at 115.
52 P. Dyrberg, 'Accountability and Legitimacy: What is the Contribution of Transparency?' in A.
Arnull and D. Wincott (cds.), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2002), 87.
35
• • 53
aspirations of its citizens, and to make the legislative process more transparent.
2.5.1 The Birmingham summit
In response to the significance of the Danish and French votes, the Heads of State or
Government of the Member States participating in the Birmingham summit in
October 1992 stated in the first part of the "Birmingham Declaration" entitled "A
Community close to its citizens" that "[a]s a community of democracies, we can only
move forward with the support of our citizens".54 This statement indicated that they
had realised that the future of the Community could be jeopardised if they kept
ignoring the Community's perceived lack of democracy. To make the legislative
process more transparent, the leaders of the Member States welcomed the
Commission's offer to consult more widely before proposing legislation, which could
include a more systematic use of consultation documents (green papers), stating that
"[w]e want Community legislation to become simpler and clearer".55
Acting in response to the concerns raised in the debates prior to this summit, the
53 Mr. Delors began to explore subsidiarity from the time that he became Commission President in
1985, in order to search for a doctrine that would allow the Union to become involved in certain "high
political" issues traditionally at the core of national sovereignty without oncroaching on policy areas
that should remain in the national or regional domain. Dinan, n. 4 above, at 152, and sources there
cited. Former Article 3b EC (now Article 5 EC) provides that:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of
the objectives assigned to it therein.
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives
of this Treaty.
54 See particular the Declaration by the Heads of State or Government European Council,
Birmingham, 16 Oct. 1992, http://www.europarI.eu.int/summits/birmingham/bi_en.pdf
55 Ibid.
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Birmingham European Council stated that it must, inter alia, "make the Community
more open, to ensure a better informed public debate on its activities". To realise this
ideal, the participants continue to say that:
Foreign ministers will suggest ways, before the Edinburgh European Council,
of opening up the work of the Community's institutions, including the
possibility of some open Council discussion - for example on future work
programmes. ... We ask the Commission to complete by early [1993] its work
on improving public access to the information available to it and to other
Community institutions.56
The European Council's legal status should be considered when assessing its
contribution to greater EC transparency at Birmingham. The European Council
operated to an extent outside the main institutional structure of the Community until
the late 1980s, though Article 2 SEA in 1986 gave it legal recognition.57 The
Maastricht IGC introduced Article D TEU (now Article 4 TEU) that built on Article 2
SEA; Article D TEU provided that "[t]he European Council shall provide the Union
with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political
guidelines thereof'. In other words, the European Council was expected by the
56
n. 54 above.
57 Two important summits of the European Council, in The Hague in 1969 and Paris in 1972, were
agenda-setters for succeeding years. Article 2 SEA gave legal recognition to the European Council,
stating that:
The European Council shall bring together the Heads of State or of Government of the
Member States and the President of the Commission of the European Communities. They shall
be assisted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and by a Member of the Commission.
The European Council shall meet at least twice a year.
This provision, which was later repealed after successive treaty amendments, put the European
Council on to a more official basis. H. Wallace, 'The Institutional Setting' in H. Wallace and W.
Wallace (eds.), Policy-making in the European Union (4th edn., Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2000), 20.
'8 In practice, when the European Council addresses Community matters, it usually takes general
political decisions; these are then translated into legal form at meetings of the Council held at
ministerial level. Hartley, n. 11 above, at 26.
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Maastricht IGC to address strategic questions.59 Participants at the Birmingham
summit did not lay down any guideline on FOI legislation, though they would have
realised the importance of FOI protection owing to the "no" vote in Denmark. The
only effort made by the political leaders was, however, to demand once again that the
Commission should improve access to information. They did not address one of the
main reasons for the negative result in Denmark — the excessive secrecy in the
Council, a major cause of the democratic deficit.
As regards the Council, it consists of the delegates of the Member States, and
each State is represented by a government minister authorised to commit his or her
government.60 It has long been the institution where the interests of the Member
States find direct expression. Under the co-decision procedure introduced by
Maastricht Treaty, the Council, working with the Parliament,61 takes the final
decision on most EC legislation and concludes agreements with foreign countries.
The Council, jointly with the Parliament, also makes decisions on the Community
budget. Deliberations of this important EC institution were, however, rarely available
for the public prior to the upheaval caused by the EU Treaty ratification crisis. A
writer said in 1991 that "[political] behavior inside the Council of Ministers is the
least well studied or understood part of the activities of the European Community".62
59 The role of the European Council changed from the late 1980s and during the 1990s. It has
increasingly become a venue for dealing with history-making decisions in the Union, i.e. the big and
more strategic questions about core new tasks of the Union and those that define its 'identity' as an
arena for collective action. Wallace, n. 57 above, at 20.
60 Article 203 EC (ex Article 146 EC), Article 27 ECSC, and Article 116 Euratom.
61 The Council and Parliament share legal responsibility for legislation under the co-decision
procedure. The second paragraph of former Article 189b EC (now Article 251 EC) states that:
The Council, acting by a qualified majority after obtaining the opinion of the European
Parliament, shall adopt a common position. The Common position shall be communicated to
the European Parliament. The Council shall inform the European Parliament fully of the
reasons which led it to adopt its common position. The Commission shall inform the European
Parliament fully of its position.
62 H. Wallace, 'The Council and the Commission after the Single European Act' in L. Hurwitz and C.
Lequesne (eds.), The State of the European Community•: Policies, Institutions, and Debates in the
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The participants in the Birmingham European Council only committed that
"[fjoreign ministers will suggest ways of opening up the work of the Community's
institutions, including the possibility of some open Council discussion - for example
on future work programmes". This promise of uncertain and partial openness was
obviously insufficient to improve the democratic order of the Council.
2.5.2 The Edinburgh summit
The Heads of State or of Government of the Member States participating in the
subsequent Edinburgh European Council summit in December 1992 said they
adopted specific measures to support transparency, adding they welcomed the
Commission's decision to produce annual work programmes every October to allow
for wider debate, including in the national parliaments.63 They also reconfirmed
their invitation at Birmingham for the Commission to complete, by early 1993, its
work "resulting from the declaration in the Maastricht Treaty on improving access to
the information available to it and to other Community institutions".
An annex to the Edinburgh European Council's conclusions of the Presidency
entitled "Transparency - Implementation of the Birmingham Declaration" revealed
that the participants tried to strengthen public confidence by offering them more
information about the Council. For instance, "[w]hen a formal vote is taken in
Transition Years (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1991), 20.
63 The Commission made the decision about transparency to translate the decisions made by the
Birmingham European Council into a formal form. This decision also included seeking closer
consultation with the Council on the annual legislative programme; wider consultation before making
proposals; use of green papers; making Commission documents public in all Community languages;
and attaching higher priority to consolidation and codification of legal texts. "Conclusions of the
Presidency - Edinburgh", http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/edinburgh/aO_en.pdf
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Council, the record of the vote (including explanations of votes where delegations
request these) shall be published". The participants said there would be open debates
on relevant Presidency, Commission work programmes, and on major issues, adding
that public access would be achieved by televising the debate for viewing in the press
area of the Council building. Meanwhile, an effort was made to simplify the way to
access Community legislation. However, some exceptions to these rules indicated
that what the participants had achieved in the subject of transparency was limited.
For example, they claimed there would be open debates on major issues of
Community interest, but they said only the Council would have the right to decide
whether it would approve a debate proposal, adding that such decision would be
made on a case by case basis and on unanimity. Another example was that, although
the participants said that "[mjajor new legislative proposals will, whenever
appropriate, be the subject of a preliminary open debate, in the relevant Council, on
the basis of the Commission's legislative proposal", they also said the Council was
entitled to decide whether it would approve a debate proposal on a case by case basis
and on unanimity.
As to FOI protection, the political leaders of the Member States stated that
transparency as to decisions of the Council would be extended to all Council
positions through the practice of publishing a full description in the press release of
the conclusions reached by the Council. They showed a generous spirit in this
statement but immediately set out exceptions to the measure: "exceptions being made
for cases where such information would damage the interests of the Member States,
the Council, or the Community - e.g. negotiating mandates". The lack of definition
of the term "interests" reduced the value of this measure, indicating that the
Edinburgh European Council did not promise the public significantly more FOI
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protection.
Other specific measures noted by the participants in the Edinburgh summit
revealed that they sought to make European citizens believe that the EC institutions
were closer to them than they had been previously. This conference emphasised the
need for better informed public debate on the Community's activities and measures
to support this, as the Eleads of State or of Government of the Member States
appeared to have noticed the growing public resentment towards the Community.
Unfortunately, they failed to realise that the best way to close the Community's
democratic deficit was to help enact FOI legislation. They did not recognise freedom
of information as a fundamental right, because they did not make a call for change in
the EU Treaty to include explicit competence for the Council to adopt a regulation on
access to information held by the Community institutions. In fact, they made no
attempt at all to help the Community have its own FOI legislation.
2.5.3 Conclusion
The European Council is not a Community institution, but it has been expected to
meet to resolve intractable problems and lead the Union at the highest political level.
It is, however, surprising that the participants in the two summits achieved less than
the European Parliament in 1994. The Parliament showed serious interest in this
subject and adopted a resolution eight years before the Edinburgh summit.64 The
Parliament, according to the Resolution, considered that "the European Community




The political leaders at the Birmingham and Edinburgh summits made four
major efforts to realise transparency within the Community.
(1) They stated that some Council debates might be available to the public.
(2) They demanded the production by the Commission of the annual work
programme every October.
(3) They decided to simplify and clarify Community legislation.
(4) They repeatedly demanded that the Commission design and implement
the rules on freedom of information in 1993.
Generally, freedom of information means having access to government documents or
information in other forms, to understand the government's policies. Transparency
has a wider reach than freedom of information as it is also linked to a variety of
demands such as those for more open debates on key public issues and more easily
readable instruments. The specific measures adopted at these summits achieved
something in making the legislative process more transparent but achieved little in
providing the public with more FOI protection. It should be stressed that information
on the ongoing legislative process is only part of the information beneficial to the
public. In this regard, the three summits took only limited steps to realise
transparency and it was clear that FOI protection would not be realised without a
regulation on this subject.
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2.6 The Commission report
In Declaration 17 to the Maastricht Treaty, the Maastricht IGC recommended that
"the Commission submit to the Council no later than 1993 a report on measures
designed to improve public access to the information available to the institutions".
Participants in the Birmingham and Edinburgh summits also demanded that the
Commission complete such a report in 1993. The pressure for stronger assurance on
a right of access came not only from these demands and the setbacks in Demark and
France, but also from negotiations for accession to the Union with Sweden and
Finland. The two Nordic nations had strong traditions of governmental openness.65
On 5 May 1993, the Commission submitted to the Council the long-awaited report,
entitled "Public Access to the Institutions' Documents",66 following a comparative
survey of existing FOI policies in the Member States and those in some third
countries, such as the United States and Australia. The Commission stated in the
report that:
The Commission views [Declaration 17] as an important element of the
Community's policy on transparency of the institutions. Improved access to
information will be a means of bringing the public closer to the Community
institutions and of stimulating a more informed and involved debate on
Community policy matters. It will also be a means of increasing the public's
confidence in the Community.
65 C. Hoskyns, 'Democratizing the EU: Evidence and Argument' in C. Hoskyns and M Newman
(eds.), Democratizing the European Union, Issues for the Twenty-First Century (Manchester,
Manchester University Press, 2000), 180. In addition, Nils Herlitz, a professor emeritus of
constitutional and administrative law at the University of Stockholm, said in 1958 that many in other
countries had expressed surprise over the Swedish access to documents legislation when a Swede said
that "the records of public authorities are open to anybody who wants to see a document." N. Herlitz,
'Publicity of official documents in Sweden' (1958) Public Law 50.
66 Public Access to the Institutions' documents (Communication to the Council, the Parliament and
the Economic and Social Committee) [1993] OJ C156/5.
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The Commission said it considered Declaration 17 a key element of transparency
policy and that the survey was conducted to implement this Declaration. The
Commission stated in this report that it would establish a framework for granting
general access to documents. "This will entail some adjustments of the
Commission's working practices but the Commission considers that general access is
a particularly important instrument to bring the Community closer to its citizens".67
Nonetheless, the Commission only carried out part of the duties the Maastricht IGC
imposed on it. The IGC in the Declaration recommended that the Commission
submit "a report on measures to improve the public access to the information
available to the institutions", but the Commission report indicated that the
Commission did not work out any concrete measures to increase access to
information held by the other EU institutions. The Commission only said it "felt"
that the principle of access to information should be shared by the other institutions
and Member States.
The Commission stated in this report that "[t]he public is granted access to
specific types of information in some countries, ... Directive 90/313/EEC on access
to environmental information is an example of a Community initiative on access to a
specific area of information". This statement indicated that the Commission had
endeavoured to realise freedom of information previously, but the Directive, as we
have seen, was intended to apply only to relevant "public administration at national,
regional or local level", rather than the Community institutions.68
In June 1993, participants in the European Council in Copenhagen asked the
67 Ibid.
68 Article 2(b) of the Directive provides that '"public authorities' shall mean any public administration
at national, regional or local level with responsibilities, and possessing information, relating to the
environment with the exception of bodies acting in a judicial or legislative capacity", n. 17 above.
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Council and Commission to continue to improve FOI protection, stating that "[i]n the
area of public access to information, [the European Council] invited the Council and
the Commission to continue their work based on the principle of the citizens having
the fullest possible access to information. The aim should be to have all necessary
measures in place by the end of 1993".69 The participants at this summit set up the
timetable for implementation of the rules on access to information for the first time.
The Copenhagen European Council, however, ignored that both the Council and the
Commission had never conducted their work in the field of transparency on the
principle of the "fullest possible access to information".
Five months later, the Danish voters approved the Maastricht Treaty in a second
referendum in May 1993. Of the 71.4 percent who voted, 56.7 percent of them
favoured an approval of this Treaty and 43.3 percent against, allowing the EU to
come into being in November 1993. This should not be regarded as Danish citizens'
firm support for the Union, as 43.3 percent of the voters were against the Treaty.
Professor Desmond Dinan says that exhaustive analyses indicate a host of reasons for
the result, but "[wjhatever the reasons, the result showed how oblivious the Danish
70and other governments were to growing public resentment toward the EC".
69 The full text of "Conclusions of the Presidency - Copenhagen" is available at:
http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/copenhagen/co_en.pdf
70
Dinan, n. 4 above, at 149.
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The Framework Established
by the Code of Conduct
-Evolution n (1993~2000)
The Council and Commission in November 1993 adopted a common instrument -
the Code of Conduct concerning public access to Council and Commission
documents.1 The Code of Conduct provides that the two institutions would severally
take steps to implement its principles before 1 January 1994. The implementation
took the form of decisions taken by the two institutions separately in December 1993
and February 1994 - Council Decision 93/731 and Commission Decision 94/90.
This chapter analyses the Code of Conduct, the two corresponding decisions, and
relevant court decisions relating to the mandatory and discretionary exemptions set
out in the three measures. The aim of the examination is to obtain a clear picture of
the exceptions' nature and to determine the Community court's views on the
application of the two categories of exception.
1
(93/730/EC) [1993] OJ L340/41.
2 Council Decision of 20 December 1993 on public access to Council documents (93/731/EC) [1993]
OJ L340/43, and Commission Decision of 8 February 1994 on public access to Commission
documents (94/90/ECSC, EC, Euratom) [1994] OJ L46/58.
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3.1 The Code of Conduct and corresponding
decisions
3.1.1 Exclusion of other institutions
The Code of Conduct, a common agreement between the Commission and Council,
was the first EC provision to deal generally with access to information held by its
institutions, but it was far from perfect. First of all, the Code of Conduct was
deficient as it excluded many key institutions in the EU. Crucially, it only covered
the Council and Commission. The EU institutions are dynamic organisms exercising
a
a unique mix of legislative, executive, and judicial power. In addition to the five
most important institutions - the Commission, the Council, the European Council,
the Parliament, and the European Court of Justice,4 there are other institutions
carrying out a variety of representative, oversight, or managerial functions in the
Union. There was, however, no reference in the Code of Conduct and corresponding
decisions to the European Council, to the other institutions, or to the Second and
Third Pillars of the Union. Institutions and satellites emanating from these
institutions were also excluded. The inability of the Council and Commission to
impose such requirements on these other bodies is a direct result of deciding to
proceed not through a recognised legislative measure but by means of an internal
agreement.
3 E. Bomberg, L. Cram, and D. Martin, 'The EU's Institutions' in E. Bomberg and A. Stubb (eds.),
The European Union: How Does it Work?" (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), 43.
4 Ibid. Strictly speaking, the European Council is not an EU institution, but its role is of great
importance as it is required to address strategic questions. The European Council, according to Article
4 TEU, "shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the
general political guidelines thereof'.
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For instance, prior to the adoption of the Code of Conduct, the plan to establish
the European Central Bank (ECB) had been laid down in the Maastricht Treaty to
better formulate the EU's monetary policy.5 The ECB, which was inaugurated on 1
June 1998, faced problems of openness after the Maastricht Treaty was signed in
December 1991. The issue of how, and to what extent, the European banking
system should be made accountable then became controversial,7 but the Code of
Conduct and two related decisions showed that the Council and Commission did not
plan to make the ECB's documents available to the public. Analogous domestic
o
specialised organisations are, however, typically included under national FOI law.
In sum, the Council and Commission adopted the Code of Conduct to allow
access only to the documents in their possession, though the European Ombudsman
was capable of partially remedying this deficiency. This is because, when the
Ombudsman investigates complaints, it has wide powers of access to documents held
by Community institutions.9
5 The ECB was made the most significant specialised institution by the participants in the Maastricht
IGC. Former Article 107 EC (now Article 108 EC) provided that the Community institutions and
bodies and the government of the Member States shall not seek to influence the members of the
decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the national central banks in the performance of their tasks.
6 After the Maastricht Treaty was signed, the ECB has tried to maintain independence and to be
viewed as accountable and legitimate to the European public at the same time.
7 Some believe that no more than performance in maintaining price stability in the medium term
should be used by the public to judge the success of the Eurosystem, but others think that
decision-making by technocrats is acceptable and viable only if the institution to which these
decisions are delegated is accountable to the public at large and to its elected representatives. C.
Harlow, Accountability in the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), 48-49.
8 For instance, documents available to the Swedish public are those held, received or drawn up by any
public authority, according to Article 3 of Chapter 2 of the 1949 Freedom of the Press Act, one of the
four fundamental laws which made up the constitution of Swedish. The English translation of the
Freedom of the Press Act is available at the Swedish government website:
http://www.riksdagen.se/english/work/fundamental/press/index.htm
9 For example, the first paragraph of Article 3(2) of the European Ombudsman Statute provides that
"[t]he Community institutions and bodies shall be obliged to supply the Ombudsman with any
information he has requested of them and give him access to the files concerned. They may refuse
only on duly substantiated grounds of secrecy". [1994] OJ LI 13/15. The Ombudsman's role in EU
FOI protection is examined in Chapter 7.
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3.1.2 "Widest possible access"
The Code of Conduct provided for more, but only limited, freedom of information.
The general principle of the Code of Conduct is that: "The public will have the
widest possible access to documents held by the Commission and the Council.
'Document' means any written text, whatever its medium, which contains existing
data and is held by the Council or the Commission".10
Suppose a citizen of the Union asks a public body for a document that has never
been released, there are two possible approaches to address the request:
(1) a presumption that the information ought to be offered to the citizen unless
decision-makers within the Union have a good reason not to do so; or
(2) a presumption that the information should be kept secret unless the
decision-makers decide to release it.
The Code of Conduct's appreciation concerning both the "widest possible access to
documents" and "any written text" seemed to be a response to the call for "fullest
possible access" made by the Copenhagen European Council. Such phrases
suggested that the former approach had been adopted and that the Council and
Commission, which had not made material efforts to realise the idea of access to
information before the Code of Conduct, had altered their stance on the issue.
However, the real position of the two major EU institutions at this time cannot be
ascertained without examining the other parts of the legislation, in particular the
provisions setting out exceptions to openness and those establishing the procedures
for applying for documents.
10 First section of the Code ofConduct entitled "general principle".
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Considering, first, the exceptions, these are set out in the Code of Conduct's
fourth section entitled "exceptions":
The institutions will refuse access to any document whose disclosure could
undermine:
-- the protection of the public interest (public security, international relations,
monetary stability, court proceedings, inspections and investigations),
— the protection of the individual and ofprivacy,
— the protection of commercial and industrial secrecy,
— the protection of the Community's financial interests,
— the protection of confidentiality as requested by the natural or legal persons
that supplied the information or as required by the legislation of the Member
State that supplied the information.
They may also refuse access in order to protect the institution's interest in the
confidentiality of its proceedings, (emphasis added)
This first subsection of this section covered almost all the usual areas contained in
exemptions to openness in domestic legislation and couched them in mandatory
terms; access will be denied where disclosure could undermine the abovementioned
interests. Professor Carol Harlow has said that "[the] list of mandatory exceptions to
disclosure [is] so extensive as to change the balance: from positive rights with
negative exceptions to a text which treats access as the exception".11
The lists of specific exceptions were followed by a provision which provided
the Council and Commission with a discretionary exemption where they wished to
defend the confidentiality of their proceedings. The two institutions would have the
right to impose an almost total ban on freedom of information to protect the
abovementioned rights and interests. A Swedish writer has said that:
11
Harlow, n. 7 above, at 38.
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[The Code of Conduct] includes precisely such a broad and imprecise category
of exceptions which may be invoked as a last resort by Community institutions
ifnone of the specifically enumerated exceptions are applicable. This of course
allows for almost unlimited secrecy and thereby for the elimination of
openness ifCommunity institutions so wish.12
The very extensive exceptions revealed that the "widest possible access to
documents" was severely limited in reality, owing to the five areas covered by
exceptions and the two institutions' right to refuse access to information relating to
their proceedings.
Limitations are also apparent in the procedures for applying for access to
documents, set down in the Code of Conduct and the two corresponding Council and
n
Commission decisions, and it is notable that the two institutions did not establish a
register of their documents. This was a major impediment for those who wished to
obtain access to a document. Another constraint was that the Council and
Commission would provide the EU citizens with access only to the documents drawn
up by the two institutions. The Code of Conduct provided that "[wjhere the
document held by an institution was written by a natural or legal person, a Member
State, another Community institution or body or any other national or international
body, the application must be sent direct to the author". As one writer observes, "[i]n
essence, the Code left untouched the strict norm of confidentiality that has
traditionally prevailed in international relations." 14 Under this controversial
provision, requests made to the Council or Commission for information received by
12 I. Osterdahl, 'Openness v. Secrecy: Public Access to Documents in Sweden and the European
Union' (1998) 23 European Law Review 342.
13 Procedures of applications for access to documents were laid down in the second section of the
Code of Conduct, Article 2 of the Council decision, and Article 2 of the Commission decision. They
required that an application must be made in writing in a sufficiently precise manner.
14
A. Roberts, 'Multilateral Institutions and the Right to Information: Experience in the European
Union' (2002) 8 European Public Law 260.
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the two institutions from another institution, or from a third party, would be refused.
In other words, the EU institutions other than the Council and Commission, and third
parties would have the right to decide whether they would provide applicants with
access to the documents produced by them. As they would consider factors such as
national interest, privacy and possibly personal interest, access to the documents
written by them could also be highly problematic.
The Code of Conduct provided for a two-stage procedure which included not
only the initial application but also "confirmatory applications". An applicant,
according to the third section entitled "Processing of confirmatory applications," had
the right to apply for a refusal to be reconsidered - a "confirmatory application" -
within one month.15 Under these rules, if the institution concerned decided to
disapprove the access to information again, it had to inform the applicant of the
second refusal immediately and the grounds on which the decision was based.
Meanwhile, the decision had to indicate the means of redress that were available, i.e.
judicial proceedings and complaints to the Ombudsman under the conditions
specified in, respectively, Articles 173 and 138e EC (now Articles 230 and 195 EC).
The procedures relating to confirmatory applications could have been of great
importance if the Code of Conduct had provided for wide access to information. As
the legislation offered, however, only limited FOI protection to the public, the sound
procedures of confirmatory applications were of little value in practice.
15 The first paragraph of the Code of Conduct's third section states that "[w]here the relevant
departments of the institution concerned intend to advise the institution to reject an application, they
will inform the applicant thereof and tell him that he has one month to make a confirmatory
application to the institution for that position to be reconsidered, failing which he will be deemed to
have withdrawn his original application".
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3.1.3 Comment
The Code of Conduct, which established a general principle, and exceptions, as well
as procedures for making applications and confirmatory applications, was only a
fragmentary measure.16 It was insufficient to realise the ideal of access to
information, and the principle of "widest possible access to documents" was only a
hortatory statement. Widest possible access was impossible at that time because, first
of all, the Code of Conduct did not appear on its face to be applicable to the Second
and Third Pillars. Moreover, the European Council and EU institutions other than the
Council and Commission were excluded. Secondly, the Council and Commission did
not provide for a register of their documents under the Code of Conduct. Thirdly, the
Council and Commission transferred their responsibility to defend the widest
possible access to "a natural or legal person, a Member State, another Community
institution or body or any other national or international body" where a document
was produced by them.
The fourth, and presumably the most important reason, was that, in contrast to
the Code of Conduct's principle of widest possible access, the measure laid down
very wide exemptions. The Commission in a 1993 Report boasted that it was aware
that it already had a "commendable history of an open door policy", adding that
"[t]his stems from the belief that such a process is fundamental for the development
of sound and workable policies".17 If the Commission and Council had not laid
down the extensive mandatory and discretionary exceptions, they would have
16 Professor Inger Osterdahl has also said that "[t]he Code of Conduct taken as a whole hardly gives
European Union citizens any right against the institutions except for some procedural aspects ofminor
importance concerning the reasons for rejections of applications for access to documents and the
balancing of interests". Osterdahl, n. 12 above, at 346-347.
17 Public Access to the Institutions' Documents (Communication to the Council, the Parliament and
the Economic and Social Committee) [1993] OJ C156/5.
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realised such a belief and put the development of freedom of information legislation
on the right course. Nonetheless, the broad exceptions revealed that the two
institutions at that time held the belief that secrecy ought to be the rule and openness
the exception. Close review of the Code of Conduct indicates that the tone of
openness couched in the legislation was not borne out by the seriously deficient text.
In other words, the Commission did not follow through the demand made by the
Copenhagen European Council, which stated that all necessary measures to realise
the ideal of fullest possible access should be in place by the end of 1993.
The following sections address the key judgments delivered by the ECJ and CFI
between 1995 and 2001 in chronological order. The aim is to obtain a clear picture of
the Courts' role in the development of EU FOI protection during this period. In the
final section of this chapter, we pull together and analyse the key issues thrown up by
these cases, such as the relevance of the distinction between the mandatory and
discretionary exceptions, the applicability of the principle of proportionality, and
whether individuals can gain access to Second and Third Pillar documents.
3.2 The Carvel case18
Exemptions to openness laid down in Article 4 of Council Decision 93/731
corresponded to those in the fourth section of the Code of Conduct. Article 4(1) of
Council Decision 93/731,19 which included a list of specific exceptions, covered
18 Case T-194/94, John Carvel and Guardian Newspapers v. Council [1995] ECR 11-2769.
19 Article 4( 1) provides that:
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almost all the usual subjects contained in exceptions in domestic FOI legislation and
couched them in mandatory terms. Article 4(2) of Decision 93/731 stated that
"[ajccess to a Council document may be refused in order to protect the
confidentiality of the Council's proceedings". This provision, which provided the
Council with a discretionary exemption where it wished to defend the confidentiality
of its proceedings, was highly controversial. This provision might be invoked as a
last resort by the Council, if none of the specifically enumerated exceptions in Article
4 (1) were applicable. Under Article 4(2), the Council was allowed to apply the
provision as long as it considered a refusal of access to information was necessary to
protect confidentiality of its proceedings. But what was the margin of this
discretionary exception? The Court of First Instance (CFI) answered the question in
20
John Carvel and Guardian Newspapers Ltd v. Council ofthe European Union.
3.2.1 Facts
In February 1994, the applicants John Carvel, European Affairs Editor of The
Guardian, and Guardian Newspapers Ltd, sought access to the following documents
held by the Council:
(1) the preparatory reports, the minutes, the attendance, voting records, and
Access to a Council document shall not be granted where its disclosure could undermine:
— the protection of the public interest (public security, international relations, monetary stability,
court proceedings, inspections and investigations),
— the protection of the individual and of privacy,
— the protection of commercial and industrial secrecy,
— the protection of the Community's financial interests,
— the protection of confidentiality as requested by the natural or legal person who supplied any
of the information contained in the document or as required by the legislation of the Member




the decisions of the Councils of Ministers for Social Affairs (hereinafter
"the Social Affairs Councils") of 12 October and 23 November 1993;
(2) the preparatory reports, the minutes, the attendance, voting records, and
the decisions of the Council of Ministers for Justice (hereinafter "the
Justice Council") of 29 and 30 November 1993;
(3) the minutes of the Council of Ministers for Agriculture (hereinafter "the
Agriculture Council") of 24 and 25 January 1994.21
On 28 February 1994, the applicants received from the General Secretariat of the
Council a letter and a copy of the Social Affairs Councils' preparatory reports, the
minutes, the attendance, and voting records in question. For the decisions on the
dates, they were referred to the issues of the Official Journal of the European
22Communities in which those decisions appeared. The General Secretariat told the
applicants in the letter that they were refused access to the Justice Council's minutes,
the attendance, voting records and the decisions.23 The Council also refused access
to the Justice Council's preparatory reports on the Justice Council's future work.24 In
addition, the applicants were informed that the Agriculture Council's minutes in
question "were not yet available."25
The applicants then made a confirmatory application, reiterating their request
for access to the documents relating to the Justice Council and to the Agriculture
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Council's minutes. However, the applicants received no response within the
21
para. 14, n. 18 above.
22
para. 15, n. 18 above.
2j
para. 16, n. 18 above.
24
para. 16, n. 18 above.
25
para. 17, n. 18 above.
26
para. 19, n. 18 above.
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time-limit of one month laid down by Article 7(3) of Decision 93/731. They later
wrote to the General Secretariat to make another confirmatory application, pursuant
to Article 7(2) of Decision 93/731, in relation to the minutes of the Agriculture
Council.29 The Council replied to the applicants in a letter of 17 May 1994, saying
that access to the Justice Council's documents in question "cannot be allowed", or
"the Council would fail to protect the confidentiality of its proceedings". It said the
documents contained "confidential information relating to the position taken by the
members of the Council during its deliberations".30
The Council said in the letter that similar considerations of confidentiality
applied to the Social Affairs Councils' preparatory reports, minutes and voting
records in question, and "which in fact should not have been sent to you", adding that
they were "sent to him because of an administrative error". It said access to the
31
Agriculture Council's minutes should not be allowed for the same reasons. The
77
applicants then brought the present action. They were supported by the Danish and
Dutch Governments and the European Parliament.33 They claimed that the Court
should:
(1) annul the decision whereby the Council refused to grant them access to
the Justice Council's documents at issue;
27
para. 20, n. 18 above. Article 7(3) of Decision 93/731 provides that:
Any decision to reject a confirmatory application, which shall be taken within a month of
submission of such application, shall state the grounds on which it is based. The applicant shall
be notified of the decision in writing as soon as possible and at the same time informed of the
content of Articles 138e and 173 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (now
Articles 195 and 230 EC), relating respectively to the conditions for referral to the Ombudsman
by natural persons and review by the Court of Justice of the legality ofCouncil acts.
28 Article 7(2) of Decision 97/731 states that "[fjailure to reply to an application within a month of
submission shall be equivalent to a refusal, except where the applicant makes a confirmatory
application, as referred to above, within the following month".
29
para. 21, n. 18 above.
30
para. 22, n. 18 above.
31
para. 22, n. 18 above.
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(2) annul the decision of 17 May 1994 whereby the Council refused to
grant them access to the Agriculture Council's minutes in question and
that to the documents of the Social Affairs Councils.34
The Council contended that the Court should dismiss the application as unfounded.
The applicants put forward the pleas that allege:
(1) breach of the fundamental principle ofCommunity law of access to the
documents of the institutions of the Union;
(2) breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations;
(3) infringement of Article 4(2) of Decision 93/731 inasmuch as the
contested decisions are the expression of a blanket refusal to allow
access to certain types of document.36
The applicants said the Council had expressed a blanket refusal to grant access to
documents which related to its deliberations. They said such refusal infringed Article
4(2) of Decision 93/731. In their view, this provision implied that the Council must
carefully balance the interests involved before deciding whether access to a
document was to be refused.37 They stated that no balancing of interests took place
before the Council decided to reject their confirmatory application. They added
that "the confidentiality of deliberations [was] only one of the interests to be taken
into account when applying the general principle of access to the institutions'
"4
para. 27, n. 18 above,
para. 28, n. 18 above,
para. 36, n. 18 above.
^
para. 43, n. 18 above.
jS
para. 43, n. 18 above.
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documents".39
In response, the Council, first of all, said the applicants had adduced no
evidence to support their allegation that the Council did not balance the interests
involved40 The Council went on to say that Decision 93/731, being based on the
Council's Rules of Procedure, must be construed according to the legislation. In its
view, "[ujnder Article 5(1) of its Rules of Procedure,41 the deliberations of the
Council are in principle protected against disclosure, although the Council may
decide otherwise".42
The Council denied that it had expressed a blanket refusal to grant access to
documents related to its deliberation. It said it was "always open to it to make use of
the derogation provided for in its Rules of Procedure and to decide to disclose
documents relating to its proceedings",43 adding that it had "made a proper
evaluation of the interests to be balanced". 44 It described in detail the
decision-making process which resulted in the refusal,45 without elaborating on how
the interests were balanced. Outlining the reasons underlying the principle of the
confidentiality of its proceedings, it emphasised that:
This process of compromise and negotiation is vital to the adoption of
Community legislation, and would be jeopardised if delegations were
constantly mindful of the fact that the positions they were taking, as recorded
in Council minutes, could at any time be made public through the granting of
para. 44, n. 18 above.
40
para. 46, n. 18 above.
41 Article 5(1) of the Rules of Procedure provides that "[wjithout prejudice to Article 7(5) and other
applicable provisions, the deliberations of the Council shall be covered by the obligation of
professional secrecy, except in so far as the Council decides otherwise".
42
para. 47, n. 18 above.
43
para. 48, n. 18 above.
44
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access to those documents.46
3.2.2 Held
The applicants contested the decision which they considered to be contained in the
Council's letter of 17 May 1994, refusing them access to the Social Affairs Councils'
documents in question. The Court, however, ruled that this claim was inadmissible
"since no decision to refuse them access thereto was ever adopted by the Council".47
However, the Court said the letter had constituted the decision refusing the applicants
access to the minutes of the Agriculture Council, because the Council explained in
the letter why it had decided not to allow them access to the minutes of the
Agriculture Council.48 Second, the Court stressed that Council Decision 93/731 was
"the only measure governing citizens' rights of access to (Council) documents; the
Council's Rules of Procedure, on the other hand, regulate its own internal operating
mechanisms".49 It then examined the third of the applicants' pleas, stating that:
It is clear both from the terms of Article 4 of Decision 93/731 and from the
objective pursued by that decision, namely to allow the public wide access to
Council documents, that the Council must, when exercising its discretion
under Article 4(2), genuinely balance the interest of citizens in gaining access
to its documents against any interest of its own in maintaining the
confidentiality of its deliberations.50
46
para. 52, n. 18 above.
47
para. 35, n. 18 above.
48
paras. 38 and 39, n. 18 above.
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para. 62, n. 18 above.
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The Court said such interpretation of Article 4(2) was consistent with the Code of
Conduct which the Council decision was intended to implement,51 adding that
"whenever access to documents is requested, the Council must balance the interests
defined above and reach a decision in accordance with the applicable procedure".52
The Court stated that the two letters sent to the applicants on 28 February 1994
and 17 May 1994 by the General Secretariat of the Council, showed that the Council,
when responding to the applicants' requests, did not comply with the obligation of
balancing the interests involved, laid down by Article 4(2) ofDecision 93/731.53 The
Court said the terms of the letters indicated that the Council had considered both that
it was obliged to refuse access to the documents in question, merely because they
referred to its deliberations and that disclosure of the documents requested by the
applicants would involve a breach of its Rules of Procedure, in particular of Article
5.
The Court continued to say that the Council's incorrect interpretation of the
relevant provisions was illustrated by the phrases used in the letter of February 1994,
as the General Secretariat told the applicants that "I am unable to send you these
documents, since they ... cannot ... be disclosed", and in that ofMay 1994, because
the Council said "... access to these documents cannot be allowed ....". The Court
said the phrases indicated that the Council had considered that it did not have the
option of disclosing the documents requested.54 In addition, it said the Council "did
not adduce any concrete evidence capable of establishing that it did assess the
specific competing interests".55 Therefore, it upheld the third plea advanced by the
51
para. 66, n. 18 above.
52
para. 67, n. 18 above.
53
para. 73, n. 18 above.
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para. 73, n. 18 above.
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applicant,56 and concluded that "[t]he contested decisions must therefore be annulled,
without there being any need to examine the other pleas advanced by the
applicants".57
3.2.3 Comment
First, the present case mainly concerned the scope of the discretionary exception laid
down in Article 4(2) of Council Decision 93/731. This provision, in the view of the
applicants, implied that the Council must carefully balance the interests involved
before deciding whether access to a document was to be refused. But actually this
provision did not, at least not expressly, put the Council under such obligation. It
only stated that "[ajccess to a Council document may be refused in order to protect
the confidentiality of the Council's proceedings". These terms provided the Council
with a discretionary exception where they wished to defend the confidentiality of
their proceedings, without elaborating on the scope of this exception.
The Court accepted the view of the applicants after examining Article 4 of
Decision 93/731 and the objective of this Decision. The Court said the rules and
objective revealed that "the Council must, when exercising its discretion under
Article 4(2), genuinely balance the interest of citizens in gaining access to its
documents against any interest of its own in maintaining the confidentiality of its
deliberations". It added that such an interpretation ofArticle 4(2) was consistent with
the provisions of the Code of Conduct, which Decision 93/731 was intended to
56
para. 79, n. 18 above.
57
para. 80, n. 18 above.
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implement. The Court addressed this case mainly by setting the limit to the exception
before making an effort to determine whether relevant interests were balanced in the
case. As the two letters from the Council indicated that it had considered that it was
obliged to refuse access to the documents in question, the Court annulled the
decisions at issue.
Attention should also be drawn to the term "the provisions of the Code of
Conduct", because the Court did not explain what these provisions were and why its
interpretation was consistent with them. The provisions at issue presumably include
the general principle of the Code of Conduct set out in its first section, which
provided that "[t]he public will have the widest possible access to documents held by
the Commission and the Council". Nevertheless, as we have seen in 3.1.2, the
extensive exceptions laid down in both the Code of Conduct and Decision 93/731
showed that the "widest possible access to documents" could be limited in reality.
The judgment reveals an attempt on the part of the judges to remedy the
deficiency of both the Code of Conduct and Decision 93/731. It was the Court, rather
than the two measures, that set the limit to the exception. Professor Carol Harlow has
said "Carvel was a breakthrough in establishing the justiciability of the Code of
Conduct; it was equally important in establishing that decision-making under the
Code (of Conduct) in respect of Third Pillar documents was subject to review by the
CFI". The judgment is indeed revolutionary in the FOI field, but it is also
important to appreciate the limited nature of the judgment in favour of the applicants.
The Court only demanded that the Council properly exercise its discretion rather than
issuing a blanket refusal, but it made no effort to prevent the Council from
concluding that the interests of confidentiality outweighed the public's right of
58
Harlow, n. 7 above, at 163 and 164.
63
access.
The applicants said the blanket refusal had constituted a breach of the
fundamental principle of Community law of access to the documents of the
institutions of the Union. The CFI, however, only examined the third plea of the
applicants before it decided to annul the contested decisions. It added that there was
no need to examine the other pleas advanced by the applicants. The CFI avoided
determining whether access to documents was a fundamental right. Crucially, the
Court made no statement about access rights in general.
The Council obviously thought that such requests fell within the field of internal
affairs, as it said that Decision 93/731 must be construed according to the Rules of
Procedure, adding that "[u]nder Article 5(1) of its Rules of Procedure, the
deliberations of the Council are in principle protected against disclosure, although
the Council may decide otherwise". The CFI said that Decision 93/731 was the only
measure governing citizens' rights of access; the Council's Rules of Procedure
regulated its internal mechanisms. It added that access should not have been refused
merely because it involved a breach of its Rules of Procedure, in particular ofArticle
5. This dispute once again revealed that the Union needed general rules on FOI
protection and such legislation should not have been based on rules of internal
affairs.
In addition, the Council argued that a process of negotiation was vital to the
adoption of EC legislation. It said such a process would be jeopardised if delegations
were constantly mindful of the fact that the positions they were taking could be made
public through the granting of access to those documents. This statement showed that
policy-makers would be fearful if their positions could be made public. The CFI
made no direct statement about such fear, but its conclusion suggested that the judges
64
believed that the right of access right prevailed over prevention of such fear.
Fear is a form of "cost" in the FOI field. Professor Patrick Birkinshaw says that
"[t]here is the fear of perpetual intervention when policy-makers are constantly
exposed or challenged and have to justify their every move. In such a situation
individuals may not wish to take risks or make innovative decisions. The cost could
be a reduction in professionalism".59 This and the other forms of cost60 will be
carefully considered throughout this study, especially when analysing the relevant
legislation and case law. It is not surprising that the Council and Commission attempt
to use these cost factors in argument against release of information, but it should be
noted that these concerns should not be employed as the basis for a general refusal.
3.3 The 1996 Netherlands judgment61
The Commission and Council implemented the Code of Conduct but in doing so
followed very different approaches. The Commission simply adopted this instrument
and elaborated procedural rules concerning application for access to documents in
Commission Decision 94/90.62 The Council Decision 93/731 was, however, adopted
59 P. Birkinshaw, Freedom of Information, The Law, the Practice and the Ideal (3rd edn., London,
Butterworths, 2001), 61.
60 For instance, there is the cost of opening up operations relating to national security, because
openness in this area could be destructive of citizens' security. In addition, there is also the financial
cost of freedom of information. This is because the public's demand for information requires civil
servants to address requests and all the other relevant matters.
61 Case C-58/94, Netherlands v. Council [1996] ECR 1-2169.
62 Article 1 of Commission Decision 94/90 states that "[t]he code of conduct on public access to
Commission documents set out in the Annex is adopted", n. 2 above.
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on the basis of Article 151(3) EC63 (now Article 207(3) EC) and the Council's Rules
of Procedure, particularly Article 22.54 This Council Decision was controversial,
because, first, the general principle of the Code of Conduct that "[t]he public will
have the widest possible access to documents held by the Commission and the
Council" was not included. However, Article 1(1) of Council Decision 93/731 states
that "[t]he public shall have access to Council documents under the conditions laid
down in this Decision". Though this does not use the phrase "widest possible access",
it does not explicitly reject this principle. This is an important principle in guiding
the Community court especially in circumstances where there are conflicts between
protection of freedom of information and other interests.
Second, further exceptions to openness were laid down in addition to the
already extensive exceptions in the Code of Conduct. For instance, Article 8 of
Decision 93/731 provided that "[tjhis Decision shall apply with due regard for
provisions governing the protection of classified information", which is an additional
exception not found in the Code of Conduct. It was, therefore, not difficult to realise
why the Netherlands, which consistently pushed the FOI issue in relation to
governance of the Community, would regard the exceptions contained in the Code of
Conduct, Decision 93/731, and Article 22 of the Council's Rules of Procedure, as
dangerously extensive rules. Within two months of the adoption ofDecision 93/731,
the Netherlands requested the ECJ to annul the measures in Netherlands v. Council, a
case which raised key questions of principle.65
63 Former Article 151(3) EC provides that "[t]he Council shall adopt its rules of procedure".
64 Council Decision of 6 December 1993 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure, 93/622/EC
[1993] OJ L304/1. Article 22 of the Rules of Procedure states that "[t]he detailed arrangements for
public access to Council documents disclosure ofwhich is without serious or prejudicial consequences





By application lodged at the ECJ on 10 February 1994, the Netherlands, supported
by the European Parliament, brought an action under Article 173 EC (now Article
230 EC) for annulment of the Code of Conduct, Council Decision 93/731, and
Article 22 of Council's Rules of Procedure. The Council claimed that the
intervention by the Parliament should be declared inadmissible as it did not have "the
same object as the Netherlands Government's application".66 In response, the
Parliament based its intervention on the following arguments:
(1) By basing the contested rules on its power to organise its internal
operation, the Council arrogated to itself the power to determine the
extent in which its legislative proceedings are accessible to the public
and thereby misused the powers conferred on it by Article 151(3) EC
(now Article 207(3) EC).67
(2) The principle of openness of the legislative process and the access to
legislative documents entailed could not be treated as organisational
matters purely internal to the institutions as they constituted essential
requirements of democracy.68
(3) The right to information, of which access to documents constituted the
corollary, had been a fundamental human right recognised by various
international instruments.69
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The Netherlands stated that the Code of Conduct did not constitute an act having
legal effects as it was not an act within the meaning ofArticle 189 EC70 (now Article
249 EC) or any act provided for elsewhere in the Treaties, but "a text of a political
nature setting out political agreements". Nonetheless, the Netherlands stressed
inconsistently that "[t]he Code should be held to be a decision in its own right having
legal effects, that it should be annulled in so far as, contrary to the requirements of
Article 19071 [now Article 253] of the EC Treaty, it contains no reference to its legal
basis".72
The Dutch government sought annulment of Decision 93/731 by arguing that
the Council had wrongly used former Article 151(3) EC and Article 22 of its Rules of
Procedure as the legal basis for that decision, as they had been concerned "solely in
the Council's internal organisation". The Netherlands said the contested decision
had gone far beyond the sphere of application of the rules on the internal organisation
and management of the Council and had constituted an act expressly designed to
have effects vis-a-vis citizens, adding that public access to Council documents had
constituted the basic principle of the decision (Article 1 of the Code of Conduct) and
that legal effects may arise vis-a-vis individuals.7 The Netherlands conceded that
internal measures may exceptionally have external effects. However, it stressed that
as "the very purpose of the rules is to create rights in individuals, the rules in
70 The first paragraph of former Article 189 EC provides that "[i]n order to carry out their task and in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, the European Parliament acting jointly with the Council,
the Council and the Commission shall make regulations and issue directives, take decisions, make
recommendations or deliver opinions".
71 Former Article 190 EC states that "[r]egulations, directives and decisions adopted jointly by the
European Parliament and the Council, and such acts adopted by the Council or the Commission, shall
state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any proposals or opinions which were
required to be obtained pursuant to this Treaty".
72
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question may not be adopted on the basis of provisions authorising the Council to
adopt measures relating to its internal organisation and functioning".75 The
Netherlands also argued that the Council's exclusion of the Parliament in addressing
the question of open government had infringed the balance among the institutions
defined in Article 4 EC76 (now Article 7 EC).77
Finally, to seek annulment of Article 22 of the Rules of Procedure, the
Netherlands said the purpose of this provision greatly exceeded the confines of the
rules governing the internal organisation of the Council, with the result that it could
not form part of a body of provisions intended solely to set out rules on the internal
organisation and management of an institution. It maintained that the Council had
infringed former Article 151(3) EC, or at least misused the power conferred on it by
70
those provisions by adopting Article 22 of its Rules of Procedure.
3.3.2 The Advocate General's opinion
Advocate General Tesauro said that "[i]t may be considered that the right of access to
information is increasingly clearly a fundamental civil right".79 He also said that "a
link is made between the right to access to documents in the possession of the public
authorities and the right to freedom of expression and to receive and impart
information enshrined in Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of
75
para. 30, n. 61 above.
76 The second paragraph of former Article 4 provides that "[e]ach institution shall act within the limits
of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty".
77
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Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms". He continued to say that: "[t]hat right,
as the European Parliament rightly points out, constitutes a corollary of the freedom
to seek, receive and disseminate information and ideas of every kind guaranteed by
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signed at New
York on 19 December 1966".81
He said that "[consequently, we are witnessing, also on the level of the law of
international conventions as in the legislation of the Member States, a progressive,
increasingly broader affirmation of the individual's right of access to official
82
information". He stressed that the basis for an individual right to information
"should be sought in the democratic principle, which constitutes one of the
83
cornerstones of the Community edifice". However, he proposed that the Court
OA
should declare the application for annulment inadmissible mainly because the
o r
Code of Conduct was an "agreement essentially of a policy nature", and that the
Council and Commission were authorised, "pursuant to the power of self-regulation
vested in each of them, to lay down rules independently in this sphere governing the
aspects more directly concerned with the procedures and conditions for examining
80 Ibid. The first paragraph of Article 10 ECHR provides that "[ejveryone has the right to freedom of
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers".
81
point 16. This Covenant entered into force on 23 March 1976. As at November 1999, 144 states
have ratified this Covenant. M. Dixon and R. McCorquodale, Cases and Materials on International
Law (3rd edn., London, Blackstone Press, 2000), 198. Article 19 of the Covenant states that:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special
duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall
only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;














The Court first declared the intervention by the Parliament admissible since the
Parliament sought to show the Council had exceeded the powers of its internal
organisation conferred on it by Article 151(3) EC (now Article 207(3) EC). The
Court said that the Parliament's argument was in common with that of the
Netherlands.87 It then ruled on the application for annulment of the Code of Conduct.
It stated that "an action for annulment must be available in the case of all measures
adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have
legal effects".88 It continued to say that it had appeared, in particular from the Code
of Conduct's preamble and its fifth section entitled "implementation", that "the Code
of Conduct merely foreshadows subsequent decisions intended, unlike the Code, to
have legal effects".89 The Court, therefore, dismissed the application for annulment
of the Code of Conduct, because "the Code is an act which is the expression of
purely voluntary coordination and is therefore not intended in itself to have legal
effects".90
Thirdly, the Court did not accept the Dutch government's arguments for
annulment ofDecision 93/731. It stated that at Community level the importance of a
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order to conform to this trend, ... that the Council deemed it necessary to amend the
rules governing its internal organisation, which had hitherto been based on the
principle of confidentiality".91 It elaborated on why the Council should be
empowered to make the decision in question. It stated that:
So long as the Community legislature has not adopted general rules on the right
of public access to documents held by the Community institutions, the
institutions must take measures as to the processing of such requests by virtue
of their power of internal organisation, which authorises them to take
appropriate measures in order to ensure their internal operation in conformity
with the interests of good administration.92
The Netherlands said the contested decision had constituted an act expressly
designed to have legal effects vis-a-vis citizens, but the Court said that there was
nothing to prevent rules on the internal organisation of an institution's work from
having such effects.93 Consequently, the Court said that, as EC law stood at that time,
the Council was empowered to adopt measures intended to address requests for
access to documents in its possession.94 The Court, therefore, said that the Council
had not circumvented any procedure specially provided for by the Treaty to address
circumstances of this kind and hence was not guilty of any misuse of power.95
In response to the plea alleging infringement of the principle of institutional
balance, the Court said the fact that Decision 93/731 "did not involve the Parliament
in its adoption cannot detract from the Parliament's prerogatives, which include
participation, where provided for in the Treaties, in the process of the drafting of
91
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legislative measures".96 As to the application for annulling Article 22 of the
Council's Rules of Procedure, the Court said the arguments by the Netherlands could
not be upheld because "the measures in question are among those which, as
Community law stands at present, an institution is empowered to take pursuant to its
. • 97
power of internal organisation". The Court, therefore, dismissed the application for
annulling the Code of Conduct, Decision 93/731, and Article 22 of the Rules of
Procedure.
3.3.4 Comment
This subsection examines the views of the Court summarised as follows:
(1) The Code of Conduct has no legal effects.
(2) As the Code of Conduct has no legal effects, it is fair to say the Community
legislature has not adopted general rules on freedom of information.
(3) There are no general rules, so the Council and Commission must deal with
the issue under their powers of internal organisation.
(4) The contested acts should not be annulled because these powers authorised
the institutions to take appropriate measures.
3.3.4.1 Legal effects
The first view is very important since the three others are closely related to it.
Considering the indistinct line between a political statement and a legal measure, the
96
para. 41, n. 61 above.
97
para. 43, n. 61 above.
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Court held that the Code of Conduct was an instrument of no legal effect by
interpreting the term "legal effect" in a narrow manner. However, it should be noted
that the Code of Conduct had a normative quality as the Council and Commission
saw it as obliging them to adopt the two corresponding decisions, though it did not
have full enforceable quality or have a direct impact on citizens in the Union. Second,
the Court addressed the case technically when it defined the Code of Conduct as just
an "agreement" or "simply the expression of purely voluntary coordination" without
legal effects.
The Court lost sight of the fact that the Commission simply adopted the Code of
Conduct without making any change in this "agreement". The adoption by the
Commission indicated that the Code of Conduct was capable of having a normative
quality, as the Commission adopted it without altering the language used in the
measure. In addition, in their request for access to information held by the
Commission, citizens of the Union would apply Commission Decision 94/90 directly
and the Code of Conduct in an indirect manner, as the latter became an annex to the
former. The language used in the Code of Conduct was not purely political but
introduced rules capable ofbeing enforced, though the Court was right in recognising
the instrument to be a non-binding act on a strictly literal interpretation of its nature.
3.3.4.2 General rules
The Court insisted that, as the Code of Conduct had no legal effect, it was fair to say
that the Community legislature had not adopted general rules on freedom of
information. This statement was not entirely clear because the Court made use of the
phrase "general rules" without explaining what it envisaged these rules were. They
could be provisions in a FOI regulation, as a regulation has "general application",
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according to Article 189 EC (now Article 249 EC). These rules could also take the
form of a regulation coupled with an express provision in the EC Treaty. The latter
alternative is presumably what the Court had in mind, as the two types of rule would
definitely help the Court deal with disputes over public access with less difficulty.
Secondly, this vague statement by the Court can also be considered
controversial when we examine the preamble of the Code of Conduct, in which the
Council and Commission stated that they adopted the measure with regard to the
conclusion of the Copenhagen European Council. In June 1993, participants at the
summit asked the Council and Commission to continue the realisation of access to
information, adding that "[t]he aim should be to have all necessary measures in place
by the end of 1993". The term "all necessary measures" expressly revealed that the
two institutions were expected to adopt legally binding general rules and those
designed to implement the guidelines by the end of 1993. If there was no general rule
in the Code of Conduct, could we say the two institutions had failed to meet the
expectations of the Copenhagen European Council?
3.3.4.3 Power of internal organisation
The third point made by the Court was that, as the Community legislature had not
adopted general rules on freedom of information, the Council was entitled to use its
power of internal organisation to take appropriate measures to address the issue.
First, after the Court took the view that the Code of Conduct did not establish
legally binding general rules, it made another statement that permitted the Council to
address freedom of information issues by its power of internal organisation. It stated
98 Article 249(2) EC provides that "[a] regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in
its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States".
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that, as the Community legislature had not adopted any general rules, the Council
and Commission must take measures as to the processing of such requests by virtue
of their power of internal organisation. This statement showed that the Court laid the
primary responsibility to act firmly on legislative shoulders. In other words, the
Court insisted that any further action to delineate a right of access must await the
legislature's further intervention. This view was insufficient to help resolve the
dispute. This is because, under the so-called "co-decision procedure" or "joint
legislative procedure",99 the Council shares legal responsibility for legislation with
the Parliament.100 This meant that, with the permission of the Court, the Council
would be able to continue to address requests for access to information by its internal
rules, such as Decision 93/731, if it declined to adopt general rules, within the
definition of the Court. Therefore, the Council should not have been entitled by the
Court to use its power of internal organisation to deal with the issue.
Second, the ECJ's permission revealed that a Council decision based on the
power of internal organisation would not be annulled even if this measure was
designed to have legal effects vis-a-vis citizens. The philosophy behind this
permission was that freedom of information was simply an extension of the
requirements of good administration rather than an outcome of the belief in
participatory democracy. Third, the Court wrongly recognised the Council's
amendment of the internal rules as an effort to respond to the trend in favour ofmore
access to information. If the Council had intended to conform to this trend, it would
99 This procedure is laid down in Articles 251 EC (ex Article 189b EC), which is a provision inserted
into the EC Treaty by the EU Treaty and modified by the Treaty ofAmsterdam.
100 In addition, under the co-decision procedure, the interaction - between the Commission as the
instigator of proposals and the Council wielding the power of final decision - remains central under
EC procedures that either do not involve the Parliament at all, or merely give it the right to be
consulted and to render a non-binding Opinion. A. Dashwood, 'Issues of Decision-making in the
European Union after Nice' in A. Arnull and D. Wincott (eds.), Accountability and Legitimacy in the
European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), 23.
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have adopted the Code of Conduct without laying down the additional exceptions in
Article 4. The Court did not appear to accept that the Council had attempted to halt
rather than conform to the trend.
The ECJ concluded that the contested acts should not be annulled, as the
internal power authorised the institutions to take appropriate measures "to ensure
their internal operation in conformity with the interests of good administration". The
ECJ permitted the Council to safeguard the "interests of good administration",
without explaining why such interests prevailed over freedom of information. In
addition, this conclusion indicated that the Court unrealistically believed the Council
and Commission were capable of taking proper measures. The fact was that both the
Decision 93/731 and Article 22 of the Council's Rules ofProcedure were not perfect,
as they did not greatly help to improve the democratic order of the Union. In other
words, we should not expect the Council to oblige itself to face democratic scrutiny.
The ECJ held the view that nothing prevented rules concerning the internal
organisation of an institution from having effects vis-a-vis third parties. But whether
a Council decision, which was based on internal power and designed mainly to have
effects vis-a-vis citizens, should be annulled is a distinct question. This was exactly
the question asked by the Netherlands, but the Court did not respond to it. In other
words, the ECJ did not elaborate on whether it was appropriate for the Council to
address FOI issues by means of internal rules.
In response to the plea alleging infringement of the principle of institutional
balance, the Court said that "the fact that it did not involve the Parliament in its
adoption cannot detract from the Parliament's prerogatives, which include
participation, where provided for in the Treaties, in the process of the drafting of
legislative measures". The Court approved the Council's notable exclusion of the
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Parliament's input in the legislative procedure, which were listed in the Code of
Conduct. This statement also suggested that the Parliament had not been barred from
adopting a measure to address FOI-related issues. However, the ECJ did not face the
challenge by the Netherlands, as it did not respond to whether the Council and
Commission's exclusion of the Parliament's input had constituted a subversion of the
EU's democratic processes.
The Parliament contributed to EU FOI protection via its support to the
Netherlands in the present case. Its arguments expressly showed the intention to
facilitate access to information. The efforts revealed the Parliament's perception of
itself as representing democratic accountability in a wide sense.
3.3.4.4 Right of access as a fundamental right
Some writers have said that the present case is a technical one as the Netherlands
contested the legal basis of Decision 93/731,101 but the philosophy behind the
argument is that freedom of information should be considered a fundamental right. A
Danish official said that "[t]he true purpose of the Dutch government's action was
not simply to obtain a declaration of nullity from the Court. On the contrary, the
Government sought recognition from the Court that access to documents is one of the
citizens' fundamental rights".102 Indeed, in addition to the contest to Decision
93/73 l's legal basis, the Netherlands also stressed that "the Council wrongly
categorised as a matter of internal organisation something which in fact constitutes a
101 For example, Professors Deirdre Curtin and Herman Meijers have said that "[tjhis is a technical
case with the Dutch government relying heavily on the fact that the rules ofprocedure of an institution
are not apt to include provisions or to provide the legal basis for provisions which confer rights on
their parties". D. Curtin and H. Meijers, 'Access to European Union Information: an Element of
Citizenship and a Neglected Constitutional Right' in N. Neuwahl and A. Rosas (eds.), The European
Union and Human Rights (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 92.
102 M. Broberg, 'Access to Documents: a General Principle of Community Law?' (2002) 27 European
Law Review 199.
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fundamental right, namely the public's right of access to information".
Although both the Netherlands and Advocate General Tesauro, as we have seen,
raised the key questions concerning a legal right of access, the Court made no
response to the issues. It addressed the case in a technical manner, repeatedly
avoiding a direct response to the claims regarding the existence of a fundamental
right. Professor Patrick Birkinshaw says that "[i]t appeared that the ECJ had failed to
rise to the challenge of the advocate general who argued for a legal, indeed a
constitutional right of access".103 To declare the application for annulment of the
Code of Conduct inadmissible, the Court interpreted the term "legal effects" in a
narrow sense after considering the hazy line between legal and political instruments.
It ruled that the Council was empowered by EC law at that time to adopt the
measures intended to address requests for access to documents in its possession.
Two choices were before the Court when addressing this present case. It had the
choice to declare access to information a fundamental right before annulling the
Code of Conduct, Decision 93/731, and Article 22 of the Rules of Procedure. Or the
Court could both rule the Dutch government's application inadmissible and wait for a
future recognition of the right of access in the EC Treaty. If the Court had taken the
former option, the Council would have had to cooperate with the other major EU
institutions in addressing the issue by drawing up one of the measures listed in
Article 189 (now Article 249) of the Treaty, presumably a regulation. This would
definitely have accelerated FOI protection in the Union. The Court, however, took
the latter option. It enabled the Council and Commission to subvert the Union's
democratic processes by proceeding through the Code of Conduct to exclude input
from the Parliament. A writer has said that "[o]n a positive note, while the Court did
103
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not examine the issue of the nature of the public's right of access, it certainly left the
door open for future judicial developments in this area".104
Although the Court made such a decision, it did not mean that the Court had
failed to realise the significance of the fundamental right at issue. In fact, the Court
stressed that at Community level the importance of the right of access had been
reaffirmed on various occasions, though the judges did not go on to recognise this
right as a fundamental right. It should be noted that it was extremely difficult for the
Court to deliver a revolutionary judgment recognising this right. This was because
there was only Declaration 17 to the Maastricht Treaty, rather than express provisions
on freedom of information in the constitutive Treaties. A declaration's status is not
entirely clear.105 Thus, if the Court had decided to annul the contested rules, it would
have had to elaborate on the nature of freedom of information in its judgment. It was
not surprising that the judges then chose to address the case technically and wait for a
future adoption of general rules, which could take, as we have seen, the form both of
express provisions in the EC Treaty along with a specific FOI regulation.
3.4 The WWFcase106
In Carvel, the CFI addressed the scope of the discretionary exception set out in
104 M. O'Neill, 'The Right of Access to Community - Held Documentation as a General Principle of
EC Law' (1998) 4 European Public Law 412.
105 Professor Trevor Hartley has said that "status of the declarations annexed to the Treaties - some of
which are joint declarations on the part of all the Contracting States and some of which are unilateral
declarations by one Contracting State only - is not entirely clear". T. Hartley, The Foundations of
European Community Law (5th edn., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), 94. Although some
declarations have indirect legal effects, many others were obviously ofpolitical significance alone.
106 Case T-105/95, WWF (United Kingdom) v. Commission [1997] ECR II-313.
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Article 4(2) of Council Decision 93/731, a provision corresponding to the fourth
section, second subsection of the Code of Conduct. In its judgment, the Court said
that "the Council must, when exercising its discretion under Article 4(2), genuinely
balance the interest of citizens in gaining access to its documents against any interest
of its own in maintaining the confidentiality of its deliberations". It demanded that
the Council strike a genuine balance between relevant interests when applying the
second category of discretionary exception set out in the Code of Conduct and
Decision 93/731. But what was the scope of the first category of mandatory
107
exceptions laid down in these measures? Is the Council or Commission allowed to
refuse requests by invoking these two categories of exception concurrently? In the
WWF judgment, the CFI set out the conditions to be met by the Commission when
attempting to invoke these two categories simultaneously.
3.4.1 Facts
The Irish authorities planned to use structural funds to build a visitors' centre at
Mullaghmore in the west of Ireland. The applicant, WWF UK (World Wide Fund for
Nature), a trust incorporated under English law, complained to the European
Commission, objecting that this project would infringe EC environmental law and
• 1 OR
involved a wrongful application of structural funds. The Commission's
107 The mandatory exceptions laid down in Article 4(1) of Council Decision 93/731 mainly
corresponded to those in the fourth section, first subsection of the Code of Conduct. This subsection
couched the list of exemptions in mandatory terms; access will be denied where disclosure could
undermine the various rights and interests, such as privacy and public interest.
108
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investigation indicated that this proposal did not infringe EC law.109 By two letters
written to the Directors General of DG XI (Environment) and DG XVI (Regional
Policies), the applicant, relying on Commission Decision 94/90, requested access to
"all Commission documents relating to the examination of the Mullaghmore
project".110 By two letters, an official within DG XI and the Director General ofDG
XVI informed the applicant of the refusal.111
The applicant submitted confirmatory applications according to the Code of
Conduct,112 to the Secretary General of the Commission,113 who replied by a letter
dated 2 February 1995, in which he reconfirmed the refusals made by the DG XI and
DG XVI,114 saying that "[t]he fundamental principle guiding the consideration of
each request is that the public will have the widest possible access to documents held
by the Commission, albeit with certain exemptions to protect public and private
interests which could be damaged if access to certain documents were permitted, and
to ensure that the Commission can deliberate in confidence".115 He said that "it is
indispensable for the Commission to ensure that a climate of mutual confidence is
maintained, which would risk being severely disrupted by publicity".116
The applicant then brought the action before the CFI.117 The applicant claimed
the Court should annul the Commission decision contained in its letter of 2 February
1995,118 while the Commission contended that the Court should dismiss the
109
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112 An applicant, according to the Code of Conduct's third section entitled "Processing of
confirmatory applications", had the right to apply for a refusal to be reconsidered - a confirmatory
application - within one month.
113
para. 17, n. 106 above.
114
para. 20, n. 106 above.
113
para. 20, n. 106 above.
116
para. 20, n. 106 above.
117
para. 22, n. 106 above.
118
para. 26, n. 106 above.
82
application.119 The applicant relied on two pleas in support of its application. The
first was based on breach of the Code of Conduct and infringement of Decision
94/90. The second was based on infringement of Article 190 EC (now Article 253)
EC.120
The applicant first alleged that the Commission had infringed Decision 94/90 by
mistakenly invoking the exceptions in the Code of Conduct as adopted by Article 1
171
of the Decision. The applicant said Decision 94/90 and the Code of Conduct were
legally binding on the Commission and conferred on persons in the Community a
right of access to documents "to the widest extent possible".122 The Commission
said Decision 94/90 and the Code of Conduct gave rise to "no absolute or
fundamental right of access to documents in favour of citizens".
The applicant said the Commission was not entitled to invoke the exceptions in
a general way but must establish by reference to the particularities of each case the
"imperative reasons" for which the conditions for application of an exception were
177 • • •
fulfilled. The Commission contended that, when it invoked a mandatory exception,
it "had no need to engage in an exercise of balancing its interests against those of the
person who has requested access to the documents". When a discretionary exception
was invoked, the balancing of interests was undertaken.124
The applicant challenged the reference in the contested decision to the exception
in favour of protection of the public interest (hereinafter the "public interest
exception") and to that in favour of protection of the institution's interest in the
119
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confidentiality of its proceedings (hereinafter the "confidentiality exception").125
First, the applicant argued that the Commission had interpreted the public interest
exception too widely by refusing access to all documents relating to infringement
proceedings as to their content, and to the specific circumstances of the particular
1 9 f\
investigation. The applicant also submitted that the Commission had to
demonstrate, by reference to imperative reasons, why disclosure would undermine
• • 127the protection of the public interest. Second, the applicant said the invocation of
the confidentiality exception failed to fulfill the conditions required in the Code of
Conduct. The applicant alleged that the Commission merely claimed that the
documents sought concerned its internal deliberations, without balancing its interests
against the applicant's right of access. The applicant emphasised that the
Commission had failed to provide the necessary "imperative reasons", contrary to the
128
requirements of the case law.
The Commission denied such accusations. As to the public interest exception, it
stressed that the exemption was one of the mandatory exceptions.129 It contended it
was clear from the Code of Conduct's wording that once there was a danger that
disclosure of particular documents would undermine the public interest, the
1 TO
application of the exception was obligatory. With regard to the confidentiality
exception, the Commission argued that the use of the word "may" in the category
showed that it had a discretion. It said, as the invoked confidentiality related to the
examination and investigation of infringements, rather than internal procedures, it
was fair to say that the confidentiality in question involved exactly the same elements
125
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as those of the public interest exception. Thus, it said its "entitlement to invoke the
former exception is precisely the same as its entitlement to rely upon the latter".131
3.4.2 Held
First, the CFI considered that the letter from the Commission's Secretary General,
dated 2 February 1995, contained the decision challenged in the present case.132 As
to the invocation of the exceptions in the Code of Conduct, the Court said where a
general principle was established and exceptions to that principle were laid down, the
exceptions should be construed and applied strictly, in a manner which did not defeat
the application of the general rule.133 The CFI considered that the distinction
between these two categories of exception in the Code of Conduct was explained by
the nature of the interest which the categories sought respectively to protect. The
Court said that:
The first category, comprising the "mandatory exceptions", effectively protects
the interest of third parties or of the general public in cases where disclosure of
particular documents by the institution concerned would risk causing harm to
persons who could legitimately refuse access to the documents if held in their
own possession. On the other hand, in the second category, relating to the
internal deliberations of the institution, it is the interest of the institution alone
which is at stake.134
The Court said the Commission was entitled to invoke jointly an exception within the
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first category and one within the second to refuse a request.135 However, the Court
stressed that the Commission should not "confine itself to invoking the possible
opening of an infringement procedure as justification, under the heading of
protecting the public interest, for refusing access to the entirety of the documents
identified in a request made by a citizen".136 The Court said the Commission had
been required to indicate the reasons for which it considered that the documents
detailed in the request which it received were about the possible opening of an
i 'in
infringement procedure. The Court said the contested decision, however, confined
its reasons for refusing that request solely to the confidentiality exception, as had
been indicated in the letter from DG XVI, as there was no reference to the public
interest exception in the texts.138
The Court stated that it did not appear from the DG XVI's letter or the contested
decision that the Commission had undertaken a genuine balancing of the interests
involved as required by the Code of Conduct, because both the decision and the letter
confined themselves to mention the confidentiality exception and made no mention
of balancing of the interests involved.139 Thirdly, the Court stated that the contested
decision had referred expressly to the letter from DG XVI, which made no reference
to the public interest exception.140 Thus, the contested decision did not meet the
requirement to state reasons in former Article 190 EC and must be annulled.141
The Court stated that the Commission had given no indication of its reasons for
considering that the documents covered by the request to DG XI were "all related to
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a possible infringement proceeding".142 Also, in its letter, DG XI had not indicated
either the reasons for which the requested documents were in its view all covered by
the public interest exception.143 Thus, as the Commission refrained from indicating
that all the documents requested from DG XI were covered by the public interest
exception and relied on the confidentiality exception, the applicant could believe that
part of the documents held by DG XI were refused on the basis that they were
covered by the confidentiality exception alone. The Court stated that "[njeither the
contested decision nor the letter from DG XI enabled the applicant and, therefore, the
Court to ascertain whether the Commission had fulfilled its obligation to undertake a
genuine balancing of the interests involved as required by the Code of Conduct".144
The Court stated that, in so far as the contested decision dealt with the request
made by the applicant to DG XI, it again failed to meet the requirements to state
reasons which were laid down in former Article 190 EC and must be annulled.145
The Court concluded that the contested decision must be annulled.146
3.4.3 Comment
In Carvel, the CFI set limits to the operation of the second category of discretionary
exception by introducing the balancing test. As the Council's letters to the applicants
indicated it had considered that it was obliged to refuse the request in question, the
CFI annulled the decisions concerned. In WWF, in his letter to the applicant, the
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Commission's Secretary General applied different terms, stressing that "[t]he
fundamental principle guiding the consideration of each request is that the public will
have the widest possible access to documents held by the Commission", but this
empty statement did not lead the Court to uphold the refusal. It was rather because
the Commission's invocation of the two categories of mandatory and discretionary
exceptions was found inappropriate.
The applicant argued that the Commission was not entitled to invoke the
exceptions in a general way, without setting out the basis for their application in the
particular circumstances. As to the public interest exception, the WWF said the
Commission had read this exception too widely, and it did not refer to any imperative
reasons to demonstrate why the disclosure would undermine protection of the public
interest. As to the confidentiality exception, the applicant said the Commission
neither balanced relevant interests nor put forward any imperative reasons in the
refusal.
The Commission emphasised the nature of the mandatory exception before
attempting to extend the scope of this public interest exception, in order to eliminate
the distinction between the public interest and confidentiality exceptions. The
Commission contended that when relying on a mandatory exception, it had no need
to balance its interests against those of the person who requested access to the
documents. Secondly, it said that, as the confidentiality at issue concerned the
investigation of infringements, rather than internal procedures, exactly the same
elements were at play as those raised by the public interest exception. The
Commission also argued that the use of the word "may" in the exception relating to
internal proceedings had shown that in this instance it had a discretion. Thus, it
considered that its "entitlement to invoke the former exception is precisely the same
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as its entitlement to rely upon the latter". This highly contentious statement indicated
that the Commission had misunderstood the term "discretion", because it believed
that it was allowed under the second category of discretionary exception to refuse a
request on the basis of considerations applicable to the first category of mandatory
exceptions. Although the Commission did not expressly reveal whether it was
invoking the former or latter exception, it apparently planned to apply the former as
it was mandatory. If the Commission was allowed to do so, it successfully eliminated
the distinction between the two categories of mandatory and discretionary
exceptions.
The Court disagreed with the Commission and stated that the exceptions should
be strictly applied. The judgment was mainly based on the following grounds:
1. The Commission should establish why it considered that the documents
sought related to the possible opening of an infringement procedure.
2. The contested decision confined its reasons for refusing that request
solely to the confidentiality exception, as there was no reference to the
public interest exception in the decision or the letter from DG XVI.
3. The Commission did not undertake a genuine balancing of the interests
involved as required by the confidentiality exception.
The judgment revealed that the Court, first, considered that the Commission must
establish why the requested documents related to the possible opening of an
investigation. In other words, the Commission must explain why the documents
related to the protection of the public interest if that was what it was relying on.
Second, the Court concluded that the contested decision had confined its reasons for
refusing that request solely to the confidentiality exception. It bears noting that the
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scope of this exception in the Court's view was much narrower than that of the
Commission. Finally, as the Commission did not undertake a genuine balancing of
the interests involved, the contested decision was annulled.
As regards whether freedom of information constituted a fundamental right, the
applicant said Decision 94/90 and the Code of Conduct conferred on persons in the
EC a right of access to documents "to the widest extent possible", but the
Commission said the texts gave rise to "no absolute or fundamental right of access to
documents in favour of citizens". As in Carvel, the CFI avoided making a statement
about this issue in WWF. However, this does not mean that the CFI made no effort to
provide citizens in the EU with more FOI protection. In fact, the CFI elevated
protection of this freedom to a level similar to that of a fundamental right, when it
elaborated on the methods of stricter invocation of the two categories of exemption.
3.5 The Interporc I and Carlsen cases
Exceptions set out in the fourth section, first subsection of the Code of Conduct, to
which Article 4(1) of Council Decision 93/731 corresponded, comprised the
"mandatory exceptions", and protected the "interest of third parties or of the general
public", according to the WWF judgment. The CFI also said, as to the fourth section,
second subsection of the Code of Conduct, which Article 4(2) of Decision 93/731
adopted, "it is the interest of the institution alone which is at stake". This distinction
seemed to be clear: the first category contained mandatory exceptions which mainly
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addressed the interest of the public, while the second category established the
discretionary exception, securing the interests of the Commission or Council.
The distinction was, however, shown to be hazy. It is also doubtful whether the
CFI was right in WWF when it stated that the interest protected by the second
category of discretionary exception solely related to the Commission. Various types
of documents, for instance, those concerning EC legislation and court proceedings,
can be discussed at the meetings of the Commission and Council. As draft legislation
and court proceedings can have a strong impact on citizens of the Union, the two
institutions could, first, apply the first category of mandatory exceptions to deny a
request for access to information relating to legislation and court proceedings. Such a
refusal could be made on the basis that release of the information could damage one
of the interests listed in the first category of mandatory exceptions, in particular, the
public interest. Second, the institutions could choose to apply the second category of
discretionary exception in a refusal on the ground that disclosure could jeopardise the
confidentiality of their proceedings. They could also concurrently apply the two
provisions in a refusal, the third approach available when refusing a request.
The CFI might have imperfectly drawn the line between the two categories of
exemption, but the Court should be praised for attempting to distinguish the two
since the Court drew the distinction to improve FOI protection and to remedy the
flawed rules establishing the exceptions. These rules provided the two institutions
with excessive discretion, i.e. the three approaches noted above, when making
refusals. A literal interpretation of the two categories of exemption would suggest
that there was only a vague dividing line between them, and Carvel and WWF
revealed that the two institutions and the CFI interpreted the distinction in a very
different manner. The institutions, which attempted to take advantage of the
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indistinct line, failed to indicate expressly which of the two provisions they were
relying on in their refusals. It was the applicants and the CFI that channelled the
disputes in Carvel to the second category of discretionary exception and in WWF to
the first category ofmandatory exceptions.
In Carvel, the CFI stated that "the Council must, when exercising its discretion
under Article 4(2) [of Council Decision 93/731], genuinely balance the interest of
citizens in gaining access to its documents against any interest of its own in
maintaining the confidentiality of its deliberations". The balancing of interest
obligation placed on the Council was a difficult one. In WWF, what the applicant
requested were documents relating to the Commission's examination of an Irish
government construction project. The Commission could have chosen to apply the
discretionary exception to refuse the request, but it did not do so. The Carvel
judgment might have had an influence on the Commission's strategy in the WWF
case. The Commission tried to invoke both of the provisions, which was exactly the
third of the approaches noted above. However, this approach was unsuccessful, as
the CFI said the contested decision was based solely on the confidentiality exception
and no balancing of relevant interests was undertaken. To put it differently, the Court
held that the Commission was not entitled to apply the two provisions jointly without
realising there was a distinction between them.
These two cases reveal that the Court considered the two categories to be
distinct, but the Council and Commission read the categories as overlapping and tried
to avoid the balancing test. The two categories provided the institutions with
disproportionate power to refuse a request. Without judicial scrutiny over the
institutions, there would have been no balancing of interests as the public would have
had no legal means to secure its freedom of information. The role of the Court was
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very important as it established the duty to balance the institutions' interests in
confidentiality with that of the citizen in seeking disclosure of information. The
following subsections examine two judgments delivered by the CFI in 1998, to see
whether the Court was prepared to elaborate further on the scope of the exceptions or
alter its previous position.
3.5.1 The 1998 Interporc I case147
3.5.1.1 Facts and ruling
Under the Community's "Hilton quota", certain quantities of high-quality beef,
"Hilton beef' from Argentina, could be imported into the Community free of levies,
but a certificate of authenticity from the Argentine authorities was required.148
Germany sought post-clearance recovery of import duty from the applicant, Interporc
Im- und Export GmbH, a German company, after this firm presented falsified
certificates of authenticity to the German authorities.149 The applicant requested
remission of that duty and claimed that it presented the documents "in good faith and
that certain deficiencies in the control procedure were attributable to the competent
Argentine authorities and to the Commission".150 The Commission decided on 26
January 1996 that the applicant's request for the remission was "not justified".151
The company then requested access to 10 categories of document relating to the
control procedures for imports of Hilton beef and to the inquiries which gave rise to
147 Case T-124/96, Interporc Im- und Export GmbH v. Commission [ 1998] ECR 11-231.
148
para. 9, n. 147 above.
149
para. 11, n. 147 above.
150
para. 11, n. 147 above.
151
para. 12, n. 147 above.
93
Germany's decision to effect the recovery of import duty.152
The Commission refused this request and the firm then made a confirmatory
application.153 The applicant and two other German firms later sought the annulment
of the Commission's decision of 26 January 1996, which was the Primex case.154 By
letter of 29 May 1996, the institution rejected the confirmatory application. In this
letter, which later became the contested decision in this Interporc I case, the
Commission said the requested documents concerned the Commission's 26 January
1996 decision, which had become the subject-matter of an application for annulment
in the Primex case.155 It added that "[consequently, the exception for protection of
the public interest (court proceedings) is applicable".156
The applicant brought this action, seeking annulment of the contested
decision.157 This firm alleged infringement of the Code of Conduct, Decision 94/90,
and Article 190 EC (now Article 253 EC).158 It said the Commission should weigh
the interests which the exception in question was intended to protect against the
overall aim of the Code of Conduct and establish for each document the "imperative
reasons" justifying application of the exception.159 It added that "[t]he Commission
is wrong to consider, relying on the exception for protection of the public interest
(court proceedings), that it is empowered to refuse access to any document relating to
152
para. 13, n. 147 above. The documents include, for instance, (1) the declarations of the Member
States of quantities of Hilton Beef imported from Argentina between 1985 and 1992, (2) the
declarations of the Argentine authorities of quantities ofHilton Beef exported to the Community in the
same period, (3) the Commission's internal records drawn up on the basis of those declarations, and (4)
the documents relating to the opening of the Hilton quota.
153
para. 16, n. 147 above.
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para. 17, n. 147 above. See Case T-50/96, Primex Produkte Import-Export and Others v.
Commission [1998] ECR 11-3773.
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para. 18, n. 147 above.
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paras. 20 and 23, n. 147 above.
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paras. 25 and 26, n. 147 above.
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para. 30, n. 147 above. In this regard, the applicant relied on the order of the ECJ in the 1990
Zwartveld case, in particular, paras 11 and 12 of the judgment. Case C-2/88, Zwartveld and others
[1990] ECR 1-3365.
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a decision which is the subject of an action for annulment".160 In response, the
Commission said the public interest exception relating to court proceedings
authorised it not to make available to the public all documents relating to pending
proceedings. For that exception to be applicable, it considered it was enough that the
documents requested concerned the pending proceedings and related to their
subject-matter.161
Secondly, as to possible infringement of former Article 190 EC, the applicant
said the contested decision did not meet the requirements of that provision.162
According to the applicant, first, "the contested decision does not reveal whether the
special features of the case in issue were analysed. In addition, the Commission did
not specify the reasons for which it considers that the exception for protection of the
public interest (court proceedings) is applicable".163 It added that "the Commission
failed, in breach of its obligations, to state for each document the 'imperative
reasons' for which disclosure would jeopardise protection of the public interest".164
The Commission denied this accusation, saying it was not obliged to prove, for each
and every document, that disclosure could damage the public interest.165
The Court examined the exceptions in the Code of Conduct, especially the
distinction between the two categories of mandatory and discretionary exceptions,166
stating that a Commission decision concerning the first category of mandatory
exceptions, "must state the reasons on which it is based, in accordance with Article
para. 31, n. 147 above.
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190 of the Treaty".167 The Court said it had consistently held that "the reasoning
required by that provision must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the
Community authority which adopted the contested measure so as to enable the
persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure in order to protect their
• 168
rights, and the Court to exercise its power of review". The Court, therefore, said
the statement of the reasons for a refusal must contain the specific reasons for which
the Commission considered that disclosure of the documents requested was
precluded by one of the exceptions in the first category.169
The Court stated that "however, the contested decision contains only the
conclusion that the exception for protection of the public interest (court proceedings)
is applicable. It provides no explanation, even for categories of documents, from
which it might be ascertained whether all the documents requested ... indeed fall
170within the scope of the exception relied upon". The Court, therefore, decided that
the contested decision must be annulled.171
3.5.1.2 Comment
We focus on why the Commission would invoke the first rather than the second
category of exception in its refusal. The two categories of exception, as we have seen,
provided the Commission and Council with three approaches to refuse requests. In
this case, the documents sought obviously related to the second category, because
what the applicant had requested were the Commission's control procedures for
imports of Hilton beef, including the institution's internal records drawn up on the
167
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basis of those declarations, and the documents relating to the opening of the Hilton
quota. It would not be surprising if the Commission had resorted to the category of
discretionary exception, arguing that the refusal was aimed to secure confidentiality
of the Commission's proceedings.
However, in relation to the discretionary exception, the CFI had placed the
obligation to balance relevant interests on the Council and Commission in Carvel
and WWF. This might explain why the Commission chose to apply the first category
rather than the second. The Commission stressed that the public interest exception
relating to court proceedings authorised it not to make available to the public all
documents relating to pending proceedings. However, if the applicant and the two
other German companies had not brought the Primex case before the Court, it would
be fair to predict that the Commission would have resorted to the second category.
As the Commission invoked the public interest exception, the scope of the first
category of mandatory exceptions was a major issue in this case. The refusal was
based on the reason presented in the contested decision, namely, that the 10
categories of document related to an application for annulment. Thus, the
Commission relied on "the exception for protection of the public interest (court
proceedings)". Both this statement and the Commission's argument before the Court
seemed to be correct because the first category of exceptions was indeed mandatory.
The Court agreed that court proceedings closely related to the public interest, but it
held that this ground alone was insufficient justification for the refusal since there
should be control over the operation of even the mandatory exceptions. In other
words, this provision did not entitle the Commission to refuse the request without
providing further reasoning.
What reasons should be presented to support such a refusal? The CFI accepted
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the applicant's view in relation to former Article 190 EC. The CFI said a
Commission decision concerning the first category "must state the reasons on which
it is based, in accordance with Article 190 of the Treaty". The Court stressed that a
refusal "must contain the specific reasons for which the Commission considered that
disclosure of the documents requested was precluded by one of the exceptions
provided for in the first category of exceptions". The Commission must elaborate
why the disclosure could jeopardise one of the first-category exceptions. This
statement indicated that, as with the invocation of the second category of exemption,
the first category should also operate within strict limits, even though it was a
mandatory provision. The contested decision was annulled as the Commission had
not met this requirement.
The Court should be praised for laying down such clear obligations on the
institution to improve FOI protection. Its approach was very different from the literal
interpretation of the first category apparently preferred by the Commission.
3.5.2 The Carlsen case172
3.5.2.1 Facts and ruling
On an examination in proceedings for interim relief, Hanne Norup Carlsen and nine
other applicants made a request to the Council for "access to opinions of legal
services of the Community institutions concerning particular draft legislation",
information held by the Council.173 The Council refused the request on the basis that
172 Case T-610/97, Carlsen and others v. Council [1998] ECR 11-485.
173
para. 5, n. 172 above.
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the "disclosure ... could be detrimental to the public interest both in 'the
maintenance of legal certainty and the stability of Community law', and in 'the
Council's being able to obtain independent legal advice'".174
The CFI said the statement of reasons required by Article 190 EC (now Article
253 EC) "must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the institution which
enacted the measure so as to inform the persons concerned of the justification for the
measure adopted and to enable the Court to exercise its powers of review". It stated
that the refusal concerned did not "appear to be in breach of the Code of Conduct ...
or of Decision 93/731" (emphasis added),175 because the reasons presented by the
Council "must be considered to be sufficient in the context of an application for
interim measures".176 It added that, "the absence of a reference, in the statement of
reasons, to the specific effects of releasing documents having such a content does not,
177taken alone, render the statement of reasons inadequate".
The CFI stated the documents sought were "merely working instruments", and
disclosure of them could "give rise to uncertainty with regard to the legality of
Community measures and have a negative effect on the stability of the Community
legal order and the proper functioning of the institutions, which are matters of public
matters". It said "those interests are not expressly referred to in the list of exceptions
provided for in the Code of Conduct and Decision 93/731",178 but "it is the
protection of the public interest in general which may justify refusal to grant access
to documents, and accordingly it would not be right to limit the scope of the concept
para. 4, n. 172 above.
175
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of the public interest by reducing it to the five cases set out in [the] brackets".179
3.5.2.2 Comment
The information sought in this case comprised "opinions of legal services of the
Community institutions concerning particular draft legislation", a category not
among the five types of information set out in the bracket contained within the public
180interest provision. The Council, however, said the request should be refused on
the ground that the "disclosure ... could be detrimental to the public interest both in
'the maintenance of legal certainty and the stability of Community law', and in 'the
Council's being able to obtain independent legal advice'".
As in Interporc /, the CFI stressed that reasons should be given for the refusal,
but it apparently lowered the obligation put on the Commission in the present case.
In Interporc I, the CFI said the Commission must detail the reasons why disclosure
of each document sought could bring into play one of the exceptions in the first
category, though it was a mandatory provision. The Council indeed presented two
reasons for the refusal in Carlsen. However, prior to its refusal, the institution had
apparently failed to establish why release of the specific information requested could
damage "the maintenance of legal certainty and the stability of Community law" and
"the Council's being able to obtain independent legal advice". Nonetheless, the Court
held that reference to the two reasons "must be considered to be sufficient", leaving a
number of questions unanswered.
para. 5, n. 172 above.
180 The five categories of information concerned public security, international relations, and monetary
stability, as well as court proceedings, inspections and investigations.
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A. Legal certainty
As regards the term "legal certainty" - sometimes referred to as "legal security"
(,securite juridique, in French), it is one of the general principles recognised by the
181 • • •
Community Court. It is a wide reaching concept that cannot be easily explained in
a few words, though predictability is its core aspect. The most important
sub-concepts of legal certainty are non-retroactivity, the protection of vested rights,
and legitimate expectations.182 Nevertheless, the Council failed to elaborate on
which of the elements of legal certainty could be damaged by disclosure in this case.
The CFI said in its judgment that the documents sought were "merely working
instruments", adding that disclosure of them could "give rise to uncertainty with
regard to the legality of Community measures and have a negative effect on the
stability of the Community legal order and the proper functioning of the institutions".
This view corresponded to the Council's claim, but the Court also failed to check
whether disclosure of the information sought could jeoparidse any of the components
of legal certainty noted above. In other words, the Court failed to consider whether
the Council had established why the information sought could have a negative effect
on the stability of the EC legal order.
It is possible that there could be a difference between the legal advice offered by
the legal services and legislation later adopted by the institutions, and that this might
lead to adverse comments on the legislation or even criticism of the legal services or
the institutions. This is apparently a result that the Council may seek to avoid. The
Council can thus obtain legal opinions and discuss them internally under the name of
protecting its ability to receive "independent legal advice". Reliance on this claim
181
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182
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helps the Council and its legal service escape scrutiny by the European public. The
statement made by the Council arguably related more to its fear of democratic
scrutiny than a desire to protect legal certainty. Without further development, both
the Council and the Court's opinions seem insufficient to justify the refusal.
B. Nature of legal advice
The Council said it refused the request on, inter alia, the ground that disclosure of
the information sought could be detrimental to the public interest in "the Council's
being able to obtain independent legal advice". The Court stated that "it would not be
right to limit the scope of the concept of the public interest by reducing it to the five
cases set out in [the] brackets". However, what the Court did not say, at least not
explicitly, was where the proper limit was, and whether all legal advice prepared by
the legal services should be understood as included.
These views can be considered from the following perspectives. The exceptions
set out in the Code of Conduct and Council Decision 93/731 were extensive. The
Court should be very careful when extending the already broad scope of the
exceptions. This extension would set an additional limit to the freedom of
information offered by the Code of Conduct and the corresponding Council and
Commission Decisions. As Professor Deirdre Curtin has said, "[t]he very wide
interpretation of public interest accepted by the CFI in Carlsen gives the Courts
considerable margin in fleshing out its scope in practice, and does not seem to take
account of the fact that exceptions to general principles must be construed
narrowly".183
183 D. Curtin, 'Citizens' Fundamental Right of Access to EU Information: an Evolving Digital
PassepartoutT (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 34.
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We should also examine the main issue of this case - the nature of the
information sought, i.e. opinions prepared by the legal services of the Council and
Commission. The CFI did not address this issue in its judgment, but such analysis
will help determine whether there is "independent legal advice", and whether the
Council should be allowed to obtain this kind of opinion without being scrutinised by
the public. To analyse the nature of the legal advice requires consideration of the role
of the legal services within the two institutions. There are a number of specialised
services within the Council and Commission, including legal services. The legal
services provide the institutions with legal advice, which can be mainly divided into
opinions on draft legislation, international negotiations, and those relating to court
184 ... . . .
proceedings. Legal advice is privileged and thus has a unique nature because it is
absolutely necessary to ensure that legal professionals are able to offer legal advice
without being subject to undue influence.
The Court rightly held that legal advice fell within the scope of the public
interest exception in the Code of Conduct. It bears noting that it is the ability of the
Council to obtain independent legal advice that should be protected under the public
interest exception. To express the wish to secure this ability should not have been
regarded as a statement of sufficient reasons required by former Article 190 EC.
What the CFI should have examined was whether the Council had established why
release of the legal opinions at issue would prevent it from obtaining independent
legal advice. However, the CFI accepted that merely to indicate the wish was
184 The legal service under the Commission "provides comprehensive in-house assistance to the
Commission and all its departments. Its resources have to be deployed to cover all Commission
activities and areas of responsibility. In each area, it must be able to assist the Commission in its
functions of drafting legislation and conducting international negotiations". The legal service alone
can act as agent of the Commission in legal proceedings before the Community Court, the EFTA
Court, and the WTO panels. A detailed description of the role of this legal service is available at its
website: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/legal_service/index_en.htm. The Council's legal
service has similar function.
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sufficient. Therefore, the Council and Commission might consider that the public
interest exception entitles them to refuse access to legal opinions on a systematic
basis.
C. Application of the Code of Conduct
The CFI's application of the Code of Conduct in this case deserves specific attention.
It should be noted that, in the 1996 Netherlands judgment, the ECJ considered the
Code of Conduct to be a non-binding measure. The ECJ said in the judgment that
"the Code is an act which is the expression of purely voluntary coordination and is
therefore not intended in itself to have legal effects". However, the CFI applied the
Code of Conduct in this case as if it were legally binding. For instance, the Court
used the terms "in breach of the Code of Conduct ... or of Decision 93/731",
suggesting that both the Code of Conduct and Decision 93/731 were of a normative
quality.
3.6 The van der Wal case
Documents connected with court proceedings are one category among the five set
out in the bracket contained within the Code of Conduct's public interest exception.
This court proceedings exception is enshrined in the provision to secure the right to a
fair hearing, a fundamental right assured by Article 6 of the European Convention on
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Human Rights and in constitutional traditions of most democracies in the world.185
What could, however, be controversial in relation to FOI protection is the scope of
the court proceedings exception. The right of EU citizens to a fair hearing by an
independent tribunal could be jeopardised if the scope is narrowly drawn. However,
the EU institutions could take advantage of this exception to avoid democratic
scrutiny if the scope is unduly extensive. In the analysis of the van der Wal case, we
examine the efforts by the CFI186 and ECJ187 to limit the invocation of this
exception.
3.6.1 Facts
Mr. Gerard van der Wal, a Belgian lawyer, dealt with EC competition law cases. He
requested copies of three letters sent by the Commission's Directorate-General for
Competition to three courts in Diisseldorf, St Brieuc, and Paris, under Notice 93/C
39/05 on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in applying
Articles 85 and 86 EC (now Articles 81 and 82 EC).188 The Director-General of DG
IV (Competition) refused his request on the ground that disclosure of the letters
185 Article 6 ECHR provides that:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and
public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of
the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the
court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests ofjustice.
186 Case T-83/96, Gerard van der Wal v. Commission [1998] ECR 11-545.
187 Joined cases C-174/98 and C-l 89/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands and Gerard van der Wal v.




would be detrimental to "the protection of the public interest (court proceedings)".189
The applicant made a confirmatory application to the Secretariat-General but by
letter dated 29 March 1996, the Secretary-General confirmed DG IV's refusal as
disclosure "could undermine the protection of the public interest and, more
specifically, the sound administration of justice".190 The applicant then brought this
action before the CFI. He claimed that the CFI should annul the decision in the
March 1996 letter, while the Commission contended that the Court should dismiss
the application.191
The applicant raised two pleas, alleging infringement of Commission Decision
94/90 and Article 190 EC (now Article 253 EC).192 In the first plea, he said the court
proceedings exception in the Code of Conduct could not be relied on in this case
because it applied only to proceedings to which the Commission is a party.193 If the
Court disagreed on this view, he alternatively submitted that "disclosure of the
documents in issue does not undermine the cooperation between the Commission and
national courts or adversely affect the public interest".194 He said that "the
information which might be provided by the Commission in the context of
cooperation with national courts is not in any way confidential".1 5 The Commission,
first, rejected the view that the court proceedings exception applied only to the
proceedings to which the Commission was a party.196 It stressed that "[t]he rule set
out in the Code of Conduct is broad enough to include Commission letters drafted in
para. 12, n. 186 above.
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the context of cooperation with national courts".197 Second, it said that "[disclosure
of the replies given by the Commission in the context of the Notice could indeed
1 QR
undermine the protection of the public interest (court proceedings)". The
Commission also said it "plays a secondary role vis-a-vis the national court" in the
context of its cooperation with national courts, adding that its role "can be compared
to that of an expert commissioned by a court to provide information or an
opinion".199
In his second plea alleging infringement of former Article 190 EC, the applicant
said the statement of reasons given by the Commission was insufficient.200 However,
the Commission said the refusal was based on sufficient grounds as its letters
201
"clearly indicate the reasons for which the application for access was refused".
The CFI first addressed the plea that alleged infringement of Decision 94/90. It
considered the extent to which the Commission was entitled to invoke the court
709 • ...
proceedings exception to refuse the request. It said it had drawn inspiration from
Article 6 ECHR and that "[t]he right of every person to a fair hearing by an
independent tribunal means, inter alia, that both national and Community courts
must be free to apply their own rules of procedure concerning the powers of the
judge, the conduct of the proceedings in general and the confidentiality of the
70"j
documents on the file in particular". It held that the court proceedings exception
in Decision 94/90 was "designed to ensure respect for that fundamental right".204
Thus, the scope of that exception entitled the Commission to "rely on that exception
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even when it is not itself party to the court proceedings which, in the particular case,
90S
justify the protection of the public interest". Moreover, it stated that:
[A] distinction must be drawn between documents drafted by the Commission
for the sole purposes of a particular court case, such as the letters in the present
case, and other documents which exist independently of such proceedings.
Application of the exception based on the protection of the public interest can
be justified only in respect of the first category of documents."206
The CFI declined to uphold the first plea because "[tjhose letters thus concerned
points of law raised in the context of specific pending proceedings".207
As to the second plea alleging that the Commission's reasons were inadequate,
the CFI did not accept this since "the Commission clearly indicated the grounds on
which it had applied the exception based on the need to protect the public interest
(court proceedings) in respect of the three replies requested, whilst taking account of
208the nature of the information contained therein". The applicant later appealed this
decision to the ECJ.
3.6.2 Held
The ECJ, which did not dispute the CFI's view on the right to a fair hearing, set aside
the CFI's judgment since not all the documents sought concerned Article 6 ECHR.209
The ECJ said documents supplied by the Commission to national courts could be
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those "in which the Commission merely expresses an opinion of a general nature,
independent of the data relating to the case pending before the national court".210 It
said such documents "may also contain legal or economic analyses, drafted on the
911
basis of data supplied by the national court". The ECJ said that "[compliance
with national procedural rules is sufficiently safeguarded if the Commission ensures
that disclosure of the documents does not constitute an infringement of national
212 • ....law". It annulled the refusal, stating that the Commission infringed Decision
94/90 because it did not verify whether the documents requested constituted legal or
economic analyses of the type noted above, and "if that were so, without ensuring
• 213that their disclosure was not contrary to national law".
3.6.3 Comment
The issue here is whether the three letters in question, which contained legal opinions
provided by the Commission to three national courts, should have been made
available to the public. The dispute mainly concerned three separate but interrelated
issues that should be taken into account. First, we must consider the legal basis of the
court proceedings exception. Second, the nature of the information obtained on the
basis of cooperation between the Commission and national courts should also be
analysed, to determine whether all the information offered by the Commission falls
within the scope of the exception. Third, if the answer is positive, it is unnecessary to
210
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examine the character of the information sought by the applicant, as it should be
excluded from openness despite its nature. Nonetheless, such an examination will be
of great importance if only part of the information falls within the area that should
not be made available to the public.
The applicant and the Commission's arguments indicated that they addressed
the controversy in this case without carefully considering these three issues discussed
further below. For instance, the applicant said before the CFI that "disclosure of the
documents in issue does not undermine the cooperation between the Commission and
national courts or adversely affect the public interest". The Commission said before
the CFI that "[disclosure of the replies given by the Commission in the context of
the Notice could indeed undermine the protection of the public interest (court
proceedings)". These arguments show that both parties touched on the first two
issues noted above, but they addressed them inadequately. The applicant simply
assumed that the disclosure would not undermine the public interest, while the
Commission held a contrary view, both failing to show a firm legal basis for their
statements.
3.6.3.1 Basis of the court proceedings exception
The CFI considered the extent to which the court proceedings exception entitled the
Commission to refuse the request. What the CFI did first was to elaborate on the
legislative basis of the exception, i.e. the first of the three major issues above. It said
the right of every person to a fair hearing by an independent tribunal means, inter
alia, that both national and Community courts must be free to apply their own rules
of procedure concerning the powers of the judge, the conduct of the proceedings in
general and the confidentiality of the documents on the file in particular. The CFI
110
said this exception was designed to better protect the right to fair hearing, which was
quoted in the ECJ judgment, indicating that the ECJ agreed on this interpretation.214
3.6.3.2 Information offered on basis of cooperation
What should then be considered is whether all types of information offered by the
Commission under the Notice fell within the scope of the court proceeding exception,
the second of the three issues mentioned above. The CFI gave an answer to this
question, which was that application of this exception could be justified only in
respect of documents drafted by the Commission for the sole purposes of a particular
case rather than those existing independently of such proceedings. The second
category of documents mentioned by the CFI, namely those that exist independently
of such proceedings, was of little controversy, because granting access could in no
way undermine the right to a fair hearing. Nevertheless, we doubt whether the CFI
adequately delimited the scope of the first category. The right to a fair hearing, in the
CFI's words, means that both national and Community courts must be free to apply
their own rules of procedure, but release of not all the documents drafted for a
particular case would infringe the courts' right to apply freely its procedural rules.
According to the Notice, national courts may ask the Commission and in particular
its Directorate-General for Competition for "information of a procedural nature".
National courts may also consult the Commission on points of law regarding the
application of former Articles 85 and 86 EC. All the responses from the Commission
are prepared for pending cases, but it is unlikely that disclosure of all the answers
would jeopardise the right to a fair hearing.
214
para. 7, n. 187 above.
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3.6.3.3 Nature of the information at issue
A serious point thus concerns the nature of the information sought by the applicant in
this case. It was unlikely that disclosure of each of the opinions at issue would be
detrimental to the national courts' freedom to apply procedural rules. This was, firstly,
because, as the Commission stated before the CFI, the Commission only played a
secondary role vis-a-vis the national courts. The national courts remained entitled to
apply their own procedural rules. Secondly, where individuals decide to avoid
judicial proceedings after accessing the legal opinions provided by the Commission,
such a decision could in no way stop the national courts from freely applying their
procedural laws. Finally, it is not the case that access to all the legal opinions from
the Commission would jeopardise the right to a fair hearing. As Professor Deirdre
Curtin said before the ECJ judgment that:
[Bjecause [the three letters] had been produced at the request of a national
court for use in national court proceedings the fundamental right to a fair
hearing in the view of the CFI took precedence over the citizens' right of
access. I suggest that this is a very questionable approach and that it is not at
91 S
all clear the "right to a fair hearing" could indeed be affected.
As long as the disclosure of the content of the documents would not infringe the
domestic procedural law in question, access to the information should not be denied.
This was why the ECJ held that "[compliance with national procedural rules is
215 Professor Deirdre Curtin asked "whose right to a fair hearing was at stake by granting access to
documents prepared by the Commission (on points of law and its customary practices) at the request
of the national court". Therefore, she said in 2000 before the ECJ judgment that the reasoning of the
CFI on this point was fundamentally flawed, and she suspected it might not be upheld on appeal to the
ECJ. Curtin, n. 183 above, at 34. See also S. Peers, 'The European Court of Justice and the European
Court of Human Rights: Comparative Approaches,' in E. Oriicu (ed.), Judicial Comparativism in
Human Rights Cases (London, The United Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law, 2003),
124.
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sufficiently safeguarded if the Commission ensures that disclosure of the documents
does not constitute an infringement of national law".
3.6.3.4 Conclusion
The Code of Conduct, Commission Decision 94/90, and Council Decision 93/731
were all intended to offer "widest possible access" to information. An overbroad
scope for the court proceedings exception was presumably to undermine public
scrutiny of the operation of the EU institutions. The CFI judgment as to the scope of
this exception was dangerous, because it only considered the importance of the right
to a fair hearing, without noticing that EU citizens were entitled to monitor the
operation of the institutions, including cooperation between the Commission and
national courts. Lack of freedom of information definitely has a negative impact on
democratic scrutiny in the Union. For instance, citizens may lack the legal means to
scrutinise the Commission if it provides national courts with incorrect legal analyses.
As to whether the information at issue fell within the scope of the court
proceedings exception, which is the third major issue relating to the present case, the
CFI gave a positive answer. However, the CFI came to the conclusion on the sole
ground that the three letters "concerned points of law raised in the context of specific
pending proceedings". This opinion was far from satisfactory because, as we have
seen, information relating to pending cases is not necessarily detrimental to the right
to a fair hearing. The ECJ stated that documents supplied by the Commission to
national courts could be those that contain "an opinion of a general nature" or
economic analyses. As such information did not undermine protection of the right to
a fair hearing, the ECJ set aside the CFI judgment.
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3.7 The 1998 Svenska Journalistforbundet case216
Svenska Journalistforbundet, the Swedish Journalists' Union, deliberately tested
Council Decision 93/731 against the wider Swedish FOI law after the Nordic
country's accession to the EU on 1 January 1995. This action, of experimental nature,
compelled the CFI to deliver clearer rules for invoking the two categories of
mandatory and discretionary exceptions in the Code of Conduct and Decision
93/731.
3.7.1 Facts
Svenska Jonrnalistforbundet made requests to the national Police Authority and
Ministry of Justice in Sweden, seeking access to certain Council documents
concerning the setting up of the European Police Office (hereinafter "Europol"), to
"test the way in which the Swedish authorities applied Swedish citizens' right of
access to information in respect of documents relating to European Union
activities".217 The applicant was granted access to 18 of the 20 documents but was
refused access by the Ministry of Justice to two documents mainly on the ground that
218
they concerned the negotiating positions of the Dutch and German governments.
The applicant then turned to the Council, requesting access to the same 20
documents under Decision 93/731,219 but the Council refused access to 18 of them
216 Case T-174/95, Svenska Journalistforbundet v. Council [1998] ECR 11-2289.
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because they were "subject to the principle of confidentiality as laid down in Article
4(1) of Decision 93/731".220 The applicant later submitted a confirmatory
application.221 The Council replied by a letter dated 6 July 1995, in which it agreed
222
to grant access only to two more documents. It said that "[i]n the Council's
opinion access to those documents cannot be granted because their release could be
harmful to the public interest (public security) and because they relate to the
Council's proceedings, including the positions taken by the members of the Council,
99 T
and are therefore covered by the duty of confidentiality".
The applicant instituted this action before the CFI requesting the Court to annul
the decision contained in the letter dated 6 July 1995,224 while the Council supported
225
by France and the UK requested the CFI to declare the application inadmissible.
As to admissibility of this case, there were two key issues. First, the Council
said the application was inadmissible mainly because it concerned "documents that
the applicant had already received from the Swedish authorities. ...The applicant's
interest is general and political in nature, its intention being to ensure that the
Council gives proper effect to its own Code of Conduct and Decision 93/731".226 It
said Article 173 EC (now Article 230 EC) did not "allow individual actions in the
public interest, but only permits individuals to challenge acts which concern them in
... 227
a way in which they do not concern other individuals", adding that "the applicant
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cannot derive any benefit from obtaining access to documents which are already in
its possession".228 The applicant argued that "[ajddressees must show that they have
an interest in bringing their action but do not have to prove that they are individually
concerned".229 It said its newspaper Tidningen Journalisten published articles "on
specific subjects of general interest and on the functioning of public authorities and
other matters concerning the way in which Swedish journalists can go about their job.
It therefore has a direct interest in gaining access to Council documents".
Second, France said in the absence of an express provision, Decision 93/731
was "not applicable to acts adopted on the basis of Title VI of the EU Treaty", which
. . . . ... .... 231contained provisions on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The
applicant argued that Decision 93/731 "confirms that the Court has jurisdiction in
cases concerning application of that decision, since it specifies that its provisions are
232
applicable to any document held by the Council".
As to the substantial aspect of this case, the applicant said the refusal infringed
Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731.233 It argued that "the Council did not make a real
assessment of the likely impact that granting access to the documents requested
might have on public security in the European Union".234 It then precisely described
all the documents sought which were in its possession, when arguing that "the public
security exception was applied in an unlawful manner by the Council". The
Council asserted that "it would not be in the interest of public security to allow those
involved in illicit activities to obtain detailed knowledge of the structures and means
228
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available to police cooperation in the European Union". The applicant disputed
this and said it simply bore "no relation to the actual content of the documents in
question".237 As to the legal basis for the refusal, the Council simply denied that it
considered all the documents relating to Europol to be covered by the public security
exception. It added that "[t]he fact that four documents were disclosed shows that a
real assessment was carried out".238
The applicant also said the refusal infringed former Article 190 EC, stating that
"the refusal, expressed in a single sentence, to grant access to 16 of the 20 documents
does not satisfy the requirements of Article 190 of the EC Treaty or Article 7(3) of
Decision 93/731".239 It was impossible for it "to assess whether the refusal should be
challenged before the Court, for the Court to assess whether the Council had made
proper use of the exceptions referred to above".240 The Council argued that "[i]t
would be excessive to require a specific statement of reasons for each of the
technical choices made by the institution. If it were necessary to provide a very
detailed statement of reasons in the case of negative responses to requests for access,
the underlying objectives ofArticle 4(1) would be compromised".241
3.7.2 Held
Addressing its jurisdiction on this case, the CFI said that "Decision 93/731, in
Articles 1(2) and 2(2), expressly provides that it is to apply to all Council documents.
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Decision 93/731 therefore applies irrespective of the contents of the documents
requested".242 Secondly, as to the applicant's interest in seeking the annulment, the
Court ruled that "[t]he applicant is the addressee of the contested decision and, as
such, is not obliged to prove that the decision is of direct and individual concern to it.
It needs only to prove that it has an interest in the annulment of the decision".243 The
Court stressed that "a person who is refused access to a document or to part of a
document has, by virtue of that very fact, established an interest in the annulment of
the decision".244 The Court added that "the contested decision denied access to 16 of
the 20 documents requested. The applicant has therefore proved an interest in the
annulment of that decision".245 Thus, the Court held that the application was
admissible.
As regards the substance of this case, the CFI concurrently examined the
applicant's two pleas noted above, i.e. possible infringement of Article 4(1) of
Decision 93/731 and that of Article 190 EC (now Article 253 EC). First, the CFI said
the Council in the contested decision "indicated only that the disclosure of the 16
documents in question would prejudice the protection of the public interest (public
security) and that the documents related to the proceedings of the Council,
particularly the views expressed by members of the Council, and for that reason fell
within the scope of the duty of confidentiality".246 The Court said that "[ajlthough
the Council was at once invoking both the mandatory exception based upon the
242
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protection of the public interest (public security) and also the discretionary exception
based upon protection of the confidentiality of its proceedings, it did not specify
whether it was invoking both exceptions in respect of all of the documents refused or
whether it considered that some documents were covered by the first exception while
others were covered by the second".247 What the Council did was to admit that it had
not considered that all of the documents connected with Europol were covered by the
248
exception relating to public security, without elaboration.
The Court stated that a note prepared by the Council before the contested
decision was made, indicated that it was concerned not with operational matters of
Europol but "only with negotiations on the adoption of the Europol Convention".249
As the note contained a brief summary of the documents and a preliminary
assessment as to whether they could be released, which was communicated to the
applicant in the court proceedings, the Court said the note clearly showed that "it was
possible to give an indication of the reasons why certain documents could not be
• 250disclosed to the applicant without at the same time disclosing their contents".
The Court went on to say that the terms of the contested decision did not permit
the applicant and the Court to check whether the Council had complied with its duty
to carry out a genuine balancing of the interests concerned as the application of
Article 4(2) ofDecision 93/731 required.251 The Court added that:
[T]he contested decision mentions only the fact that the requested documents
related to proceedings of the Council, including the views expressed by
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members of the Council, without saying whether it had made any comparative
analysis which sought to balance, on the one hand, the interest of the citizens
seeking the information and, on the other hand, the criteria for confidentiality
252of the proceedings of the Council.
The Court concluded that the contested decision did not comply with the
requirements to give reasons required by former Article 190 EC and must be
annulled.253
3.7.3 Comment
Here, we examine the arguments of the two parties and the Court's opinion as to the
procedural and substantive lawfulness of the contested decision.
3.7.3.1 The applicant's interest
A major issue concerning the procedural aspect of this case was whether the
application was inadmissible in that the applicant had challenged the refusal in the
public interest. There seemed to be no reason to prohibit the applicant from
instituting the proceedings before the Court under Decision 93/731, which did not set
out any limitation for an EU citizen seeking access to Council documents. The
Council, however, said former Article 173 EC "only permits individuals to challenge
acts which concern them in a way in which they do not concern other individuals".
The CFI held, however, that the application was admissible, stressing that the
252
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applicant only needed to prove that it had an interest in the annulment of the decision,
suggesting that citizenship was a sufficient requirement to challenge such a refusal.
3.7.3.2 The Second and Third Pillar documents
This judgment is a milestone in the development of EU FOI protection, as the Court
ruled that the Second and Third Pillar documents held by the Council fell within the
scope of Council documents under Decision 93/731. France said that in the absence
of an express provision, Decision 93/731 did not apply to acts adopted on the basis of
Title VI TEU. France argued that Decision 93/731 only applied to documents
actually produced by the Council, rather than documents held by the Council relating
to the three pillars. This statement suggested that it was unnecessary to consider
whether the Third Pillar documents sought fell within the public security exception
set out in Decision 93/731, as they were not even governed by this Decision. This
view was, however, very controversial. In fact, the Council refused access to the 18
documents on the basis that they were "subject to the principle of confidentiality as
laid down in Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731". This indicates that the Council did
apply Decision 93/731 to the information sought, and it was this application that led
to the refusal.
The CFI disagreed with France, holding that "Decision 93/731, in Articles 1(2)
and 2(2), expressly provides that it is to apply to all Council documents. Decision
93/731 therefore applies irrespective of the contents of the documents requested".
The CFI read the term "Council documents" in a broad manner, regarding these
documents as all documents held by the Council. This interpretation was appropriate
since it was in line with the principle of widest possible access in the Code of
Conduct. Decision 93/731 would then be applicable to not only to the Third Pillar
121
documents held by the Council, such as those sought in this case, but also to Second
Pillar documents held by the Council.
At that time, the Second and Third Pillar documents not held by the Council and
Commission remained unavailable for EU citizens under the legal framework of the
Code of Conduct and the two corresponding decisions. This judgment, however,
shows that the Court made a significant effort to enhance public scrutiny of the
operation of the Second and Third Pillars in a context where general rules on
freedom of information had not yet been adopted.
3.7.3.3 Public security
As to the substantive aspect of this case, a key issue was whether disclosure of the
information was detrimental to one or more interests in Article 4 of Decision 93/731.
The answer to this determines whether the contested decision should be annulled.
The Council said that "it would not be in the interest of public security to allow those
involved in illicit activities to obtain detailed knowledge of the structures and means
available to police cooperation in the European Union". The applicant argued that the
claim simply bore "no relation to the actual content of the documents in question".
After examining the note prepared by the Council before the contested decision was
made, the Court held that the information did not concern Europol's operation.
The CFI eventually annulled the contested decision, but this annulment was not
based on the ground that the documents were irrelevant to the public interest, but on
the Council's inappropriate invocation ofArticle 4 ofDecision 93/731.
3.7.3.4 Reliance on first, second, or both categories of exception?
The second issue concerning the substantive lawfulness of the contested decision was
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whether the Council had properly applied Article 4 of Council Decision 93/731. The
Council and Commission were entitled to invoke the first, second, or both categories
of exception set out in the Code of Conduct, Decision 93/731, and Decision 94/90,
when refusing requests. The situation here was analogous, though not exactly the
same, to that of the WWF case, where the Commission applied the two categories of
mandatory and discretionary exceptions in a general fashion. In the present case, the
Council had the choice to invoke a first-category mandatory exception set out in
Decision 93/731. The Council could have refused the request on the basis that
disclosure of the documents concerned could be detrimental to the public interest
relating to public security. It could, in the alternative, have applied the
second-category discretionary exception on the ground that all the information had
been under discussion at the Council meetings. In this case, however, the Council
attempted, unsuccessfully, to invoke both categories simultaneously. This approach
indicates once again that the distinction between the two categories was extremely
unclear. As the Court found it difficult to ascertain whether the Council was applying
the first, second, or both categories, it decided to annul the refusal.
It can be concluded that the CFI annulled the contested decision owing to the
Council's insufficiently detailed invocation of the two categories of exception. The
Court emphasised the Council's duty to specify the legal basis for a refusal, and to
balance the interest of those seeking access to the information and the criteria for
confidentiality of the proceedings of the Council. Unfortunately, the Court did not
clearly establish the scope of the public security exception. As Professor Carol
Harlow has said, the CFI annulled the decision "only on the narrow ground that
inadequate reasons for refusal had been given, a 'halfway house' solution which
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allows for further refusal, based on more appropriate grounds".254
3.8 The Rothmans case255
The case law examined in this study to date has mainly concerned the mandatory and
discretionary exceptions set out in the fourth section of the Code of Conduct and
Article 4 of Decision 93/731. However, the analysis of the Code of Conduct and
the corresponding Council and Commission decisions, as we have seen in 3.1,
reveals that there was another exception other than these two categories. This was
that the Council and Commission would not provide the citizens with documents
produced by the other EC institutions or bodies. The Code of Conduct states that
"[w]here the document held by an institution was written by a natural or legal person,
a Member State, another Community institution or body or any other national or
international body, the application must be sent direct to the author".
In Rothmans, the Commission invoked this rule on authorship when refusing
access to minutes of a comitology committee. This issue was of considerable
importance. The three measures noted above only applied to the Council and
Commission rather than all the Community institutions and bodies, which meant that
it could be very difficult for the citizens to access documents of comitology
committees if the CFI held that this kind of information was not covered by Decision
254 Harlow, n. 7 above, at 164.
255 Case T-188/97, Rothmans International BVv. Commission [1999] ECR 11-2463.
256 The 1996 Netherlands judgment, as we saw in 3.3, is the only exception, as it primarily concerns
the legal basis of Decision 93/731 and whether freedom of information should be regarded as a
fundamental human right.
124
94/90. A tough challenge for the Court was how to conclude that the Committee
minutes were covered by Decision 94/90, when it was unclear whether comitology
committees constituted an integral part of the Commission.
3.8.1 Facts
A Dutch company, Rothmans International BV, manufactured, distributed, and sold
tobacco products.257 The applicant requested from the Commission access to certain
documents including minutes of the Customs Code Committee — Transit Section
(hereinafter "the Committee").258 In a letter of 30 April 1997, the Secretary-General
of the Commission forwarded a number of its documents but refused to offer the
259Committee minutes since the Commission was not their author. The
Secretary-General told the applicant by another letter that "while the minutes are
drawn up by the Commission in its secretarial capacity, they are adopted by the
Committee, which is therefore their author".260 The applicant then brought the
present action, claiming that the CFI should annul the Commission decision of 30
961
April 1997, while the Commission said the Court should dismiss the application.
The applicant, supported by Sweden, put forward two pleas in support of its
action. The first plea alleged infringement of former Article 190 EC (now Article 253
EC) and the second infringement of Decision 94/90.262 As to the first plea, the
applicant submitted that the contested decision was vitiated by defective
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reasoning. Rothmans might have elaborated on this plea when seeking the
annulment, and the Commission might have responded to this elaboration, but the
Court in its judgment referred to neither the applicant's statement nor the
Commission's response. As to the applicant's second plea alleging infringement of
Decision 94/90, the applicant said the Commission infringed Decision 94/90 through
its refusal, in reliance on the authorship rule, to grant access to the Committee
minutes.264 Rothmans said the Commission drew up the minutes, so by virtue of this
work the Commission was, "materially and intellectually, the author of those
documents".265 It stressed that the Committee's Chairman was a Commission
official, and it was a Commission representative who convened the Committee and
266drew up its agenda. The company said the authorship rule was by contrast
967
designed to protect third-party documents.
The Commission responded that it made the refusal since the information did
not fall within the category "Commission documents".268 It denied that it was the
minutes' author and said Decision 94/90 only applied to those documents ofwhich it
was the author.269 It said the mere fact that it undertook technical work, such as
secretarial services for the Committee, was not sufficient to confer authorship on it,
since that was "determined by 'intellectual possession' of the text".270 It said the
Committee approved the minutes, which was solely responsible for its
deliberations.271 Sweden disagreed with the Commission and argued that:
263
para. 35, n. 255 above.
264
para. 39, n. 255 above.
265
para. 40, n. 255 above.
266
para. 41, n. 255 above.
267
para. 41, n. 255 above.
268
para. 42, n. 255 above.
269
paras 43 and 44, n. 255 above.
270
para. 44, n. 255 above.
271
para. 44, n. 255 above.
126
[I]f "comitology" committees were to be regarded as separate bodies, this
would mean that the documents of such committees would fall outside the
scope of the rules adopted in relation to public access to Council and
Commission documents. An individual wishing to obtain access to the work of
the committees would then be dependent on the committees' exercise of their
own discretion, without any possibility ofjudicial review.272
3.8.2 Held
Addressing the applicant's first plea that alleged infringement of former Article 190
EC, the Court stated that the Commission provided reasons for the contested decision
by referring to the authorship rule and by confirming that, by virtue of that rule, the
applicant's request was inadmissible on the ground that the author of the documents
979
sought was a third party. The Court said such reasoning was sufficiently clear to
enable the applicant to understand why the Commission did not forward to it the
documents at issue.274 It therefore ruled that this plea must be rejected.275
As to the second plea alleging infringement ofDecision 94/90, the Court stated
that the authorship rule set out "an exception to the general principle of transparency
in Decision 94/90".276 It stated that "this rule must be construed and applied strictly,
277
so as not to frustrate the application of the general principle of transparency".
Referring to Article 145 EC (now Article 202 EC) and the Council decision laying
down the procedures of the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the
Commission, the Court said that "the Committee cannot be regarded as being
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'another Community institution or body' within the meaning of the Code of Conduct
adopted by Decision 94/90".278 It also stated that "refusal of access to the minutes of
the numerous 'comitology' committees would amount to placing a considerable
restriction on the right of access to documents", adding that such a restriction was
incompatible with the very objective of the right of access to documents.279 Thus, "it
must be held that, for the purposes of the Community rules on access to documents,
'comitology' committees come under the Commission itself. It is therefore the
Commission which is responsible for ruling on applications for access to documents
of those committees, such as the minutes here in question".280
The Court stated that "[t]he Commission was therefore not entitled, in this case,
to refuse access to the minutes of the Committee by invoking the rule on authorship
set out in the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90. It follows that it infringed
281that decision in adopting the contested decision". The Court, therefore, ruled that
the second plea must be upheld and that the contested decision must be annulled.282
3.8.3 Comment
The two pleas forwarded by the applicant alleged infringement of former Article 190
EC and of Decision 94/90, i.e. failure to meet the requirement to state clear reasons
278
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and improper invocation of the authorship rule. The CFI rejected the first plea
because the invocation of the authorship rule was sufficient. It agreed on the second
plea, annulling the contested decision since the authorship rule did not entitle the
Commission to make the refusal. This ruling benefited the EU citizens as far as FOI
protection was concerned, but it remains necessary to examine the reasoning behind
this judgment, in particular the grounds for determining the Committee's legal status.
3.8.3.1 Sufficient reasoning
As to the first plea concerning whether the refusal infringed former Article 190 EC,
the CFI said the Commission provided reasons for the refusal by referring to the
authorship rule and by confirming that, by virtue of that rule, the applicant's request
was inadmissible since the author of the documents sought was a third party. The CFI
rejected this plea mainly because such reasoning was sufficiently clear to enable
Rothmans to understand why the Commission did not provide the documents at
issue.
What constitutes sufficient reasons as regards former Article 190 EC and the
denial of a request for access to the information held by the EC institution? First,
decisions such as the refusal concerned, according to Article 190 EC, "shall state the
reasons on which they are based". This requirement is an obligation to give clear
reasons, which should not be regarded as a mere indication of source of legal
authority. In addition to specification of legal basis, more reasons are expected. As
regards what constitutes sufficient reasoning, Professor Trevor Hartley has stated
that:
[These reasons] must at the very least set out the factual background which the
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author of the act regards as relevant; they must specify the Treaty provision (or
other source of legal authority) under which the act was adopted (its legal
basis); they must state the objectives which the act is designed to attain; and
they should state why, in the opinion of the enacting authority, it is desirable to
attain these objectives.283
As to the present case, the Commission had therefore to meet the sub-requirements
derived from the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 190 EC. Thus, the
Commission in its refusal had to indicate the legal basis for the decision before
indicating the objectives that the decision was intended to achieve. Additionally, it
had also to establish why it was desirable to accomplish those purposes.
Were these sub-requirements met in the present case? As noted above, the
Secretary-General of the Commission told the applicant in a letter that, "while the
minutes are drawn up by the Commission in its secretarial capacity, they are adopted
by the Committee, which is therefore their author". It is obvious that this refusal did
not infringe Article 190 EC because, on the one hand, the Commission clearly
pointed out that this refusal was based on the authorship rule. On the other hand, the
Commission said that it invoked this rule because the Committee was the only author
of the information concerned. The CFI was, therefore, right when stating that the
Commission's reasoning was sufficiently clear to enable Rothmans to understand
why the Commission did not provide the documents at issue.
3.8.3.2 Documents produced for comitology committees
As regards the applicant's second plea alleging infringement of Decision 94/90, the
applicant, Sweden, and the Commission focused on whether the Committee
283
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constituted an integral part of the Commission, as the answer would help determine
whether the Committee minutes were Commission documents and, eventually,
whether the Commission should be considered the minutes' author.
Comitology is the web of committees made up primarily of national officials
and experts, and chaired by the Commission, which oversees the implementation of
EU legislation. 284 The Commission said the Committee minutes were not
Commission documents and it did not have authority to decide whether the applicant
should be granted access to the minutes. The Commission stressed that Decision
94/90 applied only to the documents of which it was the author, but it was not the
author of the minutes. Sweden, however, said if comitology committees were to be
regarded as separate bodies, a request for access to the committees' work would be
dependent on their discretion. Sweden rightly pointed out it would be difficult for EU
citizens to access the committees' minutes if they were considered documents of
separate bodies.
The CFI first addressed the status of the authorship rule before considering
whether the Commission was the minutes' author. The Court stated that the
authorship rule laid down an exception to the general principle of transparency in
Decision 94/90. This statement indicated that the authorship rule was an exception
distinct from the mandatory and discretionary exceptions. However, the Court simply
addressed the second dispute technically, annulling the contested decision without
touching on the role of the authorship rule or looking at whether disclosure of the
information sought could be detrimental to the Committee's interest.
The CFI then stated that it did not regard the Committee as an EC institution or
body within the meaning of the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90. It
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stated that "refusal of access to the minutes of the numerous 'comitology'
committees would amount to placing a considerable restriction on the right of access
to documents", adding that "[s]uch a restriction is not compatible with the very
objective of the right of access to documents". These statements indicate that the
Court, after examining the "very objective of the right of access to documents", held
that the minutes concerned were within the scope of Decision 94/90. The Court,
therefore, concluded that "for the purposes of the Community rules on access to
documents, 'comitology' committees come under the Commission itself'. This
demonstrated that those committees constituted an integral part of the Commission
with respect to the rules on access.
In the present case, the Court undoubtedly stood on the side of the EU citizens.
This judgment secured the interest of those who wished to obtain information of the
comitology committees at a time when there was no general FOI legislation
applicable to all EC institutions and bodies. The Court made this decision to
accomplish the purposes of the right of access, but its views on the status of
comitology committees were contentious. Here, we consider whether comitology
committees can be treated as part of the Commission, analysing factors other than
FOI protection, such as who approves the minutes and the extent to which decisions
of the committees limit the power of the Commission.
First, it seemed that the Court was not careful enough when considering the
applicant and the Commission's arguments regarding the status of the committees.
The Commission said that authorship should be determined by "intellectual
possession" of the text at issue. It was the Committee rather than the Commission
that approved the minutes, though the documents were drawn up by the Commission.
Second, as regards the relations between the two bodies, the committees can in
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certain circumstances prevent the Commission from proceeding with a measure
without their approval.285 It was, therefore, difficult for the Commission to view the
committees as an integral part of itself when its power was in fact limited by the
committees. In other words, the Commission did not read the term "Community
institution or body" in a broad sense. The Court, however, failed to consider carefully
the committees' unique status in EC law. It ignored the fact that the Committee in
question, in common with the other comitology committees, was not under the
Commission's control. As Professor Carol Harlow has said, "[t]he Comitology, as
with all committees, has assumed a life of its own". Comitology committees are
not a part of the Commission though they are not entirely distinct from the institution.
The Court strictly interpreted the term "another Community institution or body", to
attain the objective of the Code of Conduct, i.e. "widest possible access", but it did
not take the factors noted above into serious account.
This judgment was thus flawed in certain ways, but many at that time were
pleased to see the objective of Community rules on access being attained through
Decision 94/90. This is because, without this decision, it would have been very
difficult for EU citizens to access the minutes of the hundreds of committees, which
together spent about 19.5 million Euros in 1998.287 In fact, citizens at that time had
not yet been granted the right to survey the participation of the hundreds of national
and EU bureaucrats and experts in comitology meetings in Brussels on a daily basis.
285 Ibid.
286
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First, it follows from the examination above that former Article 190 EC required that
the Council and Commission when refusing access to documents had to specify the
legal basis for the decision before indicating the objectives that the decision was
intended to achieve. Additionally, the reasons why they planed to accomplish those
purposes had also to be stated. In the present case, the refusal, which did not infringe
Article 190 EC, indicated that the authorship rule placed considerable power in the
hands of the Council and Commission. When the Council or Commission invoked
this rule, they were entitled to deny access to all documents produced by third parties,
even if they were held by these two institutions.
Second, the CFI held that the comitology committees' minutes were within the
scope of Decision 94/90, in order to avoid frustrating the principle ofwidest possible
access laid down in the Code of Conduct. The CFI made this decision in the EU
citizens' interest in obtaining information but paid little attention to the committees'
unique status in EC law. In the long run, however, a heavy responsibility should be
laid on the shoulder of the EU legislator, because only adoption of general rules
applicable to all community institutions and bodies, including the comitology
committees, would put an end to the controversy concerning their status. With such
general legislation, it would no longer be necessary for the Court to distort the
comitology committees' true status in EC law when giving effective FOI protection.
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3.9 The Hautala case
Article 4(1) of Council Decision 93/731 provided that access to a Council document
should not be granted where its disclosure could undermine the protection of the
public interest relating to public security, international relations, and monetary
stability, as well as court proceedings, inspections and investigations. According to
Article 1, the term "document" in Decision 93/731 referred to any written text,
whatever its medium, which contained existing data held by the Council. However,
these rules did not offer, at least not expressly, the solution to the main problem in
the Hautala case addressed by the CFI288 and then the ECJ289. The dispute was
whether the Council should consider affording partial access to a document that
contained information whose disclosure could undermine the public interest. Should,
that is, the Council refuse a request for access to a document, part of which was not
at all detrimental to the public interest?
3.9.1 Facts
Ms. Heidi Hautala was a Member of the European Parliament.290 She requested from
Secretary-General of the Council a report made by the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports, which the
Council's Political Committee had approved to enhance consistent implementation of
288 Case T-14/98, Hautala v. Council [1999] ECR 11-2489.
289 Case C-353/99P, Council v. Hautala [2001] ECR 1-9565.
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common criteria for arms exports. The Secretary-General refused the request
under Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731, as disclosure of the "highly sensitive
information" contained in the report "would undermine the public interest, as regards
public security". Ms. Hautala made a confirmatory application, which the Council
rejected by letter of the 4 November 1997 (hereinafter "the contested decision")
since disclosure of the report "could be harmful for the EU's relations with third
countries. Access to the document in question is therefore to be refused by virtue of
Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731 /EC in order to protect the public interest with regard
to international relations".
The applicant later brought this case before the CFI. The Council did not
challenge the CFI's jurisdiction, but France, supporting the Council in this case,
submitted that the application was not within the Court's jurisdiction. France said by
virtue ofArticle L TEU (now Article 46 TEU), it considered that "where the Council
has decided to apply Decision 93/731 to documents falling within Title V, its
decisions on access to such documents also come under Title V and, as such, may not
be the subject of an action under Article 173 of the EC Treaty".294 The CFI held that
it had jurisdiction to hear the application, stating that the fact that the report came
under Title V "has no effect on the jurisdiction of the Court". It also said it had held
in Svenska Journalistforbundet that Decision 93/731 applied to "all Council
documents, irrespective of their content".
The applicant put forward a plea alleging infringement of Article 4(1) of
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Decision 93/731. The Council said the principle of access to documents applied
"only to documents as such, not to the information contained in them".296 The CFI
disagreed. First, as Decision 93/731 did not require or prohibit the Council to
consider whether partial access to documents might be granted, the basis on which
the Council adopted Decision 93/731, in particular the principle of widest possible
access in the Code of Conduct, "must be borne in mind for the purpose of
interpreting Article 4 of that decision", the CFI stated.297 Second, it stated that the
principle of proportionality required that "derogations remain within the limits of
7QO
what is appropriate and necessary for achieving the aim in view". It also held that
the aim pursued by the Council when refusing the request was to "protect the public
interest with regard to international relations". It held that "[s]uch an aim may be
achieved even if the Council does no more than remove, after examination, the
passages in the contested report which might harm international relations".299
Accordingly, the CFI stated that "Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731 must be
interpreted in the light of the principle of the right to information and the principle of
proportionality. It follows that the Council is obliged to examine whether partial
access should be granted to the information not covered by the exceptions".300
Nonetheless, "the Council did not make such an examination, since it considers that
the principle of access to documents applies only to documents as such and not to the
information contained in them. Consequently, the contested decision is vitiated by an
error of law and must therefore be annulled".301
296
para. 75, n. 288 above.
297
paras. 78, 79, and 81, n. 288 above.
298
para. 85, n. 288 above, in which para. 38 of Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal
Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651 was referred to.
299
para. 85, n. 288 above.
J°°
para. 87, n. 288 above.
j01
para. 89, n. 288 above.
137
The Council brought an appeal to the ECJ, reiterating that Decision 93/731
provided for access to documents rather than information.302 It argued that the CFI
had erred "by deducing from Decision 93/731 an obligation on the Council not to
grant a request for access to a document, but to edit the document and thus create a
new document containing only the information capable of being disclosed, solely in
order to supply 'information' to the public".303 It said no right of partial access to
Council documents might be derived from the principle of proportionality, without
elaborating on what it conceived this principle required.304 In response, Ms. Hautala
said that "the contested judgment correctly interpreted Decision 93/731 by requiring
the Council to consider granting partial access to documents which contain
305information covered by the exceptions laid down in Article 4(1) of that decision".
She said that Article 255(1) EC "confirms the citizen's fundamental right of access to
the documents of the institutions".30
3.9.2 Held
Examining the origin of Decision 93/731, in particular the principle of widest
possible access, the ECJ held that the Council was "wrong in submitting that that
decision concerns only access to 'documents' as such rather than to the information
contained in them".307 It stated that the Council's interpretation ofArticle 4(1) would
frustrate the public's right of access to the items of information contained in a
302
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document not covered by the exceptions in Article 4(1):308 "[t]he effectiveness of
that right would thereby be substantially reduced".309 It held that the CFI had not
erred "by holding that the principle of proportionality also requires the Council to
consider partial access to a document which includes items of information whose
disclosure would endanger one of the interests protected by Article 4(1) of Decision
93/731".310 It also stated that "a refusal to grant partial access would be manifestly
disproportionate for ensuring the confidentiality of the items of information covered
by one of those exceptions".311 It held that the CFI was right to annul the contested
decision on finding that the Council had not examined whether partial access should
312be granted to the information not covered by the exceptions in Article 4(1). It
ill
therefore dismissed the appeal.
3.9.3 Comment
This case concerns a number of key issues in the FOI area. We first consider whether
Decision 93/731 applied to Second Pillar documents held by the Council. Second, we
examine whether the Council was obliged to consider granting partial access to the
information not covered by the exceptions in Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731. This
issue concerns the way the term "document" in Decision 93/731 should be
understood and the review of proportionality made by the Courts when addressing
this dispute.
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3.9.3.1 Access to Second Pillar documents
The information sought by Ms. Hautala covered documents produced by the CFSP
Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports under the framework of the Second
Pillar. France, supporting the Council in this case, challenged the CFI's jurisdiction,
though the Council did not itself raise this point. France said by virtue of Article L
TEU (now Article 46 TEU), "where the Council has decided to apply Decision
93/731 to documents falling within Title V, its decisions on access to such documents
also come under Title V and, as such, may not be the subject of an action under
Article 173 of the EC Treaty". This statement suggested that, as the contested
decision concerned documents falling within Title V TEU, the Court had no
jurisdiction in relation to that decision. In other words, France believed it was the
nature of the documents concerned that determined whether the Courts had
jurisdiction.
This argument was debatable. Article 173 EC provides that "[t]he Court of
Justice shall review the legality of acts of the Council and the Commission other than
recommendations or opinions". The authors of the EC Treaty defined reviewable acts
by means of a negative definition, merely excluding recommendations and opinions.
All the other acts of the Council and Commission, according to Article L TEU, were
reviewable unless they directly concerned matters of the Second and Third Pillars.
Article L TEU was insufficient for France to conclude that the contested decision
might not be the subject of an action under Article 173 EC. This is because although
the jurisdiction of the Court, according to Article L, was largely excluded with regard
to matters of the CFSP, the refusal at issue related mainly to the application of a
Council decision, rather than the operation of the CFSP.
In response to the challenge by France, the CFI said it had jurisdiction to hear
140
the application, stating that "[t]he fact that the contested report comes under Title V
of the Treaty on European Union has no effect on the jurisdiction of the Court". The
CFI, surprisingly, did not continue to examine the scope of the Community courts'
jurisdiction concerning Article 173 EC and Article L TEU, as we have done above.
What it did was to resort to its Svenska Journalistforbundet judgment. The CFI read
the phrase "Council documents" in a broad manner, regarding those documents as all
the information held the Council. The Court stated in that case that Decision 93/731
applied to all Council documents irrespective of the contents of the documents
requested.314 In the present case, the CFI referred to Svenska Journalistforbundet,
reaffirming that Decision 93/731 applied to the Second and Third Pillar documents.
This reasoning was far from perfect because, first, neither the Council nor
France denied that Decision 93/731 applied to documents relating to the two pillars.
Second, the CFI did not even mention Article 173 EC and Article L TEU in its
judgment. Third, the Court appeared to have assumed that, as Decision 93/731
applied to the Second Pillar documents, it had jurisdiction over decisions relating to
access to the documents. The Court did not tackle head on the challenge by France.
However, although there was lack of sound reasoning in this judgment, the Court's
view as to its jurisdiction to hear the application was correct, given the conclusion of
our examination of former Article 173 EC and Article F TEU noted above.315
3.9.3.2 Partial access versus administrative burden
Another key issue was whether the Council was obliged to consider granting partial
access to the information not covered by the exceptions in Article 4(1) of Decision
j14 See 3.7, in particular 3.7.3.2 above.
315 See the second paragraph of this subsection.
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93/731. The Council said that the CFI had erred by deducing from Decision 93/731
an obligation on the Council to edit a document and create a new document
containing only the information capable of being disclosed, solely to supply
information to the public. First, Decision 93/731 did not require or prohibit the
Council to consider the granting of partial access. Second, editing Council
documents could become an additional administrative burden on the Council,
irrespective of whether the CFI rightly interpreted the term "documents" within the
meaning of Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731. Thus, a serious question was in what
circumstances does freedom of information prevail over the interest of good
administration.
The Courts, however, held that the Council was obliged to examine whether
partial access should be granted to the information not covered by the exceptions.
The Courts came to this conclusion since Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731 had to be
interpreted in the light of the principle of the right to information on the one hand,
and the principle of proportionality on the other. Here, we examine these two issues.
The Courts, first, read Article 4(1) primarily in reliance on the principle of widest
possible access in the Code of Conduct. Ms. Hautala stated before the ECJ that
Article 255(1) EC, inserted by the Amsterdam Treaty, had confirmed the citizen's
fundamental right of access to the documents of the institutions. It was, however,
improper to present this argument before the ECJ, because that Treaty came into
force in 1999, which should not be considered the origin of Decision 93/731 adopted
in 1993. This is presumably why the ECJ did not refer to Article 255(1) EC but
turned to consider the Code of Conduct to ascertain the origin of freedom of
information.
Second, the Courts, which applied the principle of proportionality when
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addressing this dispute, should be praised for making this unprecedented effort in the
EU FOI field. This principle requires a reasonable relationship between the end and
the means. It implies both that the means must be reasonably likely to bring about the
objective, and that the detriment to those adversely affected must not be
disproportionate to the benefit to the public.316 In this judgment, the ECJ rightly
pointed out that "a refusal to grant partial access would be manifestly
disproportionate for ensuring the confidentiality of the items of information covered
by one of those exceptions". We should, however, keep a close eye on how the Court
applies this general principle of EC law in the relevant case law. This is because, first,
this general principle derived from German law can be applied to examine not only a
refusal based on protection of international relations, but also all the other kinds of
exemptions to openness. Second, this principle leaves a great deal to the judgment of
the Court. Professor Trevor Hartley has asked: "Is the measure reasonably likely to
attain its objective? Does it impose disproportionate burdens on those concerned?
These are clearly questions on which opinions may frequently differ. The Court will
not, of course, interfere unless there is a clear and obvious infringement of the
principle".317 The way the Community courts apply this principle under the 2001
Regulation is clearly an important issue and is considered further at 3.10.2 and 8.2.4
316 It is to some extent analogous to the English concept of reasonableness. Hartley, n. 105 above, at
152.
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says that "[f]ar from dictating a uniform test, [the principle of proportionality] is an open-textured
principle which is used in different contexts to protect different interests, and it entails different
degrees of judicial scrutiny". T. Tridimas, 'Proportionality in European Community Law: Searching
for the Appropriate Standard of Scrutiny,' in E. Ellis (ed.), The Principle of Proportionality in the
Laws ofEurope (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999), 84. Professor Grainne de Burca has also said that it
becomes apparent that "the way the proportionality principle is applied by the Court of Justice covers
a spectrum ranging from a very deferential approach, to quite a rigorous and searching examination of
the justification for a measure which has been challenged". G. de Burca, 'The Principle of
Proportionality and its Application in EC Law,' in A. Barav and D. Wyatt (eds.), Yearbook of




The Courts correctly interpreted the scope of the term "a document" in this case. This
phrase should be understood as meaning any information contained in a document.
Generally, the Courts favoured Ms. Hautala in the present case, but this did not
mean that she would eventually receive the information she sought from the Council.
Although the ECJ dismissed the Council's appeal, the Court seemed to agree with the
institution on its claim that the report contained highly sensitive information, which
would undermine the public interest. The Court addressed the present case
technically, demanding that the Council consider granting Ms. Hautala partial access
to the information not covered by the public interest exception relating to
international relations. In other words, the Courts did not consider whether disclosure
of the requested report could be detrimental to the protection of international
relations, or what the limit of the protection was.
What Ms. Hautala sought was the complete report on arms exports, but what she
might receive eventually could be immaterial parts of the contested report. The
information sought was a report approved by the Council's Political Committee
intended to enhance consistent implementation of common criteria for arms exports.
We doubt whether disclosure of the withheld part of the report could be detrimental
to the public interest. This is because, first, the Council did not elaborate on why
disclosure of the report would harm the EU's relationships with third countries.
Second, the Secretary-General of the Council refused Ms. Hautala's request
originally on the basis of the public security exception. The official, however, altered
his view before the ECJ and turned to rely on the international relations exception.
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We, therefore, suspect that the invocation of the two exceptions was just an attempt
to escape public scrutiny on the EU's sales ofweapons.
3.10 Key issues
This chapter has examined in detail the Code of Conduct, the two corresponding
Council and Commission decisions, and the relevant case law. The primary objective
of this analysis, as stated at the beginning of this chapter, is to capture a clear picture
of the controversial issues surrounding FOI protection between 1993 and 2000. Here
we draw out the main features of the development of the law during this period.
3.10.1 The principle of "widest possible access"
The general principle of the Code of Conduct is that "[t]he public will have the
widest possible access to documents held by the Commission and the Council". This
rule appeared to be merely a hortatory statement since it was followed by a long list
of exceptions to openness. However, the Community courts improved the FOI
regime by identifying this commitment to openness as the main purpose behind the
Code of Conduct when addressing relevant disputes. This purpose proved to be
particularly important where disputes stemmed from the vagueness of the Code of
Conduct.
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In Carvel, the first key case in this second stage, the applicant said that under
Article 4(2) of Council Decision 93/731, which protected the confidentiality of the
Council's proceedings, the Council must carefully balance the interests involved
before deciding whether access to a document is to be refused. In fact, Article 4(2)
did not expressly put the Council under such an obligation, but the CFI accepted the
applicant's view applying the principle of widest possible access. Similarly, in
Hautala, although Decision 93/731 did not require or prohibit the Council from
considering whether partial access to documents might be granted, the CFI and ECJ
held that the institution was obliged to do so. This decision was also based on the
principle of widest possible access coupled with the principle of proportionality.
These examples show that the Courts made use of the stated principle of widest
possible access to reduce the scope of the exceptions.
3.10.2 Delimiting the exceptions to openness
3.10.2.1 The Courts' primary stance
The extensive mandatory and discretionary exceptions in the Code of Conduct and
Decision 93/731 appeared to run counter to the principle of widest possible access.
What was worse was that the Council and Commission at this second stage made
every attempt to extend the two categories of exception. The analysis of the case law
reveals that these two institutions afforded the exceptions a dangerously extensive
scope, which was likely to make the commitment to widest possible access an empty
statement. The Courts in most of the disputes acted to defend freedom of information.
What they achieved was not the establishment of individual limitations to each of the
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exceptions invoked by the institutions, but rather general principles of review. Their
primary stance on this issue can be found in the WWF judgment, in which the CFI
said where a general principle was established and exceptions to that principle were
laid down, the exceptions should be construed and applied strictly, in a manner which
would not defeat the application of the general rule. This statement can be considered
the Courts' fundamental position on the institutions' invocation of the exceptions.
This commitment to openness was in practice realised through application of a
Treaty provision and a general principle of Community law, i.e. the clear reasoning
test set out in Article 253 EC (ex Article 190 EC) and the principle of proportionality,
when the Courts made an effort to reduce the scope of the exceptions.
3.10.2.2 Article 253 EC and the principle of proportionality
The CFI in the WWF, Interporc I, and Rothmans judgments agreed with the
applicants that the Commission refusals should have met the requirement to provide
sufficient and clear reasons as set out in Article 253 EC. As regards FOI protection,
Article 253 requires that the Council and Commission indicate the legal authority for
a refusal before stating the objectives that the refusal is to achieve. In addition, the
institutions should also establish why it is desirable to accomplish those purposes.
In the EU FOI field, the role of Article 253 EC is to some extent analogous to
that of the principle of proportionality applied by the Community courts in the
Hautala case. This principle requires that there exits a reasonable relationship
between the end and the means, a requirement applied in Ffautala by the ECJ, which
held that "a refusal to grant partial access would be manifestly disproportionate for
ensuring the confidentiality of the items of information covered by one of those
exceptions". In its Hautala judgment, the ECJ did not refer to Article 253 EC but
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applied the principle of proportionality, effectively to restrict the Council's
invocation of the international relations exception. This principle should be expressly
stated in a prominent place in the 2001 Regulation, a point discussed in more detail
in Chapters 5 and 8, and the Courts' future application of this principle in the FOI
field should be carefully monitored.
Generally, the Courts played the role of guardian of freedom of information
when addressing disputes, but this was not always the case. In Carlsen, for instance,
the Council failed to establish why release of the information sought could damage
"the maintenance of legal certainty" and "the stability of Community law and the
Council's being able to obtain independent legal advice". The CFI, however, held
that reference to the two reasons "must be considered to be sufficient". In van der
Wal, the CFI upheld the Commission's refusal of a lawyer's request for access to
three letters, which contained legal opinions provided by the Commission to three
national courts. The applicant submitted that the reasons given by the Commission
were insufficient, but the CFI decided that the three letters fell within the scope of the
court proceeding exception, without stressing the requirement set out in Article 253
EC.
3.10.2.3 The balancing test and the principle of proportionality
The CFI established a specific limit to the exception relating to internal proceedings,
namely the balancing of interests test, in the Carvel judgment, the first key FOI
decision during the second stage. The Court in this judgment put the Council under
an obligation to balance the citizens' interest in accessing Council documents against
its interest in maintaining confidentiality. The CFI in Car\>el annulled the refusal
mainly on the ground that the Commission did not undertake a genuine balancing of
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the interests involved. The CFI later applied the balancing test once again in WWF,
stating that the refusal referred to the internal proceedings exception but failed to
carry out any balancing of the interests involved. The stress on this test indicated that
the scope of the internal proceedings exception in the Court's view was much
narrower than that held by the institutions.
The balancing test played a role analogous to that of the principle of
proportionality when applied to secure freedom of information. The principle of
proportionality emphasises a reasonable relationship between the end and the means.
As regards FOI protection, the end is to maintain the various kinds of interest listed
in the two categories of exception and in the authorship rule, while the means is a
refusal of request for access to the EC institutions' information. A reasonable
measure in this field is certainly a refusal that strikes the balance between the
interests noted above and those of the citizens in accessing the information.
3.10.2.4 An indistinct dividing line between the mandatory and
discretionary exceptions
In WWF, the CFI said the mandatory exceptions guaranteed the interest of third
parties or of the general public, while in relation to the confidentiality exception,
only the Commission's interest was at stake. This distinction established by the Court
appeared to be a significant achievement, because it indicated that the institutions
must invoke a first-category mandatory exception when refusing a request to secure
the public interest. The second category of discretionary exception, namely the
internal proceedings exception, could only be invoked where a document concerning
the institutions' interest was at stake. Otherwise their refusals would be annulled.
The distinction, however, is of little importance in practice. The examination of
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the case law at the second stage indicates that, after WWF, this distinction has never
been the basis for an annulment of a refusal because it is not easy to tell whether a
document concerns only the interest of the public or that of the institutions. Some
documents, such as those relating to Community legislation, court proceedings, and
public policies concern the interests of both the public and the two institutions. Thus,
the two institutions could invoke one or more exceptions in the first, second, or both
categories. This distinction was established by the CFI in WWF to prevent the
Commission from invoking the two categories in a general way, but it has proved to
be of little use. The two institutions remained entitled to make their choice because
most documents concerned the interests of both the general public and the
institutions.
3.10.2.5 Certain exceptions not invoked
The mandatory exceptions in the Code of Conduct and Decision 93/731, contained
the public interest exceptions and four other exceptions intended to secure interests
relating to privacy, commercial secrecy, and the EC's financial interests. The refusals
in the case law at the second stage, however, did not concern these exceptions.
3.10.3 Access to Second and Third Pillar documents
The Code of Conduct, a common agreement between the Council and Commission,
and the corresponding Council and Commission decisions, merely covered these two
institutions. The three measures did not apply to the other Community institutions
and bodies or expressly to information relating to the Second and Third Pillars.
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What was initially controversial was whether these three instruments applied to
Second and Third Pillar information held by the two EC institutions. Most FOI
disputes in the second stage concerned documents produced by either the Council or
Commission, the First Pillar. Two exceptions were the Svenslca Journalistforbundet
and Hautala cases relating to, inter alia, requests for access to Third and Second
Pillar documents held, but not produced, by the Council. In the absence of an express
provision in the Code of Conduct and Decision 93/731, it was unclear whether these
measures covered documents relating to the two pillars in the Council's possession.
France, which supported the Council in both cases, was particularly concerned
about this issue. In Svenska Journalistforbunde, France said that without an express
provision Decision 93/731 was not applicable to acts adopted on the basis of Title VI
TEU, which contained provisions on police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters. The CFI disagreed and held that "Decision 93/731, in Articles 1(2) and 2(2),
expressly provides that it is to apply to all Council documents. Decision 93/731
therefore applies irrespective of the contents of the documents requested". The CFI
made an apparent effort to have the Second and Third Pillars documents in the
Council's possession covered by Decision 93/731. Later, in Hautala, France
acknowledged that Decision 93/731 applied to the Second Pillar documents sought
but it challenged the Court's jurisdiction in the case. France said that "where the
Council has decided to apply Decision 93/731 to documents falling within Title V, its
decisions on access to such documents also come under Title V and, as such, may not
be the subject of an action under Article 173 of the EC Treaty". The CFI did not
tackle head on the challenge, saying without elaboration the fact that the report
sought came under Title V TEU had no effect on the jurisdiction of the Court. The
Court then referred to its Svenska Journalistforbundet judgment, stating that
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Decision 93/731 applied to the Second and Third Pillars documents, an emphasis
irrelevant to the Article 173 jurisdiction issue. The Court should have addressed this
challenge by examining former Article 173 EC.318 This article provides that "[t]he
Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts of the Council and the Commission
other than recommendations or opinions". The authors of the EC Treaty, who defined
reviewable acts by means of a negative definition, merely excluded
recommendations and opinions. All the other acts are reviewable, irrespective of their
relationships with the First, Second, and Third Pillars.
These judgments indicated that, although the FOI measures did not apply
directly to the two pillars, it did not mean that all the Second and Third Pillar
information would always be unavailable to the public. This was because the
Community courts drew a distinction between those documents relating to the two
pillars held by the Council and Commission and those not in their possession. In the
Svenska Journalistforbundet and Hautala judgments, the Courts held that Decision
93/731 applied to Third and Second Pillars documents held by the Council. As there
was no provision concerning this issue, at least not an express one, such a decision
apparently showed the Courts' effort to extend the scope of the right of access.
This endeavour, however, remained insufficient to guarantee effective FOI
protection in the Union since the three FOI instruments only covered Council and
Commission documents. It bears noting that freedom of information will never be
realised in the Union unless the citizens have access to the information held by all the




3.10.4 General rules and fundamental rights
The discussion over the scope of the three FOI measures revealed that the Union
urgently needed general rules on the right of access to information. But what does the
term "general rules" refer to with regard to EU FOI protection? The Courts never
explained what they envisaged these rules to be. It has been argued that the term
general rules should be understood as meaning a regulation coupled with an express
provision in the EC Treaty. According to Article 249 EC, a regulation "shall have
general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all
Member States". This means that a regulation is essentially legislative, setting out
general rules binding at both Community and national levels. The characteristics of a
regulation, according to Article 249 EC, are different from those of directives and
decisions, which are only binding on the person or persons to whom they are
addressed. In other words, directives and decisions are not generally binding. In
addition to the FOI regulation, there was also a need for an express Treaty provision,
which, in fact, would act as the basis for the regulation noted above.
In the 1996 Netherlands judgment, the ECJ stated that at Community level the
importance of the right of access had been reaffirmed on various occasions,
indicating that the Court was fully aware of the significance of this freedom. The
Courts, however, did not deliver a revolutionary judgment recognising the right at
this second stage.319 This was because the status ofDeclaration 17 to the Maastricht
J'9 Professor Eduardo Chiti also said in 1998 that the Courts "have been neither particularly
innovative, especially if compared with national courts, nor have they adopted a consistent line in
defining the nature of access to information". E. Chiti, 'Case T-105/95, WWF UK (World Wide Fund
for Nature) v. EC Commission, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 5 March 1997, [1997] ECR
11-313' (1998) 35 Common Market Law Review 203. See also C. Harlow, "Freedom of Information
and Transparency as Administrative and Constitutional Rights," in A. Dashwood and A. Ward (eds.),
Cambridge Yearbook ofEuropean Legal Studies vol. 2 (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000), 300-301.
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Treaty was not at all clear. If the Courts had recognised freedom of information as a
fundamental right in the Union, they would have had to elaborate on the nature of
this right in their judgments. It should be noted that the Courts, by waiting for future
recognition of freedom of information in a revised or future Treaty, must not be
regarded as opposing FOI protection. The above mentioned limits set by the Courts
to the two categories of exception indicated that the Court had made an effort to
elevate freedom of information to a level analogous to a fundamental right, though
this endeavour was made under the framework of the Code of Conduct and the
corresponding decisions.
3.10.5 Conclusion
EU citizens were granted more freedom of information by the Code of Conduct and
the two corresponding decisions than they had been given before 1993. The rules in
these three legal measures, however, provided the public with only limited freedom
of information, which indicated that the leaders within the Council and Commission
at that time believed that secrecy should be the rule and openness the exception.
However, the Community courts and, in particular the CFI, adopted a contrary stance
on this issue, establishing the principle that openness should be the rule and secrecy
the exception. The Courts made an obvious effort to extend the right of access
through interpreting the exceptions narrowly by reference to Article 253 EC (former
Article 190 EC) and the principle of proportionality. It can be concluded, therefore,
that it was the Community courts, rather than the three instruments, that elevated
freedom of infonnation almost to the level of a fundamental right.
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PART II
The Present FOI Regime in the EU:
Evolution III (2001-2004)
The previous chapter addressed major issues concerning the Code of Conduct, and
corresponding Council Decision 93/731 and Commission Decision 94/90, as well as
the relevant case law. On the one hand, the three legal instruments provided for
unprecedented, though limited, protection for freedom of information in the
European Union. On the other hand, the Community courts made an overt effort not
only to secure implementation of the three measures, but also to extend the
protection on a number of occasions through broad interpretations of unclear legal
terms.1 Nonetheless, as we saw in Chapter 3, the endeavours of the Courts were not
always sufficient to defend properly the right of access in the Union. This is mainly
because the efforts were made under the legal framework of the three measures noted
above, which were adopted by the Council and Commission under Declaration 17
annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht, a non-legally binding statement, rather than a
Treaty provision recognising freedom of information as a fundamental right.
Certain disputes concerning this subject, which occurred during the second
stage of EU FOI development, indicated that the Union urgently needed "general
rules" on freedom of information. These two words, which were repeatedly
1 As in the 1998 Svenska Journalistforbundet and 2001 Hautala judgments. See 3.7, and 3.9. Case
T-174/95, Svenska Journalistforbundet v. Council [1998] ECR 11-2289, Case T-14/98, Hautala v.
Council [1999] ECR 11-2489; and Case C-353/99P, Council v. Hautala [2001] ECR 1-9565.
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employed by the Courts without elaboration, should be regarded as embracing both
Treaty provisions and secondary legislation in the form of a regulation, as we saw in
3.3.
Article 1(2) TEU concerns one of the general principles of the Union, providing
that "[t]his Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and
as closely as possible to the citizen" (emphasis added). The italicised words added at
Amsterdam placed great emphasis on openness and subsidiarity. Rapid development
then followed with an amendment to the EC Treaty by the Amsterdam Treaty in the
form of Article 255, which came into force in 1999. In May 2001, the Parliament and
the Council adopted Regulation 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001, which marked the
beginning of the third stage of the EU FOI evolution.2
This part of the study focuses on the changes consequent upon the adoption of
Article 255 EC, and the 2001 Regulation, the limitations of these provisions, and the
related case law. It also considers the extent to which Article 255 EC and the 2001
Regulation have enhanced and could modify further the protection of the right of
access in the Union. Article 255 EC came into force in 1999 rather than post 2001,
but it is considered more logical to examine the article in this part. This is because it
bears little relation to the disputes concerning the three instruments during the second
stage considered in Chapter 3 above. Moreover, as the 2001 Regulation was adopted
under Article 255 EC, it is necessary to address these closely related rules in the
same part of this study.
2
Regulation EC 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents [2001] OJ L145/43.
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Article 255 EC: Implications and Limitations
Article 255 EC, which introduced a new Treaty provision on freedom of information,
provides that:
1. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or
having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access
to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, subject to
the principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance with
paragraphs 2 and 3.
2. General principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest
governing this right of access to documents shall be determined by the
Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251
within two years of the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.
3. Each institution referred to above shall elaborate in its own Rules of
Procedure specific provisions regarding access to its documents.
These rules are different in many ways from Declaration 17 annexed to the
Maastricht Treaty and the Code of Conduct, which constituted the basis for Council
Decision 93/731 and Commission Decision 94/90. As regards legal effect,
Declaration 17 and the Code of Conduct were non-legally binding, though both of
them had indirect legal effect.1 The insertion of Article 255 EC has brought about a
' Declaration 17 undoubtedly has indirect legal effect as it grants the right of access to documents to
EU citizens. Some other declarations, such as the Declaration on the Enlargement of the European
Union annexed to the Treaty of Nice, have not only indirect legal effect but also constitutional
relevance. As to the Code of Conduct, although it was a political agreement between the Council and
Commission, it had a normative quality, as we saw in Chapter 3, in particular 3.3.4.1 and 3.5.2.2 C.
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revolution in the FOI field since the article acts as the Treaty basis for EU FOI
legislation, elevating the status of this right significantly. This study consequently
considers the extent to which the article has changed the face of this right.
4.1 Fundamental issues
4.1.1 FOI: now a fundamental right and general principle of law?
Freedom of Information became a new Treaty-based right following the insertion of
Article 255 EC. Is this freedom now a fundamental right in the EU? No one will
deny the importance of this issue but few have explained why it is now seen as so
central in the Union.
This issue was raised in the case law for the first time in the 1996 Netherlands
judgment, in which the Netherlands sought the annulment of, inter alia, Decision
93/731,2 In his opinion, Advocate General Tesauro said it might be considered to be
increasingly clear that the right of access to information was a fundamental civil
right.3 The ECJ, which did not touch upon this issue, said as there were no "general
rules" on freedom of information at that time, the Council and Commission must
take their own measures addressing this right. The ECJ, therefore, dismissed the
This is mainly because the institutions saw the Code of Conduct as obliging them to adopt the two
corresponding decisions, and the Courts on a number of occasions applied the Code of Conduct as if it
were legally binding.
2 Case C-58/94, Netherlands v. Council [1996] ECR 1-2169.
J
Opinion, at point 16. However, as we have seen in 3.3.2, Mr. Tesauro proposed that the ECJ should
declare the application inadmissible mainly because the Code of Conduct was an "agreement
essentially of a policy nature". Opinion, at points 23 and 25.
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Dutch government's application. Article 255 EC, a Treaty provision, is undoubtedly
part of the so-called "general rules", which was designed to bring to an end the days
of full institutional discretion of FOI rules. However, if freedom of information
remains a non-fundamental right, the two institutions could still claim that the
general interest in good administration prevails over freedom of information,
particularly, when considering requests for access to information in their possession.4
In dealing with this issue, we must look seriously at the place of Article 255 in
the EC Treaty. It can be found in Chapter 2 of Part V EC, entitled "Provisions
Common to Several Institutions". Article 255 EC, which concerns a right of
increasing importance, does not, therefore, emerge from that section of the EC Treaty
which addresses citizenship of the Union or the general principles of the Union. The
Netherlands was the first Member State to demonstrate serious interest in freedom of
information in the Community.5 At Maastricht, the Dutch delegation proposed to
amend Article 213 EC (now Article 284 EC) to establish competence for the Council
to adopt a FOI regulation.6 The Netherlands at that time sought to stress that the FOI
issue was not so much a matter of the internal working procedures of the institutions,
but rather that of the public's right to information. There was, however, only a
consolation prize for the Netherlands: Declaration 17 to the Maastricht Treaty.
At the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference, the Netherlands attempted to
include a public access provision in Part II of the EC Treaty which concerns
4 Dr. Ulf Oberg expressed similar concern in 2000. In addition, he said this narrow legal basis
provided for in Article 255 EC could discourage any serious attempts from the EC legislature to
initiate a constitutional reform. U. Oberg, "EU Citizens' Right to Know: the Improbable Adoption of a
European Freedom of Information Act," in A. Dashwood and A. Ward (eds.), Cambridge Yearbook of
European Legal Studies vol. 2 (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000), 324 and 328.
5 See 2.4.
6 Former Article 213 EC states that "[t]he Commission may, within the limits and under conditions
laid down by the Council in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, collect any information and
carry out any checks required for the performance of the tasks entrusted to it".
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Citizenship of the Union, on an equal footing with the other rights conferred on EU
citizens. This effort, however, appeared to "have fallen on deaf ears, including those
ofMember States with claims of a constitutional heritage of public access to official
documents". Article 255 EC, as a result, was inserted in the part entitled
"Provisions Common to Several Institutions". It bears noting, first, that the decision
to place the right in the current section could reasonably be interpreted as indicating
an intention to deny the fundamental status of the individual's right of access to
information. In practice, the Community court does not understand this article in this
way, but the three institutions, in particular the Council, could attempt to take
advantage of the interpretation by arguing that this freedom does not prevail over
fundamental rights or other non-fundamental rights. Second, this position also
indicates that the legal instrument to be adopted will not cover the information of all
the EC institutions and bodies, which is the issue we will go on to address in the next
section.
4.1.2 Which bodies are covered by Article 255 EC?
The Code of Conduct and the two corresponding Council and Commission decisions
merely covered the documents in the possession of the two institutions. As to public
scrutiny, under the legal framework of the three instruments, the public was thus able
to scrutinise the EC executive and part of its legislative operation through access to
the documents held by the two institutions. Article 255 EC, which grants the public a
7 U. Oberg, 'Public Access to Documents after the Entry into Force of the Amsterdam Treaty: Much
Ado about Nothing?' (1998) European Integration Online Papers Vol. 2, n. 8, 12-13,
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-008.htm
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right to obtain information held by all the three major EC institutions, therefore
covers the full executive and legislative functions of the Community. This change,
however, does not in practice constitute significant progress, as the Parliament has a
respectable record as to transparent decision making. A serious point here, however,
is that Article 255 EC, just as the Code of Conduct, does not include many other key
institutions and bodies in the Union, some of which have encountered problems of
openness, such as the European Central Bank (ECB). The formulation of Article 255
EC, however, indicates that the authors of this article did not plan to make the ECB
documents available to the public. It bears noting that analogous domestic
specialised organisations are typically included under national FOI law. For instance,
documents available to the Swedish public are those held, received or drawn up by
any public authority, according to Article 3 of Chapter 2 of the 1949 Freedom of the
Press Act, one of the four fundamental laws which made up the Constitution of
Sweden.8
4.1.3 Beneficiaries
As regards the beneficiaries of the right of access set out in Article 255 EC, the
following points are ofparticular interest. First, Article 255 EC states that freedom of
information is not only available to EU citizens, but also to "any natural or legal
person residing or having its registered office in a Member State". This rule
concerning beneficiaries is much clearer than that in the Code of Conduct, which
8 The three others are the 1974 Instrument of Government, the 1810 Act of Succession, and the 1991
Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression. The English translation of this Constitution is available
at the Swedish government website: http://www.sweden.gov.se
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only provided that "the public" shall have access to documents held by the
Commission and Council. The Code of Conduct neither elaborated on whether "the
public" referred only to EU citizens, nor did it explicitly exclude "natural and legal
person residing or having its registered office in a Member State" from protection.9
Second, Article 255 EC indicates that those who are neither EU citizens nor
reside or have a registered office in a Member State have no right to access the
information held by the Union, even in the circumstances where EU policies or EU
law have a direct impact on them. In reality, this may not be the case. Those who do
enjoy the right are entitled to help make a request on behalf of those who do not. The
point here is that if those who are not granted this right under Article 255 EC are not
prohibited from asking for assistance by those who have this right, the ground for
preserving this freedom for the named group of beneficiaries is shaky. From the U.S.
point of view, the European provision is not generous enough. As Professor Amanda
Frost has said, "[sjymbolically, ... the limitation serves to carve out a special
privilege reserved for EU members and citizens, perhaps with the intention of
enhancing a sense ofEuropean citizenship and community".10
It is important to note in this respect that, Article 255 EC does not require the
beneficiaries to demonstrate a reason when making an application for access to
information. This is a principle that has been repeatedly affirmed in the case law.
9 Professor Deirdre Curtin has said that "the Treaty of Amsterdam generously extended the right of
information beyond 'EU citizens' to 'any natural or legal person residing or having its registered
office in a Member State'. D. Curtin, 'Citizens' Fundamental Right of Access to EU Information: an
Evolving Digital Passepartout?' (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 9-10. We doubt, however,
whether this view is correct. The Code of Conduct and the two corresponding Council and
Commission decisions did not state, at least not in an explicit manner, that only EU citizens were
entitled to enjoy this right.
10 A. Frost, 'Restoring Faith in Government: Transparency Reform in the United States and the
European Union' (2003) 9 European Public Law 96. She points out that this is one of the ways that
Article 255 EC differs from the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, as the latter "can be used by any
individual, regardless of citizenship or country of residence".
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4.1.4 The implementing legislation
Article 255(1) EC provides that the principles and conditions of the new legislation
shall be defined according to Article 255(2) and 255(3) EC. It should be noted that
these provisions, which concern the implementation of the future legislation and
corresponding procedural rules, leave the Commission, the Parliament, and the
Council considerable space to propose and adopt the new rules. Article 255(2) EC
states that the Council and Parliament are entitled to decide on new "general
principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest", according to the
procedure referred to in Article 251 EC.11 This procedure is more democratic than
that set out in the Code of Conduct, which allowed the Council and Commission to
adopt severally their decisions on freedom of information without any requirement
that they consider the opinion of the Parliament. Under Article 255(2) EC, the
requirement that co-decision procedure be used marks the end of the days during
which the Council and Commission enjoyed full discretion when taking steps to
realise the limited freedom of information of the European public.
The implementation procedure laid down in Article 255 EC undeniably
demonstrates more respect for the Parliament, but it bears noting that this article
remains insufficient to prevent the Council and Parliament from adopting rules
similar to those in the Code of Conduct and the two corresponding decisions.12
11 Article 251 EC (ex Article 189b EC), which sets out the so-called "co-decision procedure" or "joint
legislative procedure", was incorporated into the EC Treaty by the TEU and modified by the Treaty of
Amsterdam. This procedure refers to that for legislation adopted jointly by the Parliament and
Council.
12 Mrs. Sionaidh Douglas-Scott has been particularly concerned about the possibility that the
institutions could abuse their power in adopting broad exceptions to openness. She has said Article
255(2) EC leaves quite a lot of scope for exceptions "on grounds of public or private interest" in its
implementation. S. Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Essex, Longman,
2002), 146.
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Attention should be drawn to the actions to be taken by the Council, as the EU FOI
history shows that it has made every attempt not to realise the right of access. Things
could get even worse, in that Article 255 EC is incapable of preventing the adoption
of a legal instrument which is more conservative than the previous framework. To
put it differently, if the Commission, the Council, or the Parliament, or all of them,
abuse the authority granted by Article 255 EC in adoption of the new principles and
conditions, the future legislation could become very analogous to Decision 93/731,
ofwhich the Netherlands sought annulment in the 1996 Netherlands case.13
Professor Deirdre Curtin expressed serious concern over the danger that could
arise with the interpretation of Article 255 EC in 2000, a year before the new
Regulation was adopted. She said that "the presumption must be that every EU
citizen and every third country national resident in a Member State of the Union (as
pursuant to the terms of Article 255(1)) has the right of access to the documents of
the three named institutions".14 She stressed that "no supplementary grounds can be
raised by the institutions as grounds for refusing citizens' access to documents. Either
the grounds of refusal are explicitly mentioned in the text of the legal instrument to
be adopted or they are of no relevance".15
4.1.5 Conclusion




Curtin, n. 9 above, at 15.
15 She has also said that the "presumption will always be that the citizen enjoys the right of access to
the documents in question and the burden of proof is placed squarely on the respective institutions to
rebut that presumption in a satisfactory manner and in accordance with the explicit indications
contained in the section of the legal instrument establishing the limits of the general principle of
access". Curtin, n. 9 above, at 15-16. Dr. Ulf Oberg also said in 2000 that the Parliament should
restore the Union's credibility with its citizens "by providing them with a legally enforceable 'Right to
Know', subject to clear and exhaustive exceptions" (emphasis added). Oberg, n. 4 above, at 327-328.
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did not intend to elevate freedom of information to the status of a fundamental right
in the Union. Nonetheless, we should not jump to the conclusion that this freedom
would not be protected as a fundamental right or regarded as a general principle of
Community law. We must go on to examine the 2001 Regulation and the views of the
Community courts in relevant disputes before we can better understand the status of
this freedom in practice in the Union.
4.2 Obstacles to the implementation of Article 255 EC
Article 255 EC provides an imperfect guarantee of freedom of information mainly
because it states in its first paragraph that the new legislation on access to documents
is restricted to the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament, rather than be
applicable to all the EC institutions and bodies.16 Although EU citizens are now
entitled to access information relating to the Second and Third Pillars held by the
three EC institutions, they are not allowed to put the Second and Third Pillars under
FOI-based public scrutiny in a direct and effective manner. It is, however, undeniable
that the insertion ofArticle 255 EC by the Treaty of Amsterdam marked a new stage
in the development of this field. Freedom of information in the Union has since then
been protected through a Treaty provision, rather than a non-legally binding measure,
i.e. Declaration 17 annexed to the Maastricht Treaty. The point here is, therefore,
whether this new provision assures instant and proper protection of this right.
16 See 4.1.2.
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Article 255(2) EC states that "[gjeneral principles and limits on grounds of
public or private interest governing this right of access to documents shall be
determined by the Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in
Article 251 EC within two years of the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam".
As previously noted, this provision introduces the co-decision procedure to the
legislative process of the new FOI rules, indicating that the Council and Commission
would not be entitled to decide on their rules severally. What we saw in 2000,
however, was not a linear development but deliberate attempts by the Commission
and Council to resist the implementation of Article 255 EC. This study analyses the
institutions' reluctance to accelerate the reforms in this field, concentrating on the
lessons that can be learned through an examination of the Commission's proposal for
new legislation and two relevant Council decisions adopted in 2000.
4.2.1 The Commission draft legislation
The Commission released its proposal for a new Regulation on 26 January 2000 and
a revised edition three weeks later.17 This draft was far from satisfactory mainly
because the list of exceptions to openness set out in Article 4 of the proposal was
much longer than that in the Code of Conduct. In addition, additional exceptions
were found in other provisions. Article 2 of this draft is an example. With respect to
the scope of the draft Regulation, Article 2(1) stated that "[t]his Regulation shall
apply to all documents held by the institutions, that is to say, documents drawn up by
17
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, COM/2000/0030 final - COD 2000/0032
[2000] OJC177 E.
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them or received from third parties and in their possession", which was consistent
with the obligation laid down by Article 255(1) EC. This provision was, however,
followed by a rule of considerable controversy, which provided that "[ajccess to
documents from third parties shall be limited to those sent to the institution after the
date on which this Regulation becomes applicable". Article 2(2) provided that "[t]his
Regulation shall not apply to documents already published or accessible to the public
by other means. It shall not apply where specific rules on access to documents exist".
This was another example indicating that exceptions to openness in the Commission
draft could be found not only in Article 4 of the proposal, entitled "Exceptions", but
other parts of it. As a result, it was not surprising that the document elicited serious
concerns and harsh criticism by the European Ombudsman, the Member States, and
commentators. In addition, the draft also led to a bitter dispute between the Council
and Parliament.18
The Ombudsman, who played a pivotal role in challenging the excessive
secrecy of the Commission proposal, was very critical of this proposal.19 Mr. Jacob
Soderman stated that "rights are worth nothing without effective remedies, giving as
an illustration the constitutional right of access to documents of the European
Parliament, Council and Commission promised in the Amsterdam Treaty".20 He also
18 P. Birkinshaw, European Public Law (London, Butterworths, 2003), 275.
19 In addition to the Ombudsman, a number of the Member States also made constructive criticism on
the Commission proposal. The U.K. House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, for
instance, reported on the draft. This is a valuable document because the Committee not only
commented on the draft, but also touched on the key weakness of Article 255 EC. In paragraph 178 of
this report, the Committee states that "limiting that right to EU citizens and residents and imposing
duties on only three institutions, though consistent with Article 255 EC, is in principle undesirable and
may give rise to artificial distinctions, if not unfair discrimination, in practice. The opportunity should
be taken, in so far as the Treaty permits, to extend the scope of the Regulation". The House of Lords
Select Committee on the European Union, HL Report of the Select Committee on European Union:
Public Access to EU Documents (HL Report (2000) No 16). The full text is available at:
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ldl99900/ldselect/ldeucom/102/10205.htm
20 He made the remarks on 2 February 2000, according to a press release issued by the Ombdusman
after the draft Regulation was released. The Ombudsman, Ombudsman Calls for a Fundamental Right
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stated that "I am sorry to say that this document seems to consist mainly of a long
and obscure list of possible reasons to deny access to documents. This cannot be
what was intended when the Treaty ofAmsterdam was drafted".21
The Commission proposal did not deserve such harsh comment since it brought
some benefits to the EU, though Mr. Soderman's view did highlight the major
weakness of this draft, namely too many obscure exceptions to openness. Certain
advances on the previous FOI regime could be discovered in the draft. For instance,
the Commission removed the authorship rule in the proposal, and acknowledged the
22
right to partial access to documents and the duty to maintain registers. The U.K.
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union said these proposed
23
changes were "all positive steps forward". It stated in a report that "[ajbove all, the
Regulation should recognise explicitly the concept of a fair balance between
competing or conflicting interests: on the one hand, the individual's right to the
widest possible access to documents and, on the other, the public or private interests
which may be harmed by disclosure".24 Both the Committee and the Ombudsman
were very concerned about the unnecessary exceptions that could constitute
impediments to implementation ofArticle 255 EC.
4.2.2 The first Solana decision
Things became difficult in the summer of 2000 amidst bitter debates over the
to an Open, Accountable and Service-Minded Administration Press Release 3/2000 (02 February
2000), http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/release/en/charterl.htm
21 Ibid.
22 The authorship rule refers to Section 2, paragraph 3 of the Code of Conduct, which provides that
"[wjhere the document held by an institution was written by a natural or legal person, a Member State,
another Community institution or body or any other national or international body, the application
must be sent direct to the author".
23
para. 178 of the House of Lords Select Committee on the EU report, n. 19 above.
24
para. 179, n. 19 above.
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Commission proposal. On 27 July, when Europe was on holiday, the Council took a
very controversial step further to protect the Second Pillar information, i.e. the
documents concerning the common foreign and security policy. It amended Decision
24/95 of the Secretary-General on measures for the protection of classified
information applicable to the General Secretariat of the Council with regard to the
9 S
grades of classification. This is the so-called "Solana decision", named after Mr.
Javier Solana, Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, who seemed to have masterminded the
action.26 The Council adopted the measure pursuant to the second paragraph of
Article 23(2) of the Council's Rules of Procedure of 5 June 2000 (no longer in force),
claiming that "the Secretary-General shall take all the measures necessary to ensure
the smooth running of the General Secretariat".27
The Council adopted the decision in the context where the Union was
developing its defence structures, which require close cooperation with NATO and its
strict security procedures. However, as regards its special treatment of the Second
Pillar information, Article 2(1) of the Decision indicates the "bad faith" of those who
took the decision. Article 2(1) stated that there were four categories of information:
25 Decision of the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for the Common Foreign
and Security Policy of 27 July 2000 on measures for the protection of classified information
applicable to the General Secretariat of the Council [2000] OJ C239/01.
26 The appointment of Mr. Solana, an experienced politician, in 1999 marked a departure from the
tradition of appointing a diplomat to head the Secretariat-General of the Council, and bore witness to
the changed role of the Secretary-General. F. Hayes-Renshaw, 'The Council of Ministers' in J.
Peterson and M. Shackleton (eds.), The Institutions of the European Union (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2002), 52. The structure of the Secretariat was altered towards the end of the 1990s
to implement some of provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which added the role of High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to that of the Secretary-General.
27 Preamble of the Council decision, n. 25 above. The second paragraph of Article 23(2) of the
Council's Rules of Procedure provides that "[u]nder its authority the Secretary-General and the
i- Deputy Secretary-General shall take all the measures necessary to ensure the smooth running of the
• General Secretariat". Council Decision of 5 June 2000 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure,
2000/396/EC, ECSC, Euratom [2000] OJ L149/21.
28 I. Black, 'Fury as envoys vote for military secrecy', The Guardian (Manchester the UK 27 July
2000), http://www.guardian.co.Uk/international/story/0,3604,347451,00.html
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top secret, secret, confidential, and restricted. Interpreting the phrase "classified
information" in the broadest sense, the Council was entitled under this provision to
make almost all the General Secretariat's documents classified ones. The information
which did not fall within the first three categories could be regarded as restricted
information if the Council intended to do so. This is because a document is viewed as
restricted as long as the unauthorised disclosure of it would be "inappropriate or
premature", according to Article 2(1 )(d). The long list of classified information
constituted an apparent obstacle to the implementation of Article 255 EC and
contradicted the principle of "widest possible access" set out in the Code of Conduct.
29The adoption of the Council decision led immediately to furious protests.
Fortunately, this Council decision did not result in substantial destruction of the FOI
protection in the Union for the reasons that, first, the new decision was applicable
only to the Secretariat General of the Council, rather than the whole institution, and,
second, it ceased to be in force soon after adoption of the 2001 Regulation.
4.2.3 The second Solana decision
The Guardian reported that Mr. Solana adopted the decision in July 2000 to block
not only military documents but also documents about non-military crisis
management activities, such as the proposed EU police force to operate after a
Kosovo-type conflict.30 Nevertheless, the Council decision in fact did not go that far,
29 Heidi Hautala, the Finnish co-president of the Green group in the Parliament, said on 27 July 2000
that "Solana is trying to introduce Nato's secretive methods into the EU through the backdoor". The
Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden voted against the plan. One official involved protested furiously
that it amounted to a "military coup", ibid.
Black, n. 28 above. The Guardian said in the report that it was also feared that the ban might be
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because the first decision only introduced a stricter classification system of the
Secretariat General's information, without causing significant damage to the FOI
regime in the Union. It was difficult to assess the extent to which the Council would
make use of the new classification mechanism, until the institution went one step
• • T1
further on 14 August 2000, amending Council Decision 93/731. The institution
made the amendment in reliance on, inter alia, Article 10 of the Council's Rules of
Procedure, which provides that "[t]he detailed arrangements for public access to
Council documents was to be adopted by the Council". Article 1(4) of this Decision
stated that the first indent of Decision 93/731's Article 4(1) was to be replaced by the
following: the protection of the public interest (public security, the security and
defence of the Union or ofone or more of its Member States, military or non-military
crisis management, international relations, monetary stability, court proceedings,
inspections and investigations)" (emphasis added). The italicised words were added
by the amending Council decision. What was worse, the public register of Council
documents would, according to Article 2(1), no longer contain reference to top secret,
secret and confidential documents "on matters concerning the security and defence of
the Union or of one or more of its Member States or on military or non-military crisis
management". In brief, not only access to those documents could be denied, but their
existence might not even enter on the public register of the Council.
Fortunately, EU citizens did not have to see the extent to which their freedom of
information would be infringed by the two Council decisions, in particular by the
second, because the Parliament, whose views prevailed over the Commission
extended to sensitive areas such as police and judicial cooperation.
31 Council Decision of 14 August 2000 amending Decision 93/731/EC on public access to Council
documents and Council Decision 2000/23/EC on the improvement of information on the Council's
legislative activities and the public register ofCouncil documents [2000] OJ L212/9.
171
proposal, adopted Regulation 1049/2001 jointly with the Council in May 2001.
4.2.4 The access issue: an internal matter?
The actions above jeopardised not only the commitment to FOI protection made by
Article 255 EC but also the framework under the Code of Conduct. First of all, the
Council made these attempts to alter, if not to bring about the destruction of, the
framework under the Code of Conduct and the corresponding Council and
Commission decisions, when Europe was on holiday. These actions show the
Council planned to escape public scrutiny. Academic commentators noticed the
obvious bad faith of the Council in adopting the two decisions in such controversial
circumstances.32 Secondly, the adoption of these decisions evidenced that the
Council tried to make the most of its authority regarding internal organisation to
resist the EU FOI regime under the Code of Conduct, because the institution might
soon have to face much stricter rules that could be introduced by the new Regulation.
This is presumably why the Elouse of Lords described that action as a "summertime
coup".33
All the criticism of the Solana decisions, the Commission proposal for the new
Regulation, and the debates over these documents, are presumably of historical
j2 Mrs. Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, for instance, said that the "apparent act of bad faith on the Council's
part (decided on a 12:3 majority vote) certainly seemed to make it more difficult to fulfill the
obligations under Article 255". Douglas-Scott, n. 12 above, at 147.
33 The House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, HL Report of the Select
Committee on European Union: Public Access to Documents: The Council Decision of14 August
2000 (HL Report (2001) No 8). The full text of this report is available at:
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200001/ldselect/ldeucom/31/3101.htm
This Committee, according to the report, also said that "[wjhile there may be little disagreement that
highly classified defence and military documents should not be publicly available, the suddenness and
the timing of the adoption of the Decision were, and remain, controversial".
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interest now. This study will not go into the details of the two controversial Council
decisions above as these measures, which are no longer in force following the
adoption of the new Regulation in 2001, had little influence on the Union. What
really matters is: what can be learned through examination of these disputes? To
answer this we must take a look at the procedures on which adoption of these rules
relied.
The disputes discussed above were furious, but few noticed an important
distinction here. The people who harshly criticised the two Solana decisions had no
choice but, bitterly, to accept them, while those who commented on the Commission
draft did not have to accept it, and they eventually won a victory, i.e. the 2001
Regulation. Why was this so? The main reason stemmed from a change of legislative
procedures. Before the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force in 1999, FOI issues
were addressed under the Council's authority for its internal organisation under the
legal framework established by the Code of Conduct. However, after this Treaty
came into force, FOI legislation had to be adopted under the co-decision procedure
set out in Article 251 EC. It is then necessary to analyse the procedural rules to
understand their impact on the EU FOI regime. The adoption of these decisions
indicates not only the controversial intention of those who adopted the measures, but
also the inappropriateness, if not illegality, of the Council discretion in adopting FOI
rules under its procedures.
In Netherlands v. Council in 1996, the Netherlands sought annulment of, inter
alia, Article 22 of the Council's Rules of Procedure of 6 December 1993, on the basis
that "the purpose of the provision greatly exceeded the confines of the rules
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governing the internal organisation of the Council".34 The ECJ did not uphold the
argument of the Netherlands since "the measures in question are among those which,
as Community law stands at present, an institution is empowered to take pursuant to
its power of internal organisation".35 The Council adopted the first Solana decision
pursuant to the second paragraph ofArticle 23(2) of the Council's Rules of Procedure
of 5 June 2000, by which "the Secretary-General shall take all the measures
necessary to ensure the smooth running of the General Secretariat". The second
Solana decision was adopted pursuant to Article 10 of the Rules of Procedure of 5
June 2000, entitled "Public access to Council documents", which states that "[t]he
detailed arrangements for public access to Council documents shall be adopted by
the Council". It is worth noting that this Article is exactly the same as Article 22 of
the 1993 version.
A serious point here is that these two decisions had potentially a tremendous
impact on the EU citizens' freedom of information, but in the Council's view, issues
concerning this imperative freedom, if not a fundamental right, ought to be dealt with
pursuant to its power of internal organisation. The result was that the European
public had no choice but to accept the two decisions. The 2001 Regulation, however,
was adopted according to the co-decision procedure, in which neither the Council nor
the Commission had full discretion in determining its content.
Mr. Solana argued that it was necessary to maintain the functioning of the CFSP
and to satisfy the EU's NATO partners. We nonetheless wonder whether he was
fully aware of the price the Union might have to pay, which was grave damage to the
FOI framework at that time. As to the fundamental difference between the previous
j4
para. 42, n. 2 above.
35
para. 43, n. 2 above.
Douglas-Scott, n. 12 above, at 146-147.
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legal framework and the present approach based on Article 255 EC, it bears noting
that under the previous system, the institutions could reduce or even deprive EU
citizens of their freedom of information, whenever they intended to do so. Thus, it is
fair to say that the old regime was extremely hazardous.
The intention demonstrated by the Council in the two decisions was
incompatible with the obligation laid down by Article 255 EC. This article expressly
states in its first paragraph that "[a]ny citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal
person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents". The Council
showed little respect for, if not ignored, this Treaty provision.
The previous framework was based on the Code of Conduct, which was in
nature a political agreement between the Council and Commission allowing the
institutions to adopt relevant decisions severally. Under this mechanism, freedom of
information was considered pail of the administrative resouices that could be used lo
please EU citizens in circumstances where the public had lost confidence in the
institutions. In other words, the FOI protection was at the mercy of the Council and
Commission, to be handed down to EU citizens whenever the two institutions
deemed necessary. This kind of protection is very different from that based on Article
255 EC, which places great emphasis on the importance of the co-decision procedure.
Although the EC Treaty does not recognise this freedom to be a fundamental right, it
is at least in the hands of EU citizens represented by the Parliament rather than
simply the Council and Commission. In this respect, the protection of this freedom is




This chapter examines the architecture of the all-important 2001 Regulation. It then
concentrates on the Regulation's objectives and the exceptions to openness set out in
Article 4. A number of provisions will be analysed in depth later in this chapter when
the relevant case law is examined. The 2001 Regulation, whose basic structure is
similar to that of the Code of Conduct, has 19 articles. They concern mainly the
purposes, beneficiaries, scope of the legislation and exceptions, initial and
confirmatory applications, as well as the treatment of sensitive documents, registers
of documents, and publication in the Official Journal. With regard to application
measures, Article 18(1) provides that "[ejach institution shall adapt its rules of
procedure to the provisions of this Regulation".
We first concentrate on the objectives of the 2001 Regulation. The case law
repeatedly emphasised the objective of the Code of Conduct, i.e. to ensure "widest
possible access", when addressing the initial disputes in this field. This principle was
of crucial importance, particularly when the Community courts determined whether
the protection of freedom of information prevailed over other interests, which were
not in the Code of Conduct's list of exceptions.1 Second, this study examines who
are the beneficiaries of the Regulation, entitled to exercise the right of access. Third,
it considers the scope of the various exceptions set out in this new legislation. This
1
For instance, protection of "opinions of legal services of the Community institutions concerning
particular draft legislation" was not an exception set out in the Code of Conduct.
176
task is crucial since most of the disputes concerning freedom of information at the
second stage of FOI development related to exceptions laid down in the Code of




Recital 2 of the Preamble to the 2001 Regulation states that "[ojpenness enables
citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making process and guarantees
that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more
accountable to the citizen in a democratic system". On the one hand, this stated
purpose of the legislation, namely to make a contribution towards the democratic
system of the Union, can be regarded as the fundamental purpose of this new law. On
the other hand, Article 1 entitled "Purpose" provides for practical guidelines for
determining whether a refusal of a request for access to information held by the
Council, the Commission, or the Parliament is consistent with the principle of
democracy. This article states that:
The purpose of this Regulation is:
(a) to define the principles, conditions and limits on grounds of public or private
interest governing the right of access to European Parliament, Council and
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Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the institutions") documents
provided for in Article 255 of the EC Treaty in such a way as to ensure the
widest possible access to documents,
(b) to establish rules ensuring the easiest possible exercise of this right, and
(c) to promote good administrative practice on access to documents.
First of all, the principle of "widest possible access" set out in Article 1(a), which
was also laid down in the Code of Conduct, is an essential part of this provision. The
case law, as we saw in Chapter 3, has shown that this principle is not only an
aspirational statement but also an enforceable rule of law.
Secondly, with respect to application procedures, a principle of "easiest possible
exercise" of the right is laid down in Article 1(b). Thirdly, the principle set out in
paragraph (c) concerns the purpose promotion of "good administrative practice on
access to documents". This could be controversial in that it is unclear how far, if at
all, it goes beyond the principle laid down in paragraph (a) which emphasises the
importance of "widest possible access". Indeed, under paragraph (c), a refusal could
be made on the ground that disclosure of information could jeopardise the "good
administrative practice", a term without clear definition.
On adoption of the new legislation, the Parliament and Council regarded
implementation of these three purposes as an important objective of this Regulation.
It is, therefore, not surprising that Article 17(2) requires that the Commission, at the
latest by 31 January 2004, report on "the implementation of the principles of this
Regulation and shall make recommendations, including, if appropriate, proposals for
the revision of this Regulation and an action programme ofmeasures to be taken by
the institutions" (emphasis added).2 This provision indicates that the EU legislator
2 The Commission adopted this report on 30 January 2004. European Commission, 'Report from the
Commission on the Implementation of the principles in EC Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding
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made a deliberate effort to ensure that these purposes would not be compromised in
the implementation of this new legal framework.
5.1.2 Beneficiaries
As regards the beneficiaries of this Regulation, the first three paragraphs of Article 2
provide that:
1. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or
having its registered office in a Member State, has a right of access to
documents of the institutions, subject to the principles, conditions and
limits defined in this Regulation.
2. The institutions may, subject to the same principles, conditions and limits,
grant access to documents to any natural or legal person not residing or
not having its registered office in a Member State.
3. This Regulation shall apply to all documents held by an institution, that
is to say, documents drawn up or received by it and in its possession, in
all areas of activity of the European Union.
First of all, the first paragraph of Article 2 corresponds to Article 255 EC.3 The
second paragraph states that the three institutions may additionally grant access to
any natural or legal person not residing or not having its registered office in a
Member State. The point here concerns the extent to which this provision extends the
scope of the beneficiaries set out in Article 255 EC. This provision obviously leaves
the three institutions to address this issue individually. Pursuant to Article 2(2), the
Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents', COM (2004) 45 final
(Bmssels, 30 Jan. 2004), http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/rpt/2004/com2004_0045en01.pdf.
This report will be examined at 5.8.
J See 4.1 above.
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institutions might choose to make a decision on a case-by-case basis, or they might
amend their Rules of Procedure to extend this right to all natural and legal persons,
irrespective of nationality, place of residence, or location of registered office. The
Council and Commission took the latter approach, while the Parliament does not
expressly adopt either. The amended provisions will be examined in depth at 5.2
when we concentrate on the implementation of this legislation.
Thirdly, paragraph three states that this Regulation applies to all documents
drawn up or received by an institution and its possession in all the EU activities. It
should, however, be pointed out that this does not mean that the new legislation
"expressly applies to the second and third pillars of the TEU".4 This is because
Article 1(a) of this Regulation provides that this legislation only governs "the right of
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents provided for in
Article 255 of the EC Treaty".
5.1.3 The exceptions to openness
The first two paragraphs ofArticle 4, entitled "Exceptions", provide that:
1. The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would
undermine the protection of:
(a) the public interest as regards:
- public security,
- defence and military matters,
- international relations,
- the financial, monetary or economic policy of the Community or a Member
4 S. Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Essex, Longman, 2002), 147.
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State;
(b) privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with
Community legislation regarding the protection ofpersonal data.
2. The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would
undermine the protection of:
- commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual
property,
- court proceedings and legal advice,
- the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits,
unless there is an overridingpublic interest in disclosure, (emphasis added)
It is necessary to analyse this article from a comparative perspective. Mandatory
exceptions of the Code of Conduct were set out in its fourth section, first subsection
entitled "exceptions", which provides that the Council and Commission "will refuse
access to any document whose disclosure could undermine the protection" of the
public interest, of the individual and of privacy, etc.5 What followed was the
discretionary exception, which states that "they may also refuse access in order to
protect the institution's interest in the confidentiality of its proceedings".
With respect to the 2001 Regulation, Professor Patrick Birkinshaw says that the
exceptions in the legislation are also of two types: mandatory and discretionary.6
The distinction between the two categories seems to be significant because the
exceptions set out in Article 4(2) are subject to a condition, i.e. "unless there is an
overriding public interest in disclosure". This condition requires the institutions not
to refuse a request where there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. This
additional requirement expressly puts the burden on the institution to justify an
Article 4(2) exception in which the public or private interest is claimed. In other
words, Article 4(2) requires a balancing test. This explains why the exceptions set out
5
Emphasis added.
6 P. Birkinshaw, European Public Law (London, Butterworths, 2003), 279.
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in Article 4(1) can be considered mandatory and those in Article 4(2) discretionary.
Later in this chapter, we will consider whether an institution bears an analogous
burden when invoking the specific exceptions laid down in Article 4(1) and Article
4(2) themselves. This issue is important because the case law considered in Chapter 3
indicated that the requirement to give adequate reasons in Article 253 EC and the
principle of proportionality have been employed to prevent overbroad interpretations
of the mandatory exceptions in the Code of Conduct. Since the use of these legal
principles has required the Council and Commission to consider their refusals
seriously, the coercive nature of the mandatory exceptions was lessened. This blurred
the distinction between the two categories ofmandatory and discretionary exceptions.
Thus, we will focus on what potential the Court has to restrict overbroad
interpretations of the mandatory exceptions set out in Article 4(1) of the Regulation
in the future.
5.1.4 Openness: a principle or an exception?
There are two approaches to dealing with a citizen's request for information in
possession of an EU institution, as we saw in 3.1.2, which are:
(1) a presumption that the information should be offered to the citizen unless
decision-makers within the EU have a good reason not to do so; or
(2) a presumption that the information ought to be kept secret unless the
decision-makers decide to release it.
This distinction is of considerable importance when determining whether a legal
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framework of freedom of information can be relied on to scrutinise public authorities.
Recital 11 of the preamble of the 2001 Regulation gives a clue as to whether the first
or second of the approaches above is adopted in this legislation. This provides that:
In principle, all documents of the institutions should be accessible to the public.
However, certain public and private interests should be protected by way of
exceptions. The institutions should be entitled to protect their internal
consultations and deliberations where necessary to safeguard their ability to
carry out their tasks. In assessing the exceptions, the institutions should take
account of the principles in Community legislation concerning the protection of
personal data, in all areas ofUnion activities.
This philosophy is mainly realised in the list of exceptions in Article 4 of the
Regulation, which helps determine whether openness is the principle, and secrecy the
exception in this Regulation. On the one hand, the EU legislator expressly states that
"[i]n principle, all documents of the institutions should be accessible to the public",
before emphasising the principles of "widest possible access" and "easiest possible
access". On the other hand, the legislator says that certain public and private interests
should be protected by way of exceptions. As these statements indicate that openness
is the principle, and secrecy the exception in the Regulation, it is fair to say that the
first of the two approaches noted above is adopted in this legislation. However, we
must examine the implementation by the Council, the Commission, and the
Parliament, and analyse the relevant judicial disputes before we can decide the extent
to which these institutions follow these principles.
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5.2 Implementation of the 2001 Regulation
As regards EU FOI protection, we have seen that the 2001 Regulation brought about
a number of changes in substantive and procedural rules. To what extent do these
changes make it easier in practice for EU citizens to access the information held by
the three institutions? In this section, we will concentrate on implementation of the
new legislation before we go on to focus on the relevant case law at 5.3 to 5.7.
This section examines, in the first place, the three institutions' amended Rules
of Procedure, before it establishes whether they have met the requirements set out in
Article 17 of the Regulation, i.e. publication of annual reports that address a number
of key issues.7 Attention is drawn to the Council and Commission's implementation
of the legislation, which is much more problematic than that of the Parliament,
through analysis of the two institutions' annual reports. Examination of the
enforcement of the Regulation aims to determine the controversies which have arisen
during the first two years of implementation. This analysis should help, first, to
identify major obstacles to realisation of freedom of information under the new legal
framework, and second, to indicate the possible direction of future amendments to
the Regulation.
7 The Council, Council Annual Report on Access to Documents - 2002 (Brussels, the Council, April
2003), http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/EN-AR-02.pdf; The Council, Council Annual Report on
Access to Documents - 2003 (Brussels, the Council, April 2004),
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/RapAnCons.en03.pdf. European Commission, Report from the
Commission on the Application in 2002 ofRegulation (EC) No 1049/2001 ofthe European Parliament
and of the Council regarding Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission
documents, COM(2003) 216 final, (Brussels, European Commission, 29 April 2003),
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com2003_0216en01.pdf; European
Commission, Report from the Commission on the Application in 2003 of Regulation (EC) No
1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding Public Access to European
Parliament, Council and Commission documents, COM(2004) 347 final, (Brussels, European Commission,
30 April 2004), http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/com2004_0347en01 .pdf
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5.2.1 Amended Rules of Procedure
Article 18(1) of the 2001 Regulation provides that "[e]ach institution shall adapt its
rules of procedure to the provisions of this Regulation. The adaptations shall take
effect from 3 December 2001". The Council amended its Rules of Procedure in
November 2001, adding Annex 111 entitled "Specific provisions regarding public
ft
access to Council documents". This annex became Annex II of the Council's Rules
of Procedure since July 2002 in another amendment.9 In response to Article 18(1) of
the Regulation, the Commission and Parliament also amended their Rules of
Procedure in late 2001.10 Among these adaptations, the provisions concerning the
scope ofpotential beneficiaries are of considerable importance.
As regards potential beneficiaries, Article 2(1) of the Regulation states that
"[a]ny citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its
registered office in a Member State, has a right of access to documents of the
institutions, subject to the principles, conditions and limits defined in this
Regulation", which corresponds to Article 255(1) EC. Article 2(2) of the Regulation
provides that "[t]he institutions may, subject to the same principles, conditions and
limits, grant access to documents to any natural or legal person not residing or not
having its registered office in a Member State". This provision entitles the Council,
the Commission, and the Parliament to make their own decisions on a case-by-case
8 Council Decision of 29 November 2001 amending the Council's Rules of Procedure (01/840/EC)
[2001] OJL313/40.
9 Council Decision of 22 July 2002 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure (02/682/EC, Euratom)
[2002] OJ L230/7. The Council amended its Rules of Procedure again in March 2004. Council
Decision of 22 March 2004 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure (2004/338/EC, Euratom) [2004]
OJ LI06/22. Decision 01/840 and Decision 02/682 are therefore no longer in force.
10 Commission Decision of 5 December 2001 (2001/937/EC, ECSC, Euratom) Amending its Rules of
Procedure [2001] OJ L345/94. Bureau Decision on Public Access to European Parliament Documents
[2001] OJ C374/01.
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basis, or to amend their Rules of Procedure to extend this right to all natural and legal
persons, irrespective of nationality, place of residence, or location of registered office.
The Council and Commission expressly took the latter approach. The Parliament
adopted the former but in practice it does not take a discriminatory approach.11
Article 1 of the Council Rules of Procedure's Annex II states that "[a]ny natural
or legal person shall have access to Council documents subject to the principles,
conditions and limits laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 and the specific
provisions laid down in this Annex".12 As to the Commission's Rules of Procedure,
the second paragraph of the annex's Article 1 entitled "Beneficiaries" provides that
"[pjursuant to Article 2(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, citizens of third
countries not residing in a Member State and legal persons not having their registered
in one of the Member States shall enjoy the right of access to Commission
documents on the same terms as the beneficiaries referred to in Article 255(1) of the
Treaty".13 Both institutions, under the provisions above, extended the scope of
beneficiaries.
Article 2(2) of the Regulation leaves significant space for the three institutions
to decide whether they would additionally grant access to those "not residing or not
having its registered office in a Member State". It bears noting that it is this latitude
that resulted in the differences in the provisions above. The EU legislator, therefore,
should consider amending Article 2(2) of the Regulation to extend the scope of
beneficiaries. First, it seems unnecessary to restrict any who are influenced by
operation of the Union or merely interested in this organisation from accessing its
11 The Commission says the Parliament "has provided for a similar extension of access in its rules of
procedure 'where possible'", according to a Commission report, n. 2 above, at 44.
12 The Council, n. 9 above.
The Commission, n. 10 above.
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information. This change will help citizens of third countries better to understand EU
policies, though there is a cost in terms of administrative resources. Second, no
measure in the Regulation restricts those who enjoy this freedom from helping those
who do not gain access to the three institutions' information, which brings into
question the need for Article 2(2).
5.2.2 Overview of the annual reports
Annual reports published by the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament should
address, inter alia, their implementation of the 2001 Regulation, according to Article
17 of the Regulation. Article 17(1) states that "[e]ach institution shall publish
annually a report for the preceding year including the number of cases in which the
institution refused to grant access to documents, the reasons for such refusals and the
number of sensitive documents not recorded in the register".
5.2.2.1 The failure of the Parliament
The Council and Commission published their 2002 and 2003 annual reports in April
2003 and April 2004.14 However, it is surprising that the Parliament has failed to do
so, at least not in a normal way. According to a Parliament report on freedom of
information published in September 2003 (hereinafter "the Parliament September
Report"), the Parliament seems to have published its 2002 annual report at an earlier
date.15 It is, however, extremely difficult for those interested in the 2002 Parliament
14
n. 7 above.
15 The Parliament, Report on Public Access to Parliament, Council and Commission Documents
(Implementation ofRegulation 1049/2001/EC in the year 2002) (2003/2022(INI)), 11 September 2003,
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report to locate it because, in the first place, the report is entitled "Review of the
Implementation within the European Parliament of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001",
without employing the phrases such as "report" or "2002" in its title. Secondly, those
who like to read it are unable to access it, unless they follow the application measure
set out in the 2001 Regulation to make a formal request to the Parliament.16 In other
words, the 2002 Parliament report is not directly available at the website of the
Parliament register. It is, therefore, very doubtful that the Parliament really published
its 2002 FOI report. In addition, the Parliament also failed to publish its 2003 report.
Except for this failure, the Parliament's implementation of the Regulation is less
controversial than that of the Council and Commission. As to the rate of access, the
Parliament performed much better than the two other institutions. According to the
Parliament September Report, the Parliament's access rate was 98.7 percent in
2002.17 The weakness revealed by the unpublished 2002 Parliament report has little
to do with the exceptions laid down in Article 4 of the Regulation but a failure to
produce statistics concerning the various kinds of requests, which is a technical
flaw.18
5.2.2.2 Expected increase of requests
The number of initial requests made to the Council and Commission doubled during
Final A5-0298/2003, 5, 11, and 17.
16 The 2002 Parliament report is entitled "Review of the Implementation within the European
Parliament of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001", (PE 324.892/BUR), the Parliament, n. 15 above, at 17.
According to the Parliament September report, that 2002 Parliament report is available at
http://www4.europarl.eu.int/registre/recherche/DemandeDocuments.cfm?langue=EN, The
Parliament, n. 15 above, at 5. This website only provides, however, a document request form rather
than the 2002 Parliament report.
17
According to the Parliament September Report, there were 637 requests for access to the
Parliament information in 2002. In 109 of the cases, the information sought was unavailable. Among
the 109 were nine refused by the Parliament pursuant to Article 4 of the Regulation. The Parliament, n.
15 above, at 17.
18 The Parliament, n. 15 above, at 17.
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the first year (2002) after the entry into force of the 2001 Regulation.19 Compared
with 2002, the number of initial requests made to the Council in 2003 climbed by
70 •
18.4 percent. Compared with 2002, the number of initial requests made to the
Commission sharply rose by 53.7 percent.21 However, these were not unanticipated
increases, owing to publicity surrounding adoption of the new legislation. The
number of requested Council documents soared from 8,090 in 2001 to 9,317 in 2002,
and to 12,595 in 2003. The number of requested Commission documents increased
by more than 3.5 times from 589 in 2001 to 2,150 in 2002, and to 2,931 in 2003.
First, certain factors resulted in these dramatic rises, which will be individually
examined later in this section. Second, it should be noted that although the Council
received many more requests than the Commission, it does not necessarily mean that
the public is more interested in the operation of the Council than that of the
Commission. A probable reason behind these figures is that many Commission
documents in which the public is interested might have been available at the website
of the Commission register.
5.2.2.3 Poorly edited reports
The Council and Commission annual reports address what has been achieved during
the first two years after the new Regulation came into effect. Among the
achievements were the establishment of the three institutions' registers, whose
websites have been frequently consulted, as well as the founding of the
19 The Council received 1,234 applications in 2001 and 2,394 in 2002, according to the 2002 Council
report, Part II entitled "Analysis of Requests for Access", n. 7 above. The Commission received 408
initial requests in 1999, 481 in 2000, and 450 in 2001, but 991 in 2002, according to the 2002
Commission report, n. 7 above, at 18.
20 The Council received 2,394 requests in 2002 and 2,831 in 2003, according to the 2003 Council
report. The Council, n. 7 above, at 15 and 39.
21 The Commission received 991 requests in 2002 and 1,523 in 2003, according to the 2003
Commission report. The Commission, n. 7 above, at 9 and 17.
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interinstitutional committee required by Article 15(2) of the Regulation. 22
Representatives of the institutions held three meetings in 2002, at which they
discussed certain essential issues concerning enforcement of the Regulation.23 In
addition, according to the 2002 Commission report, the officials of the institutions
responsible for implementation of the Regulation kept in touch regularly to ensure
that the Regulation was applied consistently, to share their experience and to identify
best practice.24 In September 2003, the committee held another meeting, addressing,
inter alia, the evaluation of implementation of the Regulation. Nonetheless, it seems
that they made little effort at the meetings to work out a common methodology for
presenting the annual reports, which may explain why there are a number of
problems with these documents.
First of all, it is doubtful whether the institutions have made every effort to
share their experiences in implementing the Regulation, because the Council adopted
its 2002 report in April 2003 without forwarding it to the Parliament immediately.
The Parliament received it in June 2003.25 Secondly, the statistics annexed to the
2002 Council report concern implementation between 3 December 2001 and 31
December 2002, but the figures annexed to the 2002 Commission report concern the
period starting from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2002. This difference makes it
more difficult to compare the enforcement of the Regulation by the two institutions.
22 Article 15(2) states that "[t]he institutions shall establish an interinstitutional committee to examine
best practice, address possible conflicts and discuss future developments on public access to
documents".
23 For instance, the representatives decided at their second meeting that a joint information brochure
for the public would be published. This brochure was published in 2002. The European Union, Access
to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents, A User's Guide (Luxembourg,
Publications Office, 2002). At their third meeting, they exchanged their views on, inter alia, how to
deal with extensive or abusive requests.
24 The Commission, n. 7 above, at 6.
25 The Council, according to the Parliament September Report, forwarded its annual report to the
Parliament by a letter of 2 June 2003. The Parliament, n. 15 above.
190
It should be noted that there was no such difference in the 2003 Council and
Commission reports. The terms "the reference period" and "the observation period"
in both documents refer to the year 2003. Thirdly, as regards readability and accuracy,
the 2002 Council report is far from satisfactory as this official document has no
reference number, table of contents, or page numbers. In addition, it has a number of
9
serious and minor mistakes. The 2003 Council report has its table of contents, and
page numbers, but this document has no reference number either.
5.2.3 The Council reports
27The Council published its 2002 report on access to documents in April 2003. A
large proportion of this report details the measures adopted by the Council to meet
the requirements in the 2001 Regulation, including, inter alia, amendment of the
Council's Rules of Procedure (Article 15 of the Regulation) and the establishment of
9R
an interinstitutional committee (Article 16). This subsection focuses on three key
26 These mistakes are:
1. Points 1 and 2 of the Annex to the 2002 Council report indicate the number of
applications in the reference period was 2,491, which covered 10,330 documents. Point
6 entitled "Number of Refusals" shows that there were 1,127 refusals, an astonishing
figure, because the access rate of the observation period would then be only 55 percent.
It is obviously inconsistent with the figure shown in Point 7, 89.1 percent. Thanks to the
analysis in Part II of the annual report, we have discovered that 1,127 was not the
number of refusals but that of documents covered by the refusals, n. 7 above.
2. The 2002 Council report has some minor flaws. For example, the Council says at the
end of the document's Part I that in 2002, "approximately 900,000 persons logged onto
the Internet site of the register and consulted 4,600,000 pages". As it is almost
impossible for the register to realise the number of people who visit its website, it is
presumably that the website was visited some 900,000 times in 2002. n. 7 above.
3. According to 4.5.1 of the 2003 Commission report at page 11, 36.92 percent of the
refusals made by the Commission in 2003 were based on the public interest exception
relating to inspections, investigations, and audits. However, according to Point 11 of the
Annex to this report at page 23, the figure is 37.55 percent, n. 7 above.
27 The Council, n. 7 above.
28 See 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.3,
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issues and considers whether there is room to improve the current legal framework.
5.2.3.1 Exceptions to openness
As to the exceptions to openness, attention should be drawn to the second parts of the
2002 and 2003 Council reports, both entitled "Analysis of Requests for Access", in
particular with regard to the number of refusals and the grounds given by the
Council.
The most often requested information during the period starting from 3
December 2001 to 31 December 2002 concerned justice and home affairs (24.5
percent), the internal market (14.5 percent), economic and monetary policy (10.5
percent), and external relations and CFSP (8.5 percent).29 Out of 10,330 documents
sought during this period, the Council decided not to release 1,127 of them. The
overall rate of access was thus 89.1 percent. As regards the grounds for refusal
invoked when dealing with the initial applications, the most common exception was
that of the protection of the decision-making process (27.9 percent), followed by the
protection of the public interest as regards international relations (24 percent).30
According to the 2003 Council report, the interest of the public in the
information held by the Council was similar in 2003. The most frequently requested
information continued to relate to justice and home affairs (22 percent), the internal
market (16.3 percent), external relations and CFSP (9.1 percent), and on economic
and monetary policy (9 percent). The level of access remained stable during the
32
year while the rate was 87.4 percent. Meanwhile, the protection of the
29 Part II of the 2002 Council report, and Point 10 of the annex. The Council, n. 7 above.
Part II of the 2002 Council report, and Point 2, 6, 7, and 11 of the annex. The Council, n. 7 above.
jl The Council, n. 7 above, at 17 and 42.
32 The Council, n. 7 above, at 18 and 39.
192
decision-making process and that of the public interest relating to international
relations were still the most commonly invoked exceptions (31.2 percent and 28.7
•3 -j
percent respectively). They account for nearly 60 percent of all the refusals in
2003.
A. The most commonly refused requests
Many must be curious as to whether the most popular categories of information were
made publicly available. If not, were requests for these documents refused by the
Council through invoking one or more of the most commonly invoked exceptions? A
citizen might ask, for instance, whether most, if not all, of the requests for
information on external relations were refused to protect the public interest relating
to international relations. This question is important since it will help determine
which category of information was most inaccessible during the reference periods.
The Council does not, however, answer this question in the two annual reports.
These documents, in fact, provide no data concerning the relationship between the
most commonly requested documents and the most frequently invoked exceptions.
The statistics indicate that information relating to external relations and CFSP was
among the four most common categories of information demanded by the public,
while the protection of the public interest relating to international relations was one
of the two most often invoked exceptions. We, as a result, suspect that most requests
for documents relating to external relations and CFSP were refused by the Council to
secure the public interest relating to international relations.
Generally, as there must be requests falling within the scope of the exceptions
set out in the Regulation, the 2002 refusal rate of 10.1 percent and 2003 12.6 percent
33 The Council, n. 7 above, at 19 and 44.
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should not be regarded as astonishing figures. Nonetheless, if most of the citizens
interested in the Council's information relating to international relations received
only a frustrating reply to their initial applications, the public should consider
whether the Council has been systematically refusing such requests, without showing
respect to the principles handed down by the Community courts to ensure "widest
possible access". Among these principles is the principle of proportionality, which
requires that there exists a reasonable relationship between the ends and the means, a
rule applied in the Hautala case by the Community courts.34 It should be noted that
the CFI stated in the judgment that the principle of proportionality required that
"derogations remain within the limits of what is appropriate and necessary for
achieving the aim in view".35 This principle could be applied to restrict effectively
the Council's systematic invocation of the international relations exception.
B. Opinions of the Legal Service
As regards the grounds invoked to reject initial applications, the protection of court
proceedings and legal advice was the public interest exception invoked in 12.2
percent of the refusals at the initial stage, according to the 2002 Council report. In
2003, this exception was invoked in 10.9 percent of the refusals of initial
applications. The Council says in its 2002 report that "documents or parts of
documents in which an opinion of the Legal Service on legal questions is reproduced
are not made available to the public pursuant to Article 4(2) of the Regulation, unless
34 Case T-14/98, Hautala v. Council [1999] ECR 11-2489, and Case C-353/99P, Council v. Hautala
[2001] ECR1-9565.
'5
para. 85 of the CFI judgment, n. 34 above.
j6 Part II of the 2002 report and the Annex's Point 11 entitled "Reasons for refusing access: initial
applications", n. 7 above.
37 The Council, n. 7 above, at 21 and 44.
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there is an overriding public interest in disclosure". It goes on to say that:
The Council feels that this condition is not met by the simple fact that the
disclosure of a document containing an opinion of the Legal Service would be
in the general interest of transparency of the decision-making process of the
Council. The independent advice provided for the Council by the Legal
Service allows the Council to ensure that its acts comply with Community law
and to further discussion on the legal aspects of a dossier. If the Council were
to lose that instrument, the efficiency of its work would be compromised,
(emphasis added)39
In its 2003 report, the Council reiterated this view and added further that "[t]his is
why it is in the public interest that the Council should have available advice that is
given totally independently" (emphasis added).40 These statements are extremely
controversial, as it suggests that the public should be systematically refused
information in which the Legal Service's opinion is reproduced.
These statements, first of all, are obviously incompatible with a fundamental
principle set out in Recital 11 of the 2001 Regulation, which provides, inter alia, that
"[i]n principle, all documents of the institutions should be accessible to the public.
However, certain public and private interests should be protected by way of
exceptions". The opinion of the Council shows it believes that disclosure of legal
advice will definitely have a negative impact on the efficiency of its work. The
Council does not, however, elaborate on why to attain the purpose to comply with
EC law requires secrecy. In brief, it apparently assumed that information concerning
legal opinions should be kept secret unless it decides to release it.
Secondly, as to how it makes this decision, the Council pays no heed to the
j8
Part II of the 2002 Council report, n. 7 above.
39 Part II of the 2002 Council report, n. 7 above.
40 The Council, n. 7 above, at 22.
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balancing test required by Article 4(2) of the Regulation. The Council rightly pointed
out that the condition of Article 4(2) is not met by the fact that "the disclosure of a
document containing an opinion of the Legal Service would be in the general interest
of transparency of the decision-making process of the Council". In its report,
however, the Council fails to consider whether there are any overriding public
interests that might be brought about by the disclosure of legal advice. Consequently,
it did not ponder the relationships between the specific interests and the Council's
interest in such a refusal. What the Council emphasised was solely the latter, namely
the efficiency of its work. It is doubtful whether the Council is fully aware of what
could be the specific overriding public interests. Thus, it would not be surprising if
the Council's systematic refusals of requests for access to its Legal Service's
opinions trigger bitter legal disputes in the future.
Thirdly, it should be stressed that the legal advice exception must be invoked in
a limited fashion. In many circumstances, the Legal Service's opinions are not at all
different from those provided by other Council officials. Disclosure of these views
might have positive rather than negative influence on the public's confidence in the
Union. The Council is correct when saying that "[i]f the Council were to lose that
instrument, the efficiency of its work would be compromised", but refusals based on
the legal advice exception must be made on a case-by-case basis. In addition, the
work of the Legal Service is part of the Council's operation, which in principle
should not be given total independence or exempted from public scrutiny.
5.2.3.2 Beneficiaries
The Council and Commission amended their Rules of Procedure to extend this right
to all natural and legal persons, irrespective of nationality, place of residence, or
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location of registered office.41 The Parliament decided to make its decisions on a
case-by-case basis, but in practice it does not take a discriminatory approach.
The Council's implementation of the 2001 Regulation indicates that it has
adopted the correct approach. On the one hand, although the extension above has
increased the workload of the Council, the extra work is not significantly taxing.
According to the 2002 Council report, the statistics about the geographical
breakdown of applicants indicate that only 6.5 percent of the applications during the
reference period came from four non-Member States - the United States, Norway,
Switzerland, and Japan, which may also include those made by the EU citizens
staying in these countries.42 In 2003, the data in this sector remains stable, as only
5.3 percent of the requests came from the United States, Norway, Switzerland, Japan,
and Russia.43 On the other hand, the extension will, in the long run, benefit the
Union. According to the 2002 Council report, the data concerning the applicants'
professional backgrounds shows that nearly a quarter of the initial applications (23.5
percent) were made by students and researchers in 2002.44 In 2003, the data in this
sector is 23.9 percent.45 These figures may include the students and researchers
residing in non-Member States interested in the operation of the Council. While the
five non-Member States from which applicants made requests have close
relationships with the Union, it is unnecessary to place any limits on applications
from non-EU citizens of these states. The analysis above indicates that it is time to
41 See 5.2.1.
42 The 2002 Council report, Annex I, entitled "Statistics on Public Access to Council Documents for
the Period from 3 December 2001 to 31 December 2002", n. 7 above. It should, however, be pointed
out that these statistics are those of geographical breakdown of applicants. It is not clear whether the
applicants made their applications from the non-Member States are EU citizens.
4j The Council, n. 7 above, at 41.
44
Part II of the 2002 Council report and the Annex II, Point 7 entitled "Professional background of
applicants", n. 7 above.
45 The Council, n. 7 above, at 16 and 40.
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consider making the extension a provision of the Regulation, setting out a common
scope ofbeneficiaries in this field.
5.2.3.3 Sensitive documents
Issues concerning the treatment of "sensitive documents", as we have seen in 4.2,
triggered furious disputes prior to adoption of the 2001 Regulation. Article 9 of the
Regulation, therefore, treats such documents in a very cautious manner. Article 9(1),
which defines the phrase "sensitive documents", provides that:
Sensitive documents are documents originating from the institutions or the
agencies established by them, from Member States, third countries or
International Organisations, classified as "TRES SECRET/TOP SECRET",
"SECRET" or "CONFIDENTIEL" in accordance with the rules of the
institution concerned, which protect essential interests of the European Union
or of one or more of its Member States in the areas covered by Article 4(1 )(a),
notably public security, defence and military matters, (emphasis added)
Sensitive documents are different from the other information governed by the
Regulation. This is not because that they originate "from the institutions or the
agencies established by them, from Member States, third countries or International
Organisations". It bears noting that other information held by the three institutions
might also originate from exactly the same source. The reason why the EU legislator
treats sensitive documents in a particular manner is that they concern extremely
essential interests of the Union. The major distinction between the treatment of
sensitive documents and that of the others is that "[sjensitive documents shall be
recorded in the register or released only with the consent of the originator",
according to Article 17(3) of the Regulation. This means that a number of sensitive
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documents are unavailable to the public and not recorded in the registers of the three
institutions.
The legislator gave special treatment to highly sensitive content of this type, but
it did not prevent the public from obtaining information concerning the number of
such documents not recorded in the registers. Article 17(1) of the Regulation
stipulates, inter alia, that the number of sensitive documents not recorded in the three
institutions' registers shall be included in their annual reports. According to the 2002
Council report, a total of 12 "SECRET UE" and 238 "CONFIDENTIEL UE"
documents originated from the Council or other sources, only 77 of them are
recorded by the institution's register.46 The number of sensitive documents soared
from 250 in 2002 by 63 percent to 399 in 2003, according to the 2003 Council
Report.47 A total of 17 sensitive documents originating from the Council or other
sources were classified "EU SECRET", and 382 "EU CONFIDENTIAL".48
According to this report, 136 of the "EU CONFIDENTIAL" documents are referred
to in the Council register.49 Therefore, the number of sensitive documents not
recorded in the register sharply increased by 66 percent from 173 to 263.
More details concerning this category of information, such as essential interests
involved and origins of these documents, etc., should also be included in the annual
reports. Mere numbers of sensitive documents do very little to help understand how
the Council addresses such information. This category of document is given special
treatment as it concerns compelling interests of the Union. It remains, however,
questionable whether this protection is excessive and incompatible with the principle
46 Last paragraph of Part I of the 2002 Council report, n. 7 above.
47 The Council, n. 7 above, at 11.
48 The Council, n. 7 above, at 11.
49 The Council, n. 7 above, at 11.
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of "widest possible access" set out in Article 1 of the Regulation.
5.2.4 The Commission reports
Now turning to the Commission reports, this subsection focuses on two contentious
issues concerning exceptions to openness and sensitive documents, which might
trigger disputes in this area in the near future.
5.2.4.1 Refusals
The access rate of the Council is 89.1 percent, and the refusal rate is, therefore, 10.9
percent, according to the 2002 Council report. The level of refusal remains stable in
2003 when the rate was 12.6 percent.50 According to the 2002 Commission report,
the refusal rate of the Commission was, however, 33 percent.51 The figure for 2003
was 31 percent, according to the 2003 Commission report. Can we say that the
Commission's approach towards requests for access to its information is much more
restrictive than that of the Council? The examination of the case law of the second
stage of FOI evolution, as we saw in Chapter 3, gave a negative answer to this
question, indicating that the Commission was much more open-minded than the
Council when addressing requests for access to its information. So what are the
factors that attributed to this difference? Additionally, it bears noting that the
Commission's refusal rate increased from 20 percent in 1999 to 25 percent in 2000,
50 The access rate of the Council shown in the 2003 Council report is 87.4 percent. The Council, n. 7
above, at 18.
51 The Commission, n. 7 above, at 13.
52 The Commission, n. 7 above, at 10 and 17.
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30 percent in 2001, 33 percent in 2002, and then 31 percent in 2003. Does this
tendency to increase mean that the Commission has been taking an increasingly
harsh approach towards requests for access its documents?
During these five years, an increasing number of requests might have fallen
within the scope of exceptions laid down in the Code of Conduct or the 2001
Regulation, which might have resulted in this trend. Secondly, it is also probable that
more applicants misinterpreted the scope of their right granted by the rules. But is
this really the case? To answer these questions one must look at the exceptions
invoked by the Commission when refusing the requests. With regard to the
exceptions, the Commission has said in the 2002 report that:
[A key factor] is the increasing number of requests concerning infringement
proceedings and cases relating to competition policy. It should be noted that in
over a third of cases where access to a document is refused (35.9%), the
decision to refuse disclosure is motivated by the desire to protect the purposes
of inspections, investigations and audits. In most cases the requests were made
53
by law firms. The legal appeals clearly confirm this trend, (emphasis added)
This statement concerns one of the most crucial issues in the 2002 and 2003
Commission reports, i.e. the protection of purposes of inspections, investigations,
and audits, which are exceptions laid down in Article 4(2) of the Regulation. The
Commission expressly said that in 2002 it invoked these exceptions to refuse more
than one third of all the initial requests. In 2003, the figure rose to 37.55 percent,
according to the 2003 Commission report.54
However, what the Commission has not elaborated on in the two reports is, on
53 The Commission, n. 7 above, at 13.
54 The Commission, n. 7 above, at 23.
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the one hand, what percentage of all initial applications concerned inspections,
investigations and audits, and on the other hand, what proportion of all refusals
related to infringement proceedings and cases relating to competition policy. The
answer to the former question will help determine whether the Commission refused
most of the requests involved with inspections, investigations, and audits. The latter
issue concerns whether most of those who requested access to the information
concerning competition policy were frustrated by the Commission. Unsurprisingly,
the Commission did not answer these two important questions presumably because
the answers could draw harsh criticism.
One of the tables annexed to the 2002 Commission report, which provides
statistics concerning "subject area", indicates that 12.7 percent of the requests in
2002 concerned competition issues. Another table shows that 35.9 percent of the
requests made to the Commission in 2002 were refused to protect the "purposes of
inspections, investigations and audits". As the Commission has admitted that in 2002
there was an increasing number of requests concerning infringement proceedings and
cases relating to competition policy, most of these competition related requests
appeared to have been refused on this ground. In this connection, we saw no sign of
change in 2003. According to the 2003 Commission report, 13.7 percent of the
applications received in 2003 concerned competition policy, and 37.55 percent of the
requests made to the Commission during the year were refused for the protection of
the "purposes of inspections, investigations and audits".55 The Commission remains
silent on whether, in 2003, most requests for access to the information concerning
competition policy were refused.
As we noted in Chapter 3, the Community courts have emphasised the
55 The Commission, n. 7 above, at 21 and 23
202
importance of the principle of proportionality in the EU FOI field. The Commission
has not considered whether refusals of this type are proportionate to the interest
relating to an inspection, investigation or audit. This is not an easy task because, first,
the Commission may have not yet or have just completed one of the above
proceedings when it is called upon to decide whether it would grant access. Secondly,
for the Commission, what makes this more difficult is that it has to make such a
decision before the time limit of one month expires. Thirdly, the Court might have
different views on the requirements of the principle of proportionality when disputes
about various exceptions come before it. As the Court has made proportionality
reviews only in addressing a couple of FOI disputes, it will be very challenging for
the Commission to predict how the Court will apply it when protection of the above
purposes is involved. All these difficulties might presumably be the reasons why
more than one third of the refusals were made under this provision.
Nevertheless, the approach of the Commission is extremely controversial
despite the difficulties noted above. This is because, first, the Commission's attitude
towards this taxing task is incompatible with the principle of "widest possible
access" set out in Article 1 of the Regulation. When the Commission is uncertain
about whether the interests of protection of inspections, investigations, and audits
prevail over freedom of information, it should grant access to the requested
information rather than refuse the requests. The Commission, however, has done just
the opposite. This issue has been very contentious, and is one on which we will




The Commission states in its 2002 report that "[ajmong the three categories of
documents presently covered by the register (the COM, C and SEC series of 2001
and 2002) there are no sensitive documents within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the
Regulation".56 This is a contentious way to address the requirement about sensitive
documents set out in Article 17(1), which requires that an annual report should
include, inter alia, "the number of sensitive documents not recorded in the register".
The Commission does not meet this requirement.
Under Article 17(3) of the Regulation, certain sensitive documents are not only
unavailable to the public but also not recorded in the registers of the three institutions.
The point is that the 2002 Commission report does not offer the figure. What the
provision demands is that the Commission must provide the number of unrecorded
sensitive documents, not just mention whether there are such documents in its
register. In its 2003 report, the Commission improves the way it meets the
requirements of Article 17, saying that "25 documents classified "Confidentiel UE'
[EU confidential] from the 'C' series of documents are not mentioned in the register.
The Commission does not keep other sensitive documents which are covered by the
register".57
5.2.5 Conclusion
Analysis of the three EU institutions' amended Rules of Procedures and annual
56 The Commission, n. 7 above, at 7.
57 The Commission, n. 7 above, at 7.
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reports indicates that certain measures must be adopted in the future to help realise
the principle of "widest possible access" set out in Article 1 of the 2001 Regulation.
First, as it has been unnecessary to place any limits on applications from non-EU
citizens, it is time for the EU legislator to consider amending the Regulation to
extend freedom of information to all natural and legal persons in an express manner.
Secondly, Article 17 of the Regulation should include a new paragraph requiring
that the three institutions provide cross tabulation between categories of requested
information and invoked exceptions in their annual FOI reports. This is an
indispensable provision, which will prevent the institutions avoiding addressing
crucial questions in the documents, such as what proportion of the requests for access
to information relating to the EU's external relations and CFSP are refused to protect
the public interest relating to international relations. Thirdly, as to the
implementation of the Regulation by the Commission, its refusals of access to
documents relating to investigations, inspections, and audits, in particular those
concerning competition law are very contentious. We will, as a result, concentrate on
the relevant case law in the following section. In addition, the principle of
proportionality could be applied effectively to prevent the systematic refusals by the
Commission and Council.
As to sensitive documents, the Commission fails to meet the requirement to
record the number of sensitive documents in its 2002 report, which is set out in
Article 17(1). It redresses this failure in its 2003 report. The Council followed the
requirement in its 2002 and 2003 reports, but the mere numbers of these specially
addressed documents help little to realise the nature of this category of information.
What should also be included in future annual reports is further details about these
documents, such as the essential interests involved and origins of these documents,
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etc., which could in no way jeopardise essential interests of the Union. Otherwise,
the treatment of sensitive documents appears unduly privileged and is incompatible
with the principle of "widest possible access" in Article 1 of the Regulation.
Following the detailed examination of the 2002 and 2003 Council and
Commission reports on implementation of the 2001 Regulation, it is necessary to
consider relevant judgments after the new Regulation came into force in December
2001. Some of the disputes concerned the Code of Conduct and the two Council and
Commission decisions, rather than the 2001 Regulation, but the Courts regularly
referred to the latter in these judgments, in which the purpose of the Regulation was
repeatedly emphasised.58 For this reason, these cases have been included in this
chapter. As to these cases, we focus on whether similar disputes would be better dealt
with under the new legislation. The main issues that have arisen from these disputes
are the following:
1. What are the objectives behind the public interest exceptions relating to
investigations, inspections, and court proceedings?
2. What are the differences, if any, between the authorship rule set out in
the Code of Conduct and the non-disclosure rule in the Regulation?
3. What is the relationship between the principle of proportionality and
the exceptions laid down in the 2001 Regulation?
58 For instance, in para. 39 of Case C-41/00, Interporc Im- und Export GmbH v. Commission [2003]
ECR 1-2125, the ECJ stressed that objective of the 2001 Regulation is "to enable citizens to participate
more closely in the decision-making process, to guarantee that the administration enjoys greater
legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system and to
contribute to strengthening the principles of democracy and respect for fundamental rights". This
judgment will be analysed in detail in 5.5.
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5.3 The Petrie case59
This judgment concerned the authorship rule, as well as the public interest exceptions
relating to investigations, inspections, and court proceedings, which were set out in
the fourth section of the Code of Conduct. The former, according to the Rothmans
judgment, constituted an exception in addition to the two categories of mandatory
and discretionary exceptions in the fourth section of the Code of Conduct and Article
4 ofCouncil Decision 93/731.60 This section considers the major distinction between
the authorship rule and the two categories of mandatory and discretionary exceptions.
The point is whether the authorship rule is compatible with the principle of widest
possible access. As to the public interest exceptions relating to investigations,
inspections, and court proceedings, it bears noting that their purpose was unclear. We
will consider whether they can be invoked solely to protect the privileges of lawyers
and the right to a fair hearing, or whether they can also be relied on to secure an
amicable resolution of a dispute before the Court delivers a judgment? In its 1998
van der Wal judgment, the CFI stated that the exception relating to court proceedings
enshrined in Commission Decision 94/90 was designed to ensure respect for the right
to a fair hearing.61 The Court, however, did not strictly follow this stance in the
present case. What was worse was that the Court did not examine whether the
Commission had applied the principle of proportionality when refusing the request.




para. 48 of Case T-83/96, Gerard van der Wal v. Commission [1998] ECR 11-545.
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5.3.1 Facts
David Petrie and two other natural persons served as lecturers of foreign mother
tongue at Italian universities, but the posts were replaced with those of assistants and
mother tongue language experts.62 In related judgments, the ECJ held that
systematic use by Italian universities of fixed-term contracts to meet needs in
language education was incompatible with EC law where a similar use of fixed term
contracts had not been employed in other areas of teaching. Notwithstanding the
judgments and subsequent reform, the applicants believed that discrimination against
former lecturers of foreign mother tongue persisted.64 The Commission later opened
infringement proceedings under Article 226 EC against Italy before bringing this
matter before the ECJ in June 1999.65 To examine the documents held by the
Commission relating to the infringement procedure, the applicants requested the
Commission to offer 16 categories of relevant information, including documents
originating from the Italian authorities and those drawn up by the Commission.66
The applicants brought this action in August 1999, after the Commission invoked the
authorship rule, and the public interest exceptions relating to investigations,
inspections, and court proceedings in refusing their initial and confirmative
requests.67 As to the investigations, the Commission stressed that "[infringement
62
para. 12, n. 59 above.
63
para. 13, n. 59 above. The following cases were referred to: Case 33/88, Pilar Allue and Carmel
Mary Coonan v. Universita degli studi di Venezia [1989] ECR 1591, and Joined cases C-259/91,
C-331/91 and C-332/91 Pilar Allue and Carmel Maty Coonan and others v. Universita degli studi di
Venezia and Universita degli studi di Parma [1993] ECR 1-4309.
64
para. 13, n. 59 above.
65
para. 14, n. 59 above.
66
para. 15, n. 59 above.
67
paras. 16, 17, and 18, n. 59 above. The authorship rule refers to Section 2, paragraph 3 of the Code
ofConduct, which provides that "[w]here the document held by an institution was written by a natural
or legal person, a Member State, another Community institution or body or any other national or
international body, the application must be sent direct to the author".
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investigations call for genuine cooperation and an atmosphere of mutual trust
between the Commission and the Member State concerned so as to enable those two
parties to open discussions with a view to a rapid resolution of the dispute".68 The
applicants invoked three pleas in support of their action. The first was based on
infringement of Article 255(1) EC and of Article 1(2) TEU, which are the Treaty
bases of the 2001 Regulation.69 The second related to breach of Commission
Decision 94/90, and the third infringement of the requirement of giving adequate
reasoning set out in Article 253 EC.70
5.3.2 Held
The CFI said that, as is clear from Van Gend en Loos, "the criteria for deciding
whether a Treaty provision is directly applicable are that the rule should be clear and
71 . .
unconditional". It stated that Article 1(2) TEU "is not clear in the sense required by
the case-law cited, [and] Article 255 EC is, by virtue of paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof,
not unconditional and that its implementation is dependent on the adoption of
72
subsequent measures". It rejected the plea, holding that the two provisions were
68
para. 17, n. 59 above.
69 Under Article 255(1) EC, any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or
having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to European Parliament,
Council and Commission documents. Article 1(2) TEU provides that "[t]his Treaty marks a new stage
in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are
taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen". For analysis of these provisions,
see the introduction to Chapter 4 and 4.1.
70
para. 28, n. 59 above. Article 253 EC provides that "[rjcgulations, directives and decisions adopted
jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, and such acts adopted by the Council or the
Commission, shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any proposals or
opinions which were required to be obtained pursuant to this Treaty".
71
para. 34, n. 59 above. See also Case 26/62, Van Gend cn Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie dcr
Belastingen [1963] ECR 1.
72




As regards the second plea relating to a possible breach of Decision 94/90, the
CFI individually addressed the disputes concerning the documents originating from
the Italian authorities and those drawn up by the Commission. As to the former, it
held that "[t]he restrictions on access to documents originating with third parties and
held by the institutions have no bearing on the duty imposed on those institutions
under Article 253 EC to provide adequate reasoning for their decisions".74
Consequently, it held that "the Commission did not err in law in taking the view that
it was not under an obligation to grant access to those documents".75 As regards the
documents drawn up by the Commission, i.e. letters of formal notice and reasoned
opinions drawn up within the context of proceedings instituted against Italy under
Article 226 EC, the Court referred to the 1997 WWF judgment, stating that "the
Member States are entitled to expect the Commission to guarantee confidentiality
76
during investigations which might lead to an infringement procedure". It went on
to say that:
This requirement of confidentiality remains even after the matter has been
brought before the Court of Justice, on the ground that it cannot be ruled out
that the discussions between the Commission and the Member State in
question regarding the latter's voluntary compliance with the Treaty
requirements may continue during the court proceedings and up to the delivery
77of the judgment of the Court of Justice.
73
paras. 34 and 38, n. 59 above.
74
para. 49, n. 59 above.
75
para. 50, n. 59 above.
76
paras. 51 and 68, n. 59 above. The CFI referred to para. 63 of the WWF judgment, in which the
Court said it considered that "the confidentiality which the Member States are entitled to expect of the
Commission in such circumstances warrants, under the heading of protection of the public interest, a
refusal of access to documents relating to investigations which may lead to an infringement
procedure". Case T-105/95, WWF (United Kingdom) v. Commission [1997] ECR 11-313.
77
para. 68, n. 59 above.
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The Court added that:
The preservation of that objective, namely an amicable resolution of the dispute
between the Commission and the Member State concerned before the Court of
Justice has delivered judgment, justifies refusal of access to the letters of
formal notice and reasoned opinions drawn up in connection with the Article
226 EC proceedings on the ground of protection of the public interest relating
to inspections, investigations and court proceedings, which comes within the
• • 78
first category of exceptions in Decision 94/90.
As regards the third plea concerning possible infringement of Article 253 EC, the
applicants believed that the Commission's justification for its refusal lacked legal
basis, reflecting that "infringement proceedings are conducted under conditions of
70
absolute secrecy". They added that "according to settled case-law, the reasons
given for refusing access must be sufficient and must involve a balance between the
80 •
conflicting interests". However, the Court held, first, that the Commission had
81
given sufficiently clear reasons for the contested decision. It stated that the
Commission had referred to the authorship rule and stated that, under this rule, "the
applicants' request had no basis because the documents sought had been written by a
third party". It went on to say that "[sjuch a statement of reasons is sufficiently clear
to enable interested parties to understand why the Commission did not forward to
them the documents in question and to enable the Court to exercise its power to
87
review the legality of the contested decision". Secondly, the Court stated that "the
Commission indicated in the contested decision the reasons why it formed the view
78
para. 68, n. 59 above.
79
para. 73, n. 59 above.
80
para. 73, n. 59 above.
81
para. 77, n. 59 above.
82
para. 77, n. 59 above.
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that disclosure of the letters of formal notice and the reasoned opinions would have
an adverse effect on the public interest".83 It therefore held that "the unavoidable
conclusion is that the Commission did carry out such an examination".84
5.3.3 Comment
The information sought in this case concerned documents about infringement
proceedings against Italy. Part of the documents was produced by the Italian
authorities, while the other part was drawn up by the Commission. In its refusal, the
Commission invoked the authorship rule and the public interest exceptions relating to
investigations, inspections, and court proceedings. We will focus on the Court's
opinions on the employment of these provisions. As Article 253 EC related to both
the authorship rule and the three other exceptions, we will not follow the order of the
applicants' pleas but take this provision into account when examining both topics.
5.3.3.1 The authorship rule
With regard to the authorship rule, we should consider whether Article 253 EC
requires the Commission to justify its invocation of the authorship rule. The Court
handed down a negative answer to this question, holding that "[t]he restrictions on
access to documents originating with third parties and held by the institutions have
no bearing on the duty imposed on those institutions under Article 253 EC to provide
adequate reasoning for their decisions". This stance is not surprising at all because,
83
para. 80, n. 59 above.
84
para. 80, n. 59 above.
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under the authorship rule, it is the third parties rather than the Commission or the
Council that decide whether the information provided by third parties should be
released. Generally, as such an application must be sent to the author rather than the
two institutions, it is the author that decided whether the request should be approved.
Since the institutions do not make such decisions, it is inappropriate to demand that
they justify their refusals. This was presumably the reason why the Court held that
the reference of the authorship rule and the statement indicating that "the documents
sought had been written by a third party" was sufficiently clear.
This judgment, however, demonstrated that the authorship rule was inconsistent
with the principle of widest possible access. This principle, as we saw in 3.1.2,
suggested that information should be provided to the citizen unless decision-makers
within the EU have a good reason not to do so. What is the good reason, if any,
behind the authorship rule? Obviously, the main purpose of this provision is to help
maintain mutual confidence between the Commission and third parties. The relations
between Brussels and Rome could have been strained, if the Commission had been
entitled to make the decision and indeed approved the request for access to the
documents originating from Italy. Any jeopardy to these ties should definitely be
regarded as damage to public interest. Nonetheless, in addition to the authorship rule,
the public interest exception relating to international relations was set out in the Code
of Conduct. What was protected through the invocation of the authorship rule was
not only the public interest above, but also the third parties' own interest in a denial
of public access. The two institutions have no say on any disclosure of third party
information on the one hand, and on the other, third parties tend to deny all access as
long as third parties' interests are involved. It is fair to say that the authorship rule,
which runs counter to the principle of widest possible access, constituted a major
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threat to FOI protection in the Union.
In addition, it was unclear whether release of the documents originating from
Italy would be detrimental to diplomatic ties. Was the refusal actually beneficial to
bilateral relations? The Court, as we saw earlier, avoided answering this question on
the ground that it was unnecessary for the Commission to consider the principle of
proportionality. Nonetheless, it should be noted that in reality such a rejection might
neither benefit nor jeopardise bilateral relations. For instance, the first document
requested by the applicants was a telex from an Italian government agency to Italian
universities concerning the suspension of all relations or activities with lecturers
following the judgment in Allue and Others. This document could be considered
the evidence showing that the Italian authorities concerned had endeavoured to
comply with the court decision. It was, as a result, unlikely that the granting of
access to this document would put bilateral ties at any material risk.
5.3.3.2 Public interest exceptions
Invoking the public interest exceptions relating to investigations, inspections, and
court proceedings, the Commission denied access to the letters of formal notice and
reasoned opinions. What do these exceptions refer to? Is it appropriate to say that all
the Commission-originated information relating to these three procedures should not
be made available to the public? The answer is obviously negative, as it is impossible
that all the documents about the procedures have public interest implications. But
how narrow, or how broad, is this scope? If these exceptions are read in a strict
manner, the information, disclosure of which would jeopardise those procedures'




In this case however, as regards the notice and opinions, what the Court mainly
considered was, inter alia, whether the Commission and Italy could reach an
amicable resolution. The Court said that the refusal was justified because the
Member State's voluntary compliance with the Treaty requirements might exist
during the investigations, the inspections, and the court proceedings, adding that an
amicable resolution of the dispute could be made before the Court delivered a
judgment.86
It is of interest to refer to the 1998 van der Wal judgment when examining the
present case. In van der Wal, the CFI said that the exception concerning court
proceedings enshrined in Commission Decision 94/90 was designed to ensure respect
87for the right to a fair hearing. As the present case concerned not only the court
proceedings but also the investigation and inspection exceptions, one might have
expected the Court to take the view that the objective of the three exceptions was to
guarantee fairness in relation to the three kinds of legal procedure. However, the
Court, which did not even mention this essential purpose in the present case, turned
to focus on another purpose, namely the pursuit of amicable resolutions of disputes.
This new interpretation of the public interest exceptions was flawed on the
following grounds. First, it was extremely contentious to state that the three public
interest exceptions were introduced to ensure Member States cooperation with the
Commission and to create a harmonious atmosphere during legal procedures. It bears
noting that the Member States are under the obligation to cooperate sincerely under
Article 5 EC. Regarding the procedures, it is extremely rare to see genuine
86 This opinion was in line with that of the Commission. In its refusal, the institution stressed that it
was "genuine cooperation and an atmosphere of mutual trust between the Commission and the




cooperation and an amicable atmosphere when a Member State is suspected of
infringing Community law. As little willing cooperation can be expected in these
circumstances, we doubt whether pursuit of an amicable resolution, as opposed to
fairness, is a main objective of the three exceptions. Second, even if an amicable
resolution is reached prior to the judgment, it does not necessarily mean that the
confidential content helps bring about the result. Many other factors might be taken
into serious consideration before two parties could decide to end the procedures. In
addition, as regards Article 253 EC and the principle of proportionality, the views of
the Court were controversial. This is because the Court did not consider whether the
Commission had elaborated on how the refusal could bring about an amicable end to
the dispute. Without even mentioning the principle of proportionality, the Court
stated that "the Commission indicated in the contested decision the reasons why it
formed the view that disclosure of the letters of formal notice and the reasoned
opinions would have an adverse effect on the public interest". The Court failed to
examine what was the adverse effect, if any, and whether the refusal could avoid the
result.
In the present case, the Court cited a controversial statement it made in the
WWF judgment, in which it said that "the confidentiality which the Member States
are entitled to expect of the Commission in such circumstances warrants, under the
heading of protection of the public interest, a refusal of access to documents relating
to investigations which may lead to an infringement procedure".88 Generally, when
the Court determines whether the public interest exceptions are correctly invoked in
a refusal, the major factor that should be considered is not expectation of the Member




rather than that of the public. The fragile link between this expectation and the public
interest seems to be: if the anticipation is not met, the state concerned could decline
to cooperate genuinely with the Commission or the Court in future procedures, which
could eventually do harm to the public interest. As we have seen earlier, however,
there is little chance of a pleasant atmosphere when a Member State is alleged to
have infringed Community law. The major issue that the Court must consider is
whether a refusal could ensure fair legal procedures, because it is this objective that
has straightforward impact on the public interest. In WWF however, the Court did not
focus on whether the investigation's purpose was endangered. In fact, that purpose
was unlikely to be jeopardised as the investigation had been completed.
5.3.3.3 Conclusion
This judgment indicates that there was a potential conflict between the authorship
rule and the spirit of the principle of widest possible access. Future controversy that
could arise in this context might be the reason why the authorship rule is not included
in the 2001 Regulation. Second, the Court agreed with the Commission that the
pursuit of an amicable resolution was a compelling objective, but our analysis
demonstrated that it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve this aim,
and firm causal link between the refusal at issue and this aim does not always exist.
Factors other than the refusal could attain the purpose. For instance, Italy might
decide to comply with the Treaty requirements at issue during the court proceedings
to preserve the national reputation. Thus, the exceptions relating to investigations,
inspections, and court proceedings should be interpreted in a much stricter fashion.
This controversy remains after the 2001 Regulation came into force. Article 4(2)
of this legislation provides that:
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The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would
undermine the protection of:
commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual
property,
court proceedings and legal advice,
the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits,
unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.
This provision does not touch on what constitutes the purpose of the exceptions
relating to court proceedings, inspections, and investigations. The Court must in
future examine whether the EU institutions have considered the principle of
proportionality before refusing the public access. It should be stressed that limitless
invocation of recklessly-interpreted exceptions will definitely endanger FOI
protection in the Union.
5.4 The Kuijer case89
The CFI delivered the Kuijer judgment in February 2002, two months after it handed
down Petrie. A major difference between these cases is that the Court did not
mention the principle of proportionality in the former but stressed its importance in
the latter.
5.4.1 Facts and ruling
Aldo Kuijer, a Dutch scholar in the field of asylum and immigration studies, was
89 Case T-211/00, Aldo Kuijer v. Council [2002] ECR 11-485.
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interested in certain Council documents concerning the activities of the Centre for
Information, Discussion and Exchange on Asylum (CIREA).90 In the present action,
he sought annulment of a Council decision, which rejected his application for access
to a number of CIREA documents. The request related to, first, certain reports drawn
up by, or with, the CIREA and reports of joint missions, or reports on missions,
carried out by Member States in third countries and sent to the CIREA. The
Commission provided the applicant with various documents, but this did not alter the
basic substance of dispute. Second, the applicant requested the list drawn up by, or
with, the CIREA, of the contact persons in the Member States involved with asylum
cases (the list of contact persons) and any subsequent changes to that list.91 The
Court stressed that it must consider whether the contested decision was adopted
according to, inter alia, the following principles:
Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731 must be interpreted in the light of the principle
of the right to information and the principle of proportionality. Consequently,
the Council must consider whether it is appropriate to grant partial access,
confined to material which is not covered by the exceptions. In exceptional
cases, a derogation from the obligation to grant partial access might be
permissible where the administrative burden of blanking out the parts that may
not be disclosed proves to be particularly heavy, thereby exceeding the limits of
what may reasonably be required.92
The Council refused access to the requested reports by relying on the public interest
exception relating to international relations set out in Article 4(1) ofDecision 93/731.
The application was refused on the ground that, "since their contents could be
construed as criticism of the third countries in question, in particular as regards their
90
para. 9, n. 89 above.
91
para. 9, n. 89 above.
92
paras. 57 and 58, n. 89 above.
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political situation and the situation concerning human rights, their disclosure could
be prejudicial to the European Union's relations with those countries".93 The CFI
disagreed with this approach and held that, first of all, "the mere fact that certain
documents contain information or negative statements about the political situation, or
the protection of human rights, in a third country does not necessarily mean that
access to them may be denied on the basis that there is a risk that the public interest
may be undermined".94 Secondly, the CFI stated that "[a]s regards their contents, the
reports at issue do not concern directly or primarily the relations of the European
Union with the countries concerned".95 Thirdly, "neither the nature nor the content
of the reports is consonant with the reasons put forward by the Council in the
contested decision to substantiate its refusal of the application for access".96 In
addition, the CFI, which had in the Court proceedings ordered production of the
reports concerned, stated that "disclosure of a large part of their contents clearly
cannot be regarded as likely to give rise to tension with the third countries
Q7
concerned". It ruled that "the Council therefore committed a manifest error of
assessment in maintaining that the reasons on which it relied in order to refuse access
to the reports at issue apply to the documents in their entirety".98 The Court
acknowledged that "public interest grounds may justify preserving the confidentiality
of certain passages of several of the reports at issue".99 It however emphasised that
in such cases, according to settled case-law, the Council "must grant partial access to
93
para. 59, n. 89 above.
94
para. 60, n. 89 above.
95
para. 62, n. 89 above.
96
para. 64, n. 89 above.
97
para. 69, n. 89 above.
98
para. 70, n. 89 above.
99
para. 71, n. 89 above. For instance, according to the Court, "the people who have provided the
information are cited, a refusal to disclose those passages being, to that extent, legitimate".
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the documents in question".100
As regards the list of contact persons, the Court stated that the Council had
refused to consider the possibility of granting access to the information, in particular
the names of those persons.101 According to the judgment, the Council failed to
establish "to what extent such a consideration might fall within the ambit of the
• • 109
exceptions provided for in Article 4 of Decision 93/731". The Court held that the
Council, in refusing the applicant access to the information on the list of contact
persons, had acted "in breach of the principle of proportionality".103 It therefore
annulled the contested decision.104
5.4.2 Comment
As regards the principle of proportionality, the aim of the refusal was clear, which
was to maintain, or at least not to worsen, the EU's relations with the countries
whose situations had been analysed in the reports in question. However, the link
between this objective and the means, i.e. the refusal, was very tenuous. The reports
were not closely related to international relations. Refusal of the request for most of
the documents was, therefore, irrelevant to attainment of the purpose. The Council
rejected the request in its entirety, but access to only a part of the documents should
not have been refused on the basis of the public interest in international relations.
The Court disagreed with the Council mainly on the ground that there was no proper
100
para. 71, n. 89 above. The Court referred to paras. 73 and 74 of the Hautala judgment, n. 34
above.
101
para. 73, n. 89 above.
102
para. 73, n. 89 above.
103
para. 74, n. 89 above.
104
para. 75, n. 89 above.
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link between the aim and the means. As to the list of contact persons, the Council
was held to have made another mistake. The Council did not plan to attain any
purpose in the refusal concerned, and consequently failed to consider whether there
was a sufficient link between the aim and the means. The Council, in fact, did not
even consider the possibility of granting access to the information.
The Court carefully considered whether the Council had followed the principle
of proportionality before adopting the contested decision. Nevertheless, from a
comparative perspective, we can see that the Court has not done so consistently in
the FOI field. The ECJ and the CFI made intensive proportionality reviews in the
Hautala and Kuijer cases,105 while the CFI failed to do so in the Petrie judgment. As
the public interest exception relating to international relations was invoked in the
contested decisions in both Hautala and Kuijer, it is doubtful whether the Council
and Commission have to consider the principle of proportionality only in the
circumstances where the international relations exception is invoked. As regards
Hautala and Kuijer, the Courts did not give a clear answer. In addition, other
exceptions might also be invoked to secure the public interest relating to
international relations in an indirect fashion. For instance, the authorship rule may be
invoked by the Council or Commission in a refusal to protect international relations.
Since the international relations exception is not the only exception that concerns the
protection of the public interest relating to international relations, the Court's
proportionality review should not be limited to invocations of this particular
exception.
It is worth noting that the principle of proportionality has not been included in




Council, the Commission, and the Parliament should not be released unless there is
an overriding public interest in the disclosure. Is this a provision that requires the
institutions to take serious account of the principle ofproportionality before adopting
a refusal? This provision indicates that the institutions should apply a balancing test
before approving or denying public access. This test, as we saw earlier, to some
extent operates in a similar way to the principle of proportionality, but analysis of the
Hautala and Kuijer judgments above has indicated that the Courts never regarded the
provision as imposing a proportionality requirement.106
5.5 The Interporc II case107
This action concerned implementation of the 1999 Interporc / judgment examined in
3.5.1, but what was under appeal was not that decision but another dispute brought to
108the CFI after Interporc I. Like the 2001 Petrie case, this judgment concerned the
public interest exception relating to court proceedings, as well as the authorship rule.
106 Certain key issues, in particular those concerning the principle of proportionality and the
authorship rule, might have arisen in the BAT (Investment) case. In this case, British American
Tobacco (Investments) Ltd sought to annul a Commission decision that denied access to certain
documents concerning preparatory work relating to the Commission proposal for a directive on the
approximation of the Member States laws concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of
tobacco products. The nature of the case was, however, fundamentally altered when the Commission
provided the applicant with various relevant documents during the court proceedings. The CFI
dismissed the applicant's action mainly on the ground that copies of all the relevant Commission
documents had been offered to the applicant. The CFI, therefore, did not address the essential issues
which had arisen in the original dispute. Case T-311/00, British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd v.
Commission [2002] ECR 11-2781.
107
n. 58 above.
108 The Interporc I case citied by the ECJ in the present judgment referred to Case T-124/96, Interporc
Im- und Export GmbH v. Commission [1998] ECR 11-231. The judgment which was appealed was
another case brought to the CFI, namely Case T-92/98, Interporc v. Commission [1999] ECR 11-3521.
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These issues became extremely contentious after the 2001 Regulation came into
force.
5.5.1 Facts and ruling
What the German company requested in Interporc I was information concerning the
control procedures for imports of Hilton beef and inquiries which gave rise to
Germany's decision to effect the recovery of import duty.109 The information at issue
included two categories of document: the documents drawn up by the Commission
and those drawn up by the Member States or the Argentine authorities. Although the
CFI annulled the contested Commission decision in Interporc I, the Commission did
not implement that judgment in the way expected by the applicant. The Commission
sent to the firm another decision dated 23 April 1998, containing a conclusion
identical to that in the annulled decision in Interporc I, but the Commission
employed different reasons, basing its new refusal on the authorship rule and the
public interest exception relating to court proceedings.110 The applicant then brought
an action before the CFI to annul this new Commission decision.
As regards the documents emanating from the Commission, the CFI stressed
that "the expression 'court proceedings' must be interpreted as meaning that the
protection of the public interest precludes the disclosure of the content of documents
drawn up by the Commission solely for the purposes of specific court
109
para. 13 of the Interporc / judgment, n. 108 above.
110
para. 20 of the CFI judgment, n. 108 above. The Commission said all the documents it drew up
concerned pending legal proceedings, which referred to Case T-50/96, Primex Produkte Import-Export
GmbH & Co. KG, Gebr. Kruse GmbH, Interporc Im- unci Export GmbH v. Commission [1998] ECR
11-3773.
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proceedings".111 The CFI stated that this exception's purpose "is to ensure both the
protection of work done within the Commission and confidentiality and the
117
safeguarding of professional privilege for lawyers". This exception "cannot
enable the Commission to escape from its obligation to disclose documents which
were drawn up in connection with a purely administrative matter''' (emphasis
113
added). The Commission's interpretation nonetheless "applies generally to
requests for access to documents emanating from the public", which "runs counter to
one of the essential objectives of Decision 94/90, namely to give citizens the
opportunity to monitor more effectively the lawfulness of the exercise of public
powers", according to the judgment.114 The CFI held that "the Commission has
misapplied the exception based on the protection of the public interest (court
proceedings)", annulling the part of the contested decision which denied access to the
information originating from the Commission.115 These findings are convincing
because it can be noted that they are very different from those expressed by the CFI
in the Petrie judgment.
What led the applicant to appeal this CFI judgment to the ECJ was, however,
not the findings above but those concerning the documents drawn up by the Member
States or the Argentine authorities. In this regard, the CFI dismissed all the
applicant's pleas on the ground that, first of all, the authorship rule was applicable as
there was "no rule of law of a higher order according to which the Commission was
not empowered, in Decision 94/90, to exclude from the scope of the Code of
111
para. 40, n. 108 above.
112
para. 41, n. 108 above.
113
para. 42, n. 108 above.
114
paras. 43 and 44, n. 108 above.
115
paras. 48 and 49, n. 108 above.
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Conduct documents of which it was not the author".116 Secondly, the CFI held that
the authorship rule was neither misinterpreted nor misapplied. It said, as authors of
the five types of documents concerned were either the Member States or the
Argentine authorities, the Commission had applied the authorship rule correctly in
taking the view that it was not required to grant access to those documents.117
Thirdly, as to the Article 190 (now Article 253) obligation to state reasons, the CFI
stated that "in the contested decision the Commission referred to the authorship rule
and informed the applicant that it should request a copy of the documents in question
from the Member States concerned or the Argentine authorities. Such a statement
118 •shows clearly the reasoning of the Commission". The ECJ agreed with the CFI on
all the points above and dismissed the applicant's claims.119
5.5.2 Comment
Here we focus on the changes to the CFI's opinions relating to the court proceedings
exception, the incompatibility of the authorship rule with the framework established
by the Code of Conduct and the corresponding Commission and Council decisions.
5.5.2.1 The court proceedings exception
As regards the public interest exception relating to court proceedings, the CFI
annulled part of the contested Commission decision on the basis that:
116
para. 66, which was referred to in para. 41 of the ECJ judgment, n. 58 and 108 above.
117
paras. 73 and 74, which were cited by the ECJ in paras. 50 and 51 of its judgment, n. 58 and 108
above.
118
para. 78. The ECJ in its judgment referred to this paragraph but mistakenly put paragraph 78 as




(1) The protection of court proceedings could relate solely to the purposes of
specific court proceedings.
(2) Documents drawn up in connection with a purely administrative matter
do not fall within its scope.
(3) The Commission nevertheless applied this exception generally to requests
for access to documents emanating from the public, including those
concerning the purposes of specific court proceedings and purely
administrative matters.
The first point marked an alteration to the CFI's views on the court proceedings
exception. In the Petrie judgment, the CFI emphasised that the pursuit of an
"amicable resolution" was the purpose of that exception relating to investigations,
inspections, and court proceedings. The scope of this exception drawn in Petrie was
indistinct and much wider than that drawn in the present case. Obviously, the scope
drawn in Petrie had little to do with the purposes of specific court proceedings
because these procedures are not intended for adopting amicable resolutions. They
are designed mainly to ensure the enforcement of Community law.
5.5.2.2 The authorship rule
Both Courts held that the Commission' partial refusal based on the authorship rule
did not constitute a breach ofDecision 94/90, the Code of Conduct, or former Article
190 EC. They came to this conclusion on the following grounds:
(1) The authorship rule was applicable.
(2) The Commission application of this rule was correct.
(3) The refusal concerned provided the applicant and the Court with clear reasoning.
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The Courts were right in delivering these opinions, but what they failed to consider
was the incompatibility of this rule with the framework of the Code of Conduct and
the two corresponding Commission and Council decisions.
The Courts avoided considering what the objective of the authorship rule was.
The point was that there should not be any limitless exceptions in the EU freedom of
information law. First of all, the authorship rule ran against the principle of widest
possible access set out in the Code of Conduct. This judgment suggested that, as long
as a Commission or Council document originating from third parties related to their
own interest, internal or external, significant or minor, the principle of widest
possible access did not apply. Undoubtedly, this did not necessarily mean that
absolute secrecy prevailed over public access as far as this kind of information was
concerned, because it could still be available to the public under the FOI laws in the
Member States concerned. However, this wide-ranging exception to openness has
posed a major threat to the principle ofwidest possible access.
Secondly, this exception runs counter to the very objective of Decision 94/90,
which was, in the CFI's words, "to give citizens the opportunity to monitor more
1 70
effectively the lawfulness of the exercise of public powers". A document drawn
up by a third party is sent to the EU because it concerns the operation of the Union.
However, this document is never publicly available under the EU FOI regime since it
falls within the ambit of the authorship rule. Under this rule, secrecy is the rule,
which deprives the public of the chance to scrutinise the exercise of public powers at
the Union level.
Thirdly, the purpose of the authorship mle is particularly vague. The Courts
120
para. 43 of the CFI judgment, n. 108 above. The CFI stressed the significance of this objective
when addressing the disputes concerning tire documents emanating fioiu the Commission, but it was
tightlipped on the compatibility of the authorship rale with this purpose.
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made considerable efforts to address the lawfulness and application of this rule, but
they failed even to mention its objective. As we have seen in 5.3.3, the purpose could
be to secure mutual trust between the two institutions and the third parties, but a
refusal might have little to do with the bilateral confidence. The information
concerned in the present case included the documents concerning the control
procedures for imports of Hilton beef and to the inquiries which gave rise to
Germany's decision to effect the recovery of import duty. It was very unlikely, if not
impossible, that disclosure of such information would have either significantly
enhanced or jeopardised mutual trust among the parties.
In brief, the Courts read the authorship rule technically so that it operated in a
very restrictive manner,121 and they did not touch upon its incompatibility with the
framework based on the Code of Conduct. It is thus interesting to note that this
highly controversial provision has been removed from the EU FOI framework, and
has been replaced by Article 4(5) of the 2001 Regulation.122
5.6 The Mattila case
Mandatory exceptions were set out in Article 4(1) of Council Decision 93/731. The
121 The CFI repeated that position in a 2003 judgment. Case T-47/01, Co-Frutta Soc.coop.rl v.
Commission [2003] ECR 11-4441. An Italian cooperative society of banana ripeners, applied for
annulment of the Commission's decision, by which access to the documents sought by the applicant in
connection with the arrangements for importing bananas was partly refused. Stressing that the
authorship rule was "an absolute and unqualified exception for documents authored by a third party",
the CFI stated that "since the Code of Conduct does not provide for any restriction on the application
of that rule, it must be construed as meaning that it is fully applicable to every sort of third party
document to which access is sought, and it is not possible to have different levels of applicability",
paras. 59 and 60. In this judgment, the Court reaffirmed its stance on invocation of the authorship rule
in a clearer fashion.
122 This new provision will be examined in detail at 5.7.2.1 below.
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CFI stated in Hautala that this provision "must be interpreted in the light of the
principle of the right to information and the principle ofproportionality. It follows
that the Council is obliged to examine whether partial access should be granted to the
information not covered by the exceptions".123 The ECJ later endorsed this approach,
which put the Council and Commission under an explicit obligation. But will this
always be the case? Does failure to meet this requirement necessarily infringe the
principle of proportionality? In what particular circumstances, if any, could there be
an exemption from this duty? This is the principal issue in Mattila v. Council and
Commission, on which the CFI124 and ECJ125 held divergent opinions.
5.6.1 Facts and ruling
Olli Mattila, a Finn, sought from the CFI annulment of the Commission's and the
Council's decisions of 5 and 12 July 1999 refusing him access to certain documents
drawn up by the Council, the Commission, or jointly. Most of the requested
127
documents held by the Council related to negotiations with certain third countries.
The requested information in possession of the Commission concerned the future
128
position of the Union regarding its relations with Russia. Both institutions refused
the initial and confirmatory requests on the basis of the protection of the public
interest relating to international relations set out in the Code of Conduct and in
123
para. 87, n. 34 above. Emphasis added.
124 Case T-204/99, OlliMattila v. Council and Commission [2001] ECR 11-2265.
125 Case C-353/01, OlliMattila v. Council and Commission [2004] ECR 1-0000.
126
paras. 9, 10, 11, and 17, n. 124 above.
127
para. 12, n. 124 above.
128
para. 15, n. 124 above.
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Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731. The applicant said the contested decisions
constituted a "breach of the principle of proportionality in that partial access to the
i -j/v
documents in question has not been granted or even considered". The institutions
in response did not dispute that "they had failed to consider the possibility of
1 ii
granting partial access to the documents in question". The CFI nonetheless held
that "having taken account of the explanations they have proffered and in view of the
nature of the documents in question, it seems that, had they done so, they would not
in any event have agreed to partial access", according to paragraph 71 of this
judgment.132 It stated that "[gjiven the particular circumstances of the present case,
the fact that the defendant institutions failed to consider the question of granting
• 133
partial access had no effect on the outcome of their examination". It therefore held
that the institutions "did not infringe the principle of proportionality by failing to
grant partial access to the documents at issue".134 It dismissed this action after
rejecting other pleas as well.
Advocate General Leger harshly criticised the CFI judgment, stating that it had
jeopardised the right of Mr. Mattila to a fair hearing.135 Mr. Leger stated that this
judgment had deprived the appellant "of the possibility of mounting an effective
challenge to the grounds on which the defendant institutions consider in the present
case that partial access to the documents at issue is not possible".136 He added that
Mr. Mattila was "unable to discuss them during the administrative procedure, nor
could he learn of them in time to assert his rights before the Court of First
129
paras. 12, 13, 15, and 16, n. 124 above.
lj0
para. 28, n. 124 above.
ljl




para. 71, n. 124 above.
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The ECJ also disagreed with the CFI. By reference to the views of Mr. Leger,
the ECJ held that "[the CFI] wrongly held, in paragraph 71 of the contested judgment,
that such an error of law does not result in the annulment of the contested
decisions".138 It stated that "[o]n that ground alone, Mr Mattila's submission that the
1 TO
contested judgment is vitiated by an error of law is well founded". Setting aside
the contested judgment, it held that the contested decisions must be annulled since
the institutions failed to consider the possibility of partial access to the documents
concerned.140
5.6.2 Comment
We will consider whether the Council and Commission should have applied the
principle of proportionality in dealing with this dispute, which concerned the public
interest exception relating to international relations. Is this obligation a requirement?
If the answer is positive, we should explore the reasons behind it, i.e. the purposes
that could be attained through carrying out this duty. If the answer is negative, we
must then consider what specific situations, if any, should be exempted from this
requirement. To answer this question, the relations between the denial concerned and




paras. 31 and 32, n. 125 above.
139
para. 33, n. 125 above.
140
paras. 34, 36, 37, and 38, n. 125 above.
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5.6.2.1 The first purpose
The case law indicates that the principle of proportionality has been applied in the
EU FOI field to achieve two principal aims.14' The first is to ascertain whether there
is a reasonable relation between the means, namely the refusals, and the ends, namely,
the public or private interests that could be protected through the refusals. In the
present case, it was not disputed that the Council and Commission did not consider
whether there was an appropriate relationship between the refusals of partial access
and any public interest that could be secured through the denials. In short, the
institutions failed to apply the principle of proportionality when making their
determination. It should, however, be stressed that this does not mean that a
reasonable relation did not exist. Just as the CFI stated in its judgment, had the
institutions considered the possibility of granting partial access, "they would not in
any event have agreed to partial access". The relation between the means and the aim
might be perfectly plausible. The CFI, as a result, held that the institutions did not
infringe the principle of proportionality by failing to grant partial access to the
documents at issue. With regard to this first purpose, the CFI decision was not
controversial. What the Court suggested was that the failure to consider this
compelling principle of Community law did not necessarily mean that it had been
infringed in practice.
5.6.2.2 The second purpose
The CFI nonetheless ignored another major purpose of the principle of
proportionality, which is to help applicants access reasoning about the relation
between the means and the ends. Mr. Leger rightly pointed out that the CFI judgment
141 The Hautala case, n. 34 above, and Kuijer judgment, n. 89 above.
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deprived Mr. Mattila of the right to a fair hearing. Little account of this crucial
purpose could be found in the CFI judgment. In fact, the two institutions presented
their views on the application of the principle of proportionality, namely
consideration of granting partial access, for the first time before the CFI. This
rendered it extremely difficult for Mr. Mattila properly to exercise his right to a fair
hearing. This was the main reason why the CFI judgment was set aside by the ECJ.
In addition to this right, at present, applicants are also entitled to make a complaint to
the EU Ombudsman. The grounds concerning how the principle of proportionality is
applied would definitely help applicants decide whether they would "institute court
proceedings against the institution and/or make a complaint to the Ombudsman,
under the relevant provisions of the EC Treaty". Both rights are set out in Article 8(3)
of the Regulation.
5.6.2.3 Broader issues
Our analysis has indicated that the exception invoked in the present case, i.e. the
public interest exception relating to international relations, should be interpreted in
the light of the principle of proportionality. What remained undecided was whether
the Council and Commission bore such a duty when invoking the other exceptions
set out in the Code of Conduct. It should be noted that there is a need to attain the
two purposes of the principle of proportionality in the FOI field. The need of an
applicant to, first, ascertain whether there is a reasonable relation between a refusal
and the public or private interest intended to be protected through the refusal, and
second, to access reasoning about such a relation, does not differ depending on the
exception invoked by the institutions. However, under the Code of Conduct, the
principle of proportionality did not apply to all the exceptions. This issue may be of
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historical interest only. Attention should be drawn to the fact that, under the 2001
Regulation, this principle does not apply to all the exceptions either. This means that
this Regulation is insufficient to redress the difficulty noted above. Thus, the
Regulation should be amended to have the principle of proportionality applied not
only to an invocation of the public interest exception relating to international
relations but also to that of the other exceptions.
5.7 The Messina case142
The authorship rule in the Code of Conduct led to a number of bitter disputes, in
particular where the requested documents held by an institution were drawn up by
the Member States.143 In fact, since early 2002, among all the judgments concerning
documents originating from third parties, the Member States are the only group of
third parties involved. The present case was the first concerning a request made
under the 2001 Regulation. It indicated how the Court addressed disputes about
information emanating from a Member State during the third stage of EU FOI
evolution.
142 Case T-76/02, Mara Messina v. Commission [2003] ECR 11-3203.
143
For instance, the 2001 Petrie judgment concerned certain documents drawn up by the Italian
authorities, and the 2003 lnterporc //judgment was about information originating from the Member
States or the Argentine authorities, n. 58 and 59 above. The present case was mainly about documents
drawn up by the Italian authorities.
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5.7.1 Facts and ruling
The applicant, Mara Messina, was a lecturer in law at two Italian universities.144
Messina, who was preparing a study on "the effects of State aid on undertakings in
the less-favoured regions of the South of Italy", applied for annulment of a
Commission decision refusing her access to certain documents originating from the
Italian authorities and concerning the State aid scheme, which was the subject of an
earlier Commission decision.145 The Commission delivered this refusal after asking
the Italian authorities whether they agreed with the applicant being sent the
documents.146 In response, "the Italian authorities, by letter of 16 May 2002, stated
that they agreed with her being refused access".147 This dispute mainly concerned
the "non-disclosure" rule, namely Article 4(5) of the 2001 Regulation, which states
that "[a] Member State may request the institution not to disclose a document
originating from that Member State without its prior agreement" (emphasis added).
The applicant argued that Italy "did not expressly request the non-disclosure of the
documents sought. That position does not preclude the possibility of a later decision
148
by the Commission opposite to that forming the subject-matter of this action".
The CFI stated that "the consultation of the Italian authorities was manifestly
necessary, since the applicant's application for access covered documents sent to the
institution prior to the date on which Regulation No 1049/2001 entered into force".149
Examining a number of facts, it demonstrated the reasons why it believed that the
144
para. 6, n. 142 above.
145 The Commission's Decision of 2 August 2000 (State Aid N 715/99 - Italy (SG 2000 D/10574)),
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/register/ii/by_case_nr_168.html. para. 7, n.
142 above.
146
para. 12, n. 142 above.
147
para. 12, n. 142 above.
148
para. 31, n. 142 above.
149
para. 42, n. 142 above.
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Commission was "justified in taking the view that it had, prima facie, received an
objection from the Italian Republic to the communication of the documents requested
by the applicant, in accordance with Article 4(5) of Regulation No 1049/2001".150
The CFI stressed that there was "no ambiguity as to the negative nature of the Italian
authorities' reply and, therefore, as to their objection, in accordance with Article 4(5)
of Regulation No 1049/2001, to any disclosure of documents drawn up by them in
the course of the examination of the aid scheme in question".151 It held that the
denial of access to the information drawn up by the Italian authorities "appears to be
legally justified" and dismissed this action.152
5.7.2 Comment
We will first compare the authorship rule and the non-disclosure rule better to
understand the latter.153 The manner in which the Court read the non-disclosure rule
when addressing this dispute will be focused on in the second part of our analysis.
5.7.2.1 Two principal changes
The authorship rule is not included in the 2001 Regulation, but attention should be
drawn to Article 4(5) of this legislation, which concerns a special exception to
paras. 35, 43, and 48, n. 142 above.
151
para 52, n. 142 above.
152
paras. 56 and 57, n. 142 above.
153 This provision transposes Declaration 35 annexed to the final act of Amsterdam, by which the
Conference agreed that the principles and conditions referred to in Article 191 a( 1) EC (now Article
255 EC) would "allow a Member State to request the Commission or the Council not to communicate
to third parties a document originating from that State without its prior agreement" (emphasis added).
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openness.154 There are two major differences between these two provisions. The first
change is that the authorship rule concerns the third parties including a natural or
legal person, a Member State, another EC institution or body or any other national or
international body, but under Article 4(5) of the Regulation, only the Member States
are subject to special treatment. This is a significant difference, but it does not
necessary mean that there will be fewer relevant disputes before the Court. This is
because, as we have seen in this chapter, the institution-held information originating
from the Member States has proven extremely controversial under the previous FOI
legal framework. The information at issue in the present case also falls within this
category of information.
The second change concerns the application process. Under the authorship rule,
a request for access to the specific category of information, drawn up by the third
parties and held by the Council and Commission, should be sent to the third parties
concerned. Under the new provision, an application for access to the information
drawn up by the Member States and held by the three institutions is made to the
institutions, while the Member States are entitled to take the initiative in requesting
the institutions not to disclose information originating from those states. A serious
point here concerns the legal status of such a request. Is it a right merely to express
an objection and the three institutions should make their own decisions? Or are the
institutions bound by such a request?
Professor Patrick Birkinshaw gives a short answer to these questions, which is
that "[t]he institutions should be mindful of, but not be bound by" such a request, but
154 In this judgment, the Court held that "the power conferred on Member States to request the
non-disclosure of their documents to third parties without their prior agreement is one of the
exceptions to the right of access to documents of the institutions which are laid down in Article 1 of
Regulation No 1049/2001". para. 55, n. 142 above.
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he does not elaborate on this view.155 It should be stressed that all the Member States
documents held by the institutions are closely related to not only the work of the
Member States, but also that of the Union. Recital 10 of the 2001 Regulation states
that "[i]n order to bring about greater openness in the work of the institutions, access
to documents should be granted by the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission not only to documents drawn up by the institutions, but also to
documents received by them". As both the institutions and the Member States are
obliged to attain this purpose, the Member States' requests for non-disclosure should
not be regarded as final decisions on possible releases. Otherwise, the institutions are
excluded from performing their duty to bring about this purpose. It bears noting that
another purpose of the legislation, according to Article 1(c) of the Regulation, is "to
promote good administrative practice on access to documents".156 Although the
scope of this objective is not perfectly clear, to avoid assessing the Member States'
requests for non-disclosure apparently runs counter to this purpose.
What then should be considered is whether the Council, the Commission, and
the Parliament must give adequate reasoning in their decisions, to meet the
requirement set out in Article 253 EC. Similar disputes were repeatedly presented
before the Court before the 2001 Regulation came into force. An explicit stance of
the Court can be found in Petrie, in which the judges held that when the Council or
Commission invoked the authorship rule in a denial, "[t]he restrictions on access to
155 P. Birkinshaw, European Public Law (London, Butterworths, 2003), 278.
156 Article 15 of the Regulation entitled "Administrative practice in the institutions" provides that:
1. The institutions shall develop good administrative practices in order to facilitate the
exercise of the right of access guaranteed by this Regulation.
2. The institutions shall establish an interinstitutional committee to examine best practice,
address possible conflicts and discuss future developments on public access to
documents.
It should, however, be stressed that the scope of promotion of good administrative practice on access
to documents, set out in Article 1(3) of the Regulation, is not confined to the scope ofArticle 15.
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documents originating with third parties and held by the institutions have no bearing
on the duty imposed on those institutions under Article 253 EC to provide adequate
1 S7
reasoning for their decisions". This view was appropriate because such a request
• *1SR
was not made to the two institutions under the authorship rule. Under Article 4(5)
of the Regulation, however, an application for access to a document, which is drawn
up by a Member State and held by an institution, is sent to the institution.159 As the
request for non-disclosure is made to the institution, it is the institution that addresses
such a request. Therefore it should not avoid meeting the requirement in Article 253
EC.
5.7.2.2 Changes ignored
In this judgment, the judges made a significant effort to examine the evidence before
stating that there was "no ambiguity as to the negative nature of the Italian
authorities' reply". They then jumped to the conclusion that the Commission denial
"appears to be legally justified". Nevertheless, issues surrounding the nature of the
reply from Italy and the legal status of the Commission refusal, as well as their
relations were much more complicated than they were presented in this judgment.
The first issue concerned the entitlement of Italy to take the initiative. The
Member State did not request the Commission not to release the document concerned.
What the Italian authorities did was to respond to the Commission inquiry in a
passive manner, though it agreed on the denial of access. The Court stated that the
consultation was "manifestly necessary" since the application for access covered
157
para. 49 of the Petrie judgment, n. 59 above.
158
Nonetheless, as we have seen in 5.3.3, the Court did not examine the incompatibility of the
authorship rule with the principle of widest possible access.
159 This rule does not prejudice the right to access the same document held by that Member State
under its domestic FOI law.
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documents sent to the institution before the 2001 Regulation entered into force. This
view is controversial because Article 4(5) of the Regulation does not require the
Commission to make such an inquiry. Its only duty was to inform Italy of the request
at issue. Even if Italy did not notice that it had sent the documents to the Commission
before the Regulation came into force, a simple notice was sufficient for removing
the lack of awareness. The Court, however, wrongly held that the consultation was
manifestly necessary, which deprived Italy of the entitlement to take the initiative
under the non-disclosure rule.
Secondly, as we have seen above, the institutions are not bound by the requests
from the Member States, mainly because both the institutions and the Member States
are under the obligation to realise openness of the EU institutions. In the present case,
those documents concerned the state aid scheme which was the subject of a
Commission decision. As to whether the information about the making of the
Commission decision should be made available to the European public, it is improper
to say that only the Italian authorities concerned were entitled to have the final say.
However, the Court's view indicated that the Commission was bound by the negative
nature of that reply, and the Commission refusal was therefore "legally justified".
Thirdly, as the Court was of the opinion that the Commission was bound by the
negative reply from Italy, it is not surprising that the Court ignored the fact that the
Commission did not take Article 253 EC or the principle of proportionality into
consideration before delivering its refusal. At present, as it is the duty of the Council,
the Commission, and the Parliament to deal with such applications, they should face
these requirements in a more serious manner.
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5.7.2.3 Conclusion
It can be concluded that the non-disclosure rule is very different from the authorship
rule. First of all, the former merely concerns the Member States. Secondly, under this
new rule, the three institutions are not bound by the Member States' requests for
non-disclosure. Thirdly, under this new rule, the institutions must consider the
obligation set out in Article 253 EC to give sufficient reasons for their decisions. In
this judgment, the Court noticed the first point but ignored the other two, which
could trigger future disputes over invocation of the non-disclosure rule. To avoid this
controversy, the EU legislator should consider amending the provision, requiring that
the three institutions carefully consider of the principle of proportionality whenever
the Member States express their objection to releases of information.
5.8 Towards better protection
In May 2001, the European Parliament and Council adopted Regulation EC
1049/2001, which marked the beginning of the third stage of the EU FOI evolution.
Article 17(2) of this legislation provides that "[a]t the latest by 31 January 2004, the
Commission shall publish a report on the implementation of the principles of this
Regulation and shall make recommendations, including, if appropriate, proposals for
the revision of this Regulation and an action programme of measures to be taken by
the institutions" (emphasis added). This report published on 30 January 2004 is of
great importance, in that the Commission reviewed the practice of the three major
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institutions on freedom of information.160 In this section, we compare the results of
our analysis to the conclusions reached in the Commission report. This comparison
aims to highlight how the Regulation could be revised in the future.
5.8.1 No problems?
The Commission says in the report that there is no need for any revision of this
legislation. "Regulation 1049/2001 has been applied for two years and no problems
have arisen during implementation that would justify amending legislation for the
time being" (emphasis added), according to the report.161 The Commission goes on
to say that "further experience is needed and significant case law must be developed
before considering any amendment of texts regulating public access to documents.
However, it would be advisable to consider ways of protecting institutions better
1 fi9
against obviously unfair applications" (emphasis added). What it has claimed is
that it is unnecessary to revise the Regulation since the more than two years of
163
implementation experience was insufficient to assess its operation properly, and
that the Courts have delivered only a few decisions on disputes about the Regulation.
The Commission appears to believe that the only additional measures that should be
adopted are those that could help reduce obviously unfair applications, though it is
160 The Commission, n. 2 above.
161 The Commission, n. 2 above, at 44. Also, in the conclusion of the 2003 Council FOI report, the
Council boasts that "[t]he Council's experience in connection with the implementation of Regulation
No 1049/2001 in 2003 has shown that application of the Regulation's provisions causes no particular
problems either with regard to the analysis of documents for which access is requested or with regard
to compliance with the response times laid down by the Regulation" (emphasis added). The Council, n.
7 above, at 36.
162 The Commission, n. 2 above, at 44.
163 The Regulation came into force in December 2001.
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not at all clear what this phrase refers to.
First of all, as to the claim relating to lack of experience, it is worth noting that
the 2001 Regulation is not the first legal instrument in the EU FOI field. The Council
and the Commission have much experience in the enforcement of Council Decision
93/731 and Commission Decision 94/90 over the last decade. Secondly, it is true that,
before the Courts, there have been only a few decisions on disputes relating to rules
of the Regulation, but the institutions should not ignore the significant body of case
law regarding disputes about earlier Council and Commission decisions. It is very
unlikely that the Courts would desert all their prior opinions on major FOI issues in
the near future.164 This is mainly because the previous and current regimes have
similar fundamental architecture and share the same philosophy, namely the spirit of
"widest possible access". Thirdly, as regards the obviously unfair applications,
Article 6(2) and Article 6(3) of the Regulation provide methods to address
sufficiently imprecise requests, as well as applications for access to very long
documents. If these provisions have proven to be insufficient to address abuses of the
right to information in 2002 and 2003, there is then an imminent need for
incorporating effective measures into this legislation to reduce such abuses. In
addition, if Article 6(2) and Article 6(3) of the Regulation are insufficient to deal
with unfair applications, it is then inappropriate for the Commission to have claimed
that "no problems have arisen during implementation that would justify amending
164 For instance, as to the interpretation of the phrase "court proceedings" in Article 4(2) of the
Regulation, the CFI stated in the 2004 Turco judgment that "[g]iven that the term 'court proceedings'
has been interpreted in the context of the right of public access to the institutions' documents, the
Court considers that that definition, reached for the purpose of interpreting Decision 94/90, is relevant
for the purposes of Regulation No 1049/2001" (emphasis added), para. 65, Case T-84/03, Maurizio
Turco v. Council [2004] ECR 11-0000. In para. 72 of Verein fur Konsumenteninformation v.
Commission, the CFI also stressed that "[i]n view of the fact that the conditional form is maintained in
Article 4(1) to (3) ofRegulation No 1049/2001, the case law developed in connection with the code of
conduct is capable of being applied to Regulation No 1049/2001". Case T-2/03, Verein fur
Konsumenteninformation v. Commission [2005] ECR 11-0000.
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legislation for the time being".
The logic of the Commission reasoning demonstrated in the report is that no
effort should be made unless the Member States ratified the Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe. The Commission states that:
The [Constitutional Treaty could] extend the right of access to documents and
to strengthen the dialogue between the institutions and civil society. The
Regulation should be thoroughly revised in this respect. It should, at the very
least, be adapted in order to be applicable to all the Union's institutions, bodies
and agencies, given their very different roles. The Regulation would thus
become a framework law, the implementing arrangements for which would
have to be laid down in the rules of procedure of the organisations
concerned.165
An extension of FOI protection is absolutely crucial. In the Constitutional Treaty,
Article 11-102 entitled "Right of access to documents" provides that "[a]ny citizen of
the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a
Member State, has a right of access to documents of the institutions, bodies, offices
and agencies of the Union, whatever their medium". When the 25 Member States
draw up a new Constitutional Treaty, this article should be revised to extend FOI
protection to any natural or legal person.166
At present, the Council and Commission are free to review their experiences in
FOI law implementation. In addition, Article 17(2) of the Regulation aims to ensure
that the objectives of the Regulation will not be compromised in implementation of
this new legal framework. In other words, under Article 17(2), the Commission was
under an explicit obligation to consider what can be learned in the enforcement of the
165
The Commission does not, however, detail the basis on which it makes this prediction. The
Commission, n. 2 above, at 44.
166 See 5.2.1 above.
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Regulation. However, the Commission has not carefully considered the limits of the
present FOI regime and the judgments delivered at the third stage of the EU FOI
evolution.
The results of our analysis, which differ from the views expressed in the
Commission's report, indicate that there is significant room for improvement in the
current FOI system. The EU legislator should consider, in particular, addressing the
controversy concerning the principle of proportionality and the non-disclosure rule.
Major revisions should not merely concern the issues relating to that possible
extension of the Regulation to other institutions, bodies, and agencies. How the
non-disclosure provision can be reasonably amended, and how the principle of
proportionality can be expressly incorporated into the Regulation, must also be taken
into account.
5.8.2 The non-disclosure rule
The Petrie and Interporc II judgments indicate that the authorship rule was
incompatible with the principle of widest possible access set out in the Code of
Conduct.167 The phrase "widest possible access" indicates that, under this principle,
there is no space for an absolute exception. The authorship rule however constitutes
an exception as such because the Council and Commission have no say on the
disclosure of information originating from third parties. This incompatibility posed a
major threat to the previous EU FOI regime, which is presumably the reason why the
authorship rule is not included in the 2001 Regulation.
167 See 5.3 and 5.5.
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Article 4(5) of the Regulation is a new exception different from the authorship
rule set out in the Code ofConduct. One of the most important features ofArticle 4(5)
is that, under this provision, the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament are not
bound by the requests from the Member States.168 When an institution decides on
releasing a document, which is drawn up by a Member State and held by the
institution, the role of the Member State is merely supplementary. The documents
governed by Article 4(5) are those sent to one or more of the Council, the
Commission, and the Parliament, which concern the operation of the institutions. At
the Community level, it is plausible to make the institutions decide on disclosure of
this kind of information. In the Messina judgment, the CFI however ignored the
feature of Article 4(5), holding that the refusal appeared to be legally justified
because Italy objected to the request at issue. In the Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds
case, the Commission refused a non-governmental organisation's request for access
to certain documents originating from the German government, the CFI reiterated its
view in Messina and stated that "a request made by a Member State under Article 4(5)
does constitute an instruction to the institution not to disclose the document in
question" (emphasis added).169 These opinions could trigger future disputes over the
invocation of the non-disclosure rule.
In addition, to prevent the institutions from broadly interpreting this exception
and systematically refusing access to the information originating from the Member
States, the EU legislator should consider revising the Regulation, requiring that the
institutions take careful account of the principle of proportionality when the Member
States oppose to releases of information.
168 See 5.7.2. Case T-76/02, Mara Messina v. Commission [2003] ECR 11-3203.
169
paras. 57 and 58, Case T-168/02, IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz Fonds gGmbH v. Commission
[2004] ECR 0000.
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5.8.3 The principle of proportionality
The CFI introduced the principle of proportionality into the area of freedom of
information in the Hautala judgment. It was, however, unclear as to how this
principle should be applied by the Council and Commission. What the CFI stated in
Hautala was that "Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731 must be interpreted in the light of
the principle of the right to information and the principle of proportionality"
(emphasis added).170 Did the institutions bear the same obligation when invoking
any exceptions laid down in the Code of Conduct? The Courts did not answer this
question in Hautala, Kuijer, orMattila. Although they were responding to challenges
relating to specific exceptions, one might have expected some guidance as to whether
such a key principle as proportionality had a wider application in this context. Both
the Council and Commission were uncertain about when the Court would intervene.
This was probably the reason that, in the Mattila case, the two institutions failed even
to think of this principle when refusing Mr. Mattila's requests. At present, a much
more important issue concerns the relation between the principle of proportionality
and the exceptions set out in the 2001 Regulation.
Hautala, Kuijer, and Mattila judgments, delivered between 1999 and 2004 have
two common features. First, the public interest exception relating to international
relations was invoked in all three cases. Second, in addressing all three disputes, the
ECJ was of the view that the Council, the Commission, or both institutions' refusals
ofpartial access were inappropriate. As to the first characteristic, the importance of
the principle of proportionality should be emphasised not only in circumstances
where the international relations exception is invoked. It bears noting that, in Mattila,
170
para. 87, n. 34 above.
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the ECJ annulled the Council and Commission refusals mainly because the
institutions failed to consider the principle of proportionality in their refusals, which
deprived the applicant of his right to a fair hearing. As regards accomplishment of
this purpose, now the three institutions should apply this principle when invoking
any of the exceptions set out in the Regulation. This is because, whenever a refusal
of a request is made, the applicant would immediately need to examine the reasoning
behind the denial, irrespective of which exception is invoked. As to the second
common feature, the Courts appeared to have limited the proportionality review to
determining whether partial access should be granted. The use of the proportionality
test should be extended to deciding whether full access should be granted.
It can be concluded that, the Court should put the Council, the Commission, and
the Parliament under a stricter obligation as to the application of the principle of
proportionality. This principle should be incorporated in an explicit fashion into the
Regulation to improve the FOI protection in the Union. We suggest that the legislator
consider amending the 2001 Regulation, requiring that, first, this principle apply
when any of the exceptions in the legislation are involved, and, second, this
application be expressly stated in a decision that approves or refuses a request.
5.8.4 The public interest exceptions relating to investigations,
inspections, and court proceedings
As to the public interest exceptions relating to investigations, inspections, and court
proceedings, the CFI stated in Petrie that the Commission was entitled to invoke
these exemptions to secure an amicable resolution of the dispute between the
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Commission and the Member State concerned, before the Community court delivers
a judgment. In Interporc II, the CFI altered its opinion, a change then endorsed by
the ECJ. The CFI stated that "the expression 'court proceedings' must be interpreted
as meaning that the protection of the public interest precludes the disclosure of the
content of documents drawn up by the Commission solely for the purposes of
specific court proceedings".171 Court proceedings are designed to ensure the
enforcement of EC law rather than an amicable resolution of disputes. It is, therefore,
inappropriate to say that the public interest exceptions relating to investigations,
inspections, and court proceedings are intended mainly to guarantee an amicable
resolution.
Under Article 4(2) of the Regulation, the Council, the Commission, and the
Parliament must refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the
protection of, inter alia, "court proceedings and legal advice", and "the purpose of
inspections, investigations and audits", unless there is an overriding public interest in
disclosure. The Court's view in Interporc II should be reflected in these provisions.
We suggest that the EU legislator revise these provisions, requiring that only the
protection of the right to a fair hearing, and the privileges of lawyers, namely major
purposes of court proceedings, inspections, and investigations, can be relied on to
justify refusals.
5.8.5 Further steps
It is time to consider what further steps are required to improve EU FOI protection,
171
para. 40, n. 108 above.
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particularly given that the status of the Constitutional Treaty remains uncertain.
Articles 1-50,11-102,111-399 of this Treaty were designed to bring about an extension
of FOI protection.172 What is the difference between these articles and Article 255
EC with respect to the scope of public scrutiny? Under Article 255 EC, the public is
capable of scrutinising the EC executive and operation of the legislature through
access to documents. Under Articles 1-50, 11-102, 111-399, a wide range of
administrative, legislative, executive, and judicial functions of the Union is put under
democratic scrutiny through the exercise of freedom of information.
Secondly, it is of interest to compare the position ofArticle 255 in the EC Treaty
to that ofArticle 11-102 in the Constitutional Treaty. Article 255 EC is in Chapter 2 of
the EC Treaty's Part V entitled "Provisions Common to Several Institutions". Article
255 EC does not emerge from either an EC Treaty section dealing with citizenship of
the Union, or the general principles of the Union. Article 11-102, however, is in Title
V "Citizens' Rights" in Part II of the Constitutional Treaty entitled "The Charter of
Fundamental Rights in the Union". Thus, the Constitutional Treaty recognises
freedom of information as a fundamental right. Under a rule like Article 11-102, it is
172
paras. 3 and 4 ofArticle 1-50 provides that:
3. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its
registered office in a Member State shall have, under the conditions laid down in Part
III, a right of access to documents of the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies,
whatever their medium. European laws shall lay down the general principles and limits
which, on grounds of public or private interest, govern the right of access to such
documents.
4. Each institution, body, office or agency shall determine in its own rules of procedure
specific provisions regarding access to its documents, in accordance with the European
laws referred to in paragraph 3.
Article LL1-399 states that:
1. The institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union shall ensure transparency in
their work and shall, pursuant to Article 1-50, determine in their rules of procedure
specific provisions for public access to their documents. The Court of Justice of the
European Union, the European Central Bank and the European Investment Bank shall
be subject to the provisions of Article 1-50(3) and to this Article only when exercising
their administrative tasks.
2. The European Parliament and the Council shall ensure publication of the documents
relating to the legislative procedures under the terms laid down by the European law
referred to in Article 1-50(3).
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difficult, though not impossible, for the EU authorities to claim that the general
interest of the administration prevails over freedom of information.
The third issue concerns the beneficiaries of freedom of information. Under
Article 11-102, this right is reserved to "[a]ny citizen of the Union, and any natural or
legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State". This wording
is exactly the same as that in Article 255 EC. Nevertheless, Article 2(2) of the 2001
Regulation states that the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament may "grant
access to documents to any natural or legal person not residing or not having its
registered office in a Member State". As we saw in 5.1.2 and 5.2.1, this provision
leaves the institutions to address this issue individually. The Council and
Commission amended their Rules of Procedure to extend this right to all natural and
legal persons, irrespective of nationality, place of residence, or location of registered
office. The Parliament makes their decisions case-by-case but not in a discriminatory
way. These achievements should be reflected in a future Treaty and in the
Regulation.
The fourth issue concerns Article 11-71 of the Constitutional Treaty entitled
"Freedom of expression and information" which provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers.
2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.
Although the citizens in France and the Netherlands in mid 2005 voted against the
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, an article such as Article 11-71, designed to
252
secure freedom of expression and freedom of media, could still be incorporated into
a future Treaty. The issue here is whether an EU citizen is entitled to rely on such an
article when defending his or her freedom of information. To answer this question
requires the following analysis.
Article 11-71(1) and the first two sentences of Article 10(1) of the Convention
for the Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are exactly the same.
In Leander v. Sweden, the European Court of Human Rights stated that "the right to
freedom to receive information basically prohibits a Government from restricting a
person from receiving information that others wish or may be willing to impart to
him".173 It stressed that Article 10 ECHR did not confer on the individual a right of
access to a register containing information on his personal position, nor does it
embody an obligation on the Government to impart such information to the
individual.174 It adopted the same approach in Gaskin v. United Kingdom,175
Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that an article like Article 11-71 cannot
be relied on to enhance FOI protection in the Union. It bears noting that the first two
paragraphs ofArticle 1-9 of the Constitutional Treaty provide that:
1. The Union shall recognise the rights, freedoms and principles set out in
the Charter of Fundamental Rights which constitutes Part II.
2. The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not
affect the Union's competences as defined in the Constitution,176
The European Court of Justice, therefore, could go beyond the case law of the
17j
para. 74, Leander v. Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433.
174 Ibid.




European Court of Human Rights, broadly interpreting the scope of freedom to
receive and impart information to guarantee better FOI protection in the Union.
The Community court could make such an interpretation after a future Treaty
incorporates rules such as Articles 11-71 and 11-102 of the Constitutional Treaty.
What difference could this opinion make as regards protection of freedom of
information, a fundamental right in the Union? Broad interpretation of the scope of
Article 11-71 solidifies the foundation for the FOI protection. In this regard, FOI
protection is based on not only Treaty provisions on right of access to documents but
also those on freedom of expression and freedom of media. In other words,
protection of freedom of information could in the future be enhanced by two other
fundamental rights in the Union. Where the EU legislator agrees that Article 11-71 of
the Constitutional Treaty also forms part of the basis of EU FOI protection, the
legislator could revise the 2001 Regulation to offer citizens and the media more
information on the operation of the Union. Possible revisions include those
narrowing the scope of exceptions to openness and new rules ensuring easier
exercise of this right. These possible changes can be fully justified on the ground that
they are not only in line with Articles 1-50, 11-102, HI-399, which guarantee freedom
of information, but also with Article 11-71, which secures freedom of expression and
freedom of media. Multiple fundamental right clauses, as a result, could help extend
the scope of EU FOI protection, which would eventually enable citizens and the
media to scrutinise the Union in a more proactive and effective manner.
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PART III Alternative Methods of
Guaranteeing Freedom of Information
within the EU
Introduction
The European Court of Justice has long endeavoured to guarantee freedom of
information through careful consideration of the way in which the Council and
Commission invoke the various exceptions to openness in the EU's FOI laws.
Nonetheless, these efforts are not always sufficient to secure openness because not all
the shortcomings of the FOI regime end up in disputes before the Court. What the Court
has addressed are highly controversial refusals, considered absolutely unacceptable by
the applicants. As to consideration of other problems regarding the FOI system, how
this regime could be improved, and alternative mechanisms of complaint for those
whose requests are refused, the European Parliament and the European Ombudsman
have played pivotal roles. In other words, the role of these two institutions in
guaranteeing this essential right differs significantly from that employed by the Court.
Certain achievements by the Parliament and the Ombudsman in furthering freedom
of information have already been examined in previous parts of this study. For instance,
the Parliament, which was the first Community institution to have its own policy on
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freedom of information, adopted an important Resolution in mid 1984.' The Parliament
also actively participated in the process of adopting the 2001 Regulation.2 What the
Ombudsman has achieved in this field is also remarkable. For example, the
Ombudsman Mr. Jacob Soderman played a central role in challenging the emphasis on
excessive secrecy in the Commission draft of what was to become the 2001 Regulation,
harshly criticising the proposal in 2000. In Chapters 6 and 7, we turn to focus on the
role of these two institutions after the Regulation came into force in December 2001.
Incentives
First, it is necessary to consider what has led the Parliament and Ombudsman to defend
freedom of information. The reasons behind this defence will help us understand the
roles these two institutions have played to date and could play in the future in this field.
Only a few Community jurists have touched on this important issue. Among them is
Professor Patrick Birkinshaw, who has said that "[t]he Ombudsman has in fact attacked
secrecy in the EU with missionary zeal".4 The Parliament has also defended freedom of
information with passion, but enthusiasm itself does not explain why these institutions
have so rigorously tackled secrecy in the Union. What needs to be considered here are
1 This Resolution, and another relevant Resolution adopted by the Parliament in 1988 have been analysed
in 2.1.
2 The Parliament, whose opinions prevailed over the Commission proposal, adopted the Regulation
jointly with the Council in May 2001. See 4.2.3.
3 The Ombudsman was extremely unsatisfied with the "long and obscure" list of exceptions set out in the
draft Regulation. See 4.2.1.
4 P. Birkinshaw, Freedom of Information, The Law, the Practice and the Ideal (3rd edn., London,
Butterworths, 2001), 368.
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the advantages and disadvantages that accompany the Parliament and the Ombudsman's
support for a liberal FOI system.
A. Advantages
With respect to the potential advantages, the Parliament and Ombudsman benefit much
more from openness than the Council and Commission. The Ombudsman and the
members of the Parliament are able to win a great deal of confidence from EU citizens
through firm and continuous support for the FOI regime. The role of the Parliament is to
represent the peoples of the Community and that of the Ombudsman is to reduce
maladministration.5 The defence of freedom of information by the two institutions
corresponds well to their fundamental roles.
To be specific, as to the Parliament, its long term backing for the FOI regime
expressly shows that in their capacity as directly elected representatives, the Members
of the Parliament make a significant effort to extend an important right of the citizens.
In addition, a liberal FOI regime helps the Parliament exercise, most importantly,
democratic supervision over the operation of the Council and Commission in a more
effective fashion. This is because narrowly drawn exceptions and flexible use of
sensitive documents will definitely make it easy, not only for the public but also for the
Parliament, to access the documents drawn up and received by the two institutions. For
5 Article 189 EC makes it clear that the Parliament consists of "representatives of the peoples of the
States brought together in the Community". As to the Ombudsman, Article 195(1) EC provides that:
The European Parliament shall appoint an Ombudsman empowered to receive complaints from any
citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a
Member State concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the Community
institutions or bodies, with the exception of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance
acting in their judicial role, (emphasis added)
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instance, where the Parliament is entitled under the Regulation to make use of the
sensitive documents drawn up or received by the Council and the Commission, the
Parliament can be expected to scrutinise the running of the two other institutions more
effectively. It bears noting that the power of the Parliament to control the Council has
never been very effective.6 As regards the Ombudsman, its long term support for the
FOI protection obviously constitutes part of its effort to uncover and reduce
maladministration.7
Nevertheless, the Council and the Commission do not seem to gain much from
openness. As far as their political careers are concerned, the ministers attending
meetings of the Council, as well as the members of the Commission, are unlikely to
gain political capital through defending freedom of information.
B. Disadvantages
As to the possible disadvantages of such support, the Parliament and Ombudsman suffer
much less than the Council and Commission under a liberal FOI regime. In fact, the
former institutions have little to lose. First, one of the most important powers the
Parliament possesses is to legislate jointly with the Council under the co-decision
procedure. Under this procedure, it is impossible for the Parliament to adopt any legal
6
Although the EU claims that the Parliament "monitors the work of the Council", what Members of the
Parliament do is merely ask the Council written and oral questions, and the President of the Council
attends the plenary sessions and takes part in important debates. The European Commission, How the
European Union Works, a Citizen's Guide to the EU Institutions (Brussel, European Commission, 2003),
12.
7 This effort also enhances the social legitimacy of the Union. Dr. Roy Davis has noted that "the
Ombudsman offers a credible alternative to the CFI, particularly when EU institutions refuse to grant
access to documents in their possession; that this helps to ensure the social legitimacy of the EU". R.
Davis, 'Quasi-Judicial Review: the European Ombudsman as an Alternative to the European Courts'
(2001) 1 Web Journal ofCurrent Legal Issues, http://webjcli.ncI.ac.uk/2000/issuel/davisl.html
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instrument alone behind closed doors. All the documents relating to a proposed measure
subject to co-decision must be shared not only by the Parliament and Council but also
the Commission where necessary, in the course of the so-called "trialogues".8 As the
relevant information is fully shared during frequent organised contacts, there is no
chance for the Parliament to keep any secrets within its office in order to gain certain
institutional advantages. As the Parliament retains no confidential information under the
co-decision procedure, this institution does not regard an increasingly liberal FOI law as
a threat.
However, the Council and Commission might take the view that they have been
suffering under the FOI regime. The main reason is straightforward, namely that
numerous decisions made within the Council and Commission are not adopted under
the co-decision procedure. This means that the decisions are not adopted in the
triolagues noted above. For these two institutions, the secrecy that they have long
practiced has always been considered essential to the decision-making process. Explicit
and stringent FOI rules nonetheless could soon bring the days during which they have
benefited from this secrecy to an end.
As regards the Ombudsman, it is not a decision-making institution. There is little
interest that seduces the Ombudsman into keeping the inquiry-related information secret.
At present, the information in the possession of the Ombudsman is not even covered by
the 2001 Regulation. Nevertheless, it is necessary to keep a close eye on how the
8 As Professor Alan Dashwood has said, under the co-decision procedure, "a measure can only be
adopted if it receives the positive approval of both Parliament and Council, at first or second reading
where the co-legislators act at arm's length, or after a joint text has been thrashed out by their
representatives in a conciliation committee, with the Commission acting as honest broker" (emphasis
added). Describing this negotiation as a "trialogue", he goes on to say that "indeed that is the name which
has been given to the organized contacts which take place between the three institutions at the different
stages in the passage of a measure which is subject to co-decision". A. Dashwood, 'Issues of
Decision-making in the European Union after Nice' in A. Arnull and D. Wincott (eds.), Accountability
and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), 23.
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Ombudsman will continue to contribute to FOI protection, given that the documents in
his or her possession are likely to be covered by the FOI Regulation in the future.
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6
The Role of the Parliament
The incentives for adopting FOI legislation suggest that the following fact should not
be very surprising: the 2001 Regulation governs information in the possession of the
Council, the Commission, and the Parliament, but regarding the defence of freedom
of information, the role of the Parliament can be seen to be distinct. First, the
Parliament has long insisted on a liberal FOI law. Second, the implementation of the
Regulation by the Parliament is much less controversial than that by the Council and
Commission. Third, no court proceedings have been instituted against the Parliament
by applicants after they have received its negative replies. What the Parliament has
achieved shows that although the information it holds is covered by the Regulation, it
considers itself to be a guardian of freedom of information within the Union.
We will analyse the position of the Parliament in this field mainly through
examining a very important Resolution adopted by the Parliament in September
2003.1 In this instrument, the Parliament expresses critical and constructive views on
the implementation of the Regulation. It addresses the following questions in detail,
suggesting how the enforcement of the 2001 Regulation can be improved and how
this legislation can be revised, though it should be noted that some of its suggestions
are of an experimental nature.
1
European Parliament resolution on public access to Parliament, Council and Commission




(1) What standards does the Parliament plan to adopt in applying the 2001
Regulation to the documents it draws up and receives?
(2) In the FOI area, how does the Parliament plan to exercise its
newly-acquired right to seek review of the acts of the Community
institutions under Article 230 EC?
(3) How should the Parliament address the controversy concerning
"systematic refusals" and what action, if any, should it take in order to
reduce such denials of access?
(4) How can enhanced interinstitutional cooperation be achieved in this
area? What practical measures could be taken at the interinstitutional
level for the reorganisation of the coding process, production, filing
and distribution of information?
6.1 The adoption of the highest standards
in pursuit of transparency
In this Resolution, the Parliament urges itself and its services to apply the highest
standards with respect to transparency, advising "in particular Committee secretariats
to ensure up-to-date information about their workings on their websites and to
operate in full transparency".2 This statement indicates the Parliament is aware of
the fact that although its performance has been much more remarkable than that of
2
para. 6, n. 1 above.
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the Council and Commission, it has not yet met the highest standards possible. In
fact, the publication of this Resolution was itself a cause of some embarrassment.
The measure was adopted by the Parliament on 23 September 2003, but it was not
available on the website of the Parliament register until seven months later on 24
May 2004.3
6.2 Exercise of the right to seek judicial review under
Article 230 EC
The enhancement of the Parliament's power must be carefully considered when
examining the role of this institution in the FOI field. Thanks to the co-decision
procedure introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Parliament was able to
participate actively in the course of adoption of the 2001 Regulation and to insist on
its ideals about FOI protection. Nonetheless, what the Parliament could achieve later
in 2002 was relatively limited. Making comments in a report on the implementation
of the Regulation during that year was one of the few ways it could contribute to this
area.4 When it comes to FOI disputes before the Community courts, the Parliament
is entitled to intervene in support of a party in court proceedings.5 In fact, the
Parliament did not hesitate in doing so in the initial development in this area. For
3
n. 1 above.
4 The Parliament, Report on Public Access to Parliament, Council and Commission Documents
(Implementation ofRegulation 1049/2001/EC in the year 2002) (2003/2022(INI)), 11 September 2003,
Final A5-0298/2003.
5 Article 40(1) (former Article 37(1)) of the Statute of the Court of Justice provides that "Member
States and institutions of the Communities may intervene in cases before the Court".
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instance, it demonstrated firm support for better FOI protection when intervening in
the 1995 Carvel and 1996 Netherlands cases.6
A significant change could be seen when the Treaty of Nice came into force in
late December 2002. The first two paragraphs ofArticle 230 EC provide that:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted jointly by the
European Parliament and the Council, of acts of the Council, of the
Commission and of the ECB, other than recommendations and opinions, and of
acts of the European Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-a-vis third
parties.
It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State,
the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of
competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement
of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of
powers, (emphasis added)
As the Parliament has been granted full locus standi to seek judicial review of
Community acts under Article 230 EC, it is expected to defend freedom of
information before the Community courts rigorously. What it can now contribute
goes far beyond merely monitoring how the Regulation is implemented.
Nonetheless, the Resolution indicates that the Parliament has not fully realised
the potential opened up by Nice. The Parliament states in the Resolution that:
[T]he European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, which seem to
refuse systematically all applications for legal opinions, which could also be
against the spirit and the letter of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001; in this
connection, and following the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice which
6 Case T-194/94, John Carvel and Guardian Newspapers v. Council of the European Union [1995]
ECR 11-2769; Case C-58/94, Netherlands v. Council [1996] ECR 1-2169.
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gives to the European Parliament a general right to appeal, requests its
Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market to discuss the European
Parliament's participation in the T-84/03 [Turco v. Council] proceedings,7
(emphasis added)
This statement is potentially quite confusing because it seems to blur the right to seek
review under Article 230 EC, as amended, with the right to participate in cases as an
intervener, a right that the Parliament has long possessed.8 What the Parliament is
entitled to do is much more than intervention in the Turco case. In response to
systematic refusals, the Parliament may bring actions under Article 230 EC to seek
annulment of the acts that systematically refuse access to information. It should be
noted, however, that as the Parliament admitted in the statement that it is also among
the institutions that systematically refuse access to legal opinions, we should keep a
watchful eye on whether it will employ this new right regularly.
6.3 Systematic refusals
6.3.1 Types
Systematic refusals based on certain exceptions listed in the 2001 Regulation or on
7 Point 6 of paragraph 4. Case T-84/03, Maurizio Turco v. Council [2004] ECR 11-0000. In this case,
Maurizio Turco sought the annulment of a Council decision partially refusing access to certain
documents appearing on the agenda of the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting of 14 and 15
October 2002. The Parliament eventually did not intervene in support of the applicant in the court
proceedings.
8 It was once unclear whether the Parliament was within the meaning of the phrase "institutions" in
former Article 37(1) (now Article 40(1) of the Statute of the Court of Justice. For text of this provision,
see n. 5 above. The Court gave a positive answer in the 1980 Freres and Maizena judgments. Case
138/79, SA Roquette Freres v. Council [1980] ECR 3333, and Case 139/79, Maizena GmbH v. Council
[1980] ECR 3393. See also H. Schermers, Judicial Protection in the European Communities (5th edn.,
Deventer, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1992), 486.
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no exemption whatsoever have posed a major threat to the entire EU FOI regime.
According to the Resolution, the Parliament wishes to take effective steps to reduce
such refusals. It considers that the following situations concerning the
decision-making process are unsatisfactory. It states that:
[The Council does not] permit the identification of the positions of the various
national delegations at the time of the decision-making process: the removal of
this information, which is essential to the supervision of national government
positions, is against the spirit and the letter of the Regulation (EC) No
1049/2001, which permits exceptions based on the content of a document
(Article 4(7)) and not on the basis of the activity of national delegations when
acting as a component of the Council.9
It is uncertain whether the Council is of the opinion that the removal of the cmcial
information is permitted under Article 4(7), but it is absolutely clear that this total
restriction on the identification of the positions taken during the decision-making
process runs counter to the Regulation. On the one hand, the Council is not entitled
to remove the information, because these denials of access are not based on any
exceptions laid down in the Regulation. These refusals seem to have been made on
the mere presumption that certain public interests are likely to be undermined. On the
other hand, these removals are not determined by the Council on a case-by-case
basis.
Secondly, the Parliament said in the Resolution that the Council "seems to
systematically refuse applications for documents concerning public security on the
basis ofArticle 4(1) of the Regulation".10 Thirdly, "the Parliament, the Council, and
9 Point 4 of paragraph 4, n. 1 above. According to Article 4(7) of the Regulation, "[t]he exceptions as
laid down in paragraph 1 to 3 shall only apply for the period during which protection is justified on
the basis of the content of the document".
10 Point 5 ofparagraph 4, n. 1 above.
266
the Commission, seem to refuse systematically all applications for legal opinions,
which could also be against the spirit and the letter of Regulation (EC) No
1049/2001", according to the Resolution.11
In addition, the Commission interpretation of the Regulation "is questionable
when it systematically denies citizens access to correspondence from the Member
States in the context of infringement proceedings once the proceedings have been
completed or suspended".12 The Parliament went on to say that the Commission
"should, instead, carry out an independent assessment of the matter on the basis of
presumption of accessibility; and reminds the Commission that applications for
access to documents must be considered on a case-by-case basis".13
6.3.2 Remedies
All these systematic refusals have a destructive impact on the EU FOI regime as they
run against the very basis of the Regulation, namely the principle of widest possible
access. We must then go on to consider what can be done to address this crisis. Is it
necessary to revise the 2001 Regulation to address this threat? It should be reiterated
that explicit incorporation of the principle of proportionality into the Regulation
could be an effective method to prevent the systematic refusals.14
An alternative, which is not mutually exclusive with the express inclusion of the
principle of proportionality, is put forward by the Parliament in this Resolution. The
11 Point 6 ofparagraph 4, n. 1 above.
12 Point 12 ofparagraph 4, n. 1 above.
13 Point 12 ofparagraph 4, n. 1 above.
14 See 5.8.3.
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Parliament calls for a reduction in the vagueness of the various exceptions in the
Regulation. This lack of definition has left the three institutions with enormous space
for interpreting the exemptions. It cannot be discounted that the lack of express and
practical definitions has been used to refuse access systematically. Therefore, in the
final part of this Resolution, the Parliament suggests that the Regulation needs
clarification "to avoid varying interpretations by the institutions (legal opinions,
positions of national delegations and other issues mentioned in paragraph 4 etc. [of
this Resolution] including definitions on the use of certain concepts such as 'public
interest'".
Nonetheless, it is much easier to put forward such an idea than to draft a list of
explicitly-defined exceptions. In fact, the Parliament puts forward this suggestion in
the Resolution without touching on how the definitions should be proposed. It bears
noting that the scope of the various exceptions in the Regulation cannot be easily
drawn through studies of relevant legislation within or outside the Union.
We will take the exception relating to privacy as an example to explain our
view. Under Article 4(1 )(b) of the Regulation, the institutions must refuse access to a
document where disclosure would undermine the protection of "privacy and the
integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with Community legislation
regarding the protection of personal data".
The legislation at the European level is very open ended. For instance, Article 8
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
entitled "Right to respect for private and family life" provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence;
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2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.
As regards respect for private and family life, Article 11-67 of the Constitutional
Treaty states that "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her private and family
life, home and communications". As to the protection of personal data, Article 11-68
of the Treaty provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him
or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate
basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which
has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it
rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an
independent authority.
These articles recognise privacy to be a fundamental right, but they do not offer the
definition or the scope of this phrase. Therefore, they will not be useful (even if the
Constitutional Treaty were ultimately to be adopted by all the Member States) when
the EU legislator seeks to clarify the scope of the privacy exception in the 2001
Regulation.
Approaches to the protection of privacy at the domestic level vary considerably,
with countries such as Germany having a developed concept founded on human
dignity, while in other countries, such as the U.K., privacy law is still at a stage of
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development. It may therefore be more helpful in this context to look specifically at
domestic FOI laws. What can we learn from the domestic FOI laws within or outside
the Union to help delimit the scope of this concept? Two domestic FOI regimes that
adopt very different approaches to guaranteeing privacy, without compromising
freedom of information, may help us better understand the potential problems that
could arise in this endeavour. In the U.S. FOI system, the scope of the exception
relating to privacy is narrowly drawn. Subsection (b)(7)(B) of the 2002 U.S.
Freedom of Information Act provides that this Act does not apply to the matters in
"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" (emphasis added).15
In Scotland, although the scope of the privacy exception is drawn narrowly as well, a
different approach is adopted. The boundary of the exemption concerning personal
information is sketched in the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 through
heavy reliance on certain definitions already available in the Data Protection Act
1998 in the U.K.16
With respect to the clarification of the scope of the privacy exception, on the
one hand, the U.S. approach is straightforward, but this does not mean that it would
15 The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.
16 For instance, under the first two subsections of Section 38 entitled "Personal information",
information is exempt information if it constitutes personal data and, inter alia, the following
condition is met:
(a) in a case where the information falls within any of paragraphs (a) to (d) of the definition of
"data" in section 1(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 (c.29), that the disclosure of the
information to a member of the public otherwise than under this Act would contravene-
(i) any of the data protection principles; or
(ii) section 10 of that Act (right to prevent processing likely to cause damage or
distress); and
(b) in any other case, that such disclosure would contravene any of the data protection
principles if the exemptions in section 33A(1) of that Act (which relate to manual data held)
were disregarded.
No definition of the phrase "personal information" can be found in the Freedom of Information
(Scotland) Act, and we should look at the Data Protection Act 1998. The former is, therefore, not very
useful in drawing the scope of the privacy exception.
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help to realise the objective of the Parliament, namely to avoid varying
interpretations by itself and the two other institutions. This is because the terms
"clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" could be read in various different
ways by the public and the institutions. On the other hand, the Scottish method seems
to have reduced the vagueness of the privacy exception through employment of the
definitions in the Data Protection Act 1998. It seems that the Scottish approach could
thus be the better choice for the Union because it is more detailed, but in fact it does
not reduce the vagueness, because we have found no definition of "personal data" at
all in the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act.
Another concern is that the personal data protection law at the Union level is
much more complicated than that at the domestic level. To introduce the definitions
in the EU data protection law into the 2001 Regulation is not an easy task for the
following reasons. First, there are four major legal instruments governing personal
17
data protection rather than one data protection law at the domestic level. Secondly,
one of the most crucial legal terms in Article 4(1 )(b) of the Regulation, namely
"privacy", is not even defined in any of the four legal instruments in the Union, while
17 At the Union level, the fundamental rules on data protection are set out in:
(1) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31;
(2) Directive 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December
1997 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the
telecommunications sector [1998] OJ L24/1;
(3) Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the Parliament and of the Council of 18 December
2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by
the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data [2001]
OJL8/1;
(4) Directive 2002/5 8/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the
electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications)
[2002] OJ C201/37.
The case law in the field of data protection in the Union mainly concerns Directive 95/46. See
Joined cases C-465/00, C 138/01 and C-139/01, Rcchnungshof v. Osterreichischer Rundfunk and
others and Christa Neukomm and Joseph Lauermann v. Osterreichischer Rundfunk [2003] ECR
1-4989, and Case C-101/01, Criminal Proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist [2003] ECR 1-12971.
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the most relevant phrase in the EU data protection legislation is "personal data".18
This means that the definitions in the EU data protection law are not very useful, as
far as the clarification of the privacy exception in the Regulation is concerned.
Our analysis concerns only one of the various exceptions in the Regulation, but
it indicates that it will be extremely difficult, though not absolutely impossible, for
the EU legislator to reach consensus on how all the boundary should be drawn.
6.4 Cooperation
In its Resolution, the Parliament says the institutions have taken the internal
measures for the reorganisation of the coding process, production, filing and
distribution of documents.19 Nonetheless, "at the interinstitutional level almost
everything still remains to be done". In fact, although the interinstitutional
committee has been set up to meet the requirement set out in Article 17(2) of the
Regulation, no significant achievements have so far been made at the committee
meetings. As regards the interinstitutional efforts, the Parliament puts forward a
18 For instance, Article 2(a) of the Regulation 45/2001 provides that '"personal data' shall mean any
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person hereinafter referred to as 'data
subject'; an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his or her physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity", n. 17 above. See also European Data
Protection Supervisor, Public Access to Documents and Data Protection, Background Paper Series
Number 1 (Brussels, European Data Protection Supervisor, 2005). This document, which reflects the
opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the relationships between public access to
documents and data protection in the Union, addresses the main issues relating to freedom of
information and privacy individually before focusing on their intersection.
19
para. 7, n. 1 above. It says these measures make it possible to identify the authors, the nature of the
document and other information necessary for the traceability of documents within each institution.
20
para. 7, n. 1 above.
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number of suggestions in the Resolution. Among them are three worth thorough
consideration. -
6.4.1 Sensitive documents
The Parliament suggests establishing "one set of rules on the treatment of
confidential documents putting all institutions on the same footing as regards
granting each other access".21 It bears noting that the information categorised as
sensitive documents is unavailable not only to the public but also to the other EU
institutions, agencies, and bodies. This plan reveals that the Parliament needs access
to the sensitive documents held by the Council and Commission. The Parliament,
therefore, wishes to have the restriction on the availability of the sensitive documents
partially relaxed. The Council and Commission, however, might not be willing to
agree with the Parliament. This is mainly because the Parliament has not produced
any sensitive documents following the enforcement of the 2001 Regulation, while
77
the Council either produced or received 250 such documents in 2002. The number
of sensitive documents soared in 2003 by 63 percent to 399, according to the 2003
77
Council Report. The Commission in 2002 produced and received an unknown
21 Point 5 of para. 15, n. 1 above.
22
According to a report it published in September 2003, the Parliament in 2002 "neither drew up nor
received any sensitive document". The Parliament, n. 4 above, at 12. Between 3 December 2001 and
31 December 2002, 12 "SECRET UE" and 238 "CONFIDENTIEL UE" documents originated from
the Council or other sources, in which only 77 of them were recorded by the institution's register,
according to last paragraph of Part I of the 2002 Council report on implementation of the 2001
Regulation. The Council, Council Annual Report on Access to Documents - 2002 (Brussels, the
Council, April 2003), http://register.consilium.eu.int/utfregister/frames/introfsEN.htm.
2j The Council, Council Annual Report on Access to Documents - 2003 (Brussels, the Council, April
2004), http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/RapAnCons.en03.pdf, 11.
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number of sensitive documents.24 In 2003, it drew up 25 sensitive documents.25 We
cannot rule out the possibility that the Parliament could draw up or receive such
information in the future, but it is almost certain that the two other institutions would
feel that they "lose" much more than the Parliament if this proposal is adopted.
6.4.2 Interinstitutional coding system
The Parliament states that the institutions have not yet established "a general system
of interinstitutional coding, both for the types of documents and for the decisional
procedures to which they refer (including the procedures in which the EP is not
76
associated)". Is this a new system or an existing one in the Union? If the phrase
"interinstitutional coding system" refers to the mechanism that helps us locate the
information drawn up by the EU institutions, it is then inappropriate to say that a
general system of interinstitutional coding has never been established within the
Union. The Official Journal and related websites can certainly be regarded as such a
system. Nevertheless, what the Parliament here envisages seems to be the setting up
of a more advanced coding system, which would make it much easier for not only
24 In its 2002 report on implementation of the Regulation, the Commission only says that among the
three categories of documents presently covered by the register (the COM, C and SEC series of 2001
and 2002) there are no sensitive documents, European Commission, Report from the Commission on
the. Application in 2.002 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the
Council regarding Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents,




European Commission, Report from the Commission on the Application in 2003 ofRegulation (EC)
No 1049/2001 ofthe European Parliament and ofthe Council regarding Public Access to European
Parliament, Council and Commission documents, COM(2004) 347 final, (Brussels, European
Commission, 30 April 2004),
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/com2004_0347en01.pdf, 7.
26 Point 1 of para. 7, n. 1 above.
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the public, but also those working for the Union, to locate information relating to any
interinstitutional decision making processes. We believe that this proposed scheme
would be particularly helpful for those who are unfamiliar with the decision-making
processes in the Union. For instance, those interested in how the 2001 Regulation
was adopted might not be aware which institutions had participated in the course of
this legislation. The proposed interinstitutional coding system is expected to assist
them to locate all the relevant information prepared by the Commission, the Council,
and the Parliament prior to the adoption of this legislation.
6.4.3 An interinstitutional register?
The Parliament states that all three institutions "seem to have problems with the
operation of the registers".27 It therefore "requests increased efforts to improve them
and also to assist citizens asking for documents, including increased interinstitutional
cooperation on this issue in order to exchange best practice and the examination of
the idea of setting up an interinstituional help desk, especially in relation to
28
unspecific requests for documents" (emphasis added). In the concluding section of
the Resolution, the Parliament further suggests "amending Article 12 of the
Regulation to provide for the setting-up of a single interinstitutional register for
29
procedures in which more than one institution is involved" (emphasis added).
These proposals, which could bring revolutionary changes to the present EU
27 Point 14 of para. 4, n. 1 above.
28 Point 14 of para. 4, n. 1 above.
29 Point 3 of para. 15, n. 1 above. Article 12 concerns direct access in electronic form or through a
register.
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FOI regime, are contentious for the following reasons. First of all, it is unclear
whether the Parliament wishes to set up two more agencies, i.e. the single
interinstitutional register and the interinstitutional help desk, or whether the
Parliament hopes to have only one new agency — a single interinstitutional register
that plays the role of an interinstitutional help desk and has a number of other
functions. Secondly, the Parliament does not elaborate why unspecific requests for
documents would be better dealt with by an interinstitutional help desk than by the
individual institutions that receive the applications. We believe that unspecific
requests for documents can be appropriately addressed by the institutions receiving
them through their registers' communications with the applicants and with the other
institutions, agencies, and bodies concerned. As it is doubtful whether the setting-up
of an interinstitutional register could effectively reduce the difficulty that has arisen
between the three institutions, it is necessary to point out that the setting-up of such a
new public register would presumably be a waste of administrative resources.
6.5 Conclusion
The Community court secures freedom of information in a relatively passive manner,
in that it acts only where there is a FOI dispute before it. By contrast, under Article
230 EC, the Parliament now has the capability to be proactive in this area to seek
reform. In doing so, the Parliament does not risk losing the benefits of secrecy
enjoyed by the Council and Commission. The Resolution that we have examined in
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this chapter is the most important policy statement to date by the Parliament
concerning the future of FOI protection. The Council and Commission should
address the issues raised in this Resolution when considering amending the 2001
Regulation.
The Commission believes that it is unnecessary to present a proposal for
TO
revision of the 2001 Regulation. In its Resolution, however, the Parliament advises
on how the enforcement of the Regulation can be improved and on how the
legislation can be revised. The efforts made by the Parliament to improve the present
EU FOI regime are undoubtedly significant, but certain suggestions of an
experimental and even revolutionary nature need careful reconsideration.
The Parliament states that it is unsatisfied with the systematic refusal of requests
for access to the following information:
(1) The information identifying the positions of the various national
delegations at the time of the decision-making process;
(2) The documents concerning public security;
(3) The documents relating to legal opinions;
(4) The correspondence from the Member States in the context of
infringement proceedings once the proceedings have been completed or
suspended.
Our analysis demonstrates that it will be particularly difficult for the EU legislator to
reach a consensus on how all the exceptions in the Regulation should be clearly
defined. The Courts have carefully considered the scope of certain exceptions in a
number of judicial decisions, but, unfortunately, the objective of the Parliament to set
30 See 5.8.
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out explicit definitions remains beyond reach. A more practical response to this great
challenge would be to incorporate expressly the principle of proportionality into the
Regulation, and to have the relevant judicial decisions and the major domestic FOI
laws with regard to the scope of the exceptions reflected in the Regulation.
As to the calls of the Parliament for interinstitutional cooperation, first, the
Council and Commission may not be willing to share with the Parliament the
sensitive documents they have drawn up and received. The key reason is that the
Parliament has never drawn up or received any sensitive documents subsequent to
the 2001 Regulation coming into force, but the Council and Commission have
hundreds. For the latter two institutions, to share the sensitive documents would be to
help enhance the Parliament's power to exercise democratic supervision over them.
Second, the plans concerning the setting up of an interinstitutional register can be
questioned since its functions could overlap with those of the separate public
registers of the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament. Our view is that each
of the registers of the three institutions should exercise the functions of the
interinstitutional register and interinstitutional help desk. It should be noted that
under Article 1 of the Regulation, one of the three major purposes of the legislation is
to "promote good administrative practice on access to documents". There are no
grounds for denying that interinstitutional cooperation falls within the scope of "good
administrative practice".
However, although there is no need for the interinstitutional register, the need
for enhanced cooperation between various public authorities at the Union level is
absolutely imperative. Under Article 11-102 of the Constitutional Treaty, the public
has a right of access to documents of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of
the Union. Although the status of this Treaty remains uncertain, an extension of FOI
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protection as such should be incorporated into a revised or future Treaty and thus into
the FOI Regulation. In this regard, a general scheme of cross public authorities
coding would be very useful. Making use of such a system, individuals will find it
much easier to locate all the public information relating to a decision, though they
may be unfamiliar with which institutions, bodies, or agencies are required by law to
participate in the adoption of this decision. Without this proposed system, it will be
extremely difficult for those interested in a decision to determine which public
authorities are involved in the decision-making process. This means that they may
waste a lot of time and remain uncertain about whether they have obtained all the
information available concerning that decision.
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7
The Role of the European Ombudsman
This chapter analyses the role played by the European Ombudsman after the 2001
Regulation came into force. We will consider the mandate of the Ombudsman and
relevant procedural issues before examining the efforts made by the Ombudsman to
advance FOI protection. Attention will, in particular, be drawn to the contradictory
views of the Ombudsman and the three other Community institutions, i.e. the
Council, the Commission, and the Parliament, in relation to the exceptions to
openness.
7.1 The mandate of the European Ombudsman
We will, first, consider the powers of the Ombudsman and the relationship between
these powers and FOI protection. Second, we will seek to clarify some of the
uncertainties surrounding the overlap between the mandate of the Ombudsman and
the jurisdiction of the Community court.
7.1.1 The powers of the Ombudsman
Article 2(2) of the European Ombudsman Statute (hereinafter "the Statute") provides
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that "[a]ny citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its
registered office in a Member State of the Union may, directly or through a Member
of the European Parliament, refer a complaint to the Ombudsman in respect of an
instance of maladministration in the activities of Community institutions or bodies,
with the exception of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance acting in
their judicial role" (emphasis added).1 This provision corresponds to Article 195(1)
EC. As to the definition of the phrase "maladministration", the Ombudsman says
that "[m]aladministration occurs when a public bodyfails to act in accordance with a
rule or principle which is binding upon it" (emphasis added). Under these
provisions, the Ombudsman is entitled to address complaints to uncover failures to
act lawfully.
In relation to the powers of the Community Court, Article 230(1) EC states that
"[t]he Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted jointly by the
European Parliament and the Council, ofacts of the Council, of the Commission and
of the ECB, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European
Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-a-vis third parties" (emphasis added).
In the EU FOI field, refusals of access to information include the decisions adopted
by the Council or Commission, of which both the Ombudsman and the Court are
entitled to examine the legality.
1 The title "the European Ombudsman Statute" is commonly used at the website of the Ombudsman
and in numerous decisions and reports made by this institution, but, strictly speaking, this is not the
formal name of this legal instrument. Its official title is 94/262/ECSC, EC, Euratom: Decision of the
European Parliament of 9 March 1994 on the regulations and general conditions governing the
performance of the Ombudsman's duties [1994] OJ LI 13/15.
2 As regards the Ombudsman, Article 195(1) EC provides that:
The European Parliament shall appoint an Ombudsman empowered to receive complaints from
any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in
a Member State concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the Community
institutions or bodies, with the exception of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance
acting in their judicial role, (emphasis added)
3 The Ombudsman, The European Ombudsman Annual Report for 1997 (Strasbourg, European
Ombudsman, 1998), 23.
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Two dividing lines can be drawn between the mandate of the Ombudsman and
the jurisdiction of the Court. The first is set out in Articles 1(3) and 2(7) of the
Statute. The former provides that "[t]he Ombudsman may not intervene in cases
before courts or question the soundness of a court's ruling". A more specific
distinction is contained in the latter provision, which states that "[w]hen the
Ombudsman, because of legal proceedings in progress or concluded concerning the
facts which have been put forward, has to declare a complaint inadmissible or
terminate consideration of it, the outcome of any enquiries he has carried out up to
that point shall be filed without further action". These articles indicate that the
Ombudsman is entitled to examine the legality ofparticular acts only when the Court
has not intervened. The second distinction is that the Court is competent to declare
Community acts void while the role of the Ombudsman is to uncover
maladministration, to criticise, and to make recommendations. The ways in which
the Ombudsman carries out these duties will be considered further at 7.2 below.
In the FOI area, failure of the Council, the Commission, or the Parliament to act
according to the 2001 Regulation and the relevant legal principles established in the
case law constitutes an instance of maladministration. The Ombudsman is then
entitled to review the legality of such a refusal. In the following subsection we will
consider in more detail one of the issues raised above, i.e. how the various
institutions would address the controversy that could arise where an applicant wishes
to seek assistance from both the Ombudsman and the Community court.
7.1.2 Complaints and Court proceedings
Under Article 8(3) of the 2001 Regulation, failure by an institution to reply to
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confirmatory applications within the prescribed time limit "shall be considered as a
negative reply and entitle the applicant to institute court proceedings against the
institution and/or make a complaint to the Ombudsman, under the relevant
provisions of the EC Treaty" (emphasis added). According to this provision, an
applicant whose initial and confirmatory applications are refused is entitled to
institute court proceedings against the institution concerned, or, alternatively, to
make a complaint to the Ombudsman. It also would appear to suggest that an
individual might pursue both options. Little controversy could arise if the applicant
exercises only one of the two rights set out in Article 8(3) of the Regulation.
Nevertheless, this provision could prove confusing where the applicant decides to
exercise both rights.
Is the applicant entitled to complain to the Ombudsman and to bring the same
case to the Court as well? The answer to this question differs when we take into
account the following situations. First, where the applicant complains to the
Ombudsman without initiating court proceedings, the applicant remains entitled to
bring the same facts to the Court after being informed of the result of the complaint.
Nevertheless, in the next two situations, the complaints will be declared inadmissible,
or consideration of them will be terminated, by the Ombudsman, according to Article
2(7) of the Statute, noted above.
(1) The applicant complains to the Ombudsman and then initiates court
proceedings without having been informed of the result of the
complaint.
(2) The applicant initiates court proceedings and then complains to the
Ombudsman.
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This analysis indicates that if the applicant wishes to exercise both rights laid down
in Article 8(3) of the Regulation, two conditions must be met if Article 2(7) of the
Statute is to be complied with:
(1) The applicant must complain to the Ombudsman before initiating court
proceedings.
(2) The court proceedings should never be initiated prior to the receipt of
the outcome of the complaint.
Otherwise, only the right to initiate court proceedings can be properly exercised. In
other words, the expression in question in Article 8(3) of the Regulation, i.e. "to
institute court proceedings against the institution and/or make a complaint to the
Ombudsman", could be extremely misleading for those whose initial and
confirmatory requests are refused by the Council, the Commission, or the Parliament.
It would not be surprising at all if some assume that they are entitled to take
advantage of the two rights concurrently. To eliminate the vagueness in Article 8(3)
of the Regulation, this provision should be revised to include clear procedural
guidance.
7.2 Procedures open to the Ombudsman in the course
of an inquiry
This section analyses how the Ombudsman exercises his or her powers to realise FOI
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protection within the Union. According to Article 3(1) of the Statute, "[t]he
Ombudsman shall, on his own initiative or following a complaint, conduct all the
enquiries which he considers justified to clarify any suspected maladministration in
the activities of Community institutions and bodies". The Ombudsman has not
conducted an own-initiative FOI-related enquiry since the 2001 Regulation came into
force.4 We will, therefore, focus on the procedures relating to the handling of
complaints. Particular attention will be given to how complaints can be closed.
In 2002, 248 inquires were closed with reasoned decisions, 51.6 percent of
which were closed as no maladministration was found.5 In 2003, 180 inquires were
•closed with reasoned decisions, 47.3 percent of which were closed as no
maladministration was found.6 Other relevant breakdowns will be referred to in the
4 The Ombudsman made three FOI-related draft recommendations on his own-initiative inquiries
before the 2001 Regulation came into force:
A. Draft recommendation of the European Ombudsman on the own inquiry into public access
to documents (616/PUBAC/F/IJH), http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/recommcn/en/317764.htm.
The Ombudsman made this draft recommendation following an own-initiative inquiry into
public access to documents held by the Community institutions and bodies, other than the
Council and Commission. This inquiry ended up in a special report to the Parliament, in
which the Ombudsman stated that the institutions and bodies had adopted certain rules that
represented "a significant step forward in improving the transparency of Community
administration, in accordance with the expectations, and to the benefit, of European
citizens".
B. Draft recommendation to the European Commission in the own initiative inquiry
1004/97/PD, http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/recommen/en/971004.htm. In this
draft recommendation, the Ombudsman said that "[t]he Commission shall make known to
applicants in oral exams the names of the Members of the Selection Board. In its future
competitions, the Commission shall give applicants access to their own marked exam
papers upon request".
C. Draft recommendations to Europol in own initiative inquiry OI/1/99/IJH into public access
to documents, http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/recommen/en/oi990001.htm. The
Ombudsman made the following draft recommendations to Europol:
1. Europol should adopt rules concerning public access to documents within three
months. The rales could be based on those already adopted by the Council,
including the exceptions contained therein.
2. The rales should apply to all documents that are not already covered by existing
legal provisions allowing access or requiring confidentiality.
3. The rales should be made easily available to the public.
5 The Ombudsman, The European Ombudsman, Annual Report 2002 (Luxembourg, Publications
Office, 2003), 264.




7.2.1 Complaints settled by the institution involved
The Ombudsman, according to Article 3(1) of the Statute, shall inform the institution
or body concerned of such inquiry, which may submit any useful comment to the
Ombudsman. What the relevant public body can do after being informed of an
inquiry is in fact much more than submitting a comment. The institution or body
concerned may take effective steps "to settle the case to the satisfaction of the
complainant. If the opinion and observations show this to be so, the case is then
closed as 'settled by the institution'".7 In practice, this is a common ground for
closing an inquiry. It is, however, not mentioned in the Statute or Decision of the
European Ombudsman adopting implementing provisions (hereinafter "the
o
Implementing Decision"), though it will clearly be unnecessary to continue an
inquiry when a complainant is absolutely satisfied with the efforts made by the
relevant public body.
As to a complaint about refusal of access to information, a settlement could take
place when the Council, the Commission, or the Parliament provides the complainant
with all or part of the requested information. A complaint could also be settled where
the complainant is fully satisfied with the explanations given by the relevant
institution or body of the reasons why access must not be granted.
7
The Ombudsman, n. 6 above, at 32; European Ombudsman, IVhat can the European Ombudsman
Do for You? The European Ombudsman, A Guide for Citizens (Luxembourg, Publications Office,
2002), 8.
8 Decision of the European Ombudsman adopting implementing provisions of 8 July 2002 and
amended by decision of the Ombudsman of 5 April 2004,
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/Ibasis/en/provis.htm#defl
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In 2002, 25.8 percent of the 248 inquiries closed with reasoned decisions were
closed as the complaints were settled by the institution involved.9 In 2003, 26.1
percent of the 180 inquiries closed with reasoned decisions were closed as the
complaints were settled by the institution involved.10 It was, however, unclear how
many of the complaints settled by the institution involved concerned FOI protection.
7.2.2 Friendly solutions
According to Article 3(5) of the Statute, "[a]s far as possible, the Ombudsman shall
seek a solution with the institution or body concerned to eliminate the instance of
maladministration and satisfy the complaint". This is the duty to seek a friendly
solution, a term employed in the Implementing Decision and widely used in the
annual reports published by the Ombudsman. This obligation marks a major
difference between the role of the Ombudsman and that of the Community court. The
latter does not bear the legal duty to serve as a mediator to seek an amicable end to a
judicial dispute. For complainants, there might be little difference between
complaints closed by friendly solutions and those settled by the relevant public
bodies, discussed above. This is because the complainants are fully satisfied in both
situations. Similarly, when a friendly solution is secured for a complaint about a
refusal of access to information, the complainant could be offered all or part of the
requested information, or a satisfactory explanation of the refusal.
Nevertheless, two major differences between a friendly solution and a
9 The Ombudsman, n. 5 above.
10 The Ombudsman, n. 6 above.
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settlement must be noted. First, in the situation where a friendly solution is sought
for a complaint, that complainant is completely satisfied owing to the mediation of
the Ombudsman, but when a complaint is settled by the public body concerned, it is
that public body that plays the key role. Second, in the former case, the Ombudsman
has not yet formally found any failure to act lawfully, while in the latter situation, the
Ombudsman has discovered that there is an instance ofmaladministration.
In 2002, six inquires were closed as friendly solutions were sought, while in
2003, friendly solutions were sought for four inquiries, according to the 2002 and
2003 Ombudsman reports.11 However, these reports do not indicate how many of the
10 inquiries concerned FOI protection.
7.2.3 Critical remarks by the Ombudsman
Under Article 3(6) of the Statute, "[i]f the Ombudsman finds there has been
maladministration, he shall inform the institution or body concerned, where
appropriate making draft recommendations". This indicates that if there has been
maladministration, and a friendly solution has not been obtained, the Ombudsman
can make a draft recommendation where appropriate. In practice, however, it is more
common for the Ombudsman to close the inquiry with a critical remark to the
relevant public body than to make a draft recommendation. The former course of
action is specified in the Implementing Decision but not in the Statute. Under what
circumstances will the Ombudsman make a critical remark, rather than a draft
recommendation to the public body concerned? Under Article 7.1 of the
11 The Ombudsman, n. 5 and 6 above.
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Implementing Decision, the Ombudsman can make a critical remark if he or she
considers:
(a) that it is no longer possible for the institution concerned to
eliminate the instance ofmaladministration and;
(b) that the instance of maladministration has no general
implications.
The second condition is particularly important because it indicates that, generally, a
draft recommendation is much more influential than a critical remark and is more
likely to be referred to in future complaints.
In 2002, 29 of the 180 inquiries closed with reasoned decisions were closed
12
with a critical remark addressed to the institution involved. In 2003, 20 of the 180
inquiries closed with reasoned decisions were closed with a critical remark addressed
to the institution involved.13
7.2.4 Draft recommendations and special reports
Under Article 8.1 of the Implementing Decision, the Ombudsman makes a report
containing draft recommendations to the institution concerned if he or she considers
either:
(a) that it is possible for the institution concerned to eliminate the instance
ofmaladministration, or
12 The Ombudsman, n. 5 above.
Ij The Ombudsman, n. 6 above.
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(b) that the instance ofmaladministration has general implications.
"The institution or body so informed shall send the Ombudsman a detailed opinion
within three months", according to Article 3(6) of the Statute. After the Ombudsman
receives a detailed opinion sent by the public body concerned, he or she "shall then
send a report to the European Parliament and to the institution or body concerned"
and may make recommendations in the report, according to Article 3(7). The phrase
"shall" in this provision indicates that the duty to make a special report is mandatory.
This obligation is, however, discretionary under Article 8.4 of the Implementing
Decision. This provision provides that "[i]f the Ombudsman does not consider that
the detailed opinion is satisfactory he may draw up a special report to the European
Parliament in relation to the instance of maladministration". It is then necessary to
consider what would be regarded as an acceptable response to a draft
recommendation. What must be included in a satisfactory opinion? According to
Article 8.3 of the Implementing Decision, "[t]he detailed opinion could consist of
acceptance of the Ombudsman's decision and a description of the measures taken to
implement the draft recommendations". In other words, full acceptance and
implementing measures are considered indispensable elements of an acceptable
reply.
In 2002, 10 inquiries were closed with draft recommendations accepted by the
institutions concerned, while three others ended up in special reports to the
Parliament.14 In 2003, five inquiries were closed with draft recommendations
accepted by the institutions concerned, and two others ended up in special reports to
14 The Ombudsman, n. 5 above.
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the Parliament.15 The Ombudsman made nine draft recommendations concerning
FOI-related complaints between 2002 and 2004, including two that ended up in
special reports to the Parliament. All these draft recommendations and special reports
will be examined at 7.3 below.
7.2.5 Summary of possible outcomes
The following are the key potential outcomes of complaint-initiated inquiries:
(1) When a complaint is settled, the complainant is fully satisfied with the
steps taken by the relevant institution or body.
(2) Where a friendly solution is sought, both the complainant and the
public body concerned are satisfied owing to the mediation of the
Ombudsman.
(3) Where an inquiry reveals no maladministration, the complainant will be
informed of the reasons why the Ombudsman believes that the relevant
institution or body has not failed to act lawfully.
(4) The Ombudsman may make a critical remark when an inquiry reveals
an instance of maladministration that has no general implications and
no follow-up action is necessary.
(5) Draft recommendations are made in cases involving serious
maladministration or those that have general implications. The
Ombudsman makes a special report to the Parliament if the public body
concerned does not accept the draft recommendation.
15 The Ombudsman, n. 6 above.
291
We will now focus on the role of draft recommendations made by the Ombudsman,
in particular those that ended up in special reports to the Parliament. Under the
present legal framework, these recommendations are intended to eliminate the most
serious FOI-related maladministration with general implications.
7.3 Draft recommendations and special reports
The main objectives of our examination of draft recommendations and special
reports are:
(1) to analyse the legal debates surrounding the most contentious
exceptions to openness that have been addressed by the Ombudsman;
(2) to identify whether there is room for the Ombudsman to improve the
way he or she guarantees freedom of information;
As to the second purpose, a watchful eye must be kept on whether the Ombudsman
has followed the procedures set out in the Statute and the Implementing Decision
when it contributes to FOI protection. A failure to meet any of these procedural
requirements also constitutes an instance ofmaladministration.
The Ombudsman made nine draft recommendations between 2002 and 2004 in
relation to complaints concerning refusals of access to information, two of which
ended up in special reports to the Parliament. It bears noting that the Ombudsman
made only three special reports to the Parliament during the three year period, while
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two of them concerned FOI protection.16 Special attention will be drawn to one of
the two special reports that concerned a complaint against the Parliament. How much
sense, if at all, does it make for the Ombudsman to make a special report to the
Parliament after the Parliament has itself declined to give a satisfactory reply to a
draft recommendation?
As to the refusals involved in the nine complaints, two of the complaints
involved Council refusals of access to legal opinions of the institution, which
primarily concerned the exception relating to legal advice in Article 4(2) of the 2001
Regulation. This provision provides that "[t]he institutions shall refuse access to a
document where disclosure would undermine the protection of ... court proceedings
and legal advice, ... unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure".
Six other complaints, which involved the Council and Commission, related to
the refusals of access to their information concerning internal proceedings. These
cases mainly concerned the exception relating to protection of institutional
proceedings set out in Article 4(3) of the Regulation, which states that:
Access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use or received
by an institution, which relates to a matter where the decision has not been
taken by the institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the document would
seriously undermine the institution's decision-making process, unless there is
an overriding public interest in disclosure. Access to a document containing
opinions for internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary consultations
within the institution concerned shall be refused even after the decision has
been taken if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the
16 In the other special report, the Ombudsman recommended that Commission should reconsider its
rules concerning the classification of posts of press officers in its delegations in third countries in
general and in particular the classification of the post of the complainant, Mr. Shahzad Badar. He was
the Press and Information officer at the Commission's Delegation in Islamabad. The Ombudsman,
Special Report from the European Ombudsman to the European Parliament following the draft
recommendation to the European Commission in own-initiative inquiiy OI/2/2003/GG, 1, 9, and 10,
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/special/pdf/en/oi030002.pdf
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institution's decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public
interest in disclosure, (emphasis added)
The remaining complaint concerned a refusal by the Parliament based on rights and
citizenship set out in the Member States Constitutions and the Charter of Human
Rights. However, the Parliament did not refer to any specific provisions in the refusal.
All these complaints are considered at the following subsections.
7.3.1 Legal advice
7.3.1.1 Complaint 1542/2000/(PB)SM
According to one of the two special reports, the complainant, who was a student,
requested access, inter alia, to two opinions from the Legal Service of the Council,
17but this application was refused by the Council. The first document sought,
8443/00, contained an analysis by the Legal Service as to how the Council should act
in future cases analogous to T-l88/98,18 while the other document sought, 7594/00,
was about the proposal for a regulation on freedom of information, namely the 2001
Regulation.19 In the inquiry, the Council told the Ombudsman that "a disclosure
would undermine the protection of the public interest under Article 4(1) of Decision
93/731/EC and the Council's ability to obtain independent legal advice from its
Legal Service".20 The Ombudsman drew a dividing line between different kinds of
17 The Ombudsman, Special Report from the European Ombudsman to the European Parliament
following the draft recommendation to the Council of the European Union in complaint
1542/2000/(PB)SM, 2, http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/special/en/default.htm
18 Case T-l88/98, Kuijer v. Council [2000] 2 CMLR 400. This case concerned asylum seekers.
19 The Ombudsman, n. 17 above.
20 The Ombudsman, n. 17 above, at 3. Under Article 4(1), access to a Council document shall not be
granted where its disclosure could undermine the protection of the public interest (public security,
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legal opinions.21 As regards the first opinion, the Ombudsman said that the
document was about possible future court proceedings and was "analogous to a
written communication between a lawyer and a client", so "the Council was entitled
in the present case to consider that its disclosure would, as a matter of principle, be
contrary to the public interest".22 As to the other legal opinion in question, the
Ombudsman said this document concerned the preparatory legislative process of the
proposal concerned.23 He stated that under Article 207(3) EC, "greater access to
Council documents could be allowed in cases where the Council is to be regarded as
acting in its legislative capacity".24 The Ombudsman concluded that the Council
failed to give adequate reasons for refusing access to the second legal opinion,
demanding that the Council reconsider the complainant's application, "unless one or
■yc
more of the exceptions contained in Article 4 ofDecision 93/731 applies".
It should be noted that the detailed opinion of the Council and Ombudsman's
evaluation of this opinion were based on the 2001 Regulation rather than Decision
93/731, as the new legislation came into force after the draft recommendation above
was made. In its detailed opinion, the Council said it disagreed with the Ombudsman
mainly on the ground that "Article 207(3) EC also provides that the Council is to
strike a balance between greater access to documents relating to its legislative
activities and the interest of preserving the effectiveness of its decision-making
process in general".26 In response, the Ombudsman reiterated its view concerning
international relations, monetary stability, court proceedings, inspections and investigations).
21 The Ombudsman, n. 17 above, at 1.
22 The Ombudsman, n. 17 above, at 6.
23 The Ombudsman, n. 17 above, at 6.
24 The Ombudsman, n. 17 above, at 6. Under Article 207(3) EC, for the purpose ofArticle 255(3) EC
concerning FOI legislation, "the Council shall define the cases in which it is to be regarded as acting
in its legislative capacity, with a view to allowing greater access to documents in those cases, while at
the same time preserving the effectiveness of its decision-making process" (emphasis added).
23 The Ombudsman, n. 17 above, at 6.
26 The Ombudsman, n. 17 above, at 7.
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the distinction, noted above, stressing that "only the first type of legal opinions
should be considered as 'legal advice' within the meaning of Article 4(2), second
27indent ofRegulation 1049/2001". At the end of the special report, the Ombudsman
said that "the Council's detailed opinion fails to provide sufficiently adequate reasons
for its refusal to grant access to document 7594/00". He therefore recommends that
the Council "reconsider the complainant's application and give access to the
document requested, unless one or more of the exceptions other than Article 4(2),
second indent ofRegulation 2049/2001 applies".28
7.3.1.2 Complaint 2371/2003/GG
The draft recommendation made in April 2004 concerned a complainant, a research
assistant of the University of Munich, who had requested access to an opinion of the
Council's Legal Service for preparation of his thesis on EU asylum law, but his
confirmatory application was refused by the Council on the basis of Article 4(2) of
9Q •
the 2001 Regulation. In the inquiry conducted by the Ombudsman, the Council
took the view that "opinions of its Legal Service could, if they were disclosed, be
used by others to mount legal challenges to the acts of the Council". The
Ombudsman reiterated his views on the distinction between different types of legal
opinions, noted above, and said that not all the Council arguments concerned
possible future court proceedings. He went on to say that "[a]s the complainant
correctly observed, Regulation 1049/2001 has the aim of ensuring the 'widest
27 The Ombudsman, n. 17 above, at 11.
28 The Ombudsman, n. 17 above, at 13.
29 Draft recommendation to the Council of the European Union in complaint 2371/2003/GG, 1,
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/recommen/en/032371.htm. The document at issue was
Council document no 10678/99, an opinion of the Council's Legal Service concerning the application
of the Protocol, annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, on asylum for nationals ofMember States of the
European Union.
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possible access to documents'. Article 4(2), second indent of Regulation No
1049/2001 is thus an exception that needs to be interpreted narrowly, taking into
account the principle of proportionality". The Ombudsman concluded that the
Council failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the refusal, recommending
that the Council review its refusal.
7.3.1.3 Comment
As regards the two complaints above, the Council held the view that, on the one hand,
disclosure of legal opinions would undermine its ability to obtain independent legal
advice from its Legal Service, and, on the other hand, disclosed legal opinions could
be used by others to mount legal challenges to the acts of the Council. As the Council
did not mention any legal opinions that were likely to be made available to the public,
it is obvious the institution was of the opinion that no legal opinion of its Legal
Service should be released. In other words, the Council took the view that systematic
refusal of access to legal opinions was compatible with Article 4(2) of the Regulation.
This is, however, an incorrect opinion since under this provision, the Council bears
the duty to consider whether "there is an overriding public interest in disclosure". As
various public interests could be involved in different requests for access to this kind
of information, such decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis.
However, the Ombudsman did not lay stress on the incompatibility of a
systematic refusal with the balancing test required by Article 4(2) of the Regulation,
but instead founded on the distinction between legal opinions concerning possible
future court proceedings and those relating to the legislative process. This distinction
could prove very problematic because, first of all, the rationale behind this dividing
line is extremely fragile. In reliance on Article 207(3) EC, the Ombudsman argued
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that the public was entitled to have greater access to the Council's legal opinions
concerning the legislative process. Nonetheless, relying on the same provision, the
Council said Article 207(3) EC also provided that the effectiveness of its
decision-making process must be preserved. In his response to the detailed opinion,
the Ombudsman avoided elaborating on why this effectiveness would not be
jeopardised were legislative-process-related legal opinions to be disclosed.
Secondly, this dividing line is incompatible with Article 4(2) of the Regulation,
under which decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis. This provision
neither indicates that a legal opinion must not be made available to the public if it
relates to potential judicial disputes, nor does it entail that a legal opinion must be
made available to the public where it concerns legislative process. In addition, the
CFI held in the 2004 Turco judgment the phrase "legal advice" in Article 4(2) of the
Regulation must be understood as meaning that the protection of the public interest
might preclude the disclosure of the documents drawn up by the Council's legal
service in the context of court proceedings, legislative activities, or for any other
30
purpose.
Thirdly, a legal opinion concerning possible future cases is analogous to a
written communication between a lawyer and a client, but they are not exactly the
same. On the one hand, a practicing lawyer outside the Council is not under public
scrutiny, but legal experts of the Legal Service must be put under the sharp public
eye as they are public servants of the Union. On the other hand, a lawyer outside the
institution may decline to advise a client if his or her legal advice is likely to be, or
has been, disclosed to a third party, but the legal experts of the Legal Service are not
entitled to do so. The Ombudsman, therefore, should not have held that this limited
j0
paras. 62 and 66. Case T-84/03, Maurizio Turco v. Council [2004] ECR 11-0000.
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analogy entitled the Council to consider that its disclosure would be contrary to
the public interest. The exception relating to legal opinion is intended to make
certain that the legal professionals are able to offer legal advice without being fearful
of undue influence. What the Ombudsman should have done was to determine
whether there was an overriding public interest that was more important than the
protection of the legal advice, but he failed to do so.
Fourthly, the distinction drawn by the Ombudsman might not be apparent where
the Ombudsman is faced with a refusal of access to a document containing both
kinds of legal opinion. When an expert of the Legal Service is required to comment
on a proposed Community act, it is very likely that he or she would concurrently
consider how to prevent possible future legal challenges to the act.
It can be concluded that the distinction founded by the Ombudsman is flawed in
certain respects. A better strategy for the Ombudsman in countering Council
systematic refusals of access to legal opinions would be to take the requirements in
Article 4(2) into serious account, applying the balancing test on a case-by-case basis
when addressing the relevant complaints.
7.3.2 Confidentiality of institutional proceedings
7.3.2.1 Complaints regarding the Council: Complaint 573/2001/IJH
In a draft recommendation made in June 2002, a complainant requested access to the
second annual progress report from the Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation)
to ECOFIN — the Council meeting in the formation of Economic and Finance
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Ministers. To protect its internal proceedings, the Council invoked Article 4(2) of
Decision 93/731 in its refusal of the complainant's confirmatory application.32 It
argued in the inquiry that "[pjremature disclosure of the document could impede the
ongoing deliberations and thereby run contrary to the general interest in achieving
progress in the area of business taxation" (emphasis added). As the 2001 Regulation
came into force after the complaint was made, the Ombudsman and Council agreed
that re-examination of the request must be based on the Regulation. The Ombudsman
considered that the refusal of the Council was "tainted by maladministration" since:
- the Council's reasoning is inadequate to explain its interest in the
confidentiality of its proceedings as regards the document in question, or to
demonstrate that disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the
Council's decision-making process and
- the Council failed to address the question ofpartial access.
He states that the Council should reconsider the complainant's application and give
access to the sought documents, unless one or more of the exceptions in Article 4 of
the Regulation applied. The Council later accepted this recommendation.
7.3.2.2 Complaints regarding the Commission
A. Complaint 1128/2001/IJH
According to a draft recommendation which was also made in June 2002, a
complainant, a representative of a Netherlands-based non-governmental organisation,
requested the briefing notes of Commission delegations to two meetings of the
31 Draft recommendation to the Council of the European Union in complaint 573/2001/IJH,
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/recommen/en/010573.htm. This draft recommendation has
been anonymised because this complaint was treated as confidential at the request of the complainant.
32 Article 4(2) of Decision 93/731 stated that "[ajccess to a Council document may be refused in order
to protect the confidentiality of the Council's proceedings".
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Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) held in 1999.33 In its refusal, the
Commission invoked the exception relating to protection of Commission proceedings
set out in Decision 94/90.34 It said that:
Depending on the general context of the discussions and appropriate political
discretion, the position taken by the Commissioner may not always entirely
correspond to the advice and proposed speaking points. Therefore giving access
to these documents would be inappropriate and misleading to the public.
Moreover, disclosure would compromise or complicate relations with the US.
Nevertheless, the Ombudsman found that in applying the discretionary exception,
"the Commission has failed to show that it has struck a genuine balance between the
interest of the citizen in obtaining access to the documents and its own well-founded
interest in confidentiality. This is an instance of maladministration". He therefore
stated that "[t]he Commission should reconsider the complainant's application and
give access to the documents requested, unless one or more of the exceptions
contained in Article 4 of Regulation 1049/2001 applies. The reconsideration should
include the possibility of partial access, in accordance with Article 4(6) of Regulation
1049/2001". The Commission then accepted this recommendation.
B. Complaint 1874/2003/GG
The draft recommendation made by the Ombudsman in July 2004 concerned a
complainant, a German non-governmental organisation, which had contracted with
IBF, a Brussels-based body acting on behalf of the Commission, to execute a
Draft recommendation to the European Commission in complaint 1128/2001/IJH,
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/recommen/en/011128.htm
j4 This provision is in fact the fourth section, second subsection of the Code of Conduct, which
provided that the Council and Commission "may also refuse access in order to protect the institution's
interest in the confidentiality of its proceedings".
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35humanitarian project in Kazakhstan. The Commission was a co-financer of the
project, supervision of which was entrusted to the Centre Europeen du Volontariat
(CEV) in Brussels. The Commission later cancelled this project. The complainant
requested access to a file containing "internal documents, including those between
the Commission and the external offices IBF and CEV". The letter in which the
Commission replied to the request referred to the fact that the information at issue
would not be disclosed, without giving any reasons. In the inquiry conducted by the
Ombudsman, the Commission said that "the disclosure of these documents which
contained opinions for internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary
consultations would seriously undermine the decision-making process of the
Commission". The Ombudsman stated that the reasoning given by the Commission
in the letter replying to the complainant, namely no reason at all, was "manifestly
inadequate to allow the complainant (and the Ombudsman himself) to understand
why no access could be granted to these documents". Thus, the Ombudsman
concluded that the Commission had failed to handle the complainant's request
properly, which constituted an instance ofmaladministration. He therefore stated that
the Commission should reconsider the complainant's request to grant full access to
the documents at issue unless it could show that they were covered by any exceptions
set out in the 2001 Regulation.
C. Complaint 2028/2003/(MF)PB
According to a draft recommendation made in October 2004, a complainant, who
failed a written examination organised by the European Personnel Selection Office
3 Draft recommendation to the European Commission in complaint 1874/2003/GG.,
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/recommen/en/031874.htm
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(hereinafter "EPSO"), asked the EPSO to send her, inter alia, the selection criteria
established and applied by the selection board, but the EPSO refused to do so.36 In
the inquiry, the Commission referred to the Innamorati case of 1996.37 In its view,
the Commission said the ECJ held that "such criteria constitute an integral part of the
deliberations of the selection board, and as such are covered by secrecy". The
Commission said that access had to be refused under Article 4(3) of the Regulation,
"as their release would seriously undermine the decision-making process of the
board". The Ombudsman, however, disagreed, stating that Innamorati did not
concern the issue of access to documents. "EPSO and the Commission therefore
failed to give adequate reasons for refusing access. This constitutes an instance of
maladministration". He stated that "EPSO should reconsider its refusal to provide the
complainant access to the selection criteria established by selection board, and give
access", unless valid grounds prevent their disclosure under any exceptions in the
Regulation. The EPSO has not yet accepted this draft recommendation.
D. Complaint 2097/2003/(ADB)PB
The Ombudsman made a further draft recommendation two weeks later, addressing
another complaint concerning a competition organised by the EPSO.38 The
complainant who failed a German typing test asked the Commission for the selection
criteria and a copy of her marked examination paper, but both requests were refused.
In the inquiry, the Commission said those documents formed an integral part of the
oral examination and that they were therefore covered by the secrecy referred to in
36 Draft recommendation to the European Personnel Selection Office in complaint
2028/2003/(MF)PB, http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/recommen/en/032028.htm
j7 Case C-254/95P, Parliament v. Angelo Innamorati [1996] ECR 1-3423.
38 Draft recommendation to the European Personnel Selection Office in complaint
2097/2003/(ADB)PB, http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/recommen/en/032097.htm
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Article 6 Annex III of the Staff Regulations.39 It added that "[t]he practical
examination took place the same day as the oral examination, for which reason the
deliberations were covered by the secrecy appertaining to the selection boards".
Nonetheless, as to the examination paper, the Ombudsman stated that "[t]he fact that
the practical test and the oral examination were held on the same day does not show
that they were inseparable". As regards the selection criteria, the Ombudsman stated
that the findings in his draft recommendation in complaint 2028/2003/(MF)PB, noted
in the last paragraph, were "equally relevant and applicable to the present case". He
concluded that the Commission's refusal to grant access to the documents at issue
constituted two instances of maladministration, and made the following draft
recommendations to EPSO:
1. EPSO should provide the complainant with a copy of her written
examination paper.
2. EPSO should furthermore reconsider its refusal to give the complainant
access to the evaluation criteria, and give access unless valid grounds
prevent their disclosure.
The EPSO has not yet decided whether it will accept this draft recommendation.
E. Complaint 413/2004/(MF)PB
In another draft recommendation made in October 2004, the Ombudsman once again
referred to his findings in the draft recommendation in complaint 2028/2003, when
he was faced with the circumstances where the EPSO declined to provide the
complainant with the individual evaluation sheet for her performance in a French
j9
This provision states that the "proceedings of the Selection Board" are to be secret.
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translation test.40 In the inquiry, the Commission stressed that to make separate
evaluation sheets public "would create a risk of external pressure and interference in
the selection board's deliberations. Access to the separate evaluation sheets therefore
had to be refused on the basis of the exception contained in Article 4(3)(ii) of
Regulation 1049/2001". The Ombudsman disagreed and stated that his findings in
his draft recommendation in complaint 2028/2003 "are equally relevant and
applicable to the present case". He concluded that the reasons for not giving the
complainant access to a copy of the detailed evaluation sheet were inadequate, which
constituted an instance ofmaladministration. He stated that "EPSO should reconsider
its refusal to give the complainant access to a copy of the detailed evaluation sheet,
and give access unless valid grounds prevent its disclosure". This draft
recommendation has also not yet been accepted by the EPSO.
7.3.2.3 Comment
It must be stressed in the first place that under Article 4(3) of the 2001 Regulation,
access shall be refused only if disclosure "would seriously undermine the
institution's decision-making process". Recital 11 of the preamble to the Regulation
provides that the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament "should be entitled to
protect their internal consultations and deliberations where necessary to safeguard
their ability to carry out their tasks" (emphasis added). On the basis of this statement,
it is fair to say that such refusals can be made only in situations where disclosure is
so detrimental that the operation of the institutional work would be jeopardised.
Nonetheless, the Council and Commission failed to take into account the
40 Draft recommendation to the European Personnel Selection Office in complaint 413/2004/(MF)PB,
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/recommen/en/040413.htm
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requirement set out in Article 4(3) of the Regulation. The main features of the
Council and Commission's invocation of Article 4(3) are that, first, in these refusals
the institutions sought to guarantee various kinds of general interest not specified in
the governing Regulation, or they failed to specify any interest at all. Secondly, the
two institutions showed little respect for the balancing test required by this provision.
These conclusions are elaborated on in more detail in the points below:
(1) As far as the taxation report was concerned, the Council wished to
secure the general interest in the area of business taxation, but the
institution failed to explain how its internal proceedings could seriously
be damaged by the disclosure of the information.
(2) As to the briefing notes prepared for the transatlantic meetings, the
Commission said disclosure would be inappropriate and misleading to
the public and would complicate relations with the US. First, the public
could indeed get confused when noticing that the position of the
Commissioner did not entirely correspond to the briefing notes
concerned. However, it was not difficult for the Commission to
eliminate such confusion as it could attach a cover letter to the briefing
notes when making disclosure, noting that these documents should be
understood as briefing notes only. Secondly, the Commission did not
consider the extent to which disclosure would complicate the EU-US
relations. This is an important issue because the exception relating to
internal proceedings can be invoked only where the decision-making
process of the Commission or the Council would be substantially
undermined. The mere fact that the mutual relations could be
complicated must not be regarded as serious jeopardy.
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(3) As regards the documents about the humanitarian project, the
Commission did not even mention what was the interest that would be
secured in the refusal.
(4) As to the first complaint regarding Community examinations, the
Commission referred to an ECJ judgment, which did not concern
freedom of information, in support of its invocation ofArticle 4(3). The
Commission did not elaborate on why the proceedings of the selection
board would be seriously undermined.
(5) The Commission responded to the second examination complaint by
referring to a provision of the Staff Regulations, which provides that
proceedings of a selection board should be covered by secrecy. This
provision, which indicates that deliberations of a selection board must
remain secret, does not entail that the selection criteria themselves
should be kept secret.
(6) In the inquiry into the third examination complaint, the Commission
argued that access to the evaluation sheet would create a risk of
external pressure and interference in the deliberations of the selection
board. It is, however, unthinkable that there could be any illegal
intervention, or how the deliberations concerned could be seriously
undermined when the Selection Board had made its final decision on
the outcome of a specific competition.
In brief, the Council and Commission failed to consider whether any specific public
interests would be significantly jeopardised so that their internal work could not
proceed. The institutions also failed to take into account what were the interests of
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the applicants in accessing the information.
Generally, the Ombudsman has made considerable efforts to prevent the two
institutions from holding that the general interests, which were not specified in the
governing FOI laws, prevailed over freedom of information. Nevertheless, it was
improper for the Ombudsman to hold the view that his findings in the draft
recommendation in complaint 2028/2003/(MF)PB were "equally relevant and
applicable" to the two other complaints.
First, the Ombudsman is certainly entitled to reiterate his opinions on specific
issues, but what the complainants requested in the three cases were different kinds of
information. The information in question in complaint 2028/2003 was selection
criteria, but the document concerned in 413/2004 was the individual evaluation of the
complainant's performance in a test. It is doubtful that the findings of the
Ombudsman in the former case were equally applicable to the latter, and at least
further elaboration was required. Second, as there were significant differences
between the arguments put forward by the Commission in the inquiries into the three
complaints, the findings of the Ombudsman in the first case were not necessarily
relevant to the two others. In complaint 2028/2003, the Commission claimed that it
was entitled to invoke Article 4(3) as the ECJ had held that selection criteria were
covered by secrecy. However, in complaint 2097/2003, the Commission argued that
such criteria were covered by secrecy under Article 6 Annex HI of the Staff
Regulations. And in complaint 413/2004, the Commission said its refusal was based
on Article 4(3)(ii) of the Regulation as access could bring pressure and interference
to the selection board deliberations. The Ombudsman, however, said in the two latter
cases that its findings in the former equally applied in the latter cases. In fact, the
Ombudsman failed to respond to the argument about Article 6 Annex HI of the Staff
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Regulations and that concerning extra pressure in the two latter cases. It was,
therefore, inappropriate for him to rule on an instance of maladministration without
addressing the main arguments presented by the Commission.
7.3.3 Protection of personal data
7.3.3.1 Complaint 341/2001/(BB)IJH
According to another Ombudsman special report, a complainant, who failed in a
competition for typists organised by the Parliament, asked the Parliament for the
names and marks of the successful candidates but the request was refused.41 In the
inquiry, the Parliament said unsuccessful candidates could not "be informed of the
reserve list without violating the Constitutions of Member States and the rights of
citizens under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union" (emphasis
added). The Ombudsman said the Parliament appeared to have acted according to the
previously-published notice of competition. 42 Nonetheless, the Ombudsman
considered it "to be inconsistent with Parliament's commitment to openness in the
recruitment process for its administration to fail to announce, in notices of
competition, that the names of successful candidates will be made public".43 He
found no maladministration in his inquiry but made the following draft
41 The Ombudsman, Special Report from the European Ombudsman to the European Parliament
following the draft recommendation to the European Parliament in complaint 311/2001/(BB)IJH, 2,
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/special/en/defauIt.htm
42 The Ombudsman, n. 41 above, at 3.
43 The Ombudsman, n. 41 above, at 4. In support of this conclusion, the Ombudsman referred to a
Parliament resolution in which the Parliament stressed that the principle of openness must apply
throughout the Commission recruitment procedures. European Parliament resolution on the special
report from the European Ombudsman to the European Parliament following the own-initiative
inquiry into the secrecy which forms part of the Commission's recruitment procedures
(C5-0082/2000 - 2000/2048 (COS)), 17 November 2000.
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recommendation "to guarantee that the principle of openness will be applied in future
competitions": "In future competitions, the European Parliament should inform
candidates in the notices of competition that the names of successful candidates will
be made public".44
Nevertheless, the Parliament did not accept the draft recommendation on the
ground that the publication of the name of a successful candidate could be deemed
"to be lawful only if the person in question has unambiguously given his or her
consent to such publication", according to Article 5(d) of Regulation 45/2001.45 The
Parliament stressed that participating in a competition whose notice stated that the
list of successful candidates would be published could not be regarded as the
unambiguous consent. 46 In response, the Ombudsman said the Parliament
misunderstood the Community data protection law since the publication of the
information concerned was permitted under Article 5 of Regulation 45/2001 47 The
Ombudsman, therefore, made the following recommendation: "In future
competitions, the European Parliament should publish the names of successful
44 The Ombudsman, n. 41 above, at 4.
45 The Ombudsman, n. 41 above, at 4. Under this provision, personal data may be processed only if
"the data subject has unambiguously given his or her consent". As to the definition of the phrases
"data subject" and "the data subject's consent", Article 2(a) ofRegulation 45/2001 provides that data
subject refers to an identified or identifiable natural person, and Article 2(h) of Regulation 45/2001
states that "'the data subject's consent' shall mean any freely given specific and informed indication of
his or her wishes by which the data subject signifies his or her agreement to personal data relating to
him or her being processed". Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data [2001]
OJ L8/1.
46 The Ombudsman, n. 41 above, at 4.
47 The Ombudsman, n. 41 above, at 6. The Ombudsman referred to Article 5(a) ofRegulation 45/2001
in support of his view. Under this provision, personal data may be processed if "processing is
necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest ... in the legitimate exercise
of official authority vested in the Community institution or body". The Ombudsman stated that "it
would be a legitimate exercise of official authority for the European Parliament to decide that the
names of successful candidates in competitions will be published and that candidates will be informed
accordingly in the notice of competition".
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candidates and inform candidates accordingly in the notices of competition".48
Finally, the Ombudsman stated that "[t]he European Parliament could consider
adopting the recommendation as a resolution".49 The Parliament later accepted this
recommendation.
7.3.3.2 Comment
This special report indicates that the Parliament did not address the request properly,
and the Ombudsman's way of dealing with this complaint was far from perfect.
A. A refusal without clear legal basis
The Parliament said in the inquiry that disclosure of the information concerned
would violate the Constitutions of Member States and the rights of citizens under the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter the "Charter").
This argument was flawed because it lacks of specificity. In this statement, the
Parliament failed to point out which parts of the Constitutions and the Charter would
be violated. The most relevant provision in the Charter is Article 11-68 entitled
"Protection ofpersonal data", which states that:
1. Everyone has the right to the protection ofpersonal data concerning him
or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate
basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which
has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it
rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an
48 The Ombudsman, n. 41 above, at 6.
49 The Ombudsman, n. 41 above, at 6.
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independent authority.
It bears noting that the Parliament did not refer to the Charter or Constitutions of the
Member States again after the Ombudsman made the draft recommendation. In its
detailed opinion, the Parliament turned to claim that the refusal was based on Article
5(d) ofRegulation 45/2001. Privacy is indeed guaranteed under not only the Charter
and the Constitutions, but also Regulation 45/2001. However, the point was that the
Parliament did not state in the refusal or the inquiry that the access was refused on
the basis of Article 4(5) of Regulation 45/2001, Article 11-68 of the Charter, or any
provisions in the Constitutions. If the Parliament had referred to either of these
provisions in the refusal or the inquiry, the complainant could have decided not to
complain to the Ombudsman, or to drop the complaint if he has brought this case to
the Ombudsman. This failure to give adequate reasoning in the refusal ran against
Article 253 EC, which constituted an instance ofmaladministration.
The Ombudsman did not focus on this failuie but argued that the publication of
the names and marks of the successful candidates was permitted under Article 5(a) of
Regulation 45/2001. Although he held this view, he did not find that the refusal to
publish constituted an instance ofmaladministration. This is because he believed that
the Parliament acted according to the previously-published notice of the competition.
B. Abuse of mandate?
The Ombudsman found that the Parliament acted according to the notice of the
competition, but he insisted on making the draft recommendation and special report.
The reason why the Ombudsman made the draft recommendation and the special
report, which consisted of a recommendation, was that the refusal was inconsistent
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with a commitment to openness made by the Parliament at an earlier date.50
Under Article 195(1) EC and Article 2(2) of the Statute, the Ombudsman has
sole competence to act to eliminate maladministration, which refers to failure of a
public body to act according to a rule or principle which is binding upon it.51 Where
he or she finds no maladministration in an inquiry, the case should be closed
subsequently. Draft recommendations and special reports to the Parliament are made
where there is an instance of maladministration. It must be stressed that where the
Ombudsman makes these recommendations or reports without uncovering any
maladministration, such acts are themselves instances of maladministration, which
constitute an abuse of the mandate of the Ombudsman.
Given that the Ombudsman found no maladministration in the present case, the
making of the draft recommendation and special report was an abuse of the
Ombudsman's mandate, which itself constituted an instance of maladministration.
Surprisingly, the Parliament's detailed opinion indicated that it did not even notice
that the draft recommendation was not based on any maladministration. However,
even if it had noticed this flaw, the Parliament was not entitled to challenge the views
and recommendation made by the Ombudsman in the special report under Article
230 EC. This is because special reports, which do not have legal effects on the
Parliament, are not among the reviewable acts set out in this article.
50
n. 43 above.
51 For text ofArticle 195(1) EC, see n. 5 of the introduction to this chapter. See also 7.1.1 above.
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7.4 Conclusion
Our analysis of the mandate of the Ombudsman, the procedures under which he/she
exercises his/her powers, and the most contentious complaints concerning freedom of
information, indicates that the Ombudsman has made considerable efforts in securing
this right in the Union. The Ombudsman has adopted a very strict approach when
assessing the three institutions' invocation of the exceptions set out in the EU FOI
laws. This contribution is of great importance because the attitudes of the three
institutions towards public access give cause for concern. Our study demonstrates,
first of all, that as regards the public interest exception relating to legal advice, the
Council took the view that systematic refusal of access to legal opinions was
compatible with Article 4(2) of the Regulation. Secondly, as to protection of
confidentiality of institutional proceedings, the Council and Commission's
invocation of Article 4(3) showed they considered that freedom of information was
less important than certain general interests not specified in the governing FOI laws.
Thirdly, many might be surprised that it was the Parliament that made one of the
most contentious refusals considered by the Ombudsman after the 2001 Regulation
came into force. Analysis of this refusal, which was addressed in the special report
on complaint 341/2001, demonstrates that the Parliament did not consider the refusal
in a serious manner prior to the Ombudsman's draft recommendation.
We should applaud the Ombudsman for what he has contributed to FOI
protection, but there remains considerable room for improvement. As to legal
reasoning, a number of flaws can be found in the way the Ombudsman has dealt with
the relevant complaints. The first flaw can be found in the draft recommendations
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relating to the legal advice exception. The Ombudsman stressed the importance of
the principle of "widest possible access", the principle of proportionality, and Article
207(3) EC, while he even drew a distinction between legal opinions relating to
possible future court proceedings and those relating to the legislative process.
However, he did not make sufficient effort to establish why the refusals of the
Council were incompatible with these legal rules and principles. Secondly, the
Ombudsman needs to be more careful about the way in which he or she makes use of
references to previous opinions. For instance, Complaints 2028/2003, 2097/2003,
and 413/2004 all concerned Community examinations, but the information sought by
these complainants differed, and the Commission put forward significantly different
arguments in the inquiries into these complaints. It was thus unhelpful for the
Ombudsman to say that its findings in the draft recommendation relating to the first
complaint equally applied to the two others, without addressing the arguments
presented by the Commission. Thirdly, the Ombudsman needs to be careful to
evaluate the scope of his/her mandate. Otherwise, addressing a complaint could
constitute an instance of maladministration. The most important example can be
found in the special report on complaint 341/2001, in which the Ombudsman made a
draft recommendation and then a special report to the Parliament without finding an
instance ofmaladministration.
Finally, the Ombudsman should be extremely careful as to how he/she expresses
views on FOI complaints. This is because, first, in the inquiries conducted by the
Ombudsman, the Council and Commission have repeatedly referred to previous
views of the Ombudsman in defence of their refusals. Second, the Ombudsman is
entitled only to recommend. The relevant institutions and bodies, in particular the
Parliament, will accept a draft recommendation or recommendation mainly because
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the legal reasoning of the Ombudsman is thought to be convincing. The Ombudsman
has no powers to take any effective action where its draft recommendations are
ignored. It should also be noted that before the Community court, the Ombudsman
does not possess the right to challenge the legality of the acts adopted jointly or
individually by other institutions and bodies.
The role of the Ombudsman is likely to remain important in the FOI field in the
future and the Ombudsman will continue to act as the guardian of freedom of
information. However, we should also keep a watchful eye on whether the
Ombudsman and the Community court relax their high standards, if a revised or




This thesis is in three parts. The first and second parts analyse the development of the
law and policy on freedom of information in the European Economic Community
and European Union between 1984 and 2004. These two parts focus on how the
Council, the Commission, and the Parliament enacted and implemented the rules on
FOI protection, and on the role of the Community court in this field. The third part
examines the roles of the European Parliament and the European Ombudsman, which
have supplemented the role of the Court in securing this right. As to the objectives of
this project: on the one hand, it seeks to understand the degree of legal protection
offered to freedom of information in the Union over the last two decades; on the
other, it seeks to identify how the current EU FOI regime could be improved. To
accomplish these objectives, attention has been drawn to the following interrelated
issues:
(1) What were the major controversies surrounding FOI law and policy
between 1984 and 2004? In particular, this thesis focuses on the extent
to which the 2001 Regulation addresses the pre-existing obstacles to
FOI protection.
(2) The exceptions in Article 4(1) and Article 4(2) of the 2001 Regulation
can be categorised as mandatory and discretionary respectively, but the
distinction between the two provisions is vague. This indistinct
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dividing line should be removed to end the misunderstanding that the
Council, the Commission, and the Parliament are entitled to refuse
requests systematically when invoking the so-called mandatory
exceptions.
(3) What are the principles established by the 2001 Regulation, the EC
Treaty, or by the Court to guide the interpretation of the exceptions laid
down in the Regulation?
(4) Should the EU legislator expressly incorporate the principle of
proportionality into the 2001 Regulation?
(5) What can we learn from recent initiatives to adopt a constitution for
Europe, and in the light of the "no" votes to the Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe in the referendums in France and the
Netherlands in mid 2005, what further steps are now required to
guarantee freedom of information in the future?
This chapter draws together these important issues and considers them systematically.
The first section reviews the dramatic shifts in position of the Council and
Commission towards FOI protection. It looks at the case law and annual reports
which demonstrate the institutions' questionable interpretation. of the exceptions
relating to inspections, investigations, court proceedings, and of the authorship rule.
Following this assessment, we highlight in the second section how such
controversies might be reduced before focusing on the function played by the
principle of proportionality. In the final part of this chapter, the impact of the
troubled ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the 2001
Regulation will be examined.
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8.1 What ground has been covered?
This thesis has considered the relevant legal rules, case law, and policy documents
regarding EU FOI protection. Between 1984 and 1992 no Community law on
freedom of information required the Community institutions to make their
information publicly available. The Parliament adopted two Resolutions calling on
the Commission and the Council to, inter alia, adopt FOI legislation, but these
appeals fell on deaf ears.1
It is worth noting that these two institutions ultimately did not benefit from
ignoring the Parliament's calls. Examination of the 1990 Zwartveld judgment
• 2indicates that the Community clearly needed FOI legislation. As there was no such
legislation in place, the Dutch official in that case requested the Commission to
provide him with inspection reports in the name of judicial cooperation. The
Commission refused the request on the ground that "the documents formed part of a
file on legal matters pending in the Commission", but it was also unable to provide
"3 ... . .
any legal basis for this refusal. The ECJ read the principle of sincere cooperation in
a very broad sense and decided that the Commission had to produce to the Dutch
official the requested documents.4 The Court simply disregarded the Commission's
argument regarding the protection of its internal proceedings, which had not yet been
identified as an exception to openness in any EC legislation. The analysis of the first
stage of the FOI evolution indicates that, on the one hand, it was difficult for the
' Resolution on the compulsory publication of information by the European Community [1984] OJ
CI72/176; Resolution on the compulsory publication of information by the European Community,
[1988] OJC49/174.
2 Case C-2/88 Imm, Zwartveld and others [1990] ECR 1-3365.
3
para. l(v), n. 2 above.
4
paras. 17, 19, 21, 22, 25, and 26, n. 2 above.
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public to gain access to information in the possession of the Community institutions.
On the other hand, the institutions did not have a firm legal basis on which to refuse
access, however justified in the public interest. Both the public and the EC
institutions can, therefore, be considered victims of the absence of FOI legislation
between 1984 and 1992.
The public enjoyed more freedom of information under the 1992 Code of
Conduct and the two corresponding Council and Commission decisions than they did
prior to their adoption. These instruments, however, proved insufficient to offer
comprehensive FOI protection. The Council and Commission between 1993 and
2004 tended systematically to refuse applications, which indicated that they still held
to the view that secrecy ought to be the rule and openness the exception. This view is
reflected in the following cases:
(1) In its 1995 Carvel judgment, the CFI held that the Council had
considered that it was obliged to refuse access under the confidentiality
exception because, inter alia, the information in question referred to its
deliberations.5
(2) In the 1998 Interporc / judgment, the Commission said the exception
for protection of the public interest relating to court proceedings
authorised it, in the context ofDecision 94/90, not to make available to
the public all documents relating to pending proceedings.6
Nonetheless, the Community courts, in particular the CFI, adopted the opposite
approach when addressing FOI disputes during the second stage, and established the
5 Case T-194/94, John Carvel and Guardian Newspapers v. Council [1995] ECR11-2769, para. 73.
6 Case T-124/96, Interporc Im- und Export GmbH v. Commission [1998] ECR 11-231, para. 36.
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principle that openness should be the rule and secrecy the exception.7
As regards the third stage, namely the period after the Regulation entered into
force in late 2001, the Council and the Commission appear very satisfied with how
freedom of information is protected in the Union. The Commission said in a report
published in 2004 that it was unnecessary to revise this legislation: "Regulation
1049/2001 has been applied for two years and no problems have arisen during
implementation that would justify amending [the] legislation for the time being"
o
(emphasis added). The Council also said in its 2003 FOI report that "[t]he Council's
experience in connection with the implementation of Regulation No 1049/2001 in
2003 has shown that application of the Regulation's provisions causes no particular
problems either with regard to the analysis of documents for which access is
requested or with regard to compliance with the response times laid down by the
Regulation" (emphasis added).9 Is this really the case? Our analysis indicates that it
is not. Certainly, the Council and the Commission have generally abandoned the
view that secrecy ought to be the rule and openness the exception. Nevertheless,
these two institutions, and even the Parliament on occasion, have relied on certain
exceptions, or even no exception at all, to deny systematically access to public
information. An examination of the 2002 and 2003 Council and Commission FOI
7 We will review the ways the Community courts prevented overbroad interpretation of exceptions
during the second stage in the next section. In addition to this effort, the Courts also attempted to
extend the scope of freedom of information, which also reflects the view that openness should be the
rale and secrecy the exception. See Case T-174/95, Svenska Journalistforbundet v. Council [1998]
ECR 11-2289, and Case T-14/98, Hautala v. Council [1999] ECR 11-2489, and Case C-353/99P,
Council v. Hautala [2001] ECR 1-9565. These cases have been examined in 3.7 and 3.9.
8 The Commission adopted this report on 30 January 2004 following the review of the practice of the
three major institutions on freedom of information. European Commission, 'Report from the
Commission on the Implementation of the principles in EC Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding
Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents', COM (2004) 45 final
(Brussels, 30 Jan. 2004), http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/rpt/2004/com2004_0045en01.pdf
9 The Council, Council Annual Report on Access to Documents - 2003 (Brussels, the Council, April
2004), http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/RapAnCons.en03.pdf, 39.
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reports demonstrates the following tendencies.10
(1) In 2002 and 2003, most initial applications for Council information
relating to international relations appeared to have been refused.11
(2) In 2002 and 2003, the public appeared to have been systematically
denied access to information in which the opinions of the Council's
12
Legal Service were reproduced.
(3) In 2002 and 2003, the public appeared to have been denied access to
information relating to competition on the ground of protection of the
13
"purposes of inspections, investigations and audits".
A 2003 Parliament Resolution indicates that:14
(1) The Council systematically denies access to information which could
identify the positions of the various national delegations at the time of
the decision-making process.15
(2) The Council appears systematically to refuse applications for
documents concerning public security on the basis of Article 4(1) of the
10 The Council, Council Annual Report on Access to Documents - 2002 (Brussels, the Council, April 2003),
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/EN-AR-02.pdf; The Council, Council Annual Report on Access to
Documents - 2003, ibid. European Commission, Report from the Commission on the Application in 2002 of
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding Public Access to
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, COM(2003) 216 final, (Brussels, European
Commission, 29 April 2003),
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com2003_0216en01.pdf; European
Commission, Report from the Commission on the Application in 2003 ofRegulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of
the European Parliament and ofthe Council regarding Public Access to European Parliament, Council and
Commission documents, COM(2004) 347 final, (Brussels, European Commission, 30 April 2004),
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/Iex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/com2004_0347en01.pdf
11 See 5.2.3.1 A.
12 See 5.2.3.1 B.
13 See 5.2.4.1.
14
European Parliament resolution on public access to Parliament, Council and Commission
documents (implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 in the year 2002) (2003/2022(INI)),
http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2003-0413+0+D
OC+XML+VO//EN&L=EN&LEVEL=3&NAV=S&LSTDOC=Y
15 Point 4 of paragraph 4, n. 14 above.
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Regulation.16
(3) The Parliament, the Council, and the Commission appear
systematically to refuse all applications for legal opinions.17
(4) The Commission systematically denies citizens access to
correspondence from the Member States in the context of infringement
1 R
proceedings once the proceedings have been completed or suspended.
In addition, our analysis of the most contentious FOI complaints addressed by the
European Ombudsman, demonstrates that:
(1) In terms of the public interest exception relating to legal advice, the
Council took the view that systematic refusal of access to legal
opinions was compatible with Article 4(2) of the Regulation. It is
worth noting that the 2003 Parliament Resolution noted above also
indicates that the Council appears to refuse all applications for access
to legal opinions.
(2) As regards protection of confidentiality of institutional proceedings,
the Council and Commission's invocation of Article 4(3) of the
Regulation showed they considered the protection of certain general
interests to be more important than that of freedom of information.
These systematic denials consequently surface in a number of distinct documents.
The comprehensive review above indicates that systematic refusals based on some
exceptions, or no exception whatsoever, have posed a great threat to the entire EU
16
Point 5 ofparagraph 4, n. 14 above.
17 Point 6 of paragraph 4, n. 14 above.
18 Point 12 ofparagraph 4, n. 14 above.
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FOI regime. Where the institutions misinterpret the exceptions to deny access in a
systematic fashion, none of the purposes of the FOI Regulation can be accomplished.
How, then, can we improve this regime in an effort to ensure that requests for public
information will not be refused on a systematic basis?
8.2 What can be done?
The analysis in Chapters 3 to 7 indicates that there is significant room for
improvement of the current FOI regime. We have considered four potential remedies
that could be, or have been, employed to prevent systematic refusals based on
improper interpretation of the exceptions to openness. First of all, the Parliament in
its Resolution on public access adopted in 1988, four years before the Commission
and the Council adopted the Code of Conduct, stated that future FOI legislation
should "contain a precise definition of the nature and scope of the right to
information, the exemptions on the grounds of confidentiality, the description of
documents intended for internal use".19 Fifteen years later, the Parliament made an
analogous suggestion in a 2003 Resolution. It said that the 2001 Regulation needed
clarification to avoid varying interpretations by the institutions of the exceptions
relating to legal opinions, the positions of national delegations, etc.20
This proposal seems, at least at first glance, an attractive one, but it has proven






exceptions, such as privacy and public security, has never been easy for any legislator.
The study in Chapter 6 reveals that, as regards the clarification of the scope of the
exceptions, we can learn little from the domestic FOI laws within or outside the
Union. For instance, as to the clarification of the scope of the privacy exception, the
term "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" which is used in U.S. law
can be read in a number of different ways, while the Scottish approach does not
reduce the vagueness as no definition at all can be found in the Freedom of
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Information (Scotland) Act. In addition, even if the EU legislator were to define
clearly the interests contained in the exceptions, such definitions could prove
problematic if their scope was narrowly drawn. The suggestion by the Parliament is
not of great help at present. However, the task of delimiting the exceptions clearly
and properly is expected to be less taxing in the future once the Community court
and academic writers have contributed further to our understanding of the nature of
the exceptions. For example, this thesis has attempted to establish clearly the scope
of the exceptions relating to inspection, investigation, and court proceedings,
discussed further at 8.2.3, below.
Additionally, three interrelated proposals have been put forward in this thesis to
address the problem of systematic denials. First, the EU legislator should consider
removing the unclear dividing line between the exceptions set out in Article 4(1) and
Article 4(2) in the 2001 Regulation. Second, we suggest that the Community court
alter its views on the invocation of the non-disclosure exception laid down in Article
4(5) of the Regulation. Third, the EU legislator should consider expressly
incorporating the principle of proportionality into the Regulation. We will review
these suggestions in the following subsections.
21 See 6.3.2.
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This is an appropriate moment to reassess how the 2001 Regulation could be
amended, particularly given that the status of the Treaty establishing a Constitution
for Europe remains uncertain. In this Constitutional Treaty, the FOI protection
provision is not in a section entitled "internal proceedings". The Constitutional
Treaty incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union in its Part II,
recognising the right of access to documents as a fundamental right. Article El-102
extends the scope of EU FOI protection to cover the documents of not only the
Council, the Commission, and the Parliament, but all "the institutions, bodies, and
agencies of the Union". Articles 1-50 and III-399 of this Treaty, as we saw in 5.8.5,
22reconfirm this extension.
The Constitutional Treaty is also important because of the emphasis it places on
active participation by citizens in the democratic process. Thus, Articles 1-50, 13-102,
and UJ-399 of the Constitutional Treaty enhance the role of the principle of
participatory democracy in the Union, a principle laid down in Article 1-47 of this
Treaty. Article 1-47(1) requires that the institutions of the Union give citizens and
representative associations the opportunity to exchange their views in all areas of
Union action. Under Article 1-47(2), the institutions should maintain a transparent
and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society. An extended
right of access to documents is intended to enrich the exchange of views and
dialogues, allowing EU citizens to be more familiar with and to make more informed
comments on the operation of the Union. All these rules are designed to help EU
citizens play a more significant part in the democratic life of the Union, thereby
increasing their sense of security and presumably helping to hold them together.
Flowever, Articles 1-50, 13-102, and III-399 of the Constitutional Treaty do not
22 For text ofArticles 1-50,11-102, and III-399, see 5.8.1 and 5.8.5.
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address the question of how to prevent systematic refusals. We believe that review of
the major lessons learned over the last two decades, in particular the various ways in
which improper interpretation of exceptions to openness can be avoided, will be
beneficial when considering how best to amend the Regulation.
8.2.1 Removal of an indistinct distinction
There seemed to be a clear distinction between the two categories of exceptions set
out in the Code of Conduct. The first category of exceptions appeared to be
mandatory and the other discretionary. As to the first category of exceptions, section
4, subsection 1 of the Code of Conduct stated that, the Council and the Commission
"will refuse access to any document whose disclosure could undermine" the
protection of certain public interests, as well as privacy, and commercial secrecy, etc.
According to section 4, subsection 2, the two institutions "may also refuse access in
order to protect the institution's interest in the confidentiality of its proceedings". In
the WWF judgment, the CFI said that the first category, comprising the "mandatory
exceptions", protected the interest of third parties or of the general public, while "in
the second category, relating to the internal deliberations of the institution, it is the
9T . . .
interest of the institution alone which is at stake". This distinction was
questionable because the internal deliberations of the EC authorities often have a
close relationship not only with the interest of the institution but also with that of the
general public.
The case law also indicates that the distinction between these two provisions
2j
para. 60, Case T-105/95, WWF (United Kingdom) v. Commission [1997] ECR 11-313.
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was not at all clear. This is because the Council and the Commission were under
analogous obligations to balance relevant interests or to give adequate reasoning for
their refusals when invoking the first, second, or both categories of exemption. In the
1995 Carvel judgment, the CFI stated that the Council had to carry out the interest
balancing test when invoking a discretionary exception in Article 4(2) of Council
Decision 93/731, namely the second category exception.24 In the 1998 Svenska
Journalistforbundet judgment, the CFI stated that the terms of a refusal of access
must permit the applicant and the Court to check whether the institution concerned
had conducted the balancing test when invoking Article 4(2), otherwise the
institution would have failed to comply with the requirement to give reasons laid
c
down in Article 190 EC (now Article 253 EC). These two judgments indicate that
where the Council or the Commission invokes an exception in the second category,
the balancing test and Article 253 EC must be complied with.
However, this does not mean that the two institutions were entitled to deny
access by invoking a first category exception without being subject to any legal
principles. The Community court has assessed the legality of refusals based on the
first category exceptions by reference to Article 253 EC, and the principle of
proportionality. As to Article 253 EC, according to the 1997 WWF judgment, where
the Commission invoked the public interest exception relating to infringement
proceedings, i.e. a first category exception, the Court held the Commission must
indicate the reasons why it considered that the requested documents were related to
26
the possible opening of an infringement procedure. In the 1998 Interporc I
judgment, the CFI stressed that a Commission decision based on a first category
24
paras. 65 and 67, n. 5 above.
25
paras. 125 and 127, n. 7 above.
26
para 64, n. 23 above.
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exception, here the public interest exception relating to court proceedings, "must
state the reasons on which it is based, in accordance with [Article 253 EC]".27 The
CFI reiterated these requirements of Article 253 in the 1998 Carlsen case, which
dealt with a dispute over an invocation of the public interest exception relating to
legal opinions.2 As regards the proportionality principle, the CFI in the Hautala,
Kuijer, and Mattila judgments between 2001 and 2003 required refusals based on
another first category exception, the public interest exception relating to international
relations, to be proportionate.29
The employment of Article 253 EC and the principle of proportionality in the
rulings above indicates that the Court attached importance to the phrase "could" in
section 4, subsection 1 of the Code of Conduct, highlighting the obligation of the
institutions to consider whether the public interests could be jeopardised. As these
judgments required that invocations of the first category exceptions were subject to
Article 253, and the proportionality principle, it is fair to say that the Court narrowed
down the scope of the mandatory exceptions to a significant extent. In brief, as the
Council and Commission had to consider one or more of the legal principles noted
above when invoking exceptions in the first or second category, the distinction
between the two became blurred.
Have these difficulties now been resolved by the 2001 Regulation? The answer
is "no" in that it is possible to see very similar disputes arising under the Regulation.
Article 4(1) of the 2001 Regulation is intended to guarantee the public interest, as
well as privacy and the integrity of the individual, while Article 4(2) seeks to ensure
27
para. 53, n. 6 above.
28
para. 5, Case T-610/97, Carlsen and others v. Council [1998] ECR 11-485.
29 The Hautala judgment, n. 7 above; Case T-211/00, Aldo Kuijer v. Council [2002] ECR 11-485; Case
T-204/99, Olli Mattila v. Council and Commission [2001] ECR 11-2265, and Case C-353/01, and Olli
Mattila v. Council and Commission [2004] ECR 1-0000.
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the protection of commercial interests, court proceedings, legal advice, as well as the
purpose of inspections, investigations and audits. Similarly, there seems to be a
distinction between Article 4(1) and Article 4(2), because the latter has a condition,
namely "unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure". This requirement
could prove problematic in the future because Article 4(1) of the Regulation does not
contain a similar requirement. The three institutions might consider that a request for
access can be refused on the basis of Article 4(1) even if there is a competing public
interest in disclosure. The institutions could make this misinterpretation without
noticing that, according to the spirit of the case law, invocation of the exceptions set
out in Article 4(1) of the Regulation should be in line with the requirement to give
adequate reasoning in Article 253 EC and with the principle of proportionality. Thus,
this additional condition is potentially misleading and should be removed from the
2001 Regulation. Instead, the principle of proportionality should be explicitly
incorporated into the legislation so as to apply to all the stipulated exceptions. This
suggestion is discussed in detail at 8.2.4 below. In addition, Article 253 EC will
continue to be important in this area, because it may still be used to challenge a
refusal either on its own, or jointly with the principle of proportionality.
8.2.2 The non-disclosure provision
The analysis of the Petrie and Interporc II judgments suggests that the authorship
rule ran counter to the principle of widest possible access set out in the Code of
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Conduct.30 This is because, on the one hand, the Council and the Commission had
no power to decide to disclose third party information and, on the other, third parties
tend to be unwilling to approve a request for access in circumstances where their
interests are at stake. It is then very difficult for an applicant to access public
information originating from a third party, which renders the principle of widest
possible access an empty commitment.
The authorship rule is not included in the 2001 Regulation. But is there an
analogous provision in this measure? Fortunately, the answer here is no. Although
Article 4(5) of the Regulation relates to a new exception to openness, this provision
is very different from the authorship rule set out in the Code of Conduct. Our
analysis showed that under Article 4(5), the Council, the Commission, and the
Parliament are not bound by the requests from the Member States. In the 2003
Messina and 2004 Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds judgments, however, the CFI
ignored this compelling feature.31 Unless the Court alters its approach, this could
lead to disputes over the invocation of the non-disclosure rule. In addition, the EU
legislator should consider revising this provision, requiring that the three institutions
apply the principle of proportionality whenever a Member State expresses opposition
to the release of information.
8.2.3 The exceptions regarding investigations, inspections,
and court proceedings
The case law indicates that the purpose behind the public interest exceptions relating
30 Case T-191/99, David Petrie, Victoria Jane Primhak, David Verzoni and Others v. Commission
[2001] ECR 11-3677, and Case C-41/00, Interporc 1m- und Export GmbH v. Commission [2003] ECR
1-2125.
31 Case T-76/02, Mara Messina v. Commission [2003] ECR 0000, and Case T-168/02, IFAW
Internationaler Tierschutz-F'onds gGmbH v. Commission [2004] ECR 0000.
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to investigations, inspections, and court proceedings set out in the Code of Conduct,
as well as corresponding Council Decision 93/731, and Commission Decision 94/90
was unclear. The main controversy is whether these exemptions can be invoked
merely to guarantee the privilege for lawyers and the right to a fair hearing, or
mainly to secure an amicable resolution of a dispute before the Community court
delivers a judgment? In van der Wal, the Court was of the opinion that the court
proceedings exception enshrined in Decision 94/90 was designed to ensure respect
for the right to a fair hearing. However, in the 2001 Petrie judgment the CFI went
further and said that the Commission was entitled to invoke these exemptions to
preserve an amicable resolution of the dispute between the Commission and the
Member State concerned, i.e. the Italian Republic, before the Community court has
•jo
...
delivered its judgment. Certainly, an amicable resolution could be of interest to the
public, but a close causal link does not always exist between a refusal and an
amicable resolution. In Petrie, an invocation of the exception, i.e. a refusal of access
to the documents relating to the Italy-Commission dispute, would preserve the
secrecy of the infringement proceedings. However, in other disputes between a
Member State and the Commission, it cannot be ruled out that certain information
relating to the disputes may be released by one or both parties before court
proceedings. Where relevant information is already available to the public, it is no
longer sensible to deny access on the basis of the exception in the name of preserving
an amicable resolution. Thus, pursuit of an amicable resolution should not be
recognised as a main purpose of the court proceedings exception. Otherwise, the
j2
para. 48, Case T-83/96, Gerard van der Wal v. Commission [1998] ECR 11-545, and Joined cases
C-174/98 and C-189/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands and Gerard van der Wal v. Commission [2000]
ECR 1-0001.
para. 68, n. 30 above.
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institutions could employ such a broad interpretation of the scope of the exception to
refuse relevant requests systematically.
In the 2003 Interporc //judgment, the CFI altered the view it had expressed in
Petrie, and this was then endorsed by the ECJ.34 The CFI stated that "the expression
'court proceedings' must be interpreted as meaning that the protection of the public
interest precludes the disclosure of the content of documents drawn up by the
Commission solely for the purposes of specific court proceedings". As court
proceedings are intended mainly to ensure the enforcement of Community law rather
than an amicable resolution of disputes, access to documents drawn up for preserving
an amicable resolution must not be denied under the public interest exceptions
relating to investigations, inspections, and court proceedings.
Unfortunately, the 2001 Regulation does not clarify this issue further. According
to Article 4(2) of the Regulation, the three institutions shall refuse access to a
document where disclosure would undermine the protection of, inter alia, "court
proceedings and legal advice", and "the purpose of inspections, investigations and
audits", unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. The EU legislator
should consider revising Article 4(2) of the Regulation, to reflect the conclusions of
the van der Wal and Interporc II cases. Our proposal is:
The EU authorities shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would
undermine the protection of court proceedings, legal advice, inspections,
investigations and audits, but only to the extent that the reproduction (A) could
reasonably be expected to invade the privileges for lawyers, or (B) would




para. 40, n. 30 above.
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8.2.4 Explicit incorporation of the principle of proportionality
into the FOI Regulation
8.2.4.1 Relevant rules
We have seen that during the second and third stages of the evolution of FOI
protection in the Union, both the Council and Commission constantly interpreted
certain exemptions in a very broad manner before the Community court. Indeed, no
rule in the Code of Conduct, the two corresponding Council and Commission
decisions, or, now, the FOI Regulation expressly prohibits these two institutions from
doing so. Nevertheless, four rules or principles have been employed by applicants
and the Court to afford the exceptions a narrow interpretation.
(1) The principle of "widest possible access" set out in the first section of
the Code of Conduct and Article 1(a) of the 2001 Regulation;
(2) Section 4, subsection 2 of the Code of Conduct. Under this provision,
the Council and the Commission "may also refuse access in order to
protect the institution's interest in the confidentiality of its
proceedings". This provision was held by the Court to require a
balancing test,36 prohibiting the two institutions from denying access
in a systematic fashion.
(3) The obligation to give adequate reasoning laid down by Article 253 EC
(former Article 190 EC);
(4) The principle of proportionality.
These rules perform analogous functions to the extent that each of them helps to
36 See 3.2.3,
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ensure that the exceptions to openness are properly delimited. This is the reason why
they have been used individually or jointly to counter misinterpretation of the
exceptions. Nonetheless, the analysis in the preceding chapters indicates that the
effect of the first three rules has been partial or unstable in the FOI field.
First of all, with regard to the principle of "widest possible access", the CFI
stated in the 1995 Carvel case, the first key FOI decision during the second stage,
that the objective of Council Decision 93/731 was "to allow the public wide
access".37 In the 1997 WWF judgment, the CFI stressed the importance of this
principle, noting that where a general principle was established and exceptions to that
principle were laid down, the exceptions should be construed and applied strictly, in
38
a manner which would not defeat the application of the general rule. Nevertheless,
the principle of widest possible access lacks specificity. It remains unclear what the
scope of "widest possible access" is and what legal tests this principle requires. For
the applicants whose requests are refused, this principle has not been, and is not
expected to be, of great help when they challenge refusals to provide information.
Secondly, Section 4, subsection 2 of the Code of Conduct was held by the Court
to require a balancing test. In the Carvel judgment, the CFI elaborated on this test,
noting that the Council was obliged to balance the citizens' interest in accessing
Council documents against its interest in maintaining the confidentiality of its
proceedings.39 In the WWF case, the CFI held that the Commission had failed to
fulfill its duty to undertake the balancing test.40 In Svenska Journalistforbundet, the
CFI was of the view that the information in the contested decision was insufficient
para. 65, n. 5 above.
38
para. 56, n. 23 above.
39
paras. 65 and 67, n. 5 above.
40
para. 70, n. 23 above.
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for the applicant or the Court to check whether the Council had complied with its
duty to carry out the balancing test as the application of Article 4(2) of Decision
93/731, i.e. the second category exception, requires.41 Nonetheless, the role of the
balancing test in EU FOI protection has long been limited. Under the framework of
the Code of Conduct, the balancing test did not apply to the first category of
exemptions or the authorship rule. At present, the balancing test can be found in
Article 4(2) of the 2001 Regulation. Under this provision, the Council, the
Commission, and the Parliament shall refuse access to a document where disclosure
would undermine the protection of commercial interests, court proceedings, legal
advice, as well as the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits, "unless there
is an overriding public interest in disclosure". However, the balancing test does not
apply to Article 4(1) or the non-disclosure provision as they do not contain a similar
provision.
The requirement of giving adequate reasoning is laid down in Article 253 EC,
which demands that the Council and Commission specify the source of legal
authority for a refusal before indicating the objectives that the refusal is to achieve. In
addition, the institutions should also indicate the reasons why it is desirable to
accomplish those objectives. The CFI in the WWF, the Interporc I, and the Rothmans
judgments stated that the Commission's refusals of access to the requested
documents should have provided sufficient reasons as set out in Article 253.
Nevertheless, this provision is insufficient to secure freedom of information in the
Union. This is because the CFI has not adopted a consistent approach when
interpreting the terms "sufficient reasons" and "adequate reasoning".
The CFI stated in Interporc I that it had consistently held that "the reasoning
41
para. 125, n. 7 above.
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required by that provision must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the
Community authority which adopted the contested measure so as to enable the
persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure in order to protect their
rights, and the Court to exercise its power of review".42 The CFI reiterated these
requirements ofArticle 253 in the 1998 Carlsen case.43
However, the CFI did not hold a firm stance when applying the requirement of
clear and unequivocal reasoning in its Carlsen and van der Wal judgments. In
Carlsen, the CFI failed to examine whether the Council had adequately established
why release of the specific information requested could damage "the maintenance of
legal certainty and the stability of Community law" and "the Council's being able to
obtain independent legal advice".44 It was unclear which sub-concepts of legal
certainty, such as non-retroactivity, the protection of vested rights, and legitimate
expectations could be damaged by disclosure. Although these two reasons were not
at all clear, the CFI held that they "must be considered to be sufficient".45 In van der
Wal, the Commission refused the request "on the ground that disclosure of the replies
could undermine the protection of the public interest and, more specifically, the
sound administration of justice" (emphasis added).46 This was not clear and
unequivocal reasoning. On the one hand, it is uncertain what sound administration of
justice refers to and what can be done to protect it. On the other hand, the
Commission failed to establish why disclosure of the information at issue would
jeopardise the sound administration of justice. The CFI, however, stated that the
~
para. 53, n. 6 above.
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para. 5, n. 28.
44
paras. 4 and 5, n. 28 above.
45
para. 4, n. 28 above.
46
para. 15, n. 32 above.
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reasoning presented by the Commission was sufficiently clear.47
In the 1998 Svenska Journalistforbundet judgment, however, the CFI insisted on
the clear reasoning obligation and adopted a stricter approach. In this case, the
Council did not balance "on the one hand, the interest of the citizens seeking the
information and, on the other hand, the criteria for confidentiality of the proceedings
of the Council".48 As a result, the CFI held that that the contested decision did not
comply with the requirements for reasoning laid down in Article 253.49
It can be concluded therefore that the principle of "widest possible access", the
balancing test, and the requirement to give adequate reasoning are not
comprehensive in scope, nor have they been applied consistently.
8.2.4.2 Is proportionality a better choice?
The principle of proportionality is more likely to be an effective principle of review
across the EU FOI field. This doctrine should help the public counter overbroad
interpretations of exceptions in a more effective way. We suggest that the EU
legislator include an explicit reference to the principle of proportionality in the 2001
Regulation. This proposed provision requires that (A) the proportionality test be
applied when any of the exceptions set out in the Regulation are invoked, and (B) the
way this test has been applied in practice should be expressly indicated in any refusal.
This principle places great emphasis on a reasonable relationship between the ends
and the means. As regards freedom of information, the end is to maintain the various
interests protected by the exceptions to openness, while the means is a refusal of a
request for access to information held by the EC institutions.
47
para. 71, n. 32 above.
48
para. 125, n. 7 above.
49
paras. 125 and 127, n. 7.
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The CFI introduced the principle of proportionality into this area in the 2001
Hautala judgment.50 In two FOI disputes that were subsequently addressed by the
Court, namely Kuijer and Mattila, it was held that the Council was obliged to
consider this principle when refusing access to documents.51 Why, though, should
the legislator labour to introduce the proportionality doctrine in the Regulation, when
the Courts have already stated that it is a general principle of Community law? The
main reason is that the Courts' position towards this requirement has been far from
satisfactory. To be specific, following examination of the Hautala, Kuijer, and
Mattila cases, it appears that the Court did not establish that the Council, the
Commission, and the Parliament were obliged to consider the principle of
proportionality when invoking all the exceptions set out in the 2001 Regulation.
Article 220(1) EC states that "[t]he Court of Justice and the Court of First
Instance, each within its jurisdiction, shall ensure that in the interpretation and
application of this Treaty the law is observed". It is usually thought that here the
• • 52
scope of the phrase "law" refers to, inter alia, the Treaty and general principles. As
the role of this principle has been recognised both at Treaty level, namely in Article
5(3) EC, and in the case law as a general principle, the Court is obliged to ensure the
principle ofproportionality is observed. However, the Court has considerable latitude
in ensuring that the general principles, including the principle of proportionality, are
observed since these principles are loosely worded in the Treaty. In the EU FOI
field, the Court made proportionality reviews only in the Hautala, Kuijer and Mattila





52 T. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (5th edn., Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2003), 134. S. Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU Law (6lh edn., Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2004), 89-92.
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of this principle which has resulted in significant uncertainty in this area. The two
negative dimensions of this uncertainty can be summarised in the following way.
On the one hand, the lack of an express provision establishing the principle of
proportionality could prejudice those who request access to public information. In
the Petrie and Messina cases, the Council and the Commission failed even to think of
this principle in their refusals. What was worse was that in Verein fur
Konsumenteninformation v. Commission (hereinafter the ^^VKT, case) the
Commission in a refusal attempted to justify its failure to carry out a concrete,
individual examination of the numerous documents in question by reference to the
principle of proportionality. The CFI held that this refusal constituted "a manifest
breach of the principle of proportionality", because a concrete, individual
examination helps the Commission to identify "the only documents covered, in
whole or in part," by exceptions set out in the 2001 Regulation.54 In addition, it
bears noting that all the Hautala, Kuijer, and Mattila cases concerned the same
exception, i.e. the public interest exception relating to international relations. Is an
applicant entitled to challenge a refusal based on the other exceptions where the EU
institution similarly fails to consider this principle? There is, of course, no reason
why the proportionality doctrine should not apply to invocations of other exceptions
given that it is well established as a general principle of Community law, but with
incorporation of proportionality into the Regulation, there would no longer be a risk
that where an institution invokes an exception other than the international relations
exception, it might seek to avoid application of the proportionality test.
On the other hand, this uncertainty is not at all beneficial to any of the three
54
paras. 97-100, Case T-2/03, Verein fur Konsumenteninformation v. Commission [2005] ECR
11-0000.
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Community institutions. Although the Court has applied the proportionality principle
mainly in relation to the international relations exception, it is likely that, if refusals
are referred to the Court, the judges would extend its application to other exceptions.
In fact, in its 2005 VKI judgment, the CFI applied the principle ofproportionality to a
general refusal based on "one or more of the exceptions provided for by Regulation
No 1049/2001".55 All refusals, where the principle of proportionality had not been
considered, could now be annulled. This imposes continuing pressure on the Council,
Commission, and Parliament. Incorporation of proportionality into the Regulation,
which would provide the institutions with clear guidelines, would remove any
remaining uncertainty.
8.2.4.3 FOI and the role of proportionality in EU law
Our analysis indicates that an explicit proportionality provision would be beneficial
to FOI protection in the Union. But is it really worth introducing proportionality
explicitly into the 2001 Regulation, when this doctrine is well established as a
general principle in Community law? To answer this question, we must look in more
detail at the role ofproportionality in the EC Treaty and in the case law.
The principle of proportionality was inserted into the EC Treaty by the
Maastricht amendments. The term proportionality is not used explicitly in the EC
Treaty but Article 5(3) EC captures its essence, stating that "[a]ny action by the
Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this
Treaty" (emphasis added). This is a rule of coercive nature, but this provision alone
does not guarantee appropriate FOI protection. On the one hand, under Article 5(3)
EC, the three institutions are not obliged to indicate how they apply the
35
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proportionality principle when refusing access to information. This means that where
an institution fails to apply this principle, it may be extremely difficult for applicants
to identify this failure, let alone challenge the refusal. Article 253 EC which lays
down the obligation to give clear reasoning does not help resolve this problem. In
reality, the case law indicates that the Court has not held that application of the
principle of proportionality constitutes a part of the duty to give clear reasons.
The case law on the principle of proportionality does not help much in
strengthening FOI protection in the Union. First, as under Article 5(3) EC, the case
law does not require that the three institutions indicate how they apply the
proportionality principle in their refusals. Second, an applicant can seek annulment
of a refusal on the ground that it breaches the proportionality principle without
needing to refer to Article 5(3) EC, but the case law shows that the Court assessed
the legality of refusals on the basis of the principle of proportionality only when the
public interest exception relating to international relations was involved. Though
well established in Community law, the spirit of the proportionality doctrine has not
yet been realised in the FOI field.
To introduce proportionality explicitly into the 2001 Regulation would enhance
its role in EU FOI protection. On the one hand, this proposed incorporation would
ensure that the purpose of Article 5(3) EC was met in this field, because it would
require that the institutions indicate how this principle was applied when approving
or refusing a request for access to documents. On the other hand, where the
proportionality doctrine applies to every exception in this Regulation, it will no
longer be appropriate for the Court to confine such review to invocations of the
international relations exception.
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What must then be considered is the intensity with which the Court should
apply the proportionality test to future FOI disputes under this proposed provision.
This is a subject of considerable importance, because such a provision would be an
empty statement if the institutions were to apply it in a marginal and undemanding
fashion. It would not be surprising at all if the Council and the Commission, in
particular the former, were to attempt to read this principle narrowly because, first,
these two institutions, as we have seen, have a long record of interpreting the
balancing test and the Article 253 test in a limited manner. Second, the institutions
may seek to make use of the fact that the Community court has not adopted a
consistent approach in the application of this principle. As Professor Takis Tridimas
has said, "[f]ar from dictating a uniform test, [the principle of proportionality] is an
open-textured principle which is used in different contexts to protect different
interests, and it entails different degrees of judicial scrutiny".56 Illustrations can be
found in the field of EC agricultural law, in which this principle has exerted
57
particular influence. In this area, the position of the ECJ has varied when assessing
the legality ofCommunity acts according to this principle. Advocate General Francis
Jacobs has noted that "in reviewing more general legislative measures involving an
CO
element of policy the Court has been perhaps less exacting". Thus, in the 1990
Fedesa judgment, which concerned the validity of a Council Directive prohibiting
the use in livestock farming of certain hormones, the ECJ only exercised a limited
56 T. Tridimas, 'Proportionality in European Community Law: Searching for the Appropriate Standard
of Scrutiny,' in E. Ellis (ed.), The Principle ofProportionality in the Laws ofEurope (Oxford, Hart
Publishing, 1999), 84.
57 Advocate General Francis Jacobs says that "[w]here Community measures are concerned, the
agricultural sector provides the best illustration of the current application of the principle [of
proportionality], since it is in that sector that the Community legislature is most active. F. Jacobs,
'Recent Developments in the Principle of Proportionality in European Community Law,' in Ellis, n.
56 above, at 3.
58
Jacobs, ibid. Professor Tridimas has also said that "[i]n relation to market regulation measures, the
Court applies a loose test ofproportionality". Tridimas, n. 56 above, at 70.
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review of the Council's application of the proportionality test in adopting the
Directive.59 Nonetheless, in other areas the ECJ exercised an intensive form of
review as illustrated by the 1991 Werner Faust and Wiinsche judgments.60 Professor
Tridimas has said that these two judgments "illustrate a strict application of the
principle of proportionality. They established that, in applying protective measures,
the Commission must choose the alternative which is least restrictive of commercial
freedom".61 As the proportionality principle is applied by the Court with ranging
degrees of intensity, it would not be surprising if the Council and Commission
applied the principle of proportionality in a marginal manner when refusing requests
for access to information. The institutions could defend such an application on the
ground that the Court has allowed for a less exacting standard of judicial review
depending on the context and character of the act under review. Therefore, these
institutions might attempt to interpret the principle of proportionality in the way they
favour, rendering the test less effective.
59 Case C-331/88, The Queen v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary ofState
for Health, ex parte: Fedesa and others [1990] ECR 1-4023. The measure concerned was Council
Directive of 7 March 1988 prohibiting the use in livestock farming of certain substances having a
hormonal action (88/146/EEC) OJ L70/16. The Court held that the prohibition at issue was not
manifestly inappropriate, para. 15. It held that this prohibition was not manifestly inappropriate,
mainly because it was not obvious whether the authorisation of the hormones could "prevent the
emergence of a black market for dangerous but less expensive substances". It did not concentrate on
whether the prohibition concerned was manifestly appropriate so that the objective of the Directive,
namely to remove trade barriers, could be attained through the prohibition at issue. According to
Recitals 1 and 2 of the Directive at issue, the purpose of this measure was to remove the distortions of
competition and barriers to trade resulting from the fact that the administration to farm animals of
certain substances having a hormonal action was regulated differently in the Member States.
60 Case C-24/90, Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v. Werner Faust Ojfene Handelsgesellschaft KG
[1991] ECR 1-4905; Case C-25/90, Hauptzollamt Hambuig Jonas v. Wiinschc Handclsgcscllschaft
GmbH & Co. KG [1991] ECR 1-4939. Both disputes concerned the validity of a protective measure in
a Regulation applicable to imports of preserved mushrooms. The measure in question in these disputes
was Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3429/80 of 29 December 1980 adopting protective measures
applicable to imports of preserved mushrooms OJ L358/66. The ECJ analysed the measure's objective
and its serious effects, i.e. a considerable financial charge for importers, in a very comprehensive
manner according to the principle of proportionality: paras. 11-30 of the Werner Faust judgment, and
paras. 12-31 of the Wiinsche judgment. Following this thorough review, the Court concluded that such
a measure was disproportionate in relation to the objective pursued by the Regulation and was
therefore invalid: paras. 26, and 30 of the Werner Faust judgment.
61
Tridimas, n. 56 above, at 74.
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The Court should apply an intensive form of proportionality review when
considering future FOI disputes. The first reason is that the Court applied the
proportionality principle strictly in the Hautala, Kuijer, and Mattila judgments
ft9
between 2001 and 2004. Where the use of proportionality extends to invocation of
exceptions other than the international relations exception, there is no reason why the
strictness with which the Court applies this principle should differ. Secondly, the
Court has employed an intensive form of review when considering whether
Community measures disproportionately restrict individual rights. Professor Grainne
de Burca noted in 1993 that the ECJ and CFI "are generally prepared to adjudicate on
issues involving traditionally categorised individual rights, where interference with a
discretionary policy decision can be explained not on the ground that it is not the
most sensible or effective measure, but on the ground that it unjustifiably restricts an
important legally recognised right, the protection for which is entrusted to the
court".63 The development in the case law after 1993 corresponds to this tradition.64
As we have seen in Chapters 3 to 7, freedom of information has long been
recognised as an important individual right in the Union after the adoption of the
Code of Conduct, and it could be recognised as a fundamental right by a revised or
future Treaty. To be consistent with the strict approach it has adopted in the
protection of individual rights and with FOI cases to date, the Court should adopt an
62
n. 7 and 29 above.
63 G. de Burca, 'The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law,' in A. Barav and D.
Wyatt (eds.), Yearbook ofEuropean Law vol. 13 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993), 111. This view is
evident in the case law, See, for example, Case 44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979]
ECR 3727, paras. 23-33, and Case 5/88 Hubert Wachauf v. Bundesamt fur Erndhrung und
Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 2609, paras. 18-24.
64 Case C-84/95, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Ministerfor Transport, Energy and
Communications and others [1996] ECR 1-3953, paras. 22-26. This dispute concerned whether the
sanctions laid down in a Council Regulation affecting the right to property and the freedom to pursue
a trade or business constituted a breach of the principle of proportionality.
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intensive form of proportionality review of FOI disputes if the proportionality
doctrine is incorporated into the Regulation.
8.3 The challenges
A proposal to extend EU FOI protection can be found in the Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe. What is the fundamental difference between this proposal
and Article 255 EC with respect to the scope of public scrutiny? Under Article 255
EC, the public was capable of scrutinising the operation of the EC executive and
legislature through access to public documents. Under Articles 1-50, 11-102, and
III-399 of this Treaty, a wide range of the administrative, legislative, executive, and
judicial functions of the Union are put under democratic scrutiny through the
exercise of this fundamental right. Although the ratification of this Treaty was
unsuccessful in France and the Netherlands, a further attempt to extend FOI
protection remains absolutely necessary since it is an effective way to ensure that any
future European integration takes place subject to public scrutiny. As regards the
beneficiaries of freedom of information, under the proposal, this right is reserved to
any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its
registered office in a Member State. This wording is exactly the same as that in
Article 255 EC. Article 2(2) of the 2001 Regulation states that the Council, the
Commission, and the Parliament may "grant access to documents to any natural or
legal person not residing or not having its registered office in a Member State". The
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Council and the Commission amended their Rules of Procedure to extend this right
to all natural and legal persons, while the Parliament makes their decisions on a
non-discriminatory basis. These achievements should be reflected in the Regulation.
Articles 1-50, 11-102, III-399 of the Constitutional Treaty were designed to
extend the scope of EU FOI protection but it made no attempt to improve the way
this right is guaranteed. This study focuses on strengthening the role of
proportionality in this area to elevate the level of FOI protection. We believe that our
proposal will help secure this right, but the approach of the five institutions and
presumably other EU agencies towards proportionality will continue to be decisive.
It is doubtful whether the Commission, Council, and Parliament will work together
to introduce this principle into the 2001 Regulation, because it operates to prevent
the institutions from making excessively broad interpretations of the exceptions set
out in this legislation.
Even if such a provision were to be introduced this would not necessarily ensure
that the three institutions, in particular the Council and Commission, would never
misinterpret the exemptions. However, with an explicit provision on proportionality,
we can expect the Court and the Ombudsman to play more active roles in this area.
As the proposed provision requires that (A) the proportionality test should be applied
when any of the exceptions set out in the Regulation are invoked, and (B) the way
this test is applied shall be expressly indicated in the refusal, the Court and the
Ombudsman will have clear guidelines to follow when assessing the legality of
refusals. In addition, were this proposal to be accepted by the EU legislator, we
believe that the Court would apply an intensive form of proportionality review of
future FOI disputes because the judges have done so previously in the FOI area and
when protecting other individual rights.
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APPENDIX
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30
May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission
documents
Official Journal L 145, 31/05/2001 P. 0043 - 0048
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and
Commission documents
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular
Article 255(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission(l),
Acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty(2),
Whereas:
(1) The second subparagraph ofArticle 1 of the Treaty on European Union enshrines
the concept of openness, stating that the Treaty marks a new stage in the process of
creating an ever closer union among the peoples ofEurope, in which decisions are
taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen.
(2) Openness enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making
process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more
effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system. Openness
contributes to strengthening the principles of democracy and respect for fundamental
rights as laid down in Article 6 of the EU Treaty and in the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union.
(3) The conclusions of the European Council meetings held at Birmingham,
Edinburgh and Copenhagen stressed the need to introduce greater transparency into
the work of the Union institutions. This Regulation consolidates the initiatives that
the institutions have already taken with a view to improving the transparency of the
decision-making process.
(4) The purpose of this Regulation is to give the fullest possible effect to the right of
public access to documents and to lay down the general principles and limits on such
access in accordance with Article 255(2) of the EC Treaty.
(5) Since the question of access to documents is not covered by provisions of the
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and the Treaty
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, the European Parliament, the
Council and the Commission should, in accordance with Declaration No 41 attached
to the Final Act of the Treaty ofAmsterdam, draw guidance from this Regulation as
regards documents concerning the activities covered by those two Treaties.
(6) Wider access should be granted to documents in cases where the institutions are
acting in their legislative capacity, including under delegated powers, while at the
same time preserving the effectiveness of the institutions' decision-making process.
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Such documents should be made directly accessible to the greatest possible extent.
(7) In accordance with Articles 28(1) and 41(1) of the EU Treaty, the right of access
also applies to documents relating to the common foreign and security policy and to
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Each institution should respect its
security rules.
(8) In order to ensure the full application of this Regulation to all activities of the
Union, all agencies established by the institutions should apply the principles laid
down in this Regulation.
(9) On account of their highly sensitive content, certain documents should be given
special treatment. Arrangements for informing the European Parliament of the
content of such documents should be made through interinstitutional agreement.
(10) In order to bring about greater openness in the work of the institutions, access to
documents should be granted by the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission not only to documents drawn up by the institutions, but also to
documents received by them. In this context, it is recalled that Declaration No 35
attached to the Final Act of the Treaty ofAmsterdam provides that a Member State
may request the Commission or the Council not to communicate to third parties a
document originating from that State without its prior agreement.
(11) In principle, all documents of the institutions should be accessible to the public.
However, certain public and private interests should be protected by way of
exceptions. The institutions should be entitled to protect their internal consultations
and deliberations where necessary to safeguard their ability to carry out their tasks.
In assessing the exceptions, the institutions should take account of the principles in
Community legislation concerning the protection of personal data, in all areas of
Union activities.
(12) All rules concerning access to documents of the institutions should be in
conformity with this Regulation.
(13) In order to ensure that the right of access is fully respected, a two-stage
administrative procedure should apply, with the additional possibility of court
proceedings or complaints to the Ombudsman.
(14) Each institution should take the measures necessary to inform the public of the
new provisions in force and to train its staff to assist citizens exercising their rights
under this Regulation. In order to make it easier for citizens to exercise their rights,
each institution should provide access to a register of documents.
(15) Even though it is neither the object nor the effect of this Regulation to amend
national legislation on access to documents, it is nevertheless clear that, by virtue of
the principle of loyal cooperation which governs relations between the institutions
and the Member States, Member States should take care not to hamper the proper
application of this Regulation and should respect the security rules of the institutions.
(16) This Regulation is without prejudice to existing rights of access to documents
for Member States, judicial authorities or investigative bodies.
(17) In accordance with Article 255(3) of the EC Treaty, each institution lays down
specific provisions regarding access to its documents in its rules of procedure.
Council Decision 93/731/EC of 20 December 1993 on public access to Council
documents(3), Commission Decision 94/90/ECSC, EC, Euratom of 8 February 1994
on public access to Commission documents(4), European Parliament Decision
97/632/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 10 July 1997 on public access to European
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Parliament documents(5), and the rules on confidentiality of Schengen documents
should therefore, if necessary, be modified or be repealed,
HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article 1
Purpose
The purpose of this Regulation is:
(a) to define the principles, conditions and limits on grounds of public or private
interest governing the right of access to European Parliament, Council and
Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the institutions") documents provided for in
Article 255 of the EC Treaty in such a way as to ensure the widest possible access to
documents,
(b) to establish rules ensuring the easiest possible exercise of this right, and
(c) to promote good administrative practice on access to documents.
Article 2
Beneficiaries and scope
1. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its
registered office in a Member State, has a right of access to documents of the
institutions, subject to the principles, conditions and limits defined in this Regulation.
2. The institutions may, subject to the same principles, conditions and limits, grant
access to documents to any natural or legal person not residing or not having its
registered office in a Member State.
3. This Regulation shall apply to all documents held by an institution, that is to say,
documents drawn up or received by it and in its possession, in all areas of activity of
the European Union.
4. Without prejudice to Articles 4 and 9, documents shall be made accessible to the
public either following a written application or directly in electronic form or through
a register. In particular, documents drawn up or received in the course of a legislative
procedure shall be made directly accessible in accordance with Article 12.
5. Sensitive documents as defined in Article 9(1) shall be subject to special treatment
in accordance with that Article.
6. This Regulation shall be without prejudice to rights ofpublic access to documents
held by the institutions which might follow from instruments of international law or
acts of the institutions implementing them.
Article 3
Definitions
For the purpose of this Regulation:
(a) "document" shall mean any content whatever its medium (written on paper or
stored in electronic form or as a sound, visual or audiovisual recording) concerning a
matter relating to the policies, activities and decisions falling within the institution's
sphere of responsibility;
(b) "third party" shall mean any natural or legal person, or any entity outside the
institution concerned, including the Member States, other Community or non-




1. The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would
undermine the protection of:
(a) the public interest as regards:
- public security,
- defence and military matters,
- international relations,
- the financial, monetary or economic policy of the Community or a Member State;
(b) privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with
Community legislation regarding the protection of personal data.
2. The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would
undermine the protection of:
- commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual property,
- court proceedings and legal advice,
- the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits,
unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.
3. Access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by an
institution, which relates to a matter where the decision has not been taken by the
institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine
the institution's decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest
in disclosure.
Access to a document containing opinions for internal use as part of deliberations
and preliminary consultations within the institution concerned shall be refused even
after the decision has been taken if disclosure of the document would seriously
undermine the institution's decision-making process, unless there is an overriding
public interest in disclosure.
4. As regards third-party documents, the institution shall consult the third party with
a view to assessing whether an exception in paragraph 1 or 2 is applicable, unless it
is clear that the document shall or shall not be disclosed.
5. A Member State may request the institution not to disclose a document originating
from that Member State without its prior agreement.
6. If only parts of the requested document are covered by any of the exceptions, the
remaining parts of the document shall be released.
7. The exceptions as laid down in paragraphs 1 to 3 shall only apply for the period
during which protection is justified on the basis of the content of the document. The
exceptions may apply for a maximum period of 30 years. In the case of documents
covered by the exceptions relating to privacy or commercial interests and in the case
of sensitive documents, the exceptions may, if necessary, continue to apply after this
period.
Article 5
Documents in the Member States
Where a Member State receives a request for a document in its possession,
originating from an institution, unless it is clear that the document shall or shall not
be disclosed, the Member State shall consult with the institution concerned in order
to take a decision that does not jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this
Regulation.
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The Member State may instead refer the request to the institution.
Article 6
Applications
1. Applications for access to a document shall be made in any written form,
including electronic form, in one of the languages referred to in Article 314 of the
EC Treaty and in a sufficiently precise manner to enable the institution to identify the
document. The applicant is not obliged to state reasons for the application.
2. If an application is not sufficiently precise, the institution shall ask the applicant to
clarify the application and shall assist the applicant in doing so, for example, by
providing information on the use of the public registers of documents.
3. In the event of an application relating to a very long document or to a very large
number of documents, the institution concerned may confer with the applicant
informally, with a view to finding a fair solution.
4. The institutions shall provide information and assistance to citizens on how and
where applications for access to documents can be made.
Article 7
Processing of initial applications
1. An application for access to a document shall be handled promptly. An
acknowledgement of receipt shall be sent to the applicant. Within 15 working days
from registration of the application, the institution shall either grant access to the
document requested and provide access in accordance with Article 10 within that
period or, in a written reply, state the reasons for the total or partial refusal and
inform the applicant of his or her right to make a confirmatory application in
accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article.
2. In the event of a total or partial refusal, the applicant may, within 15 working days
of receiving the institution's reply, make a confirmatory application asking the
institution to reconsider its position.
3. In exceptional cases, for example in the event of an application relating to a very
long document or to a very large number of documents, the time-limit provided for in
paragraph 1 may be extended by 15 working days, provided that the applicant is
notified in advance and that detailed reasons are given.
4. Failure by the institution to reply within the prescribed time-limit shall entitle the
applicant to make a confirmatory application.
Article 8
Processing of confirmatory applications
1. A confirmatory application shall be handled promptly. Within 15 working days
from registration of such an application, the institution shall either grant access to the
document requested and provide access in accordance with Article 10 within that
period or, in a written reply, state the reasons for the total or partial refusal. In the
event of a total or partial refusal, the institution shall inform the applicant of the
remedies open to him or her, namely instituting court proceedings against the
institution and/or making a complaint to the Ombudsman, under the conditions laid
down in Articles 230 and 195 of the EC Treaty, respectively.
2. In exceptional cases, for example in the event of an application relating to a very
long document or to a very large number of documents, the time limit provided for in
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paragraph 1 may be extended by 15 working days, provided that the applicant is
notified in advance and that detailed reasons are given.
3. Failure by the institution to reply within the prescribed time limit shall be
considered as a negative reply and entitle the applicant to institute court proceedings
against the institution and/or make a complaint to the Ombudsman, under the
relevant provisions of the EC Treaty.
Article 9
Treatment of sensitive documents
1. Sensitive documents are documents originating from the institutions or the
agencies established by them, from Member States, third countries or International
Organisations, classified as "TRES SECRET/TOP SECRET", "SECRET" or
"CONFIDENTIEL" in accordance with the rules of the institution concerned, which
protect essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of its Member
States in the areas covered by Article 4(1 )(a), notably public security, defence and
military matters.
2. Applications for access to sensitive documents under the procedures laid down in
Articles 7 and 8 shall be handled only by those persons who have a right to acquaint
themselves with those documents. These persons shall also, without prejudice to
Article 11(2), assess which references to sensitive documents could be made in the
public register.
3. Sensitive documents shall be recorded in the register or released only with the
consent of the originator.
4. An institution which decides to refuse access to a sensitive document shall give the
reasons for its decision in a manner which does not harm the interests protected in
Article 4.
5. Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that when handling
applications for sensitive documents the principles in this Article and Article 4 are
respected.
6. The rules of the institutions concerning sensitive documents shall be made public.
7. The Commission and the Council shall inform the European Parliament regarding
sensitive documents in accordance with arrangements agreed between the institutions.
Article 10
Access following an application
1. The applicant shall have access to documents either by consulting them on the spot
or by receiving a copy, including, where available, an electronic copy, according to
the applicant's preference. The cost ofproducing and sending copies may be charged
to the applicant. This charge shall not exceed the real cost of producing and sending
the copies. Consultation on the spot, copies of less than 20 A4 pages and direct
access in electronic form or through the register shall be free of charge.
2. If a document has already been released by the institution concerned and is easily
accessible to the applicant, the institution may fulfil its obligation of granting access
to documents by informing the applicant how to obtain the requested document.
3. Documents shall be supplied in an existing version and format (including
electronically or in an alternative format such as Braille, large print or tape) with full




1. To make citizens' rights under this Regulation effective, each institution shall
provide public access to a register of documents. Access to the register should be
provided in electronic form. References to documents shall be recorded in the
register without delay.
2. For each document the register shall contain a reference number (including, where
applicable, the interinstitutional reference), the subject matter and/or a short
description of the content of the document and the date on which it was received or
drawn up and recorded in the register. References shall be made in a manner which
does not undermine protection of the interests in Article 4.
3. The institutions shall immediately take the measures necessary to establish a
register which shall be operational by 3 June 2002.
Article 12
Direct access in electronic form or through a register
1. The institutions shall as far as possible make documents directly accessible to the
public in electronic form or through a register in accordance with the rules of the
institution concerned.
2. In particular, legislative documents, that is to say, documents drawn up or received
in the course ofprocedures for the adoption of acts which are legally binding in or
for the Member States, should, subject to Articles 4 and 9, be made directly
accessible.
3. Where possible, other documents, notably documents relating to the development
ofpolicy or strategy, should be made directly accessible.
4. Where direct access is not given through the register, the register shall as far as
possible indicate where the document is located.
Article 13
Publication in the Official Journal
1. In addition to the acts referred to in Article 254(1) and (2) of the EC Treaty and
the first paragraph ofArticle 163 of the Euratom Treaty, the following documents
shall, subject to Articles 4 and 9 of this Regulation, be published in the Official
Journal:
(a) Commission proposals;
(b) common positions adopted by the Council in accordance with the procedures
referred to in Articles 251 and 252 of the EC Treaty and the reasons underlying those
common positions, as well as the European Parliament's positions in these
procedures;
(c) framework decisions and decisions referred to in Article 34(2) of the EU Treaty;
(d) conventions established by the Council in accordance with Article 34(2) of the
EU Treaty;
(e) conventions signed between Member States on the basis ofArticle 293 of the EC
Treaty;
(f) international agreements concluded by the Community or in accordance with
Article 24 of the EU Treaty.
2. As far as possible, the following documents shall be published in the Official
Journal:
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(a) initiatives presented to the Council by a Member State pursuant to Article 67(1)
of the EC Treaty or pursuant to Article 34(2) of the EU Treaty;
(b) common positions referred to in Article 34(2) of the EU Treaty;
(c) directives other than those referred to in Article 254(1) and (2) of the EC Treaty,
decisions other than those referred to in Article 254(1) of the EC Treaty,
recommendations and opinions.
3. Each institution may in its rules ofprocedure establish which further documents
shall be published in the Official Journal.
Article 14
Information
1. Each institution shall take the requisite measures to inform the public of the rights
they enjoy under this Regulation.
2. The Member States shall cooperate with the institutions in providing information
to the citizens.
Article 15
Administrative practice in the institutions
1. The institutions shall develop good administrative practices in order to facilitate
the exercise of the right of access guaranteed by this Regulation.
2. The institutions shall establish an interinstitutional committee to examine best




This Regulation shall be without prejudice to any existing rules on copyright which
may limit a third party's right to reproduce or exploit released documents.
Article 17
Reports
1. Each institution shall publish annually a report for the preceding year including the
number of cases in which the institution refused to grant access to documents, the
reasons for such refusals and the number of sensitive documents not recorded in the
register.
2. At the latest by 31 January 2004, the Commission shall publish a report on the
implementation of the principles of this Regulation and shall make recommendations,
including, if appropriate, proposals for the revision of this Regulation and an action
programme ofmeasures to be taken by the institutions.
Article 18
Application measures
1. Each institution shall adapt its rules of procedure to the provisions of this
Regulation. The adaptations shall take effect from 3 December 2001.
2. Within six months of the entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall
examine the conformity ofCouncil Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 354/83 of 1
February 1983 concerning the opening to the public of the historical archives of the
European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (6)
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with this Regulation in order to ensure the preservation and archiving of documents
to the fullest extent possible.
3. Within six months of the entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall




This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following that of its
publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
It shall be applicable from 3 December 2001.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member
States.
Done at Brussels, 30 May 2001.
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